{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.70022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.70022","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2025-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.70022","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145366823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Diversity Tokenism","authors":"KELVIN K. F. LAW, JINGDAN TAN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.70019","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.70019","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using data from over 4,000 Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests across 600 U.S. counties from 2014 to 2021, we examine how BLM activism shapes corporate diversity at different organizational levels. We develop an approach integrating OpenAI's GPT-4 with Chain-of-Thought prompting to classify race and ethnicity. In our validation tests, this method achieves higher accuracy than several tested open-source algorithms. Our main findings are as follows. First, although firms headquartered in protest-affected counties add more Black directors, particularly in larger protests, this gain appears to largely offset the representation of other non-Black minority directors. Second, these board-level shifts do not consistently extend to executives or the general workforce. In contrast, a gap may emerge between a firm's workforce composition and local labor-market demographics, particularly in the representation of Black employees. This pattern is consistent with diversity tokenism, which suggests firms may prioritize high-visibility board appointments and potentially downplay broader, transformative change. Our findings indicate that although board-level diversity gains are highly visible and attract notable public attention, they may not be accompanied by an organization's transformative commitment to company-wide diversity.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"64 1","pages":"317-363"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.70019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145254609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Chelsea M. Anderson, Vivian W. Fang, James R. Moon Jr, Jonathan E. Shipman
{"title":"Accounting for Cryptocurrencies*","authors":"Chelsea M. Anderson, Vivian W. Fang, James R. Moon Jr, Jonathan E. Shipman","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.70018","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679x.70018","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper explores U.S. public firms’ cryptocurrency holdings and accounting practices from 2013 to 2022 against the backdrop of the recently enacted crypto accounting rule, ASU 2023-08. Descriptive analyses suggest exponential growth in corporate crypto holdings and significant variation in crypto accounting practices, underscoring the rule's necessity. Hypothesis tests using the pre-rule data reveal three insights with direct relevance to the rule. First, firms appear to view crypto assets more akin to investments than intangible assets, consistent with the rule's mandate of the fair value model. Second, Big 4 auditors steer firms toward the impairment model and less detailed presentation choices. This conservative approach is unlikely to meet the new rule's goal of providing the most decision-useful information. Third, increased liquidity of crypto markets prompts the use of the fair value model and a more detailed presentation, consistent with the rule's focus on more actively traded tokens. However, within our sample, we find some evidence consistent with fair value reporting increasing stock return volatility and no evidence that it enhances earnings informativeness.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"64 1","pages":"45-79"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145072760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jonas Ewertz, Charlotte Knickrehm, Martin Nienhaus, Doron Reichmann
{"title":"Listen Closely: Measuring Vocal Tone in Corporate Disclosures","authors":"Jonas Ewertz, Charlotte Knickrehm, Martin Nienhaus, Doron Reichmann","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.70015","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.70015","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the usefulness of machine learning approaches for measuring vocal tone in corporate disclosures. We document a substantial mismatch between the widely adopted actor-based training data underlying these approaches and speech in corporate disclosures. We find that existing models achieve near-perfect vocal tone classification within their training domain. However, when tested on actual executive speech during conference calls, their performance declines to chance levels. We thus introduce FinVoc2Vec, a deep learning model that adapts to audio recordings of conference calls and classifies the vocal tone of executive speech significantly more accurately than chance. FinVoc2Vec estimates are associated with future firm performance and can be used to construct profitable stock portfolios. Throughout our analyses, estimates from previous vocal tone models are largely unrelated to firm performance. Our findings emphasize the importance of a domain-specific approach to voice analysis in accounting and finance.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"64 1","pages":"229-277"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.70015","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145056728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Company Websites: A New Measure of Disclosure","authors":"ROMAIN BOULLAND, THOMAS BOURVEAU, MATTHIAS BREUER","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.70007","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.70007","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose a new measure of firms' disclosure based on company websites, which are widely available and contain a wealth of information. For a sample of U.S. public firms, we construct our disclosure measure using historical website data, validate it by correlating it with extant measures of disclosure and information asymmetry, and explore its determinants. We then apply our measure to the study of U.S. private firms' disclosure and French firms' compliance with a nonfinancial disclosure mandate. Our applications illustrate that our website-based measure provides a useful complement to extant measures of disclosure, which are more narrowly focused on investors in public capital markets.