Journal of Experimental Social Psychology最新文献

{"title":"Revisiting the bounded generalized reciprocity model: Ingroup favoritism and concerns about negative evaluation","authors":"Yutaka Horita,&nbsp;Shun Hamada","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104618","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104618","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The bounded generalized reciprocity (BGR) model, grounded in reputation management, predicts that the motivation underlying ingroup favoritism (favoring one's own group over other groups) is driven by avoiding a negative reputation within one's own group. This research conducted two economic games with minimal groups in which reputational concerns (partners' knowledge of participants' group membership) were manipulated. We aimed to verify the replicability of the experimental results in support of the BGR model. A study (<em>N</em> = 394) using a dictator game (in which participants unilaterally determined their partners' payoffs) indicated the following: (1) participants were more likely to behave cooperatively with ingroup partners than with outgroup partners, regardless of whether their partners knew the participants' group membership; and (2) individual differences in fear of negative evaluation by others were not associated with cooperation toward the ingroup. Similar results were found in another study (<em>N</em> = 429) using a prisoner's dilemma game (in which participants' payoffs were determined by their partners). However, while sharing knowledge about group membership facilitated cooperation with the outgroup in the dictator game, no such tendency was observed in the prisoner's dilemma game. These findings suggest that concerns about a bad reputation may not play a relatively important role in ingroup favoritism, and that generosity toward outgroup members is influenced by the presence or absence of interdependence (i.e., whether the partner's behavior affects the participant's payoffs). This research proposes a reconsideration of the motivations behind cooperation within or between groups.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140552449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rude or just blunt? Honor, dignity, and spontaneous trait inferences from potentially offensive behaviors","authors":"Ceren Günsoy ,&nbsp;Irmak Olcaysoy Okten ,&nbsp;A. Demaske","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104617","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104617","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>To restore their reputation, people from honor cultures (e.g., U.S. South) are more likely than people from dignity cultures (e.g., U.S. North) to retaliate against conflict partners who insult them. If a conflict partner does not insult them, however, they are more polite than dignity culture individuals, so that they don't provoke the person unnecessarily. Previous research has not examined the implicit person perception phase in these interactions. In this research, we focused on spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) that people can make from others' potentially offensive behaviors. In four studies (<em>n</em> = 1126), we tested whether being from a U.S. honor or dignity culture or the endorsement of these values was associated with hostile and nonhostile STIs, and whether honor and dignity influenced the relationship between STIs and behavioral intentions. In Study 1 and 2, honor culture participants made both types of STIs, whereas dignity culture participants only made hostile STIs. Study 3 revealed a positive association between individual honor endorsement and nonhostile STIs. In Study 4, we replicated most of these results and also found a positive association between hostile STIs and confrontation intentions in the honor (but not dignity) group. These results suggest that people from honor (vs. dignity) cultures tend to make rather simultaneous inferences of hostile and nonhostile traits from potentially offensive behaviors and making spontaneous hostile inferences can be more consequential for them. This research highlights the complexity of culture's influence on interpersonal processes and can have implications for diverse social contexts.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140542516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"To beckon or not to beckon: Testing a causal-evaluative modelling approach to moral judgment: A registered report","authors":"Cillian McHugh ,&nbsp;Kathryn B. Francis ,&nbsp;Jim A.C. Everett ,&nbsp;Shane Timmons","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104616","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104616","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Moral judgments are increasingly being understood as showing context dependent variability. A growing literature has identified a range of specific contextual factors (e.g., emotions, intentions) that can influence moral judgments in predictable ways. Integrating these diverse influences into a unified approach to understanding moral judgments remains a challenge. Recent work by Railton (2017) attempted to address this with a causal-evaluative modelling approach to moral judgment. In support of this model Railton presents evidence from novel variations of classic trolley type dilemmas. We present results from a pre-registered pilot study that highlight a significant confound and demonstrate that it likely influenced Railton's results. Building on this, our registered report presents a replication-extension of Railton's study, using larger more diverse samples, and more rigorous methods and materials, specifically controlling for potential confounds. We found that participants' judgments in sacrificial dilemmas are influenced by both direct personal force, and by whether harm occurs as a means or as a side-effect of action. We also show the relationship between a range of individual difference variables and responses to sacrificial moral dilemmas. Our results provide novel insights into the factors that influence people's moral judgments, and contribute to ongoing theoretical debates in moral psychology.