Journal of Accounting Research最新文献_第4页

Where Does the Time Go? Auditors’ Commercial Effort, Professional Effort, and Audit Quality 时间都去哪儿了？审计师的商业努力、专业努力和审计质量

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-08-17 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12569

WILLIAM A. CICONTE III, JUSTIN LEIBY, MARLEEN WILLEKENS

{"title":"Where Does the Time Go? Auditors’ Commercial Effort, Professional Effort, and Audit Quality","authors":"WILLIAM A. CICONTE III, JUSTIN LEIBY, MARLEEN WILLEKENS","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12569","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12569","url":null,"abstract":"Audit theory and regulation assumes that auditors’ commercial motivation threatens audit quality. In this registered report, we use data from two Big Four firms in the Netherlands and provide empirical evidence on the relation between auditors’ commercial motivation and (1) compensation, (2) total audit effort, and (3) audit quality. We proxy commercial motivation as the time that individual auditors report allocating to commercial activities. We hypothesize that auditors’ commercial effort is positively related to compensation and we find mixed support. Next, we hypothesize that auditors’ commercial effort is negatively related to the audit effort but we find no support. Turning to audit quality, we hypothesize a negative direct relation between auditors’ commercial effort and audit quality but we find no support. We also predict a positive indirect relation in which auditors’ commercial effort increases quality control reliance leading to higher audit quality. We find some support for this hypothesis but only when we use technical consultations to proxy for quality control. Auditors with greater commercial effort maintain quality because they rely more on technical consultations. In sum, our study challenges the assumption that auditors’ commercial effort threatens audit quality and questions the need for additional regulation to constrain commercial motivation.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 1","pages":"255-317"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12569","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141994384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Issue Information - Request for Papers 议题信息 - 征求论文

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-18 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12566

引用次数: 0

Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for 发行信息--长期征集有关《世界文化多样性宣言》的提案

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-18 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12567

引用次数: 0

Just Friends? Managers’ Connections to Judges 只是朋友？管理人员与法官的关系

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-13 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12563

STERLING HUANG, SUGATA ROYCHOWDHURY, EWA SLETTEN, YANPING XU

引用次数: 0

The Decision Relevance of Loan Fair Values for Depositors 贷款公允价值与存款人决策的相关性

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-11 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12564

QI CHEN, RAHUL VASHISHTHA, SHUYAN WANG

引用次数: 0

Show Your Hand: The Impacts of Fair Pricing Requirements in Procurement Contracting 伸出你的手采购合同中公平定价要求的影响

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-03 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12561

BRAD NATHAN

引用次数: 0

Information Spillovers at Earnings Announcements

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-06-25 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12562

RICHARD FRANKEL, BRIGHT GERSHION GODIGBE, MARYJANE RABIER

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引用次数: 0

News Bias in Financial Journalists’ Social Networks 财经记者社交网络中的新闻偏见

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-06-18 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12560

GUOSONG XU

{"title":"News Bias in Financial Journalists’ Social Networks","authors":"GUOSONG XU","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12560","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12560","url":null,"abstract":"Connected financial journalists—those with working relationships, common school ties, or social media connections to company management—introduce a marked media slant into their news coverage. Using a comprehensive set of newspaper articles covering mergers and acquisition (M&A) transactions from 1997 to 2016, I find that connected journalists use significantly fewer negative words in their coverage of connected acquirers. These journalists are also more likely to quote connected executives and include less accurate language in their reporting. Moreover, they tend to portray other firms in the same network in a less negative light. Journalists’ favoritism bias has implications for both capital market outcomes and their careers. I find that acquirers whose M&As are covered by connected journalists receive significantly higher stock returns on the news article publication date. However, these acquirers’ stock prices reverse in the long term, suggesting market overreaction to news covered by connected journalists. Around M&A transactions, connected articles are correlated with increased bid competition and deal premiums. In terms of future career development, connected journalists are more likely to leave journalism and join their associated industries in the long run. Taken together, the evidence suggests that financial journalists’ personal networks promote news bias that potentially hinders the efficient dissemination of information.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1145-1182"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12560","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141425203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Using and Interpreting Fixed Effects Models 使用和解释固定效应模型

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-06-13 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12559

MATTHIAS BREUER, ED DEHAAN

引用次数: 0

Government Subsidies and Corporate Misconduct 政府补贴与企业不当行为

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-05-18 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12553

ANEESH RAGHUNANDAN

引用次数: 0