Journal of Accounting Research最新文献

{"title":"Use and Design of Peer Evaluations for Bonus Allocations","authors":"MANUEL GRIEDER, KARL SCHUHMACHER","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12628","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12628","url":null,"abstract":"We conduct an experiment to investigate the use of peer evaluations for compensation purposes. Although organizations often rely on peer evaluations for incentive compensation, it is not well understood how peer feedback should be used and designed to ensure non‐distorted evaluations and motivate effort provision. We study peer evaluations in form of bonus allocation proposals, thereby enabling a quantifiable test of our hypothesis. We distinguish between discretionary use (i.e., allocation by the manager) and formulaic use (i.e., allocation by the team via the average) of self‐including and self‐excluding proposals. We find that, relative to self‐including proposals, self‐excluding proposals are less distorted, irrespective of use, but lead to more effort provision only under formulaic use. Under discretionary use, the benefits of self‐excluding proposals are offset, as managerial biases enter bonus allocations. In sum, our findings illustrate benefits of delegating bonus allocations to teams through formulaic use of self‐excluding peer evaluations and extend the understanding of how organizations can effectively incorporate peer evaluations into incentive compensation.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144513357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"ESG Rating Competition and Rating Quality","authors":"CAI CHEN, SVENJA DUBE, SHIRAN FROYMOVICH","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12624","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12624","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines how increased competition among environmental, social, and governance (ESG) rating agencies relates to ESG rating quality. We exploit the entry of Sustainalytics as a new ESG rating agency in 2010. We conduct a difference‐in‐differences analysis and provide three main findings. First, we find that higher competition decreases incumbents' ESG rating disagreements of the same scope. The negative relation between competition and ESG rating disagreement persists for same‐scope rating metrics not covered by Sustainalytics, suggesting that neither learning nor herding drive the results. The relationship between competition and rating disagreement strengthens for firms with more ESG disclosures, which generally require more effort to analyze. Second, we find that incumbents' ratings of ESG concerns are more strongly associated with future negative ESG news for firms additionally covered by Sustainalytics. This finding is consistent with competition improving ratings' ability to predict future negative ESG incidents. Third, we find that incumbents evaluate more difficult‐to‐measure outcome metrics for firms covered by Sustainalytics, consistent with competition inducing more effort. Overall, our findings suggest that competition serves as an implicit disciplining mechanism of ESG rating agencies' quality.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"640 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144370610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"To Interact or Not? On the Benefits of Interacting with Unfavorable Analysts During Earnings Calls","authors":"JARED FLAKE","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12629","url":null,"abstract":"Managers prioritize favorable analysts during earnings calls, reinforcing analysts’ incentives for optimism. However, managers also frequently interact with unfavorable analysts, and this study examines the determinants and benefits of these interactions. I find that managers interact more with unfavorable analysts when compelled to do so. I then examine two likely benefits of these interactions. First, unfavorable analysts attenuate their negative views after interacting with managers. Second, price reactions to management forecasts are stronger for managers who regularly interact with unfavorable analysts, consistent with enhanced reporting credibility. Finally, using peer firm restatements as exogenous shocks to investors’ perceptions of accounting quality, I find that nonrestating firms with managers who regularly interact with unfavorable analysts experience attenuated negative returns relative to other nonrestating peers. Overall, the empirical evidence indicates firms experience significant benefits when managers interact with unfavorable analysts and these benefits persist amongst compelled and voluntary interactions.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144320385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Index Creation, Information Changes, and Financing*","authors":"VIDHAN K. GOYAL, DANIEL URBAN, WENTING ZHAO","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12626","url":null,"abstract":"We study how stock index inclusion affects corporate financing using a global sample of 198 index events—primarily new index launches—across 21 markets. Firms added to indexes issue more public debt but not equity, leading to a sustained increase in leverage. Inclusion draws greater attention from analysts and the media and increases the likelihood of receiving credit ratings. As a result, indexed firms benefit from more liquid bond markets and lower yield spreads, prompting greater reliance on public debt. Consistent with an information‐driven mechanism, leverage responses are strongest in countries with weaker information environments. However, these information gains do not enhance stock price informativeness: bid‐ask spreads, price impact measures, post‐earnings announcement drift, and the implied cost of equity remain unchanged—likely because of the growing presence of information‐insensitive passive investors.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"147 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144319319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Signaling Value of Internal Employee Coordination","authors":"WEI CAI, DENNIS CAMPBELL, JIEHANG YU","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12623","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12623","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the effect of internal employee coordination on customer trust, focusing specifically on employees’ responsiveness to each other as an important, quantifiable, and objective aspect of internal coordination. Using proprietary data from a company with exogenous assignment of employees to teams that serve individual customers, we study how inter‐employee responsiveness influences customer trust. Each customer is served via an app‐based group chat by a randomly assigned team of employees. Our data include more than 2 million group chat messages with over 16 thousand customers. We find that inter‐employee responsiveness serves as a credible signal that helps build customer trust, as evidenced by their subsequent contracting choices. The effect is more pronounced when the signal is (1) more frequent and (2) more intense. Our findings highlight the novel value of internal employee responsiveness as a credible signal that helps build trust with external stakeholders.