{"title":"Measurement, decomposition and level-switching in historical science: Geochronology and the ontology of scientific methods","authors":"George Borg","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.013","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.013","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Philosophers of the historical sciences have focused to a significant extent on the problem of epistemic access facing these sciences: how do historical scientists overcome the relative scarcity of data about the past, compared to the present? Solving this problem usually requires solving another one, which I call the ‘problem of ontic access:’ how do historical scientists get access to entities and processes with properties that are potentially informative about the past? The case of geochronology illustrates one solution to this problem: historical scientists can get access to entities and processes with properties that are potentially informative about the past by exploiting the metaphysical structure of their domain. Geochronology experienced a spectacular explosion of its research boundaries in the 20th century. I explain this productivity by analyzing the ontology implicit in geochronological techniques. The productivity of isotope geochronology was based on (a) mereological decomposition in order to (b) exploit differences of properties obtaining between the parts and the whole, and (c) an exceptional complementarity between mass spectrometry and the lower-level properties, allowing application to a wide range of geological contexts. The technologically mediated ability of the scientists to exploit the metaphysical structure of their domain was crucial to their success.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"109 ","pages":"Pages 123-131"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142972949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Believing in organisms: Kant's non-mechanistic philosophy of nature","authors":"Juan Carlos González","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, I defend a non-mechanistic interpretation of Kant's philosophy of nature. My interpretation contradicts the robust tradition of reading Kant as a mechanist about nature – or as someone who endorses the view that we can know the internally purposive causality characteristic of organisms has no place in nature. By attending closely to Kant's remarks about the possibility of internal purposiveness in nature and to key premises from Kant's arguments in the Antinomy of Teleological Judgment, we shall see that it is not only plausible, but preferable, to believe that internally purposive things (i.e., organisms) exist in nature. Making room for such a belief leaves Kant with a philosophy of nature that simultaneously aligns with and surpasses the philosophies of nature offered up by his Early Modern predecessors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"109 ","pages":"Pages 109-119"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142928174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Temperature changes: The conceptual realignment of a quantity term","authors":"Jon Dickinson","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Recently, John McCaskey (2020) has proposed that the arrival of Daniel Fahrenheit's thermometers precipitated the eighteenth-century conceptual change of temperature. I examine the usage of the <em>temperature</em> term in the <em>Philosophical Transactions</em> for this period, leading from the creation of the Fahrenheit thermometer up to the first employment of numerical <em>temperature</em> within the journal, in which temperature is constituted by a numerical value. I identify four strands linking thermometry and meteorology to temperature's conceptual change: the weather data network of James Jurin; the dissemination and acclaim for Fahrenheit thermometers; a resurgence in the usage of <em>temperature</em> in meteorological writing; and both exploratory usage and a broadening of the term's extent as it realigned to thermometry. The realignment of <em>temperature</em> in this period cultivated a conception of temperature whereby it could be constituted by the numerical readings of a thermometer, a sense which had not existed previously. This historical survey demonstrates that a refinement of Joseph LaPorte's (2004) precisification account for conceptual change is required for it to accommodate temperature. I suggest two modifications: a greater potential flexibility in the term's extent, permitting the abandonment of previous senses, and the possibility for tacit conceptual changes that may proceed without stipulation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"109 ","pages":"Pages 47-57"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142899674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mixed mathematics and metaphysical physics: Descartes and the mechanics of the flow of water","authors":"Ovidiu Babeș","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Descartes' systematic physics had little to do with his quantitative accounts of natural phenomena. The former was metaphysical and was concerned with uncovering the causes operating in nature, while the latter dealt with establishing mathematical relations between various natural quantities. I reconstruct a dominant interpretation in recent literature which argues that the two practices are autonomous, and that quantitative problem-solving is normatively subordinated to metaphysical physics. However, a substantial episode of Descartes' practice resists these claims in an interesting way. Descartes' 1643 explanation of the flow of water should be, on the above reading, autonomous from metaphysically grounded physics or matter theory. Yet the explanation had unifying intentions: It is explicitly based on Descartes' laws of motion and considers the material properties of water. Additionally, because quantitative problem-solving should be subordinated to systematic physics, we would expect that Descartes' explanation is coherent with his physics of liquids. However, if we search for such a coherence, the autonomy between the two practices resurfaces as a problem. Even on a charitable reading, the physical features assumed and modelled in the 1643 explanation cannot be accounted for by Descartes' systematic physics. They are simply underdetermined in his natural philosophy. The outcome is that Descartes’ quantitative solution navigated its way around the physical constraints in a creative and opportunistic fashion.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"109 ","pages":"Pages 58-71"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142899691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"","authors":"Staffan Müller-Wille","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"109 ","pages":"Pages 120-122"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143143657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Not wasted on the young: Childhood, trait complexes & human behavioral ecology","authors":"Andra Meneganzin , Adrian Currie","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Hypotheses about the evolution of multi-trait organismal features often encounter trade-offs between the <em>precision</em> and <em>historical relevance</em> of tests performed in actualistic contexts. That is, highly precise tests aimed at discriminating between competing hypotheses often incur a risk of explanatory misalignment with the historical phenomenon they target. We illustrate this via a discussion of the evolution of childhood. We argue childhood is a <em>trait complex</em>, consisting of multiple, diverse components: patterns of growth, feeding strategies, staggered skill acquisition, and social dependence. The potential of their independent evolution bears important consequences for the evolutionary significance of tests probing the adaptive benefits of childhood in contemporary foraging communities. Via ‘isolation-testing’ such investigations aim for precision at the cost of historical relevance in a potentially serious way. We suggest that integrative investigations relying on the timing and context of components' evolution, emphasizing historical relevance, frame evolutionary hypotheses more reliably than the emphasis on precise tests currently common, thus bearing a higher explanatory potential.