{"title":"Do Shared Auditors Facilitate Follow‐on Innovation?","authors":"XUAN TIAN, JIAWEN YAN, LUO ZUO","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.70010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.70010","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate whether shared auditors promote the dissemination of innovative knowledge among their clients, thereby fostering follow‐on innovation. We find that a company cites more patents from another company when they are audited by the same audit office. To address concerns about potential confounding factors stemming from commonalities in the fundamentals of the two companies, we leverage a quasi‐exogenous shock to auditor sharing: the demise of Arthur Andersen and the subsequent increase in auditor switching in 2002. Further analysis reveals that the effect of a shared auditor on cross‐client patent citations is stronger when both clients engage in intensive innovation activities. Additional evidence suggests that shared auditors exert more influence on the citations of recent patents and patents that are easier for outsiders to utilize. Overall, our findings suggest that auditors affect corporate innovation by facilitating the transfer of innovative knowledge among their clients.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"71 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144924022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.70006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.70006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2025-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.70006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144782612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.70005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.70005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2025-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.70005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144782613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Paving the Road to the Buy‐Side","authors":"Biwen Zhang","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.70004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.70004","url":null,"abstract":"Sell‐side analysts commonly transition to buy‐side money managers. I examine whether and how these career transitions shape sell‐side analysts' behavior, relying on the granular career information of 6,310 analysts in the United States. I identify analysts who transition from the sell‐side to the buy‐side and find that these analysts issue inflated recommendations on stocks of interest to their future buy‐side employers. This favoritism is (1) present only during the year preceding their transition, (2) more pronounced among stocks where a single analyst is more influential in moving the stock price; and (3) present only among transitions likely to be strategically planned. Importantly, stocks receiving inflated recommendations experience a significant price decline following the departure of transitioning analysts from the sell‐side. Overall, these findings suggest that analyst career transitions are an important source of conflicts of interest.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144778451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ELIZABETH CARSON, PHILLIP LAMOREAUX, ROGER SIMNETT, ULRIKE THÜRHEIMER, ANN VANSTRAELEN
{"title":"Establishment of National Public Audit Oversight Boards: Descriptive Evidence and Implications for Audit Quality","authors":"ELIZABETH CARSON, PHILLIP LAMOREAUX, ROGER SIMNETT, ULRIKE THÜRHEIMER, ANN VANSTRAELEN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.70008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.70008","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the establishment of public audit oversight bodies (POBs) worldwide. We present descriptive evidence on POBs’ characteristics and factors influencing the timing of their establishment, finding that countries with stronger institutions, civil law traditions, and higher media attention to audit quality adopt POBs faster. While countries may choose similar POB design features, these choices do not align with the factors driving adoption speed. We also explore whether the finding of a positive impact on audit quality of the U.S. PCAOB generalizes to other countries. A difference‐in‐differences analysis over 20 years provides some evidence that POB establishment and their characteristics improve audit quality. However, the results appear sensitive to audit quality measures and research design. Our study offers the first broad‐based investigation of POB adoption and provides important nuance on the relation between POBs and audit quality.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144769873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Internal Forecasts in Multi‐Location Firms","authors":"LINDSEY GALLO, EVA LABRO, JAMES D. OMARTIAN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.70003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.70003","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the dynamics of internal forecasting in multi‐location firms and the relations between forecast characteristics and investment. Using U.S. Census microdata on plant‐level growth expectations, we find that plants within multi‐location firms make forecasts that are both more certain and less accurate than those of standalone plants. We provide evidence suggesting that headquarters infers uncertainty from inter‐plant forecast disagreement, and that headquarters is able to facilitate the use of relevant information held by one plant but applicable to another. Differences between peer and focal plants' forecasts predict forecast errors and relate to investment decisions at the focal plant, suggesting that information from multiple sources is integrated into capital allocation decisions. Headquarters' heavier use of peer plant forecast information when focal plants are more uncertain likely weakens focal plant managers' incentives to consider extreme scenarios when forecasting.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144712190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERIC R. HOLZMAN, BRIAN P. MILLER, KRISTINA M. RENNEKAMP, ASHLEY K. SAUCIUC
