{"title":"用模拟模型解释","authors":"Matthias Ackermann","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.07.003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Computer simulations are commonly employed when researchers work with analytically intractable or practically unsolvable mathematical modeling equations. In such cases, scientists seem to deal with two different but interrelated kinds of models: a mathematical model and a simulation model. This raises at least two philosophically interesting questions. First, does one or the other model figure centrally in the activity of generating an explanation in such situations? And second, what could an account of explanation involving both mathematical models and simulation models look like? I will argue that, in a large set of cases, the simulation model serves the central role in explanatory discovery. On this basis, I will then present a counterfactual account of simulation model-induced explanation. I claim that on this approach, we often find that the simulation model possesses an explanatory autonomy from its underlying mathematical models and conclude by relating this notion to extant views on the autonomous role of scientific models.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"113 ","pages":"Pages 1-10"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2025-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Explaining with simulation models\",\"authors\":\"Matthias Ackermann\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.07.003\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>Computer simulations are commonly employed when researchers work with analytically intractable or practically unsolvable mathematical modeling equations. In such cases, scientists seem to deal with two different but interrelated kinds of models: a mathematical model and a simulation model. This raises at least two philosophically interesting questions. First, does one or the other model figure centrally in the activity of generating an explanation in such situations? And second, what could an account of explanation involving both mathematical models and simulation models look like? I will argue that, in a large set of cases, the simulation model serves the central role in explanatory discovery. On this basis, I will then present a counterfactual account of simulation model-induced explanation. I claim that on this approach, we often find that the simulation model possesses an explanatory autonomy from its underlying mathematical models and conclude by relating this notion to extant views on the autonomous role of scientific models.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":49467,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science\",\"volume\":\"113 \",\"pages\":\"Pages 1-10\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-07-29\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0039368125000810\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0039368125000810","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Computer simulations are commonly employed when researchers work with analytically intractable or practically unsolvable mathematical modeling equations. In such cases, scientists seem to deal with two different but interrelated kinds of models: a mathematical model and a simulation model. This raises at least two philosophically interesting questions. First, does one or the other model figure centrally in the activity of generating an explanation in such situations? And second, what could an account of explanation involving both mathematical models and simulation models look like? I will argue that, in a large set of cases, the simulation model serves the central role in explanatory discovery. On this basis, I will then present a counterfactual account of simulation model-induced explanation. I claim that on this approach, we often find that the simulation model possesses an explanatory autonomy from its underlying mathematical models and conclude by relating this notion to extant views on the autonomous role of scientific models.
期刊介绍:
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science is devoted to the integrated study of the history, philosophy and sociology of the sciences. The editors encourage contributions both in the long-established areas of the history of the sciences and the philosophy of the sciences and in the topical areas of historiography of the sciences, the sciences in relation to gender, culture and society and the sciences in relation to arts. The Journal is international in scope and content and publishes papers from a wide range of countries and cultural traditions.