Journal of Experimental Social Psychology最新文献

{"title":"How pledges reduce dishonesty: The role of involvement and identification","authors":"Eyal Peer ,&nbsp;Nina Mazar ,&nbsp;Yuval Feldman ,&nbsp;Dan Ariely","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104614","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Authorities and managers often rely on individuals and businesses' self-reports and employ various forms of honesty declarations to ensure that those individuals and businesses do not over-claim payments, benefits, or other resources. While previous work has found that honesty pledges have the potential to decrease dishonesty, effects have been mixed. We argue that understanding and predicting when honesty pledges are effective has been obstructed due to variations in experimental designs and operationalizations of honesty pledges in previous research. Specifically, we focus on the role of whether and how an ex-ante honesty pledge asks individuals to identify (by ID, name, initials) and how much involvement the pledge requires from the individual (low: just reading vs. high: re-typing the text of the pledge). In four pre-registered online studies (<em>N</em> &gt; 5000), we systematically examine these two dimensions of a pledge to find that involvement is often more effective than identification. In addition, low involvement pledges, without any identification, are mostly ineffective. Finally, we find that the effect of a high (vs. low) involvement pledge is relatively more persistent across tasks. Yet, repeating a low involvement pledge across tasks increases its effectiveness and compensates for the lower persistency across tasks. Taken together, these results contribute both to theory by comparing some of the mechanisms possibly underlying honesty pledges as well as to practice by providing guidance to managers and policymakers on how to effectively design pledges to prevent or reduce dishonesty in self-reports.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"113 ","pages":"Article 104614"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140122299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The influence of dominance and prestige on children's resource allocation: What if they coexist?","authors":"Xuran Zhang ,&nbsp;Xia Zhang ,&nbsp;Ranzhi Yang ,&nbsp;Yanfang Li","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104604","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The antagonistic relation between the two ways of reaching the top, i.e., dominance and prestige, has generally been accepted in recent decades. People perceive dominance as a “negative” trait that reduces the quantity of resources that should be allocated to individuals who exhibit such a trait. In contrast, prestige is viewed as a “positive” trait, that increases the appropriate amount of resources for such allocation. However, the situation is somewhat complicated because dominance and prestige can serve as different evaluative dimensions for the same person since that person could be esteemed for their expertise yet simultaneously critiqued to their assertive personality. This article first investigated how children aged 3- to 8-year-old weigh prestige and dominance when those traits coexist within individuals. The results of Study 1 revealed that children exhibited a developmental pattern of resource allocation, progressing from favoring the high-dominance to the low-dominance individual. Their theory of mind capacity predicted their preference for low-dominance individual. One professional prestige situation was also investigated which showed that children stably favor characters with high prestige. Children begin to distinguish between dominance and prestige in resource allocation at approximately 5 years. Study 2 further explored how 5- to 8-year-olds weigh the rewarding high-prestige individuals against compensating low-dominance individuals when these traits clash within the same person, which showed that children at this stage prioritize prestige rather than dominance. Taken together, these findings suggest that children are capable to differentiate between dominance and prestige as two distinct ways when perceiving social ranks.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"113 ","pages":"Article 104604"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140103767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"(Not) showing you feel good, can be bad: The consequences of breaking expressivity norms for positive emotions","authors":"Kunalan Manokara ,&nbsp;Alisa Balabanova ,&nbsp;Mirna Đurić ,&nbsp;Agneta H. Fischer ,&nbsp;Disa A. Sauter","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104600","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104600","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Are there optimal levels of showing one feels good? Examining four positive emotions (<em>gratitude, interest, feeling moved, triumph</em>), we demonstrate in two pre-registered experiments (<em>n</em> = 901) that even for pleasant feelings, showing too much – or too little – can lead to negative social consequences. Expressers who downplay their gratitude, and to a lesser degree interest, are deprived of social contact and power. Restrained displays of feeling moved are also met with reduced contact. For triumph, amplified expressers are socially avoided, yet at the same time, those who downplay their victory are seen to be less powerful. We demonstrate the role of person-perception mechanisms (warmth and competence) as underlying explanators for these effects. Taken together, our findings contribute to the growing literature on the social consequences of emotional expressions, by pointing to divergent outcomes for norm violations relating to different positive emotions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"113 ","pages":"Article 104600"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140013969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Communication increases collaborative corruption","authors":"Mathilde H. Tønnesen ,&nbsp;Christian T. Elbæk ,&nbsp;Stefan Pfattheicher ,&nbsp;Panagiotis Mitkidis","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104603","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Despite being a pivotal aspect of human cooperation, only a few studies within the field of collaborative dishonesty have included communication between participants, and none have yet experimentally