{"title":"To Interact or Not? On the Benefits of Interacting with Unfavorable Analysts During Earnings Calls","authors":"JARED FLAKE","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12629","url":null,"abstract":"Managers prioritize favorable analysts during earnings calls, reinforcing analysts’ incentives for optimism. However, managers also frequently interact with unfavorable analysts, and this study examines the determinants and benefits of these interactions. I find that managers interact more with unfavorable analysts when compelled to do so. I then examine two likely benefits of these interactions. First, unfavorable analysts attenuate their negative views after interacting with managers. Second, price reactions to management forecasts are stronger for managers who regularly interact with unfavorable analysts, consistent with enhanced reporting credibility. Finally, using peer firm restatements as exogenous shocks to investors’ perceptions of accounting quality, I find that nonrestating firms with managers who regularly interact with unfavorable analysts experience attenuated negative returns relative to other nonrestating peers. Overall, the empirical evidence indicates firms experience significant benefits when managers interact with unfavorable analysts and these benefits persist amongst compelled and voluntary interactions.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144320385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Index Creation, Information Changes, and Financing*","authors":"VIDHAN K. GOYAL, DANIEL URBAN, WENTING ZHAO","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12626","url":null,"abstract":"We study how stock index inclusion affects corporate financing using a global sample of 198 index events—primarily new index launches—across 21 markets. Firms added to indexes issue more public debt but not equity, leading to a sustained increase in leverage. Inclusion draws greater attention from analysts and the media and increases the likelihood of receiving credit ratings. As a result, indexed firms benefit from more liquid bond markets and lower yield spreads, prompting greater reliance on public debt. Consistent with an information‐driven mechanism, leverage responses are strongest in countries with weaker information environments. However, these information gains do not enhance stock price informativeness: bid‐ask spreads, price impact measures, post‐earnings announcement drift, and the implied cost of equity remain unchanged—likely because of the growing presence of information‐insensitive passive investors.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"147 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144319319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Signaling Value of Internal Employee Coordination","authors":"WEI CAI, DENNIS CAMPBELL, JIEHANG YU","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12623","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12623","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the effect of internal employee coordination on customer trust, focusing specifically on employees’ responsiveness to each other as an important, quantifiable, and objective aspect of internal coordination. Using proprietary data from a company with exogenous assignment of employees to teams that serve individual customers, we study how inter‐employee responsiveness influences customer trust. Each customer is served via an app‐based group chat by a randomly assigned team of employees. Our data include more than 2 million group chat messages with over 16 thousand customers. We find that inter‐employee responsiveness serves as a credible signal that helps build customer trust, as evidenced by their subsequent contracting choices. The effect is more pronounced when the signal is (1) more frequent and (2) more intense. Our findings highlight the novel value of internal employee responsiveness as a credible signal that helps build trust with external stakeholders.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144153459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12622","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 3","pages":"1059"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12622","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143871597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12621","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 3","pages":"1058"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12621","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143871815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"2024 Excellence in Refereeing","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12620","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12620","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The <i>Journal of Accounting Research</i> is proud to recognize our top referees of the previous calendar year. The senior editors selected those named below for their “2024 Excellence in Refereeing” based on the quality and the number of reviews they had performed for the journal during the years 2023 and 2024. We thank the referees for their invaluable services to the journal.</p><p>Darren Bernard, <i>University of Washington</i></p><p>Anne Beyer, <i>Stanford University</i></p><p>Jannis Bischof, <i>University of Mannheim</i></p><p>Matthew Bloomfield, <i>University of Pennsylvania</i></p><p>Thomas Bourveau, <i>Columbia University</i></p><p>Matthias Breuer, <i>Columbia University</i></p><p>Ulf Brüggemann, <i>Humboldt University Berlin</i></p><p>Jung Ho Choi, <i>Stanford University</i></p><p>Christine Cuny, <i>New York University</i></p><p>Yiwei Dou, <i>New York University</i></p><p>Atif Ellahie, <i>University of Utah</i></p><p>Vivian Fang, <i>Indiana University</i></p><p>Fabrizio Ferri, <i>University of Miami</i></p><p>Paul Fischer, <i>University of Pennsylvania</i></p><p>Henry Friedman, <i>University of California, Los Angeles</i></p><p>John Gallemore, <i>University of North Carolina</i></p><p>Brandon Gipper, <i>Stanford University</i></p><p>João Granja, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Nicholas Guest, <i>Cornell University</i></p><p>Katharina Hombach, <i>Goethe University, Frankfurt</i></p><p>Allen Huang, <i>Hong Kong University of Science and Technology</i></p><p>Martin Jacob, <i>IESE Business School</i></p><p>Xu Jiang, <i>Duke University</i></p><p>Zachary Kaplan, <i>Washington University, St. Louis</i></p><p>Jung Min Kim, <i>Northwestern University</i></p><p>Sehwa Kim, <i>Columbia University</i></p><p>Natalia Kovrijnykh, <i>Arizona State University</i></p><p>Sinja Leonelli, <i>New York University</i></p><p>Rebecca Lester, <i>Stanford University</i></p><p>Miao Liu, <i>Boston College</i></p><p>Daniele Macciocchi, <i>University of Miami</i></p><p>Lucas Mahieux, <i>Tilburg University</i></p><p>Charles McClure, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Allison Nicoletti, <i>University of Pennsylvania</i></p><p>Suzie Noh, <i>Stanford University</i></p><p>James Omartian, <i>University of Michigan</i></p><p>Matthew