ROBERT R. CARNES, DANE M. CHRISTENSEN, PAUL E. MADSEN
{"title":"Externalities of Financial Statement Fraud on the Incoming Accounting Labor Force","authors":"ROBERT R. CARNES, DANE M. CHRISTENSEN, PAUL E. MADSEN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12501","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Financial statement fraud generates many negative effects, including reducing people's willingness to participate in the stock market. If it also stigmatizes accounting, it may similarly adversely affect the quantity and quality of workers willing to become accountants, thereby potentially creating negative effects for years to come. We examine the impact of fraud on the labor force entering the accounting profession, which is a key input into the production of accounting information (i.e., the output). Using data describing millions of college students across the United States, we find incoming students are actually more likely to major in accounting when local frauds occur during their formative years. These students are also more likely to have attributes desired by the accounting profession (e.g., high academic aptitude) and are more likely to subsequently serve in public accounting and become Certified Public Accountants. In the context of other fields (i.e., all college majors), we find that fraud similarly spurs interest in other business disciplines, but not in majors outside of business schools. Those attracted to other business disciplines, however, generally possess different traits. Specifically, students entering accounting are distinctively more likely to exhibit values espoused by the accounting profession, including a predisposition to public service and less commercial orientation. Thus, nonpecuniary motives appear to uniquely drive accounting student enrollment following fraud. Collectively, our findings suggest that, while fraud is unmistakably bad, it appears to have the positive unintended consequence of attracting labor into business disciplines and, in accounting, increasing the prevalence of desirable traits among entrants.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"61 5","pages":"1531-1589"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50126671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
TRAVIS CHOW, ZHONGWEN FAN, LI HUANG, OLIVER ZHEN LI, SIMAN LI
{"title":"Reciprocity in Corporate Tax Compliance—Evidence from Ozone Pollution","authors":"TRAVIS CHOW, ZHONGWEN FAN, LI HUANG, OLIVER ZHEN LI, SIMAN LI","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12500","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In a tax—public goods reciprocity framework between citizens and the state, managers view taxes as a payment to the government in exchange for public goods, and hence they adjust their willingness to pay taxes as public good quality changes. We show that corporate tax planning intensity increases with ground-level ozone pollution. Revisions in ozone pollution regulations cause counties that failed the revised and more stringent standards to reduce ozone pollution. Consequently, firms headquartered in these counties reduced corporate tax planning intensity relative to firms in other counties. The ozone-tax link varies in the predicted directions with public attention to pollution, potential welfare loss due to ozone, managers’ stakeholder orientation, taxpayers’ polluting status, political preferences, and civic norms. We also find consistent results for Superfund cleanups of hazardous waste sites. Our research sheds light on reciprocity as a potential mechanism influencing corporate tax compliance.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"61 5","pages":"1425-1477"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50144579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12446","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"61 4","pages":"980"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12446","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50154214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Financially Material Effects of Mandatory Nonfinancial Disclosure","authors":"BRIAN GIBBONS","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12499","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12499","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Complaints from institutional investors suggest that principles-based disclosure regimes that rely on financial materiality standards produce inadequate nonfinancial environmental and social (E&S) information. Using the staggered introduction of 40 country-level regulations that mandate disclosure, I document that reporting E&S information relates to increased investment from institutional owners and has material effects on firms’ investment and financing decisions. Firms mandated to disclose E&S information allocate more investment toward long-term, innovative projects and raise more equity capital. Evidence indicates that disclosure attracts long-term–oriented institutional clientele with E&S preferences, which then feeds back on firm decision making. Although the effects of nonfinancial disclosure are similar to those of improved financial disclosure, this clientele mechanism is unique. Taken together, these results suggest that jurisdictions that rely solely on financial materiality disclosure standards create nonfinancial information frictions with material effects on investors and firm decision making.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 5","pages":"1711-1754"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48296577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Economic Consequences of Transparency Regulation: Evidence from Bank Mortgage Lending","authors":"ALLISON NICOLETTI, CHRISTINA ZHU","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12498","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We examine the economic consequences of a rule designed to improve consumers' understanding of mortgage information. The 2015 TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosures rule (TRID) simplifies the mortgage disclosures provided to consumers. As a consequence, TRID-affected mortgages become a less attractive investment opportunity to banks. Our main results document that mortgage applications affected by TRID are less likely to be approved following the rule's effective date. We find evidence consistent with both a decrease in consumers' information processing costs and an increase in banks' secondary market frictions, providing insight into the potential channels through which this reduction in mortgage credit operates. We also find that banks partially compensate for reduced mortgage lending by increasing small business