{"title":"Of atoms, bricks and cells: A historical critique of historical criticisms of classical cell theory","authors":"Ariane Dröscher","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102124","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102124","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The essay argues against historical accounts that portray classical cell theory as having established an atomistic and/or building block vision of life and hence as being diametrically opposed to the organismic standpoint. The cell-atom analogy came up in the mid-nineteenth century as a rhetorical creation <em>against</em> cell theory. Yet, the historical fact that opponents, such as Thomas Huxley, Adam Sedgwick, and Charles Otis Whitman interpreted and rejected cell theory as an atomistic theory does not mean that it actually was an atomistic theory. Nevertheless, their criticisms passed from one critic to the next over a considerable period and continue to influence present-day ideas about a supposedly reductionist cell theory. A look into the original texts of some protagonists of early cell theory, such as Matthias Schleiden, Theodor Schwann, Franz Unger, Albert von Koelliker, and Rudolf Virchow, shows that no one defended such a view. On the contrary, they explicitly spoke against any form of cell–atom or cell–building block analogy. Nor did they consider cells as completely independent and interchangeable units, or organisms as mere cell aggregates. I demonstrate that their views of cells and their role in vital organization were more complex, more uncertain and more hypothetical than their critics have admitted.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102124"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146079723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Proto-externalist analyses of Darwinism in Polish philosophy at turn of 19th century: How disputes of A. Chałupczyński and B. Dybowski anticipated later controversies among historians of biology","authors":"Michał Jakub Wagner","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102111","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102111","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article revises the genealogy of “externalism” in Darwin studies by foregrounding two nineteenth-century Polish figures – Adam Chałupczyński and Benedykt Dybowski. Against the usual line from Marxism, pragmatism, and sociology of science, it shows that Marx/Engels and C. S. Peirce criticized Social Darwinism and reception dynamics rather than reducing Darwin's theory to capitalist ideology. Chałupczyński offers an explicit non-Marxist/pragmatist externalism: reading natural selection as an expression of British imperial capitalism and proposing a cooperation-cantered, pacifist evolutionism shaped by Polish nation-building ambitions. Dybowski anticipates “essentialist story” of J. Dewey and E. Mayr by attacking “mutational” (typological) thinking and tying resistance to Darwinism to church authority, idealist philosophy, and social hierarchy. Set alongside Russian and German politicizations of biological discourse, these cases show externalist analyses emerging from diverse East-European contexts. Recovering them complicates the internalism/externalism binary, decouples externalism from a narrow Anglophone lineage, and significantly widens the archive for Darwin-studies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102111"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145981862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Wendy C. Higgins , David M. Kaplan , Alexander J. Gillett , John Sutton , Robert M. Ross
{"title":"Rethinking psychological measurement: Validity potential versus realised validity","authors":"Wendy C. Higgins , David M. Kaplan , Alexander J. Gillett , John Sutton , Robert M. Ross","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102123","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102123","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a concept of validity with a novel feature that we argue can facilitate improved measurement validation practices in the psychological sciences. Following Borsboom and colleagues, our concept of validity is measurement-specific and causal. This contrasts with current guidelines linking validity to the acceptability of both measurement and non-measurement-based interpretations of test scores. Benefits of a measurement-specific concept of validity are that it can make the requirements for valid measurement clearer and make validity claims easier to interpret, which we illustrate by comparing the use of test scores for measurement versus prediction. Our concept of validity also maintains that a causal relationship of sufficient strength from the attribute being measured to the measurement outcomes is necessary and sufficient for valid measurement. This places causal explanations at the centre of the validation process. While causal complexity will make the evaluation of psychological measurements as causal inferences extremely challenging, we describe how the interventionist theory of causation and related work on causal inference can serve as a starting point for addressing this challenge. The novel feature of our concept of validity is that it makes a distinction between the <em>validity potential</em> of measurement procedures <em>in abstracto</em> (e.g., tests) and the <em>realised validity</em> of concrete measurement outcomes (e.g., specific test scores). We describe key benefits of this novel distinction, including its potential to encourage the theoretical refinement of concepts, guide the selection of appropriate measurement procedures for use in research, and increase sample-specific validity evidence reporting.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102123"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146039252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kathryn S. Plaisance , Sara Doody , Chad Gonnerman , Aaron M. McCright