{"title":"The Role of Observed Punishment in Deterring the Spillover Effects of Corporate Misconduct Among Non‐Peers","authors":"ERIC R. HOLZMAN, BRIAN P. MILLER, KRISTINA M. RENNEKAMP, ASHLEY K. SAUCIUC","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.70002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.70002","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates (1) whether misreporting by corporate executives impacts unethical decision‐making by non‐peers in unrelated reporting tasks, and (2) whether observing various forms of punishment for corporate misreporting deters this spillover effect. Specifically, we examine the deterrent effects of two common forms of punishment (fines or imprisonment) and a novel form of punishment (public shaming). Across two experiments, we find that participants are more likely to misreport performance when exposed to media reports about executives engaging in financial misreporting. This evidence is consistent with executive misreporting leading to unethical decision‐making among non‐peer observers. We also find that participant misreporting is reduced when the media reports the punishments levied against those executives. In further mediation tests, our findings suggest observed punishments for corporate misconduct can influence perceptions of injunctive norms and potentially mitigate spillover in unethical behavior.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144640054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
JENNIFER L. BROWN, PABLO CASAS‐ARCE, DAVID G. KENCHINGTON, ROGER M. WHITE
{"title":"Real Effects of Non‐Streamlined Sales Tax Administration: Evidence from the Florida Hotel Industry","authors":"JENNIFER L. BROWN, PABLO CASAS‐ARCE, DAVID G. KENCHINGTON, ROGER M. WHITE","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.70001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.70001","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether the local administration of sales taxes (as opposed to a more streamlined state administration) affects the real economy for businesses complying with the tax. We study this question in the Florida hotel industry, as counties in Florida can choose to locally administer the county‐level tourist tax or have the state administer the county‐level tax along with the state‐level tourist tax. Local administration is popular because it supports local employment (of tax administrators) and provides more stringent enforcement on non‐commercial operators (e.g., private rentals). State administration, however, has fewer compliance costs for hotels (e.g., reduced filings and fewer audits). Commentary from the profession suggests the incremental compliance costs of local administration can be considerable. We find that counties switching from state to local administration of tourist taxes is associated with slower growth in aggregate hotel payroll and employment, consistent with local tax administration increasing compliance costs to the point that affected businesses cut other services.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144603077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does U.S. Immigration Policy Facilitate Financial Misconduct?","authors":"Ruiting Dai, Xuanjun Dong, Nemit Shroff, Qin Tan","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12627","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12627","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether U.S. immigration policy, specifically the H‐1B visa program, affects the likelihood of financial misconduct. We argue that employers have leverage over employees on H‐1B visas because such employees must maintain H‐1B–eligible employment to legally reside in the United States. We posit that companies relying on H‐1B visas to hire workers in accounting roles have an increased ability to misreport their financial statements due to the greater costs H‐1B employees face if they are unexpectedly fired for not following the demands of their bosses or for blowing the whistle on misconduct. Using the sharp reduction in the H‐1B visa cap in 2004 as a shock to such employment, we find that companies that relied on this visa program for accounting roles pre‐shock experience a 2.3 percentage point decline in accounting irregularities post‐shock. Cross‐sectional tests show that the reduction in irregularities is greater in companies where H‐1B employees have (1) a greater influence on financial reporting or (2) fewer job opportunities. In addition, the relation between H‐1B visa use and irregularities is stronger in companies whose investors are more focused on near‐term earnings targets. We corroborate our findings using the outcome of H‐1B visa lotteries as shocks to such employment.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"71 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144534102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Responding to Climate Change Crises: Firms' Trade‐Offs","authors":"FELIX FRITSCH, QI ZHANG, XIANG ZHENG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12625","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12625","url":null,"abstract":"We examine firms' trade‐offs in their voluntary disclosure decisions following negative media coverage of climate change incidents. By combining a keyword discovery algorithm and a fine‐tuned BERT model, we identify “hard” and “soft” climate disclosures on Twitter. Our findings indicate that firms tend to issue climate tweets as a rapid response to negative climate incidents. Additionally, firms with a history of hard climate change disclosure, as measured by ESG reports, are more likely to issue climate‐related responses than firms without such a history. Furthermore, we show that prior hard disclosure is associated with hard responses when the incident receives moderate media attention, but with soft responses when the incident receives low media attention. Our findings provide empirical insights for dynamic disclosure theory by illustrating how prior disclosure shapes firms' response strategies to negative media coverage.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144513286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}