Phillips, <i>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</i></p><p>Thomas Rauter, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Delphine Samuels, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Joseph Schroeder, <i>Indiana University</i></p><p>Lorien Stice-Lawrence, <i>University of Southern California</i></p><p>Gurpal Sran, <i>New York University</i></p><p>Christopher Stewart, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Ivo Tafkov, <i>Georgia State University</i></p><p>Sorabh Tomar, <i>Southern Methodist University</i></p><p>Rimmy Tomy, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>David Veenman, <i>University of Amsterdam</i></p><p>Felix Vetter, <i>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</i></p><p>Edward Watts, <i>Yale University</i></p><p>Brady Williams, <i>University of Texas, Austin</i><","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 3","pages":"1061-1062"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12620","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143871814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Accounting for Goodwill","authors":"STEFAN J. HUBER, CHARLES G. MCCLURE","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12618","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12618","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A significant portion of a merger's purchase price is allocated to goodwill. Currently, goodwill is not amortized but rather tested annually for impairment. When managers of acquiring firms care about earnings, goodwill's accounting treatment can have large effects on future earnings and may influence how much a manager will bid for a target company. We quantify the effects of goodwill accounting by estimating a structural model of corporate takeovers. Our estimates suggest accrual accounting increases buyout premia by an average of approximately 11 percentage points. If firms needed to amortize goodwill over 10 years, we estimate premia would reduce by 4.9 percentage points and M&A volume would shrink by 4.1% or $67 billion per year. Furthermore, the fraction of private equity acquirers would increase by 6.9 percentage points, shifting control over productive assets to the private and financial sector. Our results suggest the accounting treatment for goodwill has a meaningful effect on the market for corporate control.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 3","pages":"1145-1185"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12618","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143846497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Common Investor Relations Representation","authors":"DAVID VOLANT","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12619","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12619","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines the capital market implications of common investor relations (IR) representation, a phenomenon in which multiple public firms share the same external IR representative. Using a difference-in-differences research design, I document that common IR representation is associated with greater overlap in institutional ownership and sell-side analyst coverage as well as similarities in disclosure practices among clients—even those operating in different industries. These effects culminate in heightened return comovement among firms sharing IR representation. My findings provide insight into the role of IR companies as capital market gatekeepers and suggest that when a firm outsources its IR function, the IR company influences its capital market connectivity.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 3","pages":"1237-1283"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12619","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143832127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
KATARZYNA BILICKA, ELISA CASI, CAROL SEREGNI, BARBARA M. B. STAGE
{"title":"Tax Strategy Disclosure: A Greenwashing Mandate?","authors":"KATARZYNA BILICKA, ELISA CASI, CAROL SEREGNI, BARBARA M. B. STAGE","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12617","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12617","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the effects of a <i>qualitative</i> tax disclosure mandate aimed at improving tax transparency and compliance by imposing reputational costs for firms. We use, as an exogenous shock, the 2016 UK reform that required large businesses to disclose their tax strategy. We find that treated firms—those that must publish a tax strategy report—also significantly increase the volume of tax strategy disclosure in their annual reports, but this disclosure contains more boilerplate. The standalone tax strategy reports contain narratives similar to those in the annual reports, are sticky, and their quality is correlated with those of disclosures on gender and human rights. Turning to real behavioral changes, we document no significant effect on tax planning across several proxies and firm characteristics. While we find that the mandate increased media attention on treated firms, our results suggest that this enforcement channel might not work in the context of qualitative disclosure, which may be hard to verify for outside stakeholders. Even in subsamples of firms for which we would expect higher reputational costs, we document similar responses. Taken together, our findings indicate that mandating qualitative tax disclosure has incentivized firms to portray themselves as good tax citizens without changing their practices.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143819977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jagan Krishnan, Meng Li, Mihir N. Mehta, Hyun Jong Park
{"title":"Consequences for Culpable Auditors","authors":"Jagan Krishnan, Meng Li, Mihir N. Mehta, Hyun Jong Park","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12608","url":null,"abstract":"We present the first comprehensive descriptive evidence on the labor market and personal consequences for audit professionals in the United States who are named in SEC or PCAOB enforcement actions. Three key findings emerge. First, between 38% and 73% of culpable auditors depart from their firms within one year after the enforcement event. These departure rates are three to four times higher compared with a sample of non-culpable auditors. Second, 83% of culpable auditors departing from Big 4 accounting firms exit the profession, compared with 58% of a departing non-culpable comparison group. In contrast, about 77% of the culpable auditors leaving non–Big 4 accounting firms remain in public accounting, compared with 51% of a departing non-culpable comparison group. Third, using novel data on personal real estate holdings, we find that culpable auditors do not appear to engage in markedly different transactions around enforcement compared with a comparison sample of non-culpable individuals.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"108 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143806081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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