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Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for 发布信息-长期征求建议书
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12616
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引用次数: 0
Measuring Greenhouse Gas Emissions: What Are the Costs and Benefits? 测量温室气体排放：成本和收益是什么？
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-26 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12613
LUCAS MAHIEUX, HARESH SAPRA, GAOQING ZHANG
{"title":"Measuring Greenhouse Gas Emissions: What Are the Costs and Benefits?","authors":"LUCAS MAHIEUX,&nbsp;HARESH SAPRA,&nbsp;GAOQING ZHANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12613","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12613","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We adopt a financial-materiality approach in studying the costs and benefits of measuring greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on social welfare. Production by firms internally generates direct GHG emissions (Scope 1 emissions) whereas outsourcing to suppliers generates indirect emissions (Scope 3 emissions). Our analysis incorporates two frictions: (1) long-term negative environmental externalities caused by emissions and (2) fragmentation in regulating emissions disclosures across jurisdictions. We show firms' failure to internalize the environmental externalities provides a rationale for mandating Scopes 1 and 3 emissions disclosures. However, such disclosures induce emissions leakage. Disciplining emissions leakage calls for setting complementary—rather than independent—disclosure requirements for Scopes 1 and 3 emissions. Our analysis underscores the importance of improving the reliability of Scope 3 emissions measurements given that measurements of Scope 1 emissions are highly reliable for public firms in Europe and the United States. Regulators can further enhance the disciplinary effects of Scope 3 emission measurements by requiring the allocations of Scope 3 emissions in supply chains to individual firms, especially when allocating Scope 3 emissions is more reliable, and for firms/industries that are more prone to transition climate risk relative to physical climate risk.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 3","pages":"1063-1105"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12613","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143713473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Limits to Political Capture: Evidence from Patent Grants, Disclosures, and Litigation 政治捕获的限制：来自专利授予、披露和诉讼的证据
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-19 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12607
CHRISTINE CUNY, MIHIR N. MEHTA, WANLI ZHAO
{"title":"Limits to Political Capture: Evidence from Patent Grants, Disclosures, and Litigation","authors":"CHRISTINE CUNY, MIHIR N. MEHTA, WANLI ZHAO","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12607","url":null,"abstract":"Substantial evidence suggests that regulatory agencies in the United States can be captured by the politicians who oversee them. We provide novel evidence of a federal agency in which capture is limited: the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Although patent applications from politically connected applicants are slightly more likely to be approved despite being of lower ex post quality, additional analyses suggest these outcomes are not indicative of capture. In particular, the disclosure quality of connected patents' legal claims increases more than unconnected patents during the review process, narrowing the scope of the patents and constraining the intellectual property rights. Furthermore, connected patents are no more likely than others to be litigated ex post, suggesting these patent grants are not spurious. Our findings provide insights into how the design of a regulator can limit the benefits that accrue to politically connected firms.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143653360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamic Information Acquisition, Investment, and Disclosure 动态信息获取、投资与披露
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-17 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12610
SEUNG Y. LEE, IVÁN MARINOVIC
{"title":"Dynamic Information Acquisition, Investment, and Disclosure","authors":"SEUNG Y. LEE, IVÁN MARINOVIC","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12610","url":null,"abstract":"We present a dynamic model of information acquisition and disclosure. The manager seeks to maximize future stock prices and collects information privately about the firm's fundamentals. Information acquisition increases the arrival rate of private information. The manager can choose to disclose his private information or withhold it in perpetuity. We study the impact of information acquisition on the accumulation of private information, disclosure, and the firm's initial investment.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"124 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143635113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Accounting Information Usage and Trading by Retail Investors: Evidence from Integrated Trading Platform 会计信息使用与散户交易：来自综合交易平台的证据
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-17 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12606
JACKY CHAU
{"title":"Accounting Information Usage and Trading by Retail Investors: Evidence from Integrated Trading Platform","authors":"JACKY CHAU","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12606","url":null,"abstract":"This registered report investigates self-directed retail investors' information choices and trading decisions on an integrated trading platform that provides timely and convenient access to accounting information. The analyses reveal that these investors access a mosaic of information, with a high proportion not firm-specific. In accessing accounting disclosures, retail investors are more interested in media articles providing summaries or expert analyses than original filings. Retail trades on this integrated trading platform are more informed than another retail trading platform providing little information services while exhibiting no significant differences in informativeness compared with institutional trades using <i>Bulge Bracket</i> platforms. In particular, trade informativeness is more pronounced when there are accounting disclosures. The evidence suggests that self-directed retail investors can benefit from a trading environment that provides rich and convenient access to a mosaic of information, particularly timely accounting disclosures.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143635112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Racial Disparities in Financial Complaints and the Role of Corporate Social Attitudes 财务投诉中的种族差异及企业社会态度的作用
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-17 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12612
RACHEL M. HAYES, FENG JIANG, YIHUI PAN, HUAYI TANG
{"title":"Racial Disparities in Financial Complaints and the Role of Corporate Social Attitudes","authors":"RACHEL M. HAYES, FENG JIANG, YIHUI PAN, HUAYI TANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12612","url":null,"abstract":"Using consumer complaints filed with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as a measure for the quality of financial products and services, we present evidence of racial disparities in the service quality received by consumers. Consumers in high-minority communities file more complaints than those in low-minority communities, and the racial gap in financial complaints increased by more than 60% during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using a triple-difference approach, we establish the role of corporate social attitudes, reflected in, for example, inclusive promotion practices and diversity in leadership, in mitigating the complaint racial gap and its pandemic-period increase. Our results shed light on how inclusive corporate culture filters through an organization to benefit minority communities and underscore the effect of corporate social attitudes on important stakeholder outcomes.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"96 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143635150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Correction to “How Does Financial-Reporting Regulation Affect Industry-Wide Resource Allocation?” 更正“财务报告监管如何影响全行业资源配置？”