{"title":"Moving beyond anecdotes: An empirical investigation of scientists' and engineers' views about and engagement with philosophy of science","authors":"Kathryn S. Plaisance , Sara Doody , Chad Gonnerman , Aaron M. McCright","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102125","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102125","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Several prominent scientists have publicly expressed negative views about philosophy of science—and philosophy more generally—ranging from declarations that philosophy is dead to assertions that philosophy of science is a waste of time for scientists. Some philosophers of science have responded by defending the relevance of philosophy to scientific practice, illustrating how philosophical concepts, skills, and approaches can help make scientific research more epistemically and ethically sound. Such defenses are often motivated at least in part by claims that many scientists are antagonistic towards philosophy of science. A recent empirical study even suggests that philosophers of science perceive a ‘lack of interest from scientists’ as one of the main barriers to fruitful engagement between the two. These claims raise the question: How widespread <em>are</em> negative views of philosophy of science across the broader scientific community? We empirically investigated this and other research questions with data from a standardized survey administered to a probability-based sample of over 2000 scientists and engineers at 54 universities across Canada and the USA. Our findings indicate that the negative sentiments mentioned above are not representative of the wider scientific community. Many respondents even expressed interest in pursuing research collaborations with philosophers of science. Moreover, a majority of respondents reported having informally engaged with philosophers of science in one way or another. This study demonstrates why it is essential to empirically examine scientists' views rather than generalizing from a few cases, regardless of how prominent they may be.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102125"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146183167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Blindspots of empiricism in the discovery of chaos theory","authors":"Brett Park","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102133","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102133","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Chaos theory is a branch of classical physics, founded in the 1960s-70s, that studies systems whose solutions are sensitively dependent on their initial conditions. For many, it is surprising that chaos theory arrived so late. However, through the work of Henri Poincaré, we know that much of the math of chaos was understood by some 70 years prior. Furthermore, through the writings of Poincaré’s colleagues — Jacques Hadamard and Pierre Duhem — we also see a detailed understanding of the chaos found in his work. They also have explicit reasons of why the math of chaos was to be ignored. It was a strict form of empiricism — positivism — causing them to label chaos as “useless” and “meaningless” mathematics because it was thought to be ungrounded in experience. In this paper, I describe how the empiricist tenets of positivism exiled chaos from physics following Poincaré.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102133"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147367012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Medicine, healthcare and the environment: from the salutogenic approach towards the salutogenic environments","authors":"Laura Menatti","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102115","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102115","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Research in medicine is increasingly calling for greater attention to the importance of the environment and the effects of climate change. In this paper, I propose that the ecological dimension of health and its role in current medicine can be better addressed and its understanding enhanced through the salutogenic approach, first introduced by Aaron Antonovsky. I discuss this approach, and I reframe it to apply it to the study of the health-environment coupling. I do so by introducing the concept of salutogenic environments to provide a comprehensive framework for health that goes beyond disease prevention to understand how environments may foster health and well-being. After a historical and theoretical introduction of the concepts of salutogenesis and pathogenesis, I analyse the role of salutogenic environments, by focusing on their epistemological and practical implications for medical theory and healthcare, with the aim to 1) capture the positive and preventive aspects of the environment as related to health, and 2) clarify the relationship between the pathogenic and positive (salutogenic) aspects of the environment. Integrating the concept of salutogenic environment into medical education and practice can provide healthcare professionals with a more nuanced understanding of environmental impacts on patients’ health. Yet, scientific rigour should be applied to this field to ensure credibility and applicability.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102115"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146020466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stefano Canali, Viola Schiaffonati, Andrea Aliverti