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103124000283/pdfft?md5=64c886f733e92422f57027ea21a78ac0&pid=1-s2.0-S0022103124000283-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140536277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Most people do not “value the struggle”: Tempted agents are judged as less virtuous than those who were never tempted","authors":"Ryan M. McManus ,&nbsp;Helen Padilla Fong ,&nbsp;Max Kleiman-Weiner ,&nbsp;Liane Young","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104615","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Do people judge those who overcome temptation as more virtuous than those who don't feel tempted in the first place? Because prior research provides conflicting answers to this question, the current paper uses an expanded set of methodological and statistical tools to solve this puzzle. First, we replicated results of prior research showing that agents who overcome temptation are seen as less virtuous than non-tempted agents, with 74–78% of people making this judgment. Second, we used participant-generated stimuli and one measure from each of two published papers to rule out stimulus and measurement sampling as explanations for the previous opposite effects. We replicated our original results: 72–75% of people judged agents who overcame temptation as less virtuous than non-tempted agents. Third, we investigated whether judgments were moderated by relationship context. Again, the majority of people judged agents who overcame temptation–that would harm strangers or close others–as less virtuous than non-tempted agents. Additionally, the following interaction effect was the most common (modal) pattern: While judging tempted agents as less virtuous than non-tempted agents within each relationship context, 39% of people judged agents who were tempted to act in a way that would harm close others as even less virtuous than those agents whose temptations would harm strangers. Together, these results provide a detailed moral psychological account of temptation by: resolving a puzzle in the literature, revealing moderation by relationship context, and documenting the pervasiveness of this effect across stimuli, measures, and persons.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140328695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Judging the guilt of the un-guilty: The roles of “false positive” guilt and empathy in moral character perception","authors":"Danielle E. Wahlers,&nbsp;William Hart,&nbsp;Joshua T. Lambert","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104613","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>When people accidentally harm others, some theory anticipates that expressing normatively unexpected (“false positive”) guilt is socially functional because it signals a positive moral character and likability. Although previous evidence shows anticipated effects of false positive guilt on these outcomes, it is possible these effects result from perceiving aspects specific to empathy (vs. guilt). We address this possibility in three preregistered studies. Participants answered questions regarding their perceptions of agents of accidental harm. In Experiment 1 (<em>N</em> = 299), agents that expressed guilt (vs. no guilt) received higher moral character and likability ratings; mediation evidence suggested these effects resulted via perceptions that the agent experienced empathy-specific (e.g., concern, understanding), not guilt-specific (e.g., self-blame) sentiments; if anything, guilt-specific sentiments reduced some moral character evaluations. Experiment 2 (<em>N</em> = 503) was a conceptual replication with more ecologically valid methods; it provided similar conclusions. Experiment 3 (<em>N</em> = 653) crossed an agent's expression of guilt-specific sentiments (present vs. absent) with empathy-specific sentiments (present vs. absent). Main effects of empathy-specific sentiments on moral character and likability judgments were at least seven times larger than those attributed to guilt-specific sentiments. Additionally, when empathy-specific sentiments were expressed, the expression of guilt-specific sentiments had no positive effects on moral character and likability judgments; however, when empathy-specific sentiments were <em>not</em> expressed, the expression of guilt-specific sentiments enhanced some but not all moral character judgments. We discuss how our findings contribute to understanding the social benefits of expressing false positive guilt and cohere with some impression formation perspectives.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140135052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How pledges reduce dishonesty: The role of involvement and identification","authors":"Eyal Peer ,&nbsp;Nina Mazar ,&nbsp;Yuval Feldman ,&nbsp;Dan Ariely","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104614","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Authorities and managers often rely on individuals and businesses' self-reports and employ various forms of honesty declarations to ensure that those individuals and businesses do not over-claim payments, benefits, or other resources. While previous work has found that honesty pledges have the potential to decrease dishonesty, effects have been mixed. We argue that understanding and predicting when honesty pledges are effective has been obstructed due to variations in experimental designs and operationalizations of honesty pledges in previous research. Specifically, we focus on the role of whether and how an ex-ante honesty pledge asks individuals to identify (by ID, name, initials) and how much involvement the pledge requires from the individual (low: just reading vs. high: re-typing the text of the pledge). In four pre-registered online studies (<em>N</em> &gt; 5000), we systematically examine these two dimensions of a pledge to find that involvement is often more effective than identification. In addition, low involvement pledges, without any identification, are mostly ineffective. Finally, we find that the effect of a high (vs. low) involvement pledge is relatively more persistent across tasks. Yet, repeating a low involvement pledge across tasks increases its effectiveness and compensates for the lower persistency across tasks. Taken together, these results contribute both to theory by comparing some of the mechanisms possibly underlying honesty pledges as well as to practice by providing guidance to managers and policymakers on how to effectively design pledges to prevent or reduce dishonesty in self-reports.