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Real Effects of Non‐Streamlined Sales Tax Administration: Evidence from the Florida Hotel Industry 非流线型销售税管理的实际影响：来自佛罗里达州酒店业的证据
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-07-11 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.70001
JENNIFER L. BROWN, PABLO CASAS‐ARCE, DAVID G. KENCHINGTON, ROGER M. WHITE
{"title":"Real Effects of Non‐Streamlined Sales Tax Administration: Evidence from the Florida Hotel Industry","authors":"JENNIFER L. BROWN, PABLO CASAS‐ARCE, DAVID G. KENCHINGTON, ROGER M. WHITE","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.70001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.70001","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether the local administration of sales taxes (as opposed to a more streamlined state administration) affects the real economy for businesses complying with the tax. We study this question in the Florida hotel industry, as counties in Florida can choose to locally administer the county‐level tourist tax or have the state administer the county‐level tax along with the state‐level tourist tax. Local administration is popular because it supports local employment (of tax administrators) and provides more stringent enforcement on non‐commercial operators (e.g., private rentals). State administration, however, has fewer compliance costs for hotels (e.g., reduced filings and fewer audits). Commentary from the profession suggests the incremental compliance costs of local administration can be considerable. We find that counties switching from state to local administration of tourist taxes is associated with slower growth in aggregate hotel payroll and employment, consistent with local tax administration increasing compliance costs to the point that affected businesses cut other services.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144603077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does U.S. Immigration Policy Facilitate Financial Misconduct? 美国移民政策会助长金融不端行为吗？
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-06-30 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12627
Ruiting Dai, Xuanjun Dong, Nemit Shroff, Qin Tan
{"title":"Does U.S. Immigration Policy Facilitate Financial Misconduct?","authors":"Ruiting Dai, Xuanjun Dong, Nemit Shroff, Qin Tan","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12627","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12627","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether U.S. immigration policy, specifically the H‐1B visa program, affects the likelihood of financial misconduct. We argue that employers have leverage over employees on H‐1B visas because such employees must maintain H‐1B–eligible employment to legally reside in the United States. We posit that companies relying on H‐1B visas to hire workers in accounting roles have an increased ability to misreport their financial statements due to the greater costs H‐1B employees face if they are unexpectedly fired for not following the demands of their bosses or for blowing the whistle on misconduct. Using the sharp reduction in the H‐1B visa cap in 2004 as a shock to such employment, we find that companies that relied on this visa program for accounting roles pre‐shock experience a 2.3 percentage point decline in accounting irregularities post‐shock. Cross‐sectional tests show that the reduction in irregularities is greater in companies where H‐1B employees have (1) a greater influence on financial reporting or (2) fewer job opportunities. In addition, the relation between H‐1B visa use and irregularities is stronger in companies whose investors are more focused on near‐term earnings targets. We corroborate our findings using the outcome of H‐1B visa lotteries as shocks to such employment.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"71 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144534102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Responding to Climate Change Crises: Firms' Trade‐Offs 应对气候变化危机：企业的权衡
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-06-26 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12625
FELIX FRITSCH, QI ZHANG, XIANG ZHENG
{"title":"Responding to Climate Change Crises: Firms' Trade‐Offs","authors":"FELIX FRITSCH, QI ZHANG, XIANG ZHENG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12625","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12625","url":null,"abstract":"We examine firms' trade‐offs in their voluntary disclosure decisions following negative media coverage of climate change incidents. By combining a keyword discovery algorithm and a fine‐tuned BERT model, we identify “hard” and “soft” climate disclosures on Twitter. Our findings indicate that firms tend to issue climate tweets as a rapid response to negative climate incidents. Additionally, firms with a history of hard climate change disclosure, as measured by ESG reports, are more likely to issue climate‐related responses than firms without such a history. Furthermore, we show that prior hard disclosure is associated with hard responses when the incident receives moderate media attention, but with soft responses when the incident receives low media attention. Our findings provide empirical insights for dynamic disclosure theory by illustrating how prior disclosure shapes firms' response strategies to negative media coverage.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144513286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Use and Design of Peer Evaluations for Bonus Allocations 同行评价在奖金分配中的应用与设计
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-06-26 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12628
MANUEL GRIEDER, KARL SCHUHMACHER
{"title":"Use and Design of Peer Evaluations for Bonus Allocations","authors":"MANUEL GRIEDER, KARL SCHUHMACHER","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12628","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12628","url":null,"abstract":"We conduct an experiment to investigate the use of peer evaluations for compensation purposes. Although organizations often rely on peer evaluations for incentive compensation, it is not well understood how peer feedback should be used and designed to ensure non‐distorted evaluations and motivate effort provision. We study peer evaluations in form of bonus allocation proposals, thereby enabling a quantifiable test of our hypothesis. We distinguish between discretionary use (i.e., allocation by the manager) and formulaic use (i.e., allocation by the team via the average) of self‐including and self‐excluding proposals. We find that, relative to self‐including proposals, self‐excluding proposals are less distorted, irrespective of use, but lead to more effort provision only under formulaic use. Under discretionary use, the benefits of self‐excluding proposals are offset, as managerial biases enter bonus allocations. In sum, our findings illustrate benefits of delegating bonus allocations to teams through formulaic use of self‐excluding peer evaluations and extend the understanding of how organizations can effectively incorporate peer evaluations into incentive compensation.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144513357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
ESG Rating Competition and Rating Quality ESG评级竞争与评级质量
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-06-24 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12624
CAI CHEN, SVENJA DUBE, SHIRAN FROYMOVICH