compared this to non-communicative contexts. As a result, the impact of communication on unethical collaborations remains unclear. To address this gap, we conducted two well-powered studies (<em>N</em>_{<em>total</em>} = 1187), closely replicating and extending seminal research by Weisel and Shalvi (2015), introducing communication as a manipulated variable within a dyadic cheating task. Across both studies, we found evidence that communication increases the magnitude of cheating—even when coordination on the task is not allowed. Importantly, the effect of communication was linked to a stronger experienced collaboration among the communicating dyads, highlighting that communication is not only key to everyday ethically sound collaborations, but also to corrupt collaborations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 104603"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103124000155/pdfft?md5=1922c040404716bb585e76cd8d717b7f&pid=1-s2.0-S0022103124000155-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139986967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Effort-based decision making in joint action: Evidence of a sense of fairness","authors":"Marcell Székely ,&nbsp;Stephen Butterfill ,&nbsp;John Michael","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104601","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>As humans, we are unique with respect to the flexibility and scope of our cooperative behavior. In recent years, considerable research has been devoted to investigating the psychological mechanisms which support this. One key finding is that people frequently calibrate their effort level to match a cooperation partner's effort costs - although little is known about exactly why they do so. We hypothesized that people calibrate with the ultimate goal of attracting and keeping good collaboration partners, with the proximal psychological motive being a preference for fairness. Across four lab-based, pre-registered experiments (<em>N</em> = 142), we found support for these hypotheses, and distinguished them from plausible alternative explanations, such as the conjecture that people may use their partner's effort costs as information to infer the value of opportunities afforded by their environment, and the conjecture that people may calibrate their effort investment in order to appear competent.</p></div><div><h3>Statement of relevance</h3><p>As humans, we have unique skills and motivations for acting together. Crucially, acting together requires effort and a growing body of empirical work on cooperation and joint action suggests that people calibrate their effort level to match that of a partner's effort costs - although little is known about the mechanisms leading them to do so. Our findings show that people calibrate their effort investment in joint action with the ultimate goal of attracting and keeping good collaboration partners and that the psychological mechanism that drives them to do so is a preference for fairness. These findings provide a valuable addition to existing research on the sense of fairness, providing evidence that the sense of fairness leads people not only to distribute resources according to individual effort costs but to distribute effort costs according to the expected reward distribution as well.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 104601"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103124000131/pdfft?md5=e3506968634ec958912085ac78a2dc36&pid=1-s2.0-S0022103124000131-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139986966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The effect of irrelevant pairings on evaluative responses","authors":"Tal Moran","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104602","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Pairing a neutral object with a valenced stimulus often results in the former acquiring the valence of the latter (i.e., the Evaluative Conditioning [EC] effect). However, the pairing of an object with an affective stimulus is not always indicative of valence similarity. Three preregistered experiments (total <em>N</em> = 1052) explored EC effects when people were explicitly informed that pairings do not reflect valence similarity. In Experiment 1, informing participants that the paired stimuli are unrelated and therefore irrelevant to each other, reduced but did not eliminate EC effects. In Experiment 2, exposure to pairings defined as irrelevant still produced an EC effect, even when participants were asked to resist being influenced by the pairings. In Experiment 3, irrelevant pairings still produced an EC effect, even when alternative diagnostic evaluative information was provided. The results constrain existing theoretical models of EC and suggest that EC effects are robust.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 104602"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139935843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dynamic indirect reciprocity: The influence of personal reputation and group reputation on cooperative behavior in nested social dilemmas","authors":"Xiaoming Wang ,&nbsp;Fancong Kong ,&nbsp;Hongjin Zhu,&nbsp;Yinyan Chen","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104599","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104599","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>The indirect reciprocity theory suggested that the cues of reputational consequences determine the scope of indirect reciprocity and influence whether individuals decide to interact with others regardless of group identity. However, in more complex intergroup environments, there is no clear answer as to how indirect reciprocity guides intergroup cooperation. Based on this, the study used Intergroup Parochial and Universal-Cooperation (IPUC) to construct in-group interaction scenarios and explore the influence of reputation on different cooperative behaviors from both individual and group perspectives. The study found: (1) at the individual level, the influence of personal reputation on different cooperative behaviors is limited by group identity, and ingroup favoritism always exists, supporting the viewpoint of Bounded Generalized Reciprocity; (2) at the group level, group reputation promotes universal cooperation and suppresses parochial cooperation, regardless of group type, consistent with the Unbounded Indirect Reciprocity. The study supported and extended indirect