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-14 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12609
Matthias Breuer
{"title":"Correction to “How Does Financial-Reporting Regulation Affect Industry-Wide Resource Allocation?”","authors":"Matthias Breuer","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12609","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12609","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This correction describes errors in the program code of Breuer [2021] and presents revised results. The errors affect the construction of the standardized reporting and auditing scopes, the treatment variables of the primary research design in Breuer [2021]. The revised results show weaker evidence that reporting mandates facilitate ownership dispersion in capital markets compared to Breuer [2021]. They also show weaker evidence that reporting mandates spur competition in product markets, including mixed evidence on product-market entry. Consistent with Breuer [2021], the revised results continue to show no unambiguous evidence that reporting mandates improve the efficiency of industry-wide resource allocation. With respect to audit mandates, the revised results continue to show evidence that the mandates impose a barrier to entry. Overall, the correction indicates that the impacts of reporting and auditing mandates are even more uncertain than reported in Breuer [2021] and that further research on these impacts is called for.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 2","pages":"1031-1055"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12609","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143619009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic Scientific Disclosure: Evidence from the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act 战略性科学披露：来自莱希-史密斯美国发明法案的证据
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-12 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12605
KRISTEN VALENTINE, JENNY LI ZHANG, YUXIANG ZHENG
{"title":"Strategic Scientific Disclosure: Evidence from the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act","authors":"KRISTEN VALENTINE, JENNY LI ZHANG, YUXIANG ZHENG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12605","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12605","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the impact of technological competition on voluntary innovation disclosure around the enactment of the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (“AIA”). The AIA moves the US patent system from the first‐to‐invent to first‐inventor‐to‐file system and induces a patent race that increases technological competition. Firms that are slow to file a patent are disadvantaged in this race. We find that focal firms with lagging patent classes strategically increase scientific publications in their lagging technology areas in an attempt to block competitors from obtaining a patent. This effect is more pronounced in technology areas where the firm has better information about their relative competitive position (proxied by greater inventor mobility), in technology classes with constraints on increasing patent filing timeliness (proxied by fewer experienced attorneys), and areas characterized by more intense competition. We find that the peers of firms with lagging classes experience greater patent filing rejections for lack of novelty and obviousness reasons after the AIA, suggesting that strategic scientific disclosure is effective.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143607822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Effect of Intangible Asset Classification on Professional Financial Statement Users’ Assessments 无形资产分类对专业财务报表使用者评估的影响
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-04 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12604
Spencer B. Anderson, Kim I. Mendoza, Cassie Mongold
{"title":"The Effect of Intangible Asset Classification on Professional Financial Statement Users’ Assessments","authors":"Spencer B. Anderson,&nbsp;Kim I. Mendoza,&nbsp;Cassie Mongold","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12604","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12604","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Classification of financial statement elements into categories is an inherent, integral part of the financial reporting system. Although prior research documents that categories influence users’ perceptions of included items, we explore the reverse effect—how classifying items in a category can impact perceptions of the category itself and its other members. Using categorization theory from psychology and accounting literature and exploiting the classification challenges inherent to the crypto asset setting, we predict and find that classifying individual items into a category can impact equity analysts’ perceptions of the category itself and perceptions of the category's other members. We also explore the boundaries of this effect and find that categories like intangibles, with fewer common prototypical features, are more susceptible to these classification effects. Our results show several ways in which balance sheet classification could lead to unintended consequences for users.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 3","pages":"1107-1143"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12604","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143545852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Public Disclosure of Private Meetings: Does Observing Peers’ Information Acquisition Affect Analysts’ Attention Allocation? 非公开会议的公开披露：观察同伴的信息获取是否影响分析师的注意力分配？
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-03 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12603
Yi Ru, Ronghuo Zheng, Yuan Zou
{"title":"Public Disclosure of Private Meetings: Does Observing Peers’ Information Acquisition Affect Analysts’ Attention Allocation?","authors":"Yi Ru, Ronghuo Zheng, Yuan Zou","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12603","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the impact of observing peers’ information acquisition on financial analysts’ allocation of attention. Using the timely disclosure mandate by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as a setting, we find that, shortly after analysts observe that a firm has been visited by peer analysts, they reduce short-term attention to that firm, as indicated by a reduced tendency to conduct follow-up visits. Nonvisiting analysts who do not conduct follow-up visits are more likely to discontinue coverage of the visited firm. These findings are consistent with the conjecture that the timely disclosure reveals the first-mover advantage of visiting analysts, leading nonvisiting ones to reallocate their limited attention. We also find that, compared with the pre-mandate period, the information environments of visited firms deteriorate immediately after an analyst's visit but not over the longer term. Further evidence suggests that the timely disclosure mandate has positive externalities in the form of increased immediate attention to and improved short-term information environments of unvisited peer firms.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143532761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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