Studies in History and Philosophy of Science最新文献

Misconceptions created about Semmelweis's reasoning by the instrumental use of his work by philosophers of science 科学哲学家们对塞梅尔威斯的推理进行了工具性的使用，从而产生了对他的推理的误解。

IF 1.3 2区哲学

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-10-01 Epub Date: 2026-09-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102233

Nicholas Kadar

{"title":"Misconceptions created about Semmelweis's reasoning by the instrumental use of his work by philosophers of science","authors":"Nicholas Kadar","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102233","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102233","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Philosophers of science have frequently used Semmelweis's work on childbed fever (CBF) as a case study to illustrate theories of scientific discovery and confirmation. However, the accounts of Semmelweis's work published in the philosophy of science literature are in many respect inconsistent with the account that Semmelweis gave of his own inferences and reasoning and are silent on how Semmelweis came to conclude that CBF was a form of pyaemia caused by the introduction of decaying animal-organic matter into the blood stream and why he accepted that the introduction of decomposed matter into the blood stream caused CBF. This has created serious misconceptions about Semmelweis's reasoning and conclusions. The purpose of this article is to correct these misconceptions by presenting a detailed textual exegesis of Semmelweis's own account of how he came to his conclusions, and to answer fundamental questions about the differences between the present account of Semmelweis's work and those published in the philosophy of science literature, namely, whether methodological differences in how the respective accounts were constructed explain the differences, and which account philosophers should accept and on what basis.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102233"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149070411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

IBE can masquerade as enumerative induction in the confirmation of mathematical conjectures—A case study: Gauss's AGM conjecture 在证实数学猜想时，IBE可以伪装成枚举归纳法——以高斯的AGM猜想为例。

IF 1.3 2区哲学

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-10-01 Epub Date: 2026-09-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102223

Marc Lange

引用次数: 0

Thinking about selective mechanisms in evolutionary biology 思考进化生物学中的选择机制。

IF 1.3 2区哲学

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-10-01 Epub Date: 2026-09-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102236

Ciprian Jeler

引用次数: 0

Pursuitworthiness in science 对科学的追求。

IF 1.3 2区哲学

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-10-01 Epub Date: 2026-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102195

Jamie Shaw, Dunja Šešelja

引用次数: 0

The precision fallacy: On the futility of preference purification 精确性谬误：论偏好净化的无效性

IF 1.8 2区哲学

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-03-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102131

Johanna Thoma

引用次数: 0

Psychology and the 20th-century Galileo cult: Kurt Lewin vs. Karl Bühler 心理学与20世纪伽利略崇拜：库尔特·列文vs.卡尔·<s:1>赫勒。

IF 1.8 2区哲学

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-03-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102130

James McElvenny, Clemens Knobloch

引用次数: 0

Isaac Newton, Interdisciplinarian: Newton's cross-domain evidential reasoning 艾萨克·牛顿，跨学科：牛顿的跨领域证据推理。

IF 1.8 2区哲学

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-06-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102154

Brendan Fleig-Goldstein

{"title":"Isaac Newton, Interdisciplinarian: Newton's cross-domain evidential reasoning","authors":"Brendan Fleig-Goldstein","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102154","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102154","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper argues that Newton employed a non-hypothetical method of evidential reasoning called demonstrative induction in his chronological studies. In demonstrative induction, inductive risk is confined to the premises, and the secureness of the conclusion depends on the secureness of those premises. I show that Newton's approach to chronology exemplifies two key restrictions on demonstrative induction: (i) premises must themselves be supported by demonstrative induction or by inductive generalizations, and (ii) inductive risk should be confined to premises drawn from domains of inquiry whose claims are better established, thereby “exporting” inductive risk to more certain domains. Drawing on Newton's use of sources from history, biology, social science, and astronomy, I analyze how he transformed data from these fields into evidence for his chronological scheme. The strategy of exporting inductive risk, I argue, reveals a common evidential pattern across his natural-philosophical, historical, and theological work, and sheds light on the deeper methodological unity that underlies his otherwise disparate intellectual pursuits.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102154"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148158804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A phenomenological approach to quantum mechanics — The London-Bauer-French interpretation 量子力学的现象学方法——伦敦-鲍尔-法伦解释。

IF 1.8 2区哲学

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-05-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102161

Philipp Berghofer , Harald Wiltsche

引用次数: 0

Lessons for human science measurement from the quantification of earthquake size 地震震级量化对人类科学测量的启示。

IF 1.8 2区哲学

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-03-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102132

Cristian Larroulet Philippi , Miguel Ohnesorge

{"title":"Lessons for human science measurement from the quantification of earthquake size","authors":"Cristian Larroulet Philippi , Miguel Ohnesorge","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102132","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102132","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>It remains controversial whether the human sciences can quantify the phenomena they study. The feasibility of quantification is usually assessed by identifying similarities and differences to quantitative measurement in physics. We argue that the case studies used to exemplify physical measurement are not sufficiently representative to underwrite such assessments. We substantiate this thesis by reconstructing how seismologists quantified “earthquake size.” Seismology demonstrates that quantification can succeed under conditions that, on the one hand, differ from canonical case studies and, on the other, resemble those of the human sciences in relevant respects—seismologists study phenomena that are not amenable to significant experimental control and that cannot be isolated from complex background conditions. This allows us to refute an influential argument for the impossibility of human science quantification, which turns on the claim that experimental control is a necessary condition for quantification (Trendler, 2009). Finally, we draw constructive lessons for the human sciences from the method that seismologists Charles Richter and Beno Gutenberg used to quantify earthquake size. That method starts by introducing (approximate and circumscribed) “placeholder” scales, which can then be extended and revised to account for inevitable disturbing factors in the measurement process. We use this method to identify promising developments but also continued shortcomings in a noteworthy effort at quantification: the Lexile measure of reading comprehension.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102132"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147373386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Emergent causal novelty. From early emergentism to the contemporary debate 突发因果新颖性。从早期的萌芽到当代的争论

IF 1.8 2区哲学

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102103

Erica Onnis

{"title":"Emergent causal novelty. From early emergentism to the contemporary debate","authors":"Erica Onnis","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102103","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102103","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Among metaphysicians, philosophers of science, and scientists, emergent phenomena are usually considered entities that depend on lower-level goings-on while maintaining some autonomy and manifesting some novelty in relation to them. Yet, understanding these features more precisely is an open problem. In this paper, I focus on emergent novelty. In the contemporary debate, this feature has been steadily interpreted in causal terms, and this causal interpretation has often been developed in a power-based framework. Moreover, several authors who played important roles in reintroducing this interpretation in the contemporary debate traced it back to the so-called “British Emergentists”. This paper aims to show that this alleged inheritance should be carefully reassessed. On the one hand, at least some of the early emergentists (John Stuart Mill, Conwy Lloyd Morgan, and Samuel Alexander) did not attach tremendous importance to causal efficacy compared to other forms of emergent novelty that I suggest calling “qualitative”. On the other hand, while contemporary accounts of emergence are prevalently outlined within a non-Humean metaphysical framework in which talk of powers is pertinent, at least some of the early emergentists were prevalently Humean in relation to causality, and explicitly rejected talk of powers or causal properties. Moreover, both Alexander and Lloyd Morgan recognised at least another form of causal efficacy associated with what the former called “Nisus”. This paper suggests that acknowledging and recovering these pluralist views about novelty and causation, besides representing a more accurate reading of early emergentism, would allow for the formulation of better and more comprehensive models of emergence.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102103"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145950329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0