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140122299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The influence of dominance and prestige on children's resource allocation: What if they coexist?","authors":"Xuran Zhang ,&nbsp;Xia Zhang ,&nbsp;Ranzhi Yang ,&nbsp;Yanfang Li","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104604","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The antagonistic relation between the two ways of reaching the top, i.e., dominance and prestige, has generally been accepted in recent decades. People perceive dominance as a “negative” trait that reduces the quantity of resources that should be allocated to individuals who exhibit such a trait. In contrast, prestige is viewed as a “positive” trait, that increases the appropriate amount of resources for such allocation. However, the situation is somewhat complicated because dominance and prestige can serve as different evaluative dimensions for the same person since that person could be esteemed for their expertise yet simultaneously critiqued to their assertive personality. This article first investigated how children aged 3- to 8-year-old weigh prestige and dominance when those traits coexist within individuals. The results of Study 1 revealed that children exhibited a developmental pattern of resource allocation, progressing from favoring the high-dominance to the low-dominance individual. Their theory of mind capacity predicted their preference for low-dominance individual. One professional prestige situation was also investigated which showed that children stably favor characters with high prestige. Children begin to distinguish between dominance and prestige in resource allocation at approximately 5 years. Study 2 further explored how 5- to 8-year-olds weigh the rewarding high-prestige individuals against compensating low-dominance individuals when these traits clash within the same person, which showed that children at this stage prioritize prestige rather than dominance. Taken together, these findings suggest that children are capable to differentiate between dominance and prestige as two distinct ways when perceiving social ranks.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140103767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"(Not) showing you feel good, can be bad: The consequences of breaking expressivity norms for positive emotions","authors":"Kunalan Manokara ,&nbsp;Alisa Balabanova ,&nbsp;Mirna Đurić ,&nbsp;Agneta H. Fischer ,&nbsp;Disa A. Sauter","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104600","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104600","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Are there optimal levels of showing one feels good? Examining four positive emotions (<em>gratitude, interest, feeling moved, triumph</em>), we demonstrate in two pre-registered experiments (<em>n</em> = 901) that even for pleasant feelings, showing too much – or too little – can lead to negative social consequences. Expressers who downplay their gratitude, and to a lesser degree interest, are deprived of social contact and power. Restrained displays of feeling moved are also met with reduced contact. For triumph, amplified expressers are socially avoided, yet at the same time, those who downplay their victory are seen to be less powerful. We demonstrate the role of person-perception mechanisms (warmth and competence) as underlying explanators for these effects. Taken together, our findings contribute to the growing literature on the social consequences of emotional expressions, by pointing to divergent outcomes for norm violations relating to different positive emotions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140013969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Communication increases collaborative corruption","authors":"Mathilde H. Tønnesen ,&nbsp;Christian T. Elbæk ,&nbsp;Stefan Pfattheicher ,&nbsp;Panagiotis Mitkidis","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104603","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Despite being a pivotal aspect of human cooperation, only a few studies within the field of collaborative dishonesty have included communication between participants, and none have yet experimentally compared this to non-communicative contexts. As a result, the impact of communication on unethical collaborations remains unclear. To address this gap, we conducted two well-powered studies (<em>N</em>_{<em>total</em>} = 1187), closely replicating and extending seminal research by Weisel and Shalvi (2015), introducing communication as a manipulated variable within a dyadic cheating task. Across both studies, we found evidence that communication increases the magnitude of cheating—even when coordination on the task is not allowed. Importantly, the effect of communication was linked to a stronger experienced collaboration among the communicating dyads, highlighting that communication is not only key to everyday ethically sound collaborations, but also to corrupt collaborations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103124000155/pdfft?md5=1922c040404716bb585e76cd8d717b7f&pid=1-s2.0-S0022103124000155-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139986967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Effort-based decision making in joint action: Evidence of a sense of fairness","authors":"Marcell Székely ,&nbsp;Stephen Butterfill ,&nbsp;John Michael","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104601","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>As humans, we are unique with respect to the flexibility and scope of our cooperative behavior. In recent years, considerable research has been devoted to investigating the psychological mechanisms which support this. One key finding is that people frequently calibrate their effort level to match a cooperation partner's effort costs - although little is known about exactly why they do so. We hypothesized that people calibrate with the ultimate goal of attracting and keeping good collaboration partners, with the proximal psychological motive being a preference for fairness. Across four lab-based, pre-registered experiments (<em>N</em> = 142), we found support for these hypotheses, and distinguished them from plausible alternative explanations, such as the conjecture that people may use their partner's effort costs as information to infer the value of opportunities afforded by their environment, and the conjecture that people may calibrate their effort investment in order to appear competent.</p></div><div><h3>Statement of relevance</h3><p>As humans, we have unique skills and motivations for acting together. Crucially, acting together requires effort and a growing body of empirical work on cooperation and joint action suggests that people calibrate their effort level to match that of a partner's effort costs - although little is known about the mechanisms leading them to do so. Our findings show that people calibrate their effort investment in joint action with the ultimate goal of attracting and keeping good collaboration partners and that the psychological mechanism that drives them to do so is a preference for fairness. These findings provide a valuable addition to existing research on the sense of fairness, providing evidence that the sense of fairness leads people not only to distribute resources according to individual effort costs but to distribute effort costs according to the expected reward distribution as well.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103124000131/pdfft?md5=e3506968634ec958912085ac78a2dc36&pid=1-s2.0-S0022103124000131-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139986966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}