reciprocity theory, providing a reference for understanding </span>group relations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 104599"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139675092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Moral thin-slicing: Forming moral impressions from a brief glance","authors":"Julian De Freitas ,&nbsp;Alon Hafri","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2023.104588","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jesp.2023.104588","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Despite the modern rarity with which people are visual witness to moral transgressions involving physical harm, such transgressions are more accessible than ever thanks to their availability on social media and in the news. On one hand, the literature suggests that people form fast moral impressions once they already know what has transpired (i.e., who did what to whom, and whether there was harm involved). On the other hand, almost all research on the psychological bases for moral judgment has used verbal vignettes, leaving open the question of how people form moral impressions about observed visual events. Using a naturalistic but well-controlled image set depicting social interactions, we find that observers are capable of ‘moral thin-slicing’: they reliably identify moral transgressions from visual scenes presented in the blink of an eye (&lt; 100 ms), in ways that are surprisingly consistent with judgments made under no viewing-time constraints. Across four studies, we show that this remarkable ability arises because observers independently and rapidly extract the ‘atoms’ of moral judgment (i.e., event roles, and the level of harm involved). Our work supports recent proposals that many moral judgments are fast and intuitive and opens up exciting new avenues for understanding how people form moral judgments from visual observation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 104588"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139514533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Moral violations that target more valued victims elicit more anger, but not necessarily more disgust","authors":"Lei Fan ,&nbsp;Catherine Molho ,&nbsp;Tom R. Kupfer ,&nbsp;Joshua M. Tybur","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104597","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104597","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The same moral violation can give rise to different emotional and behavioral responses in different individuals. The mechanisms that give rise to such differences – and the functions that those mechanisms serve – are unclear. Previous work suggests that people experience greater anger toward violations that target themselves or kin than those that target others, whereas they experience greater disgust toward violations that target others than those that target themselves or kin. In turn, anger has a stronger relation with direct aggression than indirect aggression, and disgust a stronger relation with indirect aggression than direct aggression. The current study tests whether these patterns depend on the value observers place on the targets of moral violations, even within folk relationship categories. In two studies, we asked participants to think of a person they know and to imagine that person being targeted by a moral violation described in a vignette. We assessed the value that participants placed on the target using a financial tradeoff task, their emotional reaction to the violation, and their desires to aggress toward the perpetrator. Results revealed that: (1) interpersonal value relates more strongly to anger than disgust toward the moral violation; (2) interpersonal value relates more strongly to direct than indirect aggression motives; and (3) anger relates to both direct and indirect aggression motives, whereas disgust relates only to indirect aggression motives. These results suggest that the value one places on the victims of moral violations influences emotional and behavioral reactions to those violations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 104597"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S002210312400009X/pdfft?md5=9b3689735c74c070c433e6c5a94e9459&pid=1-s2.0-S002210312400009X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139494095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Choosing not to get anchored: A choice mindset reduces the anchoring bias","authors":"Krishna Savani ,&nbsp;Monica Wadhwa","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2023.104575","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jesp.2023.104575","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In negotiations, first offers serve as potent anchors. After receiving a first offer, although people clearly have a choice about what amount to counteroffer, they often fail to adjust away from the first offer. We identify a simple nudge, a reminder that people have a choice, that can reduce the anchoring bias. We argue that a choice nudge leads people to think of more potential counteroffers that they can make, which reduces the extent to which they are anchored to the first offer. Seven studies conducted with US residents recruited from online research platforms tested this hypothesis. We found that merely reminding buyers that they have a choice led them to anchor away from sellers' first offers in a painting buying task (Studies 1 and 2) and a used car negotiation (Study 3). A choice reminder nudged people to consider more counteroffers (Study 4a) and asking people to consider more counteroffers reduced the anchoring bias (Study 4b). Consistent with the idea that thinking of counteroffers requires cognitive resources, we found that the effect of a choice nudge is attenuated under high cognitive load (Study 5). Study 6 ruled out an alternative motivational account for the choice nudge effect. This research contributes to the choice mindset literature by showing that highlighting the semantic concept of choice can help correct a pervasive decision-making bias, and to the anchoring literature by showing that thinking of more counteroffers can reduce the anchoring bias, at least in contexts in which the direction of adjustment from the anchor is known.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 104575"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139431753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}