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Tax Strategy Disclosure: A Greenwashing Mandate? 税务策略披露：洗绿指令？
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-04-11 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12617
KATARZYNA BILICKA, ELISA CASI, CAROL SEREGNI, BARBARA M. B. STAGE
{"title":"Tax Strategy Disclosure: A Greenwashing Mandate?","authors":"KATARZYNA BILICKA, ELISA CASI, CAROL SEREGNI, BARBARA M. B. STAGE","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12617","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12617","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the effects of a <i>qualitative</i> tax disclosure mandate aimed at improving tax transparency and compliance by imposing reputational costs for firms. We use, as an exogenous shock, the 2016 UK reform that required large businesses to disclose their tax strategy. We find that treated firms—those that must publish a tax strategy report—also significantly increase the volume of tax strategy disclosure in their annual reports, but this disclosure contains more boilerplate. The standalone tax strategy reports contain narratives similar to those in the annual reports, are sticky, and their quality is correlated with those of disclosures on gender and human rights. Turning to real behavioral changes, we document no significant effect on tax planning across several proxies and firm characteristics. While we find that the mandate increased media attention on treated firms, our results suggest that this enforcement channel might not work in the context of qualitative disclosure, which may be hard to verify for outside stakeholders. Even in subsamples of firms for which we would expect higher reputational costs, we document similar responses. Taken together, our findings indicate that mandating qualitative tax disclosure has incentivized firms to portray themselves as good tax citizens without changing their practices.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143819977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Consequences for Culpable Auditors 有罪审计人员的后果
IF 6.3 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-04-09 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12608
Jagan Krishnan, Meng Li, Mihir N. Mehta, Hyun Jong Park
{"title":"Consequences for Culpable Auditors","authors":"Jagan Krishnan,&nbsp;Meng Li,&nbsp;Mihir N. Mehta,&nbsp;Hyun Jong Park","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12608","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12608","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We present the first comprehensive descriptive evidence on the labor market and personal consequences for audit professionals in the United States who are named in SEC or PCAOB enforcement actions. Three key findings emerge. First, between 38% and 73% of culpable auditors depart from their firms within one year after the enforcement event. These departure rates are three to four times higher compared with a sample of non-culpable auditors. Second, 83% of culpable auditors departing from Big 4 accounting firms exit the profession, compared with 58% of a departing non-culpable comparison group. In contrast, about 77% of the culpable auditors leaving non–Big 4 accounting firms remain in public accounting, compared with 51% of a departing non-culpable comparison group. Third, using novel data on personal real estate holdings, we find that culpable auditors do not appear to engage in markedly different transactions around enforcement compared with a comparison sample of non-culpable individuals.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 4","pages":"1493-1546"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12608","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143806081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Real Effects of Hedge Accounting Standards: Evidence from ASU 2017-12 套期会计准则的实际影响：来自ASU 2017-12的证据
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-04-08 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12614
WAQAR ALI, DANIEL A. BENS, GAVIN CASSAR
{"title":"Real Effects of Hedge Accounting Standards: Evidence from ASU 2017-12","authors":"WAQAR ALI, DANIEL A. BENS, GAVIN CASSAR","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12614","url":null,"abstract":"Complexity in applying financial accounting standards can have real operational effects if firms alter their actions in response to increased reporting costs. We examine whether the introduction of ASU 2017-12, designed to reduce compliance burden and better align hedge accounting rules with risk management practices, led to more effective hedging. Using detailed hedging disclosures, we show that firms that adopt the ASU expand the use of hedge-accounted derivatives and reduce exposures to interest rate and foreign currency risks. ASU-adopting firms also reduce cash flow volatility, increase their use of debt, invest more, and reduce information asymmetry in the equity market. Our analyses reveal that easing hedge effectiveness tests and reliefs targeting “cash flow hedges” and “net investment hedges of foreign operations” were the most influential of the ASU's reforms. Our study is the first to integrate the effects of hedge accounting frictions on firms’ risk management activities and resulting spillovers to debt financing and investments.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143806082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Offshore Shared Services Center Usage by U.S. Big 4 Audit Engagement Teams 美国四大审计业务团队使用离岸共享服务中心的情况
IF 6.3 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-04-02 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12611
MATTHEW G. SHERWOOD
{"title":"Offshore Shared Services Center Usage by U.S. Big 4 Audit Engagement Teams","authors":"MATTHEW G. SHERWOOD","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12611","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12611","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Auditors frequently outsource audit work to offshore Shared Service Centers (SSCs) to reduce costs and ease the workload burdens of audit team members. However, concerns persist about whether these benefits come at the expense of audit quality. Using proprietary audit engagement-level data, I evaluate whether greater SSC usage by Big 4 audit teams has an association with either, or both, audit quality and audit costs. I find that SSC usage is nearly universal in Big 4 audits, with the percentage of audit hours SSCs perform increasing in recent years. Consistent with the audit firm's objectives, evidence suggests that SSC usage is associated with fewer audit hours and lower audit fees. Importantly, I find no evidence that SSC usage is associated with lower audit quality. Overall, results suggest that SSCs have the intended effect of reducing audit costs without sacrificing audit quality.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 4","pages":"1679-1722"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143758513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information - Request for Papers 发布信息-申请论文
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12615
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12615","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12615","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 2","pages":"544"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12615","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143745282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for 发布信息-长期征求建议书