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"64 1","pages":"81-125"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2025-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.70007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144898878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Freedom of Expression Protection and Corporate Concealment of Bad News: Evidence from State Anti-SLAPP Laws","authors":"JIMMY LEE, SHAPHAN NG, IL SUN YOO, LIANDONG ZHANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.70012","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.70012","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The protection of free speech enhances the ability of various public stakeholders to disseminate privately observed adverse information about public firms, making it difficult for corporate managers to conceal negative information about their companies. Using the staggered enactment of anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP) laws across U.S. states as a shock that strengthens free speech protection, we show that stronger protection is associated with less concealment of bad news. This is evidenced by a lower likelihood of stock price crashes, a decreased probability of accounting fraud, and an increased frequency of firm-initiated negative press releases. These results are more pronounced for states with stronger anti-SLAPP laws and where such laws are likely to be more influential. Moreover, the impact of free speech protection on bad news concealment is more significant for firms with greater ex ante incentives to conceal negative information. Further analyses suggest that free speech protection likely enhances the ability of short sellers, employees, and the media, among others, to reveal bad news about public firms. Finally, we find evidence that strengthened free speech protection also improves financial reporting quality. Our study highlights the importance of free speech protection in enhancing corporate transparency.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"64 1","pages":"365-415"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2025-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.70012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146136179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Foreign Investors’ Information Access Vary with Geopolitical Tensions? Evidence from Corporate Conference Calls","authors":"YIFEI LU, JOANNA SHUANG WU, YUCHENG (JOHN) YANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.70009","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.70009","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study how foreign investors’ access to corporate information varies with pairwise geopolitical tensions between the investor's and investee's countries. Using a sample of 1,760 country-pairs, we find that geopolitical tensions between a conference call host firm's country and a foreign country relate negatively with investor participation from that foreign country as well as the quality and tone of management responses in the call, suggesting reduced foreign investor information access with rising tensions. A single-country analysis of Chinese AB-share firms produces similar inferences. With higher China–foreign tensions, foreign attendance at private meetings with management declines, and English translations of local language disclosures become less frequent and shorter in length. Curtailment in English translations is more pronounced when local language disclosures contain politically sensitive words, suggesting lower information supply by firm choice. Reduced disclosures from geopolitical tensions are impounded in foreign investors’ asset pricing decisions, resulting in steeper foreign-share price discounts.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"64 1","pages":"417-475"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2025-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.70009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146129906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Amendment Thresholds and Voting Rules in Debt Contracts","authors":"JUDSON CASKEY, KANYUAN HUANG, DANIEL SAAVEDRA","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.70011","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.70011","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Most loan contracts in the United States contain a provision for lender voting rules. We study the optimal voting rule that allows lenders to waive a covenant violation. When lenders have heterogeneous preferences, lenient voting rules increase the probability of waivers that allow inefficient investments. Stringent voting rules tend to allocate the marginal vote to lenders who deny waivers after false alarms so that they can renegotiate the loan to extract value from the firm, which incurs deadweight costs. In equilibrium, the optimal voting rule balances these two forces to improve contracting efficiency. We derive and empirically test comparative statics on how the optimal voting rule varies with lenders’ preferences and the borrower's accounting properties. Our model offers a rationale for the prevalent use of voting rule clauses in syndicated loan contracts.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"64 1","pages":"181-227"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2025-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.70011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146136394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Shared Auditors Facilitate Follow-on Innovation?","authors":"XUAN TIAN, JIAWEN YAN, LUO ZUO","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.70010","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.70010","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate whether shared auditors promote the dissemination of innovative knowledge among their clients, thereby fostering follow-on innovation. We find that a company cites more patents from another company when they are audited by the same audit office. To address concerns about potential confounding factors stemming from commonalities in the fundamentals of the two companies, we leverage a quasi-exogenous shock to auditor sharing: the demise of Arthur Andersen and the subsequent increase in auditor switching in 2002. Further analysis reveals that the effect of a shared auditor on cross-client patent citations is stronger when both clients engage in intensive innovation activities. Additional evidence suggests that shared auditors exert more influence on the citations of recent patents and patents that are easier for outsiders to utilize. Overall, our findings suggest that auditors affect corporate innovation by facilitating the transfer of innovative knowledge among their clients.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"64 1","pages":"477-514"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2025-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.70010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144924022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.70006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.70006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2025-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.70006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144782612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}