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"109 ","pages":"Pages 12-20"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142848199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Dual Dynamical Foundation of Orthodox Quantum Mechanics","authors":"Diana Taschetto , Ricardo Correa da Silva","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper combines mathematical, philosophical, and historical analyses in a comprehensive investigation of the dynamical foundations of the formalism of orthodox quantum mechanics. The results obtained include: (i) A deduction of the canonical commutation relations (CCR) from the tenets of Matrix Mechanics; (ii) A discussion of the meaning of Schrödinger’s first derivation of the wave equation that not only improves on Joas and Lehner’s 2009 investigation on the subject, but also demonstrates that the CCR follow of necessity from Schrödinger’s first derivation of the wave equation, thus correcting the common misconception that the CCR were only posited by Schrödinger to pursue equivalence with Matrix Mechanics; (iii) A discussion of the mathematical facts and requirements involved in the equivalence of Matrix and Wave Mechanics that improves on F. A. Muller’s classical treatment of the subject; (iv) A proof that the equivalence of Matrix and Wave Mechanics is necessitated by the formal requirements of a dual action functional from which both the dynamical postulates of orthodox quantum mechanics, von Neumann’s process 1 and process 2, follow; (v) A critical assessment, based on (iii) and (iv), of von Neumann’s construction of unified quantum mechanics over Hilbert space. Point (iv) is our main result. It brings to the open the important, but hitherto ignored, fact that orthodox quantum mechanics is no exception to the golden rule of physics that the dynamics of a physical theory must follow from the action functional. If orthodox quantum mechanics, based as it is on the assumption of the equivalence of Matrix and Wave Mechanics, has this “peculiar dual dynamics,” as von Neumann called it, then this is so because by assuming the equivalence one has been assuming a peculiar dual action.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"109 ","pages":"Pages 89-105"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142903947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“Population” in biology and statistics","authors":"Nicola Bertoldi , Charles H. Pence","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.014","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.12.014","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The development of a biological notion of “population” over the first century of the theory of evolution has been commented upon by a number of historians and philosophers of biology. Somewhat less commonly discussed, however, is the parallel development of the statistical concept of a population over precisely the same period, in some cases driven by the same historical actors (such as Francis Galton and R. A. Fisher). We explore here these parallel developments, first from the perspective of a reconstruction of the historical development of each concept, then with the aid of a digital analysis of a corpus of literature drawn from the journals <em>Biometrika</em> and <em>Journal</em> <em>of</em> <em>Genetics</em>, between 1900 and 1960. These twin analyses show both points of interesting overlap between these two historical trends as well as points of important divergence. The biological and statistical notions of “population” seem to be relatively clearly distinguishable over these six decades, in spite of the fact that a number of authors contributed clearly to both traditions. The complex interplay of continuity and discontinuity across these two notions of “population” makes them a particularly interesting case study of scientific conceptual change.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"109 ","pages":"Pages 1-11"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142824741","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the “direct detection” of gravitational waves","authors":"Jamee Elder","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.01.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.01.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, I provide an account of direct (vs. indirect) detection in gravitational-wave astrophysics. In doing so, I highlight the epistemic considerations that lurk behind existing debates over the application of the term “direct”. According to my analysis, there is an epistemically significant distinction between direct and indirect detections in this context. Roughly, our justification for trusting a direct detection depends mainly on the reliability of instruments that are under our control, rather than on the reliability of our models of separate target systems. In contrast, indirect detections rely on confidence in such models. Overall, this paper solves a puzzle about what counts as a “direct” detection of gravitational waves in a way that is true to scientific usage, and (more importantly) both philosophically precise and epistemically perspicuous. Having done so, this paper provides a foundation for a broader project of analyzing the epistemic situation of (gravitational-wave) astrophysics.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"110 ","pages":"Pages 1-12"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143042961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Soft control: Furthering the case for Modified Interventionist Theory","authors":"Toby Friend","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.09.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.09.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Not all testing interventions that we might want to perform, or need to be performable in principle, fail to cause off-path variables. This is a problem for Woodward’s Orthodox Interventionist Theory of causation, but not the ‘Modified Interventionist Theory’, which I proposed in a previous issue of this journal (<span><span>Friend, 2021</span></span>). As I explain here, this is because only the modified theory permits ‘soft control’. I will survey three different kinds of case (beyond the case considered previously) in which soft control is necessary for a reasonable application of interventionism. These include cases where soft control makes intervention more practical, physically possible, and causally probative in the context of mechanisms. I’ll also take the opportunity to remove some of the confusing aspects of my original formulation of the modified theory. The result, I believe, constitutes a strong case for it.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"108 ","pages":"Pages 93-100"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142652329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}