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12616
{"title":"Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12616","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12616","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 2","pages":"545"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12616","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143745275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Measuring Greenhouse Gas Emissions: What Are the Costs and Benefits? 测量温室气体排放：成本和收益是什么？
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-26 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12613
LUCAS MAHIEUX, HARESH SAPRA, GAOQING ZHANG
{"title":"Measuring Greenhouse Gas Emissions: What Are the Costs and Benefits?","authors":"LUCAS MAHIEUX,&nbsp;HARESH SAPRA,&nbsp;GAOQING ZHANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12613","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12613","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We adopt a financial-materiality approach in studying the costs and benefits of measuring greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on social welfare. Production by firms internally generates direct GHG emissions (Scope 1 emissions) whereas outsourcing to suppliers generates indirect emissions (Scope 3 emissions). Our analysis incorporates two frictions: (1) long-term negative environmental externalities caused by emissions and (2) fragmentation in regulating emissions disclosures across jurisdictions. We show firms' failure to internalize the environmental externalities provides a rationale for mandating Scopes 1 and 3 emissions disclosures. However, such disclosures induce emissions leakage. Disciplining emissions leakage calls for setting complementary—rather than independent—disclosure requirements for Scopes 1 and 3 emissions. Our analysis underscores the importance of improving the reliability of Scope 3 emissions measurements given that measurements of Scope 1 emissions are highly reliable for public firms in Europe and the United States. Regulators can further enhance the disciplinary effects of Scope 3 emission measurements by requiring the allocations of Scope 3 emissions in supply chains to individual firms, especially when allocating Scope 3 emissions is more reliable, and for firms/industries that are more prone to transition climate risk relative to physical climate risk.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 3","pages":"1063-1105"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12613","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143713473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Limits to Political Capture: Evidence from Patent Grants, Disclosures, and Litigation 政治捕获的限制：来自专利授予、披露和诉讼的证据
IF 6.3 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-19 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12607
CHRISTINE CUNY, MIHIR N. MEHTA, WANLI ZHAO
{"title":"Limits to Political Capture: Evidence from Patent Grants, Disclosures, and Litigation","authors":"CHRISTINE CUNY,&nbsp;MIHIR N. MEHTA,&nbsp;WANLI ZHAO","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12607","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12607","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Substantial evidence suggests that regulatory agencies in the United States can be captured by the politicians who oversee them. We provide novel evidence of a federal agency in which capture is limited: the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Although patent applications from politically connected applicants are slightly more likely to be approved despite being of lower ex post quality, additional analyses suggest these outcomes are not indicative of capture. In particular, the disclosure quality of connected patents' legal claims increases more than unconnected patents during the review process, narrowing the scope of the patents and constraining the intellectual property rights. Furthermore, connected patents are no more likely than others to be litigated ex post, suggesting these patent grants are not spurious. Our findings provide insights into how the design of a regulator can limit the benefits that accrue to politically connected firms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 4","pages":"1453-1492"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143653360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Accounting Information Usage and Trading by Retail Investors: Evidence from Integrated Trading Platform 会计信息使用与散户交易：来自综合交易平台的证据
IF 6.3 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-17 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12606
JACKY CHAU
{"title":"Accounting Information Usage and Trading by Retail Investors: Evidence from Integrated Trading Platform","authors":"JACKY CHAU","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12606","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12606","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This registered report investigates self-directed retail investors' information choices and trading decisions on an integrated trading platform that provides timely and convenient access to accounting information. The analyses reveal that these investors access a mosaic of information, with a high proportion not firm-specific. In accessing accounting disclosures, retail investors are more interested in media articles providing summaries or expert analyses than original filings. Retail trades on this integrated trading platform are more informed than another retail trading platform providing little information services while exhibiting no significant differences in informativeness compared with institutional trades using <i>Bulge Bracket</i> platforms. In particular, trade informativeness is more pronounced when there are accounting disclosures. The evidence suggests that self-directed retail investors can benefit from a trading environment that provides rich and convenient access to a mosaic of information, particularly timely accounting disclosures.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 4","pages":"1377-1452"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143635112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamic Information Acquisition, Investment, and Disclosure 动态信息获取、投资与披露
IF 6.3 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-17 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12610
SEUNG Y. LEE, IVÁN MARINOVIC
{"title":"Dynamic Information Acquisition, Investment, and Disclosure","authors":"SEUNG Y. LEE,&nbsp;IVÁN MARINOVIC","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12610","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12610","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We present a dynamic model of information acquisition and disclosure. The manager seeks to maximize future stock prices and collects information privately about the firm's fundamentals. Information acquisition increases the arrival rate of private information. The manager can choose to disclose his private information or withhold it in perpetuity. We study the impact of information acquisition on the accumulation of private information, disclosure, and the firm's initial investment.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 4","pages":"1547-1581"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143635113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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