{"title":"The precision fallacy: On the futility of preference purification","authors":"Johanna Thoma","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102131","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102131","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The standard theory of choice in economics involves modelling human agents as if they had precise attitudes when in fact they are often fuzzy. For the normative purposes of welfare economics, it might be thought that the imposition of a precise framework is nevertheless well justified: If we think the standard theory is normatively correct, and therefore that agents ought to be in this sense precise, then doesn’t it follow that their true welfare can be measured precisely? I will argue that this thought, central to the preference purification project in behavioural welfare economics, commits a fallacy. The standard theory requires agents to adopt precise preferences; but neither the theory nor a fuzzy agent’s initial attitudes may determine a particular way in which she ought to precisify them. So before actually having precisified her preferences, the welfare of fuzzy agents may remain indeterminate. I go on to consider the implications of this fallacy for welfare economics.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102131"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147388169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Psychology and the 20th-century Galileo cult: Kurt Lewin vs. Karl Bühler","authors":"James McElvenny, Clemens Knobloch","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102130","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102130","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In his writings on the philosophy of science, the German-American psychologist Kurt Lewin (1890–1947) constantly claimed that his approach to psychology was characterised by the modern ‘Galilean’ mode of thought, as opposed to the medieval ‘Aristotelian’ mode of thought of the rest of the field. In this paper, we examine what Lewin meant by this opposition and how it fits into the disciplinary discourse of psychology and philosophy of science in the first half of the 20th century. We show that Lewin was one of the earliest figures to raise Galileo up to cult status as the pioneer of modern scientific thought: Lewin's invocation of Galileo predates that of Husserl and Koyré, who are often seen as the originators of the 20th-century image of Galileo. We also show that Lewin's opposition of ‘Galilean’ and ‘Aristotelian’ thought was a move in controversies of the time about the ‘crisis of psychology’, and that Lewin intended his opposition above all as an attack on his rival Karl Bühler (1879–1963).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102130"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147373389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lessons for human science measurement from the quantification of earthquake size","authors":"Cristian Larroulet Philippi , Miguel Ohnesorge","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102132","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102132","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>It remains controversial whether the human sciences can quantify the phenomena they study. The feasibility of quantification is usually assessed by identifying similarities and differences to quantitative measurement in physics. We argue that the case studies used to exemplify physical measurement are not sufficiently representative to underwrite such assessments. We substantiate this thesis by reconstructing how seismologists quantified “earthquake size.” Seismology demonstrates that quantification can succeed under conditions that, on the one hand, differ from canonical case studies and, on the other, resemble those of the human sciences in relevant respects—seismologists study phenomena that are not amenable to significant experimental control and that cannot be isolated from complex background conditions. This allows us to refute an influential argument for the impossibility of human science quantification, which turns on the claim that experimental control is a necessary condition for quantification (Trendler, 2009). Finally, we draw constructive lessons for the human sciences from the method that seismologists Charles Richter and Beno Gutenberg used to quantify earthquake size. That method starts by introducing (approximate and circumscribed) “placeholder” scales, which can then be extended and revised to account for inevitable disturbing factors in the measurement process. We use this method to identify promising developments but also continued shortcomings in a noteworthy effort at quantification: the Lexile measure of reading comprehension.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 102132"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147373386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Emergent causal novelty. From early emergentism to the contemporary debate","authors":"Erica Onnis","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102103","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102103","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Among metaphysicians, philosophers of science, and scientists, emergent phenomena are usually considered entities that depend on lower-level goings-on while maintaining some autonomy and manifesting some novelty in relation to them. Yet, understanding these features more precisely is an open problem. In this paper, I focus on emergent novelty. In the contemporary debate, this feature has been steadily interpreted in causal terms, and this causal interpretation has often been developed in a power-based framework. Moreover, several authors who played important roles in reintroducing this interpretation in the contemporary debate traced it back to the so-called “British Emergentists”. This paper aims to show that this alleged inheritance should be carefully reassessed. On the one hand, at least some of the early emergentists (John Stuart Mill, Conwy Lloyd Morgan, and Samuel Alexander) did not attach tremendous importance to causal efficacy compared to other forms of emergent novelty that I suggest calling “qualitative”. On the other hand, while contemporary accounts of emergence are prevalently outlined within a non-Humean metaphysical framework in which talk of powers is pertinent, at least some of the early emergentists were prevalently Humean in relation to causality, and explicitly rejected talk of powers or causal properties. Moreover, both Alexander and Lloyd Morgan recognised at least another form of causal efficacy associated with what the former called “Nisus”. This paper suggests that acknowledging and recovering these pluralist views about novelty and causation, besides representing a more accurate reading of early emergentism, would allow for the formulation of better and more comprehensive models of emergence.