Journal of Accounting Research最新文献_第2页

Tax Subsidy Disclosure and Local Economic Effects 税收补贴披露与地方经济效应

IF 4.4 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-12-11 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12591

LISA DE SIMONE, REBECCA LESTER, ANEESH RAGHUNANDAN

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引用次数: 0

Spillover Effects of the SEC's Regulatory Oversight on Private Debt Contracting: Evidence from Cross‐listed Foreign Firms 美国证券交易委员会的监管对私人债务契约的溢出效应：来自交叉上市外国公司的证据

IF 4.4 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-11-12 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12585

Mahfuz Chy, Inder K. Khurana, Hoyoun Kyung

{"title":"Spillover Effects of the SEC's Regulatory Oversight on Private Debt Contracting: Evidence from Cross‐listed Foreign Firms","authors":"Mahfuz Chy, Inder K. Khurana, Hoyoun Kyung","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12585","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the effect of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) regulatory oversight on private debt contracting outcomes, using the signing of the multilateral memorandum of understanding (MMoU) as a natural experiment. The MMoU enables the SEC to take stricter punitive actions against wealth expropriation by cross‐listed firms’ insiders and enforce better compliance with applicable rules and regulations. We find that enhanced SEC oversight in the post‐MMoU regime lowers loan spreads by 36 basis points, thus saving an average cross‐listed firm approximately $9 million in direct loan costs over the life of a bank loan. Cross‐sectional analyses show that the effect is more pronounced for borrowers from countries with weaker institutions, borrowers with greater accounting discretion, and for loans arranged by top lenders or loans not secured by collateral. Conversely, the effect is less pronounced for borrowers who use IFRS or when the SEC faces greater budgetary constraints. Enhanced SEC oversight also leads to an increase in loan maturity and a decrease in financial covenants. Our evidence suggests that while the SEC's primary mandate is to protect public equity and bond investors, its supervision yields substantial borrowing cost savings and more lenient nonprice loan terms in the private debt markets as well.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142601958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Issue Information - Request for Papers 议题信息 - 征求论文

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-11-06 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12587

引用次数: 0

Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for 发行信息--长期征集有关《世界文化多样性宣言》的提案

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-11-06 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12588

引用次数: 0

Do Commercial Ties Influence ESG Ratings? Evidence from Moody's and S&P 商业关系会影响 ESG 评级吗？穆迪和标准普尔的证据

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-11-06 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12582

XUANBO LI, YUN LOU, LIANDONG ZHANG

引用次数: 0

How Does Judges’ Personal Exposure to Financial Fraud Affect White-Collar Sentencing? 法官个人对金融欺诈的接触如何影响白领量刑？

IF 4.4 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-10-22 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12584

TRUNG NGUYEN, ANEESH RAGHUNANDAN, ALEXANDRA SCHERF

引用次数: 0

Disclosure, Patenting, and Trade Secrecy 信息披露、专利申请和商业秘密

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-10-22 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12580

ARNOUD BOOT, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROV

引用次数: 0

The Role of Information in Building a More Sustainable Economy: A Supply and Demand Perspective 信息在建设更可持续的经济中的作用：供需视角

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-10-18 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12581

HENRY L. FRIEDMAN, GAIZKA ORMAZABAL

引用次数: 0

Comply or Explain: Do Firms Opportunistically Claim Trade Secrets in Mandatory Environmental Disclosure Programs? 遵守还是解释？企业在强制性环境信息披露计划中是否伺机索取商业秘密？

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-10-15 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12583

YILE (ANSON) JIANG

引用次数: 0

Measuring the Prevalence of Earnings Manipulations: A Novel Approach 衡量收益操纵的普遍性：一种新方法

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-10-08 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12578

NICOLE L. CADE, JOSHUA L. GUNN, ALEX J. VANDENBERG

{"title":"Measuring the Prevalence of Earnings Manipulations: A Novel Approach","authors":"NICOLE L. CADE, JOSHUA L. GUNN, ALEX J. VANDENBERG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12578","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12578","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We provide prevalence estimates for five forms of earnings manipulation based on executives’ reports about their firms’ actual reporting practices. After preregistering our methods and analyses via the <i>Journal of Accounting Research</i>’s registration-based editorial process, we recruit nearly a thousand executives from firms listed in the Russell 3000 Index to participate in either a survey or a list experiment; the hallmark of the latter being additional privacy protections designed to promote honest disclosure about self-incriminating information. In our survey, 26.8% of executives disclose at least one form of earnings manipulation at their firm in the 2018–2023 period: 18.0% report changing an operational activity to meet a near-term earnings target at the expense of long-term value (i.e., real earnings management), 8.8% report intentionally obfuscating unfavorable information, 6.6% report manipulating accruals, 3.9% report withholding material information, and 0.0% report accounting fraud. Our list experiment produces an economically higher result in two cases, estimating that 29.9% of firms engaged in real earnings management and 12.4% committed accounting fraud over the same time period. We conclude that while a traditional survey can provide credible lower-bound estimates for the prevalence of many forms of earnings manipulation, list experiments encourage more honest disclosure in some cases.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 1","pages":"113-164"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12578","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142386277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0