{"title":"Resisting Newton in provincial France, 1750s-1770s: Opposition from the margins to the Parisian academic community.","authors":"Marco Storni","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.004","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In the eighteenth century, the requirements for participation in scientific life were progressively narrowed, leading to a gradual closure of the community of the learned. This shift was influenced by the dissemination of Newton's natural philosophy across Europe, which catalysed the rejection of previously dominant principles and methods, while heralding the adoption of a new approach, based on mathematics and experimentalism. This paper examines various forms of resistance to the emergence of a community of Newtonian savants in post-1750 France, focusing on institutions and authors located at its margins. First, I analyse the relationship between provincial and central academies through the case study of the Académie des Belles-Lettres de Caen. Here, the persistent opposition to Newton was partly due to cultural conservatism but was also a form of resistance to the centralisation and concentration of expertise, and the resulting homogenisation of practices, promoted by the Paris Academy. Secondly, I examine the opposition to Newton by some authors working outside the academic milieu, who contributed to the \"provincialisation\" of knowledge by addressing a provincial public in their writings. Their aim was not only to engage in a dialogue with the savants of the authoritative institutions, which was almost impossible at the time, but also to appear as polemicists on the public stage, attracting a readership thirsty for scientific perspectives alternative to those considered mainstream.</p>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"109 ","pages":"21-30"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142865995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Not wasted on the young: Childhood, trait complexes & human behavioral ecology.","authors":"Andra Meneganzin, Adrian Currie","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.011","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Hypotheses about the evolution of multi-trait organismal features often encounter trade-offs between the precision and historical relevance of tests performed in actualistic contexts. That is, highly precise tests aimed at discriminating between competing hypotheses often incur a risk of explanatory misalignment with the historical phenomenon they target. We illustrate this via a discussion of the evolution of childhood. We argue childhood is a trait complex, consisting of multiple, diverse components: patterns of growth, feeding strategies, staggered skill acquisition, and social dependence. The potential of their independent evolution bears important consequences for the evolutionary significance of tests probing the adaptive benefits of childhood in contemporary foraging communities. Via 'isolation-testing' such investigations aim for precision at the cost of historical relevance in a potentially serious way. We suggest that integrative investigations relying on the timing and context of components' evolution, emphasizing historical relevance, frame evolutionary hypotheses more reliably than the emphasis on precise tests currently common, thus bearing a higher explanatory potential.</p>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"109 ","pages":"12-20"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142848199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"\"Population\" in biology and statistics.","authors":"Nicola Bertoldi, Charles H Pence","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.014","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The development of a biological notion of \"population\" over the first century of the theory of evolution has been commented upon by a number of historians and philosophers of biology. Somewhat less commonly discussed, however, is the parallel development of the statistical concept of a population over precisely the same period, in some cases driven by the same historical actors (such as Francis Galton and R. A. Fisher). We explore here these parallel developments, first from the perspective of a reconstruction of the historical development of each concept, then with the aid of a digital analysis of a corpus of literature drawn from the journals Biometrika and JournalofGenetics, between 1900 and 1960. These twin analyses show both points of interesting overlap between these two historical trends as well as points of important divergence. The biological and statistical notions of \"population\" seem to be relatively clearly distinguishable over these six decades, in spite of the fact that a number of authors contributed clearly to both traditions. The complex interplay of continuity and discontinuity across these two notions of \"population\" makes them a particularly interesting case study of scientific conceptual change.</p>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"109 ","pages":"1-11"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142824741","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Soft control: Furthering the case for Modified Interventionist Theory","authors":"Toby Friend","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.09.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.09.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Not all testing interventions that we might want to perform, or need to be performable in principle, fail to cause off-path variables. This is a problem for Woodward’s Orthodox Interventionist Theory of causation, but not the ‘Modified Interventionist Theory’, which I proposed in a previous issue of this journal (<span><span>Friend, 2021</span></span>). As I explain here, this is because only the modified theory permits ‘soft control’. I will survey three different kinds of case (beyond the case considered previously) in which soft control is necessary for a reasonable application of interventionism. These include cases where soft control makes intervention more practical, physically possible, and causally probative in the context of mechanisms. I’ll also take the opportunity to remove some of the confusing aspects of my original formulation of the modified theory. The result, I believe, constitutes a strong case for it.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"108 ","pages":"Pages 93-100"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142652329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Explanatory circles","authors":"Isaac Wilhelm","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.09.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.09.