{"title":"Evidence-based medicine and the promises and limits of digital health and wearable technology","authors":"Stefano Canali, Viola Schiaffonati, Andrea Aliverti","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102097","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102097","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>New approaches to biomedical evidence are emerging in relation to innovative technologies and data sources. These include digital health, which promises to revolutionise established paradigms such as Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) and address longstanding criticism from philosophy and beyond. In this paper, we investigate the promises and show the limitations of digital health for the epistemology of medicine. Focusing on a paradigmatic type of digital health technologies – wearable devices – we specify the key epistemic assumptions at the basis of digital health and show their grounding on ideas of internal and external validity that come from EBM and promise to fix its limitations. Hence, digital health is expected to address longstanding issues of EBM and expand and reinforce its paradigm, and yet going in this direction exacerbates and creates concerns for the epistemology of medical evidence, with ethical and social implications too. In observational studies, we show that wearables are used with the assumption of extending EBM approaches to internal validity. Yet new and different issues emerge, leading to complicated trade-offs and concerns about overdetection and high false positive rates. In intervention studies, wearables are used with the assumption of creating a larger and more diverse evidential basis, potentially mitigating concerns about external validity. However, we argue that this can exacerbate and create new issues of representativity. Behind the hype, we thus paint a nuanced picture of the contribution of digital health to EBM and biomedical research and show the need to acknowledge limitations to avoid harmful applications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102097"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146012417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The conceptual evolution of exclusion rules in the DSM: Problems with determining when one diagnosis should rule out another","authors":"Rachel Cooper","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102107","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102107","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>For each mental disorder listed in the <em>Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders</em> (DSM), the classification provides diagnostic criteria which list the symptoms required for diagnosis. Most sets of diagnostic criteria incorporate exclusion criteria, which state that a diagnosis can only be made in the absence of certain other diagnoses (for example, a specific learning disorder can usually only be diagnosed in the absence of intellectual disability). Exclusion criteria make it clear whether diagnoses can be made together or are exclusive. In the absence of such guidelines, diagnoses will not be reliable and the prevalence of conditions cannot be measured. Through tracing the conceptualisation of exclusion criteria across the DSM series, I show that exclusion criteria are necessary, but that determining what they should be has been intractably difficult. The exclusion rules employed by a classification reflect basic ontological and theoretical judgements about the causal structure of psychopathology. Pragmatic judgements also often play a role. As such, exclusion criteria introduce multiple tensions into the DSM system. On the one hand, exclusion criteria are required. On the other hand, the fact that exclusion criteria often rely on theoretical suppositions undermines any claims that the DSM can avoid controversial commitments. At the same time, the role played by pragmatic concerns, which are by nature often context dependent, threatens the employment of the DSM as a multi-purpose classification used world-wide. More fundamentally, difficulties around determining exclusion rules can arise because it is often unclear how mental disorders might be individuated, and such difficulties undermine hopes that the DSM might describe ‘natural kinds’ of disorder.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102107"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145981861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Value-freedom & patient autonomy","authors":"Anke Bueter, Thor Hennelund Nielsen, Somogy Varga","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102129","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102129","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A longstanding debate in philosophy of medicine—whether disease concepts are value-free (naturalism) or value-laden (normativism)—intersects with broader discussions about patient autonomy and the move away from paternalistic practices. An important argument supporting naturalism is the idea that value-freedom is necessary to protect patient autonomy. This paper challenges that view, arguing that autonomy does not require value-freedom. We first demonstrate that prominent theories of personal autonomy do not demand value-freedom but rather a responsible way of dealing with normative judgements. Drawing on parallels to debates on values in science, we distill three strategies for managing non-epistemic values responsibly: transparency, value diversity, and prioritization of appropriate values. Applying these strategies to medicine, we illustrate how value-ladenness can align with patient autonomy when managed appropriately.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102129"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147311742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Interpreting the quantum mechanics of cosmology","authors":"David Wallace","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102101","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102101","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Quantum theory plays an increasingly significant role in contemporary early-universe cosmology, most notably in the inflationary origins of the fluctuation spectrum of the microwave background radiation. I consider the two main strategies for interpreting (as opposed to modifying or supplementing) standard quantum mechanics in the light of cosmology. I argue that the conceptual difficulties of the approaches based around an irreducible role for measurement — already very severe — become intolerable in a cosmological context, whereas the approach based around Everett’s original idea of treating quantum systems as closed systems handles cosmological quantum theory satisfactorily. Contemporary cosmology, which indeed applies standard quantum theory without supplementation or modification, is thus committed — tacitly or explicitly — to the Everett interpretation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 102101"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146031435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}