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102103"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145950329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Of atoms, bricks and cells: A historical critique of historical criticisms of classical cell theory","authors":"Ariane Dröscher","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102124","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102124","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The essay argues against historical accounts that portray classical cell theory as having established an atomistic and/or building block vision of life and hence as being diametrically opposed to the organismic standpoint. The cell-atom analogy came up in the mid-nineteenth century as a rhetorical creation <em>against</em> cell theory. Yet, the historical fact that opponents, such as Thomas Huxley, Adam Sedgwick, and Charles Otis Whitman interpreted and rejected cell theory as an atomistic theory does not mean that it actually was an atomistic theory. Nevertheless, their criticisms passed from one critic to the next over a considerable period and continue to influence present-day ideas about a supposedly reductionist cell theory. A look into the original texts of some protagonists of early cell theory, such as Matthias Schleiden, Theodor Schwann, Franz Unger, Albert von Koelliker, and Rudolf Virchow, shows that no one defended such a view. On the contrary, they explicitly spoke against any form of cell–atom or cell–building block analogy. Nor did they consider cells as completely independent and interchangeable units, or organisms as mere cell aggregates. I demonstrate that their views of cells and their role in vital organization were more complex, more uncertain and more hypothetical than their critics have admitted.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102124"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146079723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Proto-externalist analyses of Darwinism in Polish philosophy at turn of 19th century: How disputes of A. Chałupczyński and B. Dybowski anticipated later controversies among historians of biology","authors":"Michał Jakub Wagner","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102111","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102111","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article revises the genealogy of “externalism” in Darwin studies by foregrounding two nineteenth-century Polish figures – Adam Chałupczyński and Benedykt Dybowski. Against the usual line from Marxism, pragmatism, and sociology of science, it shows that Marx/Engels and C. S. Peirce criticized Social Darwinism and reception dynamics rather than reducing Darwin's theory to capitalist ideology. Chałupczyński offers an explicit non-Marxist/pragmatist externalism: reading natural selection as an expression of British imperial capitalism and proposing a cooperation-cantered, pacifist evolutionism shaped by Polish nation-building ambitions. Dybowski anticipates “essentialist story” of J. Dewey and E. Mayr by attacking “mutational” (typological) thinking and tying resistance to Darwinism to church authority, idealist philosophy, and social hierarchy. Set alongside Russian and German politicizations of biological discourse, these cases show externalist analyses emerging from diverse East-European contexts. Recovering them complicates the internalism/externalism binary, decouples externalism from a narrow Anglophone lineage, and significantly widens the archive for Darwin-studies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102111"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145981862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Wendy C. Higgins , David M. Kaplan , Alexander J. Gillett , John Sutton , Robert M. Ross
{"title":"Rethinking psychological measurement: Validity potential versus realised validity","authors":"Wendy C. Higgins , David M. Kaplan , Alexander J. Gillett , John Sutton , Robert M. Ross","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102123","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102123","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a concept of validity with a novel feature that we argue can facilitate improved measurement validation practices in the psychological sciences. Following Borsboom and colleagues, our concept of validity is measurement-specific and causal. This contrasts with current guidelines linking validity to the acceptability of both measurement and non-measurement-based interpretations of test scores. Benefits of a measurement-specific concept of validity are that it can make the requirements for valid measurement clearer and make validity claims easier to interpret, which we illustrate by comparing the use of test scores for measurement versus prediction. Our concept of validity also maintains that a causal relationship of sufficient strength from the attribute being measured to the measurement outcomes is necessary and sufficient for valid measurement. This places causal explanations at the centre of the validation process. While causal complexity will make the evaluation of psychological measurements as causal inferences extremely challenging, we describe how the interventionist theory of causation and related work on causal inference can serve as a starting point for addressing this challenge. The novel feature of our concept of validity is that it makes a distinction between the <em>validity potential</em> of measurement procedures <em>in abstracto</em> (e.g., tests) and the <em>realised validity</em> of concrete measurement outcomes (e.g., specific test scores). We describe key benefits of this novel distinction, including its potential to encourage the theoretical refinement of concepts, guide the selection of appropriate measurement procedures for use in research, and increase sample-specific validity evidence reporting.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102123"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146039252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kathryn S. Plaisance , Sara Doody , Chad Gonnerman , Aaron M. McCright
