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Cultural Origin and Minority Shareholder Expropriation: Historical Evidence 文化起源与小股东征用：历史证据
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-10-25 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12517
ZHIHUI GU, WEI SUN, FRANK S. ZHOU
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引用次数: 0
Transparency in Hierarchies 等级制度的透明度
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-10-20 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12516
CHRISTIAN HOFMANN, RAFFI J. INDJEJIKIAN
{"title":"Transparency in Hierarchies","authors":"CHRISTIAN HOFMANN,&nbsp;RAFFI J. INDJEJIKIAN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12516","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12516","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We use an agency model to address the benefits and costs of transparency in a hierarchical organization in which the principal employs a manager entrusted with contracting authority and several workers, all under conditions of moral hazard. We define the principal's transparency choices as a decision to allow workers to observe their coworkers’ performances (<i>observability</i>) and as an investment in monitoring worker performance (<i>precision</i>). We find that whereas precision alleviates agency conflicts as expected, observability can exacerbate agency conflicts, especially if the manager's interests are misaligned sufficiently with those of the principal. Our results suggest several testable hypotheses including predictions that opaque performance measurement practices are well suited for small organizational units at lower hierarchical ranks, and in settings where the sensitivity-precision of the available measures is low, workers’ performances are correlated positively, and managerial productivity is modest.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 1","pages":"411-445"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12516","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135617592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information - Request for Registered Reports 问题信息-注册报告请求
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-10-19 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12511
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Registered Reports","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12511","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12511","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"61 5","pages":"1421-1422"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12511","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50138365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for 发布信息-长期征求建议书
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-10-19 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12512
{"title":"Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12512","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12512","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"61 5","pages":"1423"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12512","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50138366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Treatment of Accounting Changes and Covenant Violation Errors 会计变更和违反公约错误的处理办法
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-10-19 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12515
CHUNMEI ZHU
{"title":"Treatment of Accounting Changes and Covenant Violation Errors","authors":"CHUNMEI ZHU","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12515","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12515","url":null,"abstract":"<p>GAAP provisions in loan contracts specify how to address the effect of accounting changes on financial covenants. I document a pronounced upward trend in and the dominance of frozen-on-request (FOR) GAAP provisions, which incorporate accounting changes unless either the borrower or the lender requests a freeze. FOR GAAP streamlines the process of incorporating accounting changes into covenant calculations by obviating the need for renegotiations and prevents opportunistic GAAP freezes by requiring good faith renegotiations. Therefore, FOR GAAP is more likely to incorporate accounting changes beneficial to covenant informativeness, leading to lower false positives (i.e., Type I errors of financial covenant violations) and false negatives (i.e., Type II errors of financial covenant violations). Based on a large sample of loan contracts, I find that FOR GAAP decreases false positives and false negatives after controlling for self-selection bias and that the decrease is more pronounced when accounting changes relevant to financial covenants are more significant. My study provides new evidence of the role accounting standards and GAAP provisions play in debt contracting efficiency.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"783-824"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12515","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135780412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information - Request for Papers 问题信息-论文征集
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-10-19 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12449
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12449","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"61 5","pages":"1420"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12449","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50138364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What Role Do Boards Play in Companies with Visionary CEOs? 董事会在拥有远见卓识的首席执行官的公司中扮演什么角色？
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-10-16 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12514
XU JIANG, VOLKER LAUX