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Roughly put, explanatory circles — if any exist — would be propositions such that (i) each explains the next, and (ii) the last explains the first. In this paper, I give two arguments for the view that there are explanatory circles. The first argument appeals to general relativistic worlds in which time is circular. The second argument appeals to special science theories that describe feedback loops. In addition, I show that three standard arguments against explanatory circles are unsuccessful.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"108 ","pages":"Pages 84-92"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142639901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Modus Darwin redux","authors":"Christopher Stephens","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.09.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.09.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>How should we evaluate Darwin and Wallace's arguments for common ancestry over separate ancestry? Elliott Sober defends a likelihood reconstruction of Darwin's reasoning that he dubs <em>modus Darwin</em>: <em>similarity, therefore common ancestry</em>. One assumption of Sober's approach is that separate ancestors have traits that are probabilistically independent. I motivate an objection to this assumption by appeal to 19th century naturalist alternatives such as those of Geoffroy and Owen. On Geoffroy and Owen's separate ancestry models, the ancestors can have traits that are probabilistically dependent. I then prove a generalization of Sober's approach that allows for similarity matching among traits to favour common ancestry over separate ancestry even when the traits of the separate ancestors are probabilistically dependent. I consider Helgeson's recent criticisms of Sober's approach and his alternative interpretation of Darwin's reasoning: <em>more similar, hence, more recent common ancestry</em>. I defend Sober's approach against Helgeson's objections.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"108 ","pages":"Pages 73-83"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142578939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The philosophical coming of age of science. Euler’s role in Cassirer’s early philosophy of space and time","authors":"Marco Giovanelli","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.09.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.09.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Cassirer’s early philosophy of space and time, overshadowed by his later work on relativity, has been scarcely explored in the literature. This paper aims to bridge this gap. It argues that understanding Cassirer’s point of view requires acknowledging the pivotal role he attributed to the work of Leonhard Euler in the philosophical ‘coming of age’ of modern science. Against the Leibniz-Berkeley <em>philosophical</em> plea for the relativity of all motion, Euler objected that if Newton’s absolute space and time did not exist, the principle of inertia would be come meaningless and with it a <em>scientific</em> theory of motion. According to Cassirer, Kant took a step beyond Euler by shifting the focus from the <em>existence</em> of space and time as ‘things’ to their <em>function</em> as necessary ‘conditions’ of the possibility of mechanics. In the nineteenth century, it became clear that Newton’s absolute space and time entail more structure than necessary. Nevertheless, according to Cassirer, the Euler-Kant insight still holds: a geometric structure serving as an inertial structure is the <em>condicio sine qua non</em> of a coherent theory of motion, including general relativity. This paper concludes that Cassirer came close to defending a sort of ‘inertial functionalism’ dressed in neo-Kantian garb.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"108 ","pages":"Pages 55-63"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142441593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Freud, bullshit, and pseudoscience","authors":"Michael T. Michael","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.09.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.09.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper critically examines the validity of Freudian psychoanalysis within the framework of Moberger's characterisation of pseudoscience as bullshit with scientific pretensions. The central question addressed is whether Freudian psychoanalysis qualifies as “bullshit,” following Moberger's guideline of looking for systematic fallacies. The analysis centres on two fundamental critiques against psychoanalysis: one posited by Popper, contending that psychoanalytic interpretation is excessively flexible, and another by Glymour, asserting that Freud's interpretative method baselessly posits associations as causes. This paper argues that both criticisms rest on misunderstandings and asserts that Freudian psychoanalysis does not commit the alleged fallacies. It also offers positive evidence that Freud was not a bullshitter. The conclusion drawn is that psychoanalysis should not be regarded as bullshit, and hence does not qualify as pseudoscience on Moberger's criteria. Consequently, the paper suggests that Freudian psychoanalysis deserves a fairer hearing then many have given it.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"108 ","pages":"Pages 64-72"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142445871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Kant on the logical form of organized being","authors":"Thomas Marré","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.09.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.09.006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"108 ","pages":"Pages 46-54"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142424636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Gauge invariance through gauge fixing","authors":"David Wallace","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.09.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.09.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Phenomena in gauge theory are often described in the physics literature via a specific choice of gauge. In foundational and philosophical discussions this is often criticized as introducing gauge dependence, and contrasted against (often aspirational) “gauge-invariant” descriptions of the physics. I argue, largely in the context of scalar electrodynamics, that this is misguided, and that descriptions of a physical process within a specific gauge are in fact gauge-invariant descriptions. However, most of them are <em>non-local</em> descriptions of that physics, and I suggest that this ought to be the real objection to such descriptions. I explore the unitary gauge as the exception to this nonlocality and consider its strengths and limitations, as well as (more briefly) its extension beyond scalar electrodynamics.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"108 ","pages":"Pages 38-45"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142394692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}