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The Impact of Information Frictions Within Regulators: Evidence from Workplace Safety Violations 监管机构内部信息摩擦的影响：工作场所安全违规行为的证据
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12541
ANEESH RAGHUNANDAN, THOMAS G. RUCHTI
{"title":"The Impact of Information Frictions Within Regulators: Evidence from Workplace Safety Violations","authors":"ANEESH RAGHUNANDAN,&nbsp;THOMAS G. RUCHTI","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12541","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12541","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is decentralized, wherein field offices coordinated at the state level undertake inspections. We study whether this structure can lead to interstate frictions in sharing information and how this impacts firms’ compliance with workplace safety laws. We find that firms caught violating in one state subsequently violate less in that state but violate more in other states. Despite this pattern, and in keeping with information frictions, violations in one state do not trigger proactive OSHA inspections in other states. Moreover, firms face lower monetary penalties when subsequent violations occur across state lines, likely due to the lack of documentation necessary to assess severe penalties. Finally, firms are more likely to shift violating behavior into states with greater information frictions. Our findings suggest that internal information within regulators impacts the likelihood and location of corporate misconduct.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"1067-1120"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12541","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140333748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Algorithmic Trading and Forward-Looking MD&A Disclosures 算法交易和前瞻性 MD&A 披露
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12540
WAYNE B. THOMAS, YIDING WANG, LING ZHANG
{"title":"Algorithmic Trading and Forward-Looking MD&A Disclosures","authors":"WAYNE B. THOMAS,&nbsp;YIDING WANG,&nbsp;LING ZHANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12540","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12540","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines how algorithmic trading (AT) affects forward-looking disclosures in Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&amp;A) of annual reports. We predict and find evidence that AT relates negatively to modifications in year-over-year forward-looking MD&amp;A disclosures. This evidence is consistent with AT reducing investors’ demand for fundamental information, which reduces managers’ incentives to supply costly forward-looking disclosures. Cross-sectional tests provide additional evidence that this negative relation is more pronounced for firms with larger earnings surprises and those with losses. We further validate our conclusion by demonstrating that investors’ fundamental information searches are a channel through which AT affects forward-looking disclosures. The conclusion is robust to using the SEC's Tick Size Pilot Program as an exogenous shock to AT and to using alternative disclosure measures (e.g., tone revisions and number of sentences in forward-looking MD&amp;A disclosures). Overall, our study demonstrates that AT is a contributing factor to regulators’ concerns over the diminishing usefulness of forward-looking information in MD&amp;A disclosures.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1533-1569"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140533249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information - Request for Registered Reports 发行信息 - 申请注册报告
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-03-29 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12537
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引用次数: 0
Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for 发行信息--长期征集有关《世界文化多样性宣言》的提案
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-03-29 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12538
{"title":"Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12538","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12538","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"451"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12538","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140329033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information - Request for Papers 议题信息 - 征求论文
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-03-29 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12536
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12536","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"448"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12536","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140329038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Social Comparison on Multiple Tasks: Sacrificing Overall Performance for Local Excellence? 多重任务的社会比较：为局部卓越而牺牲整体表现？
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-03-26 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12535
MAXIMILIAN KOHLER, MATTHIAS D. MAHLENDORF, MISCHA SEITER, TIMO VOGELSANG
{"title":"Social Comparison on Multiple Tasks: Sacrificing Overall Performance for Local Excellence?","authors":"MAXIMILIAN KOHLER,&nbsp;MATTHIAS D. MAHLENDORF,&nbsp;MISCHA SEITER,&nbsp;TIMO VOGELSANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12535","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12535","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This field experiment investigates how different levels of aggregation in relative performance information (RPI) impact employee performance in environments with multiple tasks. We randomly assign store employees of a retail chain to three groups: RPI on overall performance (control group), RPI on separate tasks, and RPI on both overall performance and separate tasks. We do not find evidence that providing separate task RPI instead of overall RPI affects performance or effort allocation. However, providing RPI on both overall performance and separate tasks seems to reduce performance, especially in the low-return task. This suggests that detailed RPI directs employees’ attention to the smaller benefits of low-return tasks. We further find that only 30.5% of the employees accessed their performance reports, highlighting a distinction between providing RPI in the field and the laboratory. This study is based on a registered report accepted by the <i>Journal of Accounting Research</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1309-1361"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12535","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
When Employees Go to Court: Employee Lawsuits and Talent Acquisition in Audit Offices 当员工诉诸法庭时：审计事务所的员工诉讼与人才招聘
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-03-24 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12534
JADE HUAYU CHEN