{"title":"What Role Do Boards Play in Companies with Visionary CEOs?","authors":"XU JIANG,&nbsp;VOLKER LAUX","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12514","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12514","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Visionary CEOs have strong beliefs about the right course of action for their firms. How should a board of directors that does not necessarily share the visionary CEO's confidence advise and monitor the CEO? We consider a model in which the board can acquire costly information about the firm's optimal strategic direction. The board not only advises the CEO on strategy, but also must approve it, and the CEO exerts effort to implement the strategy. We find that the board gathers less information when the CEO believes more strongly in his vision. Further, depending on the strength of the CEO's belief bias, the board either plays an advisory role, a monitoring role, or a rubberstamping role. The model predicts that in firms that are led by highly visionary CEOs, boards are passive in that they acquire little information and rubberstamp the visionary's proposal. Nevertheless, shareholders prefer the visionary over an unbiased manager in industries in which obtaining information about the correct course of action is difficult and costly.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"981-1005"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134993758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Regulatory Transparency and Regulators’ Effort: Evidence from Public Release of the SEC's Review Work 监管透明度与监管者的努力：公开发布美国证券交易委员会审查工作的证据
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-10-12 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12513
RUI GUO, Xiaoli (Shaolee) Tian
{"title":"Regulatory Transparency and Regulators’ Effort: Evidence from Public Release of the SEC's Review Work","authors":"RUI GUO,&nbsp;Xiaoli (Shaolee) Tian","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12513","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12513","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using the public release of comment letters on EDGAR to capture a regime shift toward regulatory transparency, we examine whether an increase in transparency affects regulators’ effort and work performance. We find that the SEC staff reviews more filings and more documents per filing following the disclosure regime shift. These effects are incrementally stronger for firms with comment letters that are expected to attract greater investor or public monitoring. Furthermore, under the new regime, reviews are more timely. Upon the regime switch, the likelihood of a restatement (receiving a comment letter) decreases (increases) for filings that are reviewed. After receiving a comment letter, a firm with signs of potential fraud is more likely to be investigated, and this effect becomes more pronounced under the new regime. Altogether, our findings suggest that publicly disclosing regulators’ work output can mitigate moral hazard (i.e., increase regulators’ work input), improving their work performance.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 1","pages":"229-273"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12513","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information Complementarities and the Dynamics of Transparency Shock Spillovers 信息互补性与透明度冲击溢出效应的动态变化
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-10-03 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12510
SHANTANU BANERJEE, SUDIPTO DASGUPTA, RUI SHI, JIALI YAN
{"title":"Information Complementarities and the Dynamics of Transparency Shock Spillovers","authors":"SHANTANU BANERJEE,&nbsp;SUDIPTO DASGUPTA,&nbsp;RUI SHI,&nbsp;JIALI YAN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12510","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12510","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We show that information complementarities play an important role in the spillover of transparency shocks. We exploit the revelation of financial misconduct by S&amp;P 500 firms, and in a “Stacked Difference-in-Differences” design, find that the implied cost of capital increases for “close” industry peers of the fraudulent firms relative to “distant” industry peers. The spillover effect is particularly strong when the close peers and the fraudulent firm share common analyst coverage and common institutional ownership, which have been shown to be powerful proxies for fundamental linkages and information complementarities. We provide evidence that increase in the cost of capital of peer firms is due, at least in part, to “beta shocks.” Disclosure by close peers—especially those with co-coverage and co-ownership links—also increases following fraud revelation. Although disclosure remains high in the following years, the cost of equity starts to decrease.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 1","pages":"55-99"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12510","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corporate R&D Investments Following Competitors’ Voluntary Disclosures: Evidence from the Drug Development Process 竞争对手自愿披露后的企业研发投资：来自药物开发过程的证据
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-09-25 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12509
YUE ZHANG
{"title":"Corporate R&D Investments Following Competitors’ Voluntary Disclosures: Evidence from the Drug Development Process","authors":"YUE ZHANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12509","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12509","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper examines the role of peer firm disclosures in shaping corporate research and development (R&amp;D) investments. Drawing on models of two-stage R&amp;D races, I hypothesize that a firm could be either deterred or encouraged by peer disclosure of interim R&amp;D success, depending on peer firms’ R&amp;D strength in the race. Using granular, project-level data on clinical trials in the drug development process, I find that a firm's R&amp;D investments in a specific therapeutic area are deterred by disclosures of early-phase trial initiation from strong rivals in the same area but encouraged by disclosures from weak rivals. Cross-sectional analyses show that focal firm strength and disclosure relevance moderate the effects of peer firm disclosure. Overall, my evidence suggests that peer firms’ R&amp;D disclosures can have both proprietary costs and deterrence benefits.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 1","pages":"335-373"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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