{"title":"Moving beyond anecdotes: An empirical investigation of scientists' and engineers' views about and engagement with philosophy of science","authors":"Kathryn S. Plaisance , Sara Doody , Chad Gonnerman , Aaron M. McCright","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102125","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102125","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Several prominent scientists have publicly expressed negative views about philosophy of science—and philosophy more generally—ranging from declarations that philosophy is dead to assertions that philosophy of science is a waste of time for scientists. Some philosophers of science have responded by defending the relevance of philosophy to scientific practice, illustrating how philosophical concepts, skills, and approaches can help make scientific research more epistemically and ethically sound. Such defenses are often motivated at least in part by claims that many scientists are antagonistic towards philosophy of science. A recent empirical study even suggests that philosophers of science perceive a ‘lack of interest from scientists’ as one of the main barriers to fruitful engagement between the two. These claims raise the question: How widespread <em>are</em> negative views of philosophy of science across the broader scientific community? We empirically investigated this and other research questions with data from a standardized survey administered to a probability-based sample of over 2000 scientists and engineers at 54 universities across Canada and the USA. Our findings indicate that the negative sentiments mentioned above are not representative of the wider scientific community. Many respondents even expressed interest in pursuing research collaborations with philosophers of science. Moreover, a majority of respondents reported having informally engaged with philosophers of science in one way or another. This study demonstrates why it is essential to empirically examine scientists' views rather than generalizing from a few cases, regardless of how prominent they may be.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102125"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146183167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Blindspots of empiricism in the discovery of chaos theory","authors":"Brett Park","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102133","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102133","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Chaos theory is a branch of classical physics, founded in the 1960s-70s, that studies systems whose solutions are sensitively dependent on their initial conditions. For many, it is surprising that chaos theory arrived so late. However, through the work of Henri Poincaré, we know that much of the math of chaos was understood by some 70 years prior. Furthermore, through the writings of Poincaré’s colleagues — Jacques Hadamard and Pierre Duhem — we also see a detailed understanding of the chaos found in his work. They also have explicit reasons of why the math of chaos was to be ignored. It was a strict form of empiricism — positivism — causing them to label chaos as “useless” and “meaningless” mathematics because it was thought to be ungrounded in experience. In this paper, I describe how the empiricist tenets of positivism exiled chaos from physics following Poincaré.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102133"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147367012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Medicine, healthcare and the environment: from the salutogenic approach towards the salutogenic environments","authors":"Laura Menatti","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102115","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102115","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Research in medicine is increasingly calling for greater attention to the importance of the environment and the effects of climate change. In this paper, I propose that the ecological dimension of health and its role in current medicine can be better addressed and its understanding enhanced through the salutogenic approach, first introduced by Aaron Antonovsky. I discuss this approach, and I reframe it to apply it to the study of the health-environment coupling. I do so by introducing the concept of salutogenic environments to provide a comprehensive framework for health that goes beyond disease prevention to understand how environments may foster health and well-being. After a historical and theoretical introduction of the concepts of salutogenesis and pathogenesis, I analyse the role of salutogenic environments, by focusing on their epistemological and practical implications for medical theory and healthcare, with the aim to 1) capture the positive and preventive aspects of the environment as related to health, and 2) clarify the relationship between the pathogenic and positive (salutogenic) aspects of the environment. Integrating the concept of salutogenic environment into medical education and practice can provide healthcare professionals with a more nuanced understanding of environmental impacts on patients’ health. Yet, scientific rigour should be applied to this field to ensure credibility and applicability.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102115"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146020466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}