{"title":"When Employees Go to Court: Employee Lawsuits and Talent Acquisition in Audit Offices","authors":"JADE HUAYU CHEN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12534","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12534","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I examine whether employee-initiated lawsuits against an audit office adversely affect its ability to attract high-quality talent and deliver quality audits. I posit that employee lawsuits erode prospective employees’ perceptions of an office, diminishing their willingness to join. Using a comprehensive data set of individual auditor profiles, I find a decline in the quality of newly hired auditors following an employee lawsuit. Cross-sectionally, the adverse effect of employee lawsuits on talent acquisition is more pronounced when an office is undergoing higher growth and when a case receives greater media attention. Conversely, this adverse effect is less pronounced when an audit office is larger or offers more competitive wages within the local area. When an audit office is unable to recruit high-quality talent, its audit quality is likely to suffer. Consistent with this, I find a deterioration in audit quality provided by an office following an employee lawsuit. Overall, this study underscores the importance of human capital management and employer reputation for audit offices that operate in competitive labor markets.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1265-1307"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12534","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140209783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Home Sweet Home: CEOs Acquiring Firms in Their Birth Countries 甜蜜的家乡首席执行官收购其出生国的公司
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-03-19 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12533
ANTONIO MARRA, ANGELA PETTINICCHIO, RON SHALEV
{"title":"Home Sweet Home: CEOs Acquiring Firms in Their Birth Countries","authors":"ANTONIO MARRA,&nbsp;ANGELA PETTINICCHIO,&nbsp;RON SHALEV","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12533","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12533","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We find that foreign-born CEOs are more inclined than domestic-born ones to acquire across borders, and that this inclination is explained by their preference for targets in their birth country. This preference is motivated by foreign-born CEOs’ information advantage in their birth country and by these CEOs’ desire to give back to the birth country. CEOs’ desire to help their birth country also influences target location, increasing the likelihood of a target in countries that colonized the CEO birth country. The motives that drive acquisitions in acquirer CEOs’ birth countries measurably affect the returns of acquirers’ shareholders, target premium, and acquisition synergy. Both acquirers’ returns and synergy but not target premium are abnormally positive when the motive for an acquisition is a CEO's information advantage in the birth country. Targets premiums but not acquirers’ returns and synergy are abnormally positive when the motive for an acquisition is the desire to give back to the CEO's birth country.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1363-1404"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140162155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Equity Incentive Plans and Board of Director Discretion over Equity Grants 股权激励计划和董事会对股权授予的自由裁量权
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-03-12 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12532
BRIAN CADMAN, RICHARD CARRIZOSA
{"title":"Equity Incentive Plans and Board of Director Discretion over Equity Grants","authors":"BRIAN CADMAN,&nbsp;RICHARD CARRIZOSA","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12532","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12532","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Equity compensation is granted out of an equity incentive plan that must be approved by shareholders and cedes discretion over equity grants to boards of directors. We predict and find that equity plan proposals give boards more discretion over grants when the firm faces greater labor market forces and more volatile stock returns. When examining votes, we find that shareholders are less likely to support plans with abnormal discretion. We also find that boards with more discretion grant more equity in response to stock price declines. Lastly, we find that boards request additional shares when their ability to grant equity is more constrained by a smaller pool of available shares, and when they plan to increase equity grants. Overall our findings illuminate how firms balance needs to respond to labor market pressure and volatile operating environments against shareholder governance and oversight of equity compensation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1227-1264"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12532","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140118011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bank Supervision and Organizational Capital: The Case of Minority Lending 银行监管与组织资本：少数族裔贷款案例
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-03-05 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12529
BYEONGCHAN AN, ROBERT BUSHMAN, ANYA KLEYMENOVA, RIMMY E. TOMY
{"title":"Bank Supervision and Organizational Capital: The Case of Minority Lending","authors":"BYEONGCHAN AN,&nbsp;ROBERT BUSHMAN,&nbsp;ANYA KLEYMENOVA,&nbsp;RIMMY E. TOMY","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12529","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12529","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We investigate whether improvements in banks' organizational capital and control systems facilitate increased loan origination to minority borrowers. We focus on bank supervisors' enforcement decisions and orders (EDOs) against banks and hypothesize that EDO-imposed improvements in loan policies, internal governance, and employee training mitigate deficiencies in credit assessments and lending decisions that previously disadvantaged minority borrowers. We find that mortgage origination to minority borrowers increases following the resolution of EDOs, and more so for banks with stricter supervisors or more severe EDOs. Using a semisupervised machine learning method to analyze the text of EDOs, we find that such increases are higher for EDOs specifying revisions of loan policies, implementation of formal internal governance procedures, or more employee training. Overall, we find that EDO-driven improvements in organizational capital generate unintended, positive social externalities that enhance access to credit for minority borrowers.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"505-549"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140053635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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