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144153459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12622","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 3","pages":"1059"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12622","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143871597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12621","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 3","pages":"1058"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12621","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143871815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"2024 Excellence in Refereeing","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12620","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12620","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The <i>Journal of Accounting Research</i> is proud to recognize our top referees of the previous calendar year. The senior editors selected those named below for their “2024 Excellence in Refereeing” based on the quality and the number of reviews they had performed for the journal during the years 2023 and 2024. We thank the referees for their invaluable services to the journal.</p><p>Darren Bernard, <i>University of Washington</i></p><p>Anne Beyer, <i>Stanford University</i></p><p>Jannis Bischof, <i>University of Mannheim</i></p><p>Matthew Bloomfield, <i>University of Pennsylvania</i></p><p>Thomas Bourveau, <i>Columbia University</i></p><p>Matthias Breuer, <i>Columbia University</i></p><p>Ulf Brüggemann, <i>Humboldt University Berlin</i></p><p>Jung Ho Choi, <i>Stanford University</i></p><p>Christine Cuny, <i>New York University</i></p><p>Yiwei Dou, <i>New York University</i></p><p>Atif Ellahie, <i>University of Utah</i></p><p>Vivian Fang, <i>Indiana University</i></p><p>Fabrizio Ferri, <i>University of Miami</i></p><p>Paul Fischer, <i>University of Pennsylvania</i></p><p>Henry Friedman, <i>University of California, Los Angeles</i></p><p>John Gallemore, <i>University of North Carolina</i></p><p>Brandon Gipper, <i>Stanford University</i></p><p>João Granja, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Nicholas Guest, <i>Cornell University</i></p><p>Katharina Hombach, <i>Goethe University, Frankfurt</i></p><p>Allen Huang, <i>Hong Kong University of Science and Technology</i></p><p>Martin Jacob, <i>IESE Business School</i></p><p>Xu Jiang, <i>Duke University</i></p><p>Zachary Kaplan, <i>Washington University, St. Louis</i></p><p>Jung Min Kim, <i>Northwestern University</i></p><p>Sehwa Kim, <i>Columbia University</i></p><p>Natalia Kovrijnykh, <i>Arizona State University</i></p><p>Sinja Leonelli, <i>New York University</i></p><p>Rebecca Lester, <i>Stanford University</i></p><p>Miao Liu, <i>Boston College</i></p><p>Daniele Macciocchi, <i>University of Miami</i></p><p>Lucas Mahieux, <i>Tilburg University</i></p><p>Charles McClure, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Allison Nicoletti, <i>University of Pennsylvania</i></p><p>Suzie Noh, <i>Stanford University</i></p><p>James Omartian, <i>University of Michigan</i></p><p>Matthew Phillips, <i>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</i></p><p>Thomas Rauter, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Delphine Samuels, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Joseph Schroeder, <i>Indiana University</i></p><p>Lorien Stice-Lawrence, <i>University of Southern California</i></p><p>Gurpal Sran, <i>New York University</i></p><p>Christopher Stewart, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Ivo Tafkov, <i>Georgia State University</i></p><p>Sorabh Tomar, <i>Southern Methodist University</i></p><p>Rimmy Tomy, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>David Veenman, <i>University of Amsterdam</i></p><p>Felix Vetter, <i>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</i></p><p>Edward Watts, <i>Yale University</i></p><p>Brady Williams, <i>University of Texas, Austin</i><","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 3","pages":"1061-1062"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12620","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143871814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Accounting for Goodwill","authors":"STEFAN J. HUBER,&nbsp;CHARLES G. MCCLURE","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12618","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12618","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A significant portion of a merger's purchase price is allocated to goodwill. Currently, goodwill is not amortized but rather tested annually for impairment. When managers of acquiring firms care about earnings, goodwill's accounting treatment can have large effects on future earnings and may influence how much a manager will bid for a target company. We quantify the effects of goodwill accounting by estimating a structural model of corporate takeovers. Our estimates suggest accrual accounting increases buyout premia by an average of approximately 11 percentage points. If firms needed to amortize goodwill over 10 years, we estimate premia would reduce by 4.9 percentage points and M&amp;A volume would shrink by 4.1% or $67 billion per year. Furthermore, the fraction of private equity acquirers would increase by 6.9 percentage points, shifting control over productive assets to the private and financial sector. Our results suggest the accounting treatment for goodwill has a meaningful effect on the market for corporate control.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 3","pages":"1145-1185"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12618","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143846497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Common Investor Relations Representation","authors":"DAVID VOLANT","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12619","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12619","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines the capital market implications of common investor relations (IR) representation, a phenomenon in which multiple public firms share the same external IR representative. Using a difference-in-differences research design, I document that common IR representation is associated with greater overlap in institutional ownership and sell-side analyst coverage as well as similarities in disclosure practices among clients—even those operating in different industries. These effects culminate in heightened return comovement among firms sharing IR representation. My findings provide insight into the role of IR companies as capital market gatekeepers and suggest that when a firm outsources its IR function, the IR company influences its capital market connectivity.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 3","pages":"1237-1283"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12619","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143832127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}