{"title":"ESG Rating Competition and Rating Quality","authors":"CAI CHEN, SVENJA DUBE, SHIRAN FROYMOVICH","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12624","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12624","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines how increased competition among environmental, social, and governance (ESG) rating agencies relates to ESG rating quality. We exploit the entry of Sustainalytics as a new ESG rating agency in 2010. We conduct a difference‐in‐differences analysis and provide three main findings. First, we find that higher competition decreases incumbents' ESG rating disagreements of the same scope. The negative relation between competition and ESG rating disagreement persists for same‐scope rating metrics not covered by Sustainalytics, suggesting that neither learning nor herding drive the results. The relationship between competition and rating disagreement strengthens for firms with more ESG disclosures, which generally require more effort to analyze. Second, we find that incumbents' ratings of ESG concerns are more strongly associated with future negative ESG news for firms additionally covered by Sustainalytics. This finding is consistent with competition improving ratings' ability to predict future negative ESG incidents. Third, we find that incumbents evaluate more difficult‐to‐measure outcome metrics for firms covered by Sustainalytics, consistent with competition inducing more effort. Overall, our findings suggest that competition serves as an implicit disciplining mechanism of ESG rating agencies' quality.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"640 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144370610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
To Interact or Not? On the Benefits of Interacting with Unfavorable Analysts During Earnings Calls 互动还是不互动？在财报电话会议上与不利分析师互动的好处
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-06-18 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12629
JARED FLAKE
{"title":"To Interact or Not? On the Benefits of Interacting with Unfavorable Analysts During Earnings Calls","authors":"JARED FLAKE","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12629","url":null,"abstract":"Managers prioritize favorable analysts during earnings calls, reinforcing analysts’ incentives for optimism. However, managers also frequently interact with unfavorable analysts, and this study examines the determinants and benefits of these interactions. I find that managers interact more with unfavorable analysts when compelled to do so. I then examine two likely benefits of these interactions. First, unfavorable analysts attenuate their negative views after interacting with managers. Second, price reactions to management forecasts are stronger for managers who regularly interact with unfavorable analysts, consistent with enhanced reporting credibility. Finally, using peer firm restatements as exogenous shocks to investors’ perceptions of accounting quality, I find that nonrestating firms with managers who regularly interact with unfavorable analysts experience attenuated negative returns relative to other nonrestating peers. Overall, the empirical evidence indicates firms experience significant benefits when managers interact with unfavorable analysts and these benefits persist amongst compelled and voluntary interactions.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144320385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Index Creation, Information Changes, and Financing*
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-06-18 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12626
VIDHAN K. GOYAL, DANIEL URBAN, WENTING ZHAO
{"title":"Index Creation, Information Changes, and Financing*","authors":"VIDHAN K. GOYAL, DANIEL URBAN, WENTING ZHAO","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12626","url":null,"abstract":"We study how stock index inclusion affects corporate financing using a global sample of 198 index events—primarily new index launches—across 21 markets. Firms added to indexes issue more public debt but not equity, leading to a sustained increase in leverage. Inclusion draws greater attention from analysts and the media and increases the likelihood of receiving credit ratings. As a result, indexed firms benefit from more liquid bond markets and lower yield spreads, prompting greater reliance on public debt. Consistent with an information‐driven mechanism, leverage responses are strongest in countries with weaker information environments. However, these information gains do not enhance stock price informativeness: bid‐ask spreads, price impact measures, post‐earnings announcement drift, and the implied cost of equity remain unchanged—likely because of the growing presence of information‐insensitive passive investors.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"147 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144319319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Signaling Value of Internal Employee Coordination 员工内部协调的信号价值
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-05-28 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12623
WEI CAI, DENNIS CAMPBELL, JIEHANG YU
{"title":"The Signaling Value of Internal Employee Coordination","authors":"WEI CAI, DENNIS CAMPBELL, JIEHANG YU","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12623","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12623","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the effect of internal employee coordination on customer trust, focusing specifically on employees’ responsiveness to each other as an important, quantifiable, and objective aspect of internal coordination. Using proprietary data from a company with exogenous assignment of employees to teams that serve individual customers, we study how inter‐employee responsiveness influences customer trust. Each customer is served via an app‐based group chat by a randomly assigned team of employees. Our data include more than 2 million group chat messages with over 16 thousand customers. We find that inter‐employee responsiveness serves as a credible signal that helps build customer trust, as evidenced by their subsequent contracting choices. The effect is more pronounced when the signal is (1) more frequent and (2) more intense. Our findings highlight the novel value of internal employee responsiveness as a credible signal that helps build trust with external stakeholders.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144153459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for 发布信息-长期征求建议书
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-04-25 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12622
{"title":"Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12622","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 3","pages":"1059"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12622","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143871597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information - Request for Papers 发布信息-申请论文
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-04-25 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12621
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12621","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 3","pages":"1058"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12621","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143871815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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