lending, and that fintechs absorb mortgage demand in areas with reduced mortgage lending by banks. Our study documents real actions that firms take in response to disclosure transparency regulation and contributes to the literature on the economic consequences of such regulation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"61 5","pages":"1827-1871"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50141912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Governments Hide Resources from Unions? The Influence of Public Sector Unions on Reported Discretionary Fund Balance Ratios","authors":"ANGELA K. GORE, YUAN JI, SUSAN L. KULP","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12497","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12497","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We explore whether municipalities with public sector unions exploit aspects of governmental (or “fund”) accounting to obscure the availability of discretionary resources in fund balance accounts, relative to municipalities without public sector unions. We first investigate whether governments with unions report higher proportions of discretionary resources <i>outside</i> of the general fund, a primary measure of financial health, and instead within less prominent fund types. Second, we explore whether governments with unions report lower ratios within accessible general fund balance account categories – that is, report lower proportions of unreserved fund balance. Primary findings are consistent with both hypotheses. Although somewhat mixed, cross-sectional analyses reveal that effects are magnified when unions have more bargaining power, as proxied by the ability to strike or the absence of state right-to-work laws. Further analysis corroborates cross-sectional findings by examining difference-in-differences specifications surrounding the quasi-exogenous shock of Wisconsin's 2011 weakening of state public sector union laws and Ohio's time-varying union contract negotiations. Overall, the evidence suggests that governments with unions shelter resources to avoid the appearance of large discretionary amounts available.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"61 5","pages":"1735-1770"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43286107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Price Rigidities and the Value of Public Information","authors":"LIFENG GU, JIN XIE","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12495","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12495","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Firms' inflexibility in adjusting output prices to economic shocks exacerbates information asymmetry with respect to firms' profits, but public information on firms' cost structure mitigates this problem. We construct a novel form of public information from economic statistics disclosed by the government and find that such public information significantly reduces inflexible-price firms' bid–ask spreads, the probability of informed trading, and analyst forecast dispersions, but these results do not hold for flexible-price firms. Security analysts seek more cost-related information during conference calls about inflexible-price firms, but such a phenomenon is observed less frequently if a firm's input cost is more publicly observable. In addition, stock markets react more strongly to earning news announced by inflexible-price firms, consistent with our intuition.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 1","pages":"137-179"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135269414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Real Effects of Modern Information Technologies: Evidence from the EDGAR Implementation","authors":"ITAY GOLDSTEIN, SHIJIE YANG, LUO ZUO","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12496","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using the implementation of the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system from 1993 to 1996 as a shock to information dissemination technologies, we examine how a significant reduction in disclosure processing costs affects the real economy. We find that the EDGAR implementation leads to an increase in corporate investment and that this effect is concentrated in value firms. We provide evidence that improved equity financing and enhanced managerial incentives are likely the underlying mechanisms. Specifically, the EDGAR implementation leads to an increase in a firm's stock liquidity, a decrease in the cost of equity capital, and an increase in the level of equity financing. Consistent with the monitoring effect of broad information dissemination, the EDGAR implementation leads to an increase in a firm's operating performance. Our findings suggest that it is important to consider information dissemination beyond information production when examining the real effects of corporate disclosures.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"61 5","pages":"1699-1733"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50140211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Public Firms’ Mandatory IFRS Reporting Crowd Out Private Firms’ Capital Investment?","authors":"JIANCHENG (DUNCAN) LIU, WEI SHI, CHENG ZENG, GUOCHANG ZHANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12494","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by publicly listed firms in the European Union affects peer private firms. We find that private firms’ capital investment decreases significantly after the IFRS mandate, relative to public firms. Private firms also display decreased investment when benchmarked against firms relatively insulated from the impact of the IFRS mandate, but the magnitude of the effect is smaller in this case. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that mandatory IFRS reporting (combined with other reforms), while increasing public firms’ financing and investment, crowds out funding for private firms. The effect is more pronounced for larger private firms and in industries where public peers have greater external financing needs. Our evidence suggests that financial reporting regulations cause shifts in resource allocation in an economy.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"61 4","pages":"1263-1312"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12494","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50144838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12443","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"61 3","pages":"692"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12443","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50143805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}