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What Role Do Boards Play in Companies with Visionary CEOs? 董事会在拥有远见卓识的首席执行官的公司中扮演什么角色？
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-10-16 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12514
XU JIANG, VOLKER LAUX
{"title":"What Role Do Boards Play in Companies with Visionary CEOs?","authors":"XU JIANG,&nbsp;VOLKER LAUX","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12514","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12514","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Visionary CEOs have strong beliefs about the right course of action for their firms. How should a board of directors that does not necessarily share the visionary CEO's confidence advise and monitor the CEO? We consider a model in which the board can acquire costly information about the firm's optimal strategic direction. The board not only advises the CEO on strategy, but also must approve it, and the CEO exerts effort to implement the strategy. We find that the board gathers less information when the CEO believes more strongly in his vision. Further, depending on the strength of the CEO's belief bias, the board either plays an advisory role, a monitoring role, or a rubberstamping role. The model predicts that in firms that are led by highly visionary CEOs, boards are passive in that they acquire little information and rubberstamp the visionary's proposal. Nevertheless, shareholders prefer the visionary over an unbiased manager in industries in which obtaining information about the correct course of action is difficult and costly.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"981-1005"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134993758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Regulatory Transparency and Regulators’ Effort: Evidence from Public Release of the SEC's Review Work 监管透明度与监管者的努力：公开发布美国证券交易委员会审查工作的证据
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-10-12 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12513
RUI GUO, Xiaoli (Shaolee) Tian
{"title":"Regulatory Transparency and Regulators’ Effort: Evidence from Public Release of the SEC's Review Work","authors":"RUI GUO,&nbsp;Xiaoli (Shaolee) Tian","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12513","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12513","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using the public release of comment letters on EDGAR to capture a regime shift toward regulatory transparency, we examine whether an increase in transparency affects regulators’ effort and work performance. We find that the SEC staff reviews more filings and more documents per filing following the disclosure regime shift. These effects are incrementally stronger for firms with comment letters that are expected to attract greater investor or public monitoring. Furthermore, under the new regime, reviews are more timely. Upon the regime switch, the likelihood of a restatement (receiving a comment letter) decreases (increases) for filings that are reviewed. After receiving a comment letter, a firm with signs of potential fraud is more likely to be investigated, and this effect becomes more pronounced under the new regime. Altogether, our findings suggest that publicly disclosing regulators’ work output can mitigate moral hazard (i.e., increase regulators’ work input), improving their work performance.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 1","pages":"229-273"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12513","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information Complementarities and the Dynamics of Transparency Shock Spillovers 信息互补性与透明度冲击溢出效应的动态变化
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-10-03 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12510
SHANTANU BANERJEE, SUDIPTO DASGUPTA, RUI SHI, JIALI YAN
{"title":"Information Complementarities and the Dynamics of Transparency Shock Spillovers","authors":"SHANTANU BANERJEE,&nbsp;SUDIPTO DASGUPTA,&nbsp;RUI SHI,&nbsp;JIALI YAN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12510","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12510","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We show that information complementarities play an important role in the spillover of transparency shocks. We exploit the revelation of financial misconduct by S&amp;P 500 firms, and in a “Stacked Difference-in-Differences” design, find that the implied cost of capital increases for “close” industry peers of the fraudulent firms relative to “distant” industry peers. The spillover effect is particularly strong when the close peers and the fraudulent firm share common analyst coverage and common institutional ownership, which have been shown to be powerful proxies for fundamental linkages and information complementarities. We provide evidence that increase in the cost of capital of peer firms is due, at least in part, to “beta shocks.” Disclosure by close peers—especially those with co-coverage and co-ownership links—also increases following fraud revelation. Although disclosure remains high in the following years, the cost of equity starts to decrease.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 1","pages":"55-99"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12510","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corporate R&D Investments Following Competitors’ Voluntary Disclosures: Evidence from the Drug Development Process 竞争对手自愿披露后的企业研发投资：来自药物开发过程的证据
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-09-25 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12509
YUE ZHANG
{"title":"Corporate R&D Investments Following Competitors’ Voluntary Disclosures: Evidence from the Drug Development Process","authors":"YUE ZHANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12509","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12509","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper examines the role of peer firm disclosures in shaping corporate research and development (R&amp;D) investments. Drawing on models of two-stage R&amp;D races, I hypothesize that a firm could be either deterred or encouraged by peer disclosure of interim R&amp;D success, depending on peer firms’ R&amp;D strength in the race. Using granular, project-level data on clinical trials in the drug development process, I find that a firm's R&amp;D investments in a specific therapeutic area are deterred by disclosures of early-phase trial initiation from strong rivals in the same area but encouraged by disclosures from weak rivals. Cross-sectional analyses show that focal firm strength and disclosure relevance moderate the effects of peer firm disclosure. Overall, my evidence suggests that peer firms’ R&amp;D disclosures can have both proprietary costs and deterrence benefits.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 1","pages":"335-373"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Target Setting in Hierarchies: The Role of Middle Managers 层次结构中的目标设定：中层管理人员的作用
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-09-15 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12508
JAN BOUWENS, CHRISTIAN HOFMANN, NINA SCHWAIGER
{"title":"Target Setting in Hierarchies: The Role of Middle Managers","authors":"JAN BOUWENS,&nbsp;CHRISTIAN HOFMANN,&nbsp;NINA SCHWAIGER","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12508","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12508","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We explore how a supervisor's hierarchical rank affects the extent to which employees’ targets reflect their past performance. Literature documents that supervisors do not fully ratchet targets for past performance, arguably because the commitment not to penalize successful employees with more difficult targets alleviates the severity of the ratchet effect. We argue that commitment is less credible in organizational hierarchies where a middle manager sets employees’ targets. Using data from an organization comprised of three hierarchical layers, we consistently find that a middle manager's exposure to performance pressure is positively associated with the ratcheting of the employees’ targets. Moreover, we show that management at headquarters reduces a middle manager's performance pressure when most of her employees missed their targets in the previous period. Overall, the results imply that the hierarchical rank is an important determinant of the credibility of a supervisor's commitment to deemphasize past performance in target setting.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 1","pages":"375-410"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12508","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
By What Criteria Do We Evaluate Accounting? Some Thoughts on Economic Welfare and the Archival Literature 我们以什么标准评价会计？关于经济福利和档案文献的一些思考
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-09-15 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12507
RAY BALL
{"title":"By What Criteria Do We Evaluate Accounting? Some Thoughts on Economic Welfare and the Archival Literature","authors":"RAY BALL","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12507","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12507","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The economic role of an accounting regime is to increase welfare through its effects—in conjunction with complementary institutions—on firm and household behavior. I review three major streams of the archival literature (real effects; price effects, including value relevance; and costly contracting), in terms of what they can and cannot reveal as proxies for welfare effects. One conclusion is that the partial correlations and average effects that predominate in this literature have provided valuable insights into the role of accounting in the economy, but provide limited and misleading proxies for welfare effects. A major concern is that teachers, students, and researchers—indeed, regulators and standard setters—raised on this literature could lose sight of, and underestimate, the fundamental contribution of accounting to aggregate welfare.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 1","pages":"7-54"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12507","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Audit Partners’ Role in Material Misstatement Resolution: Survey and Interview Evidence 审计合伙人在解决重大错报中的作用：调查和访谈证据
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-08-18 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12506
ELDAR MAKSYMOV, MARK PEECHER, ANDREW SUTHERLAND, JOSEPH WEBER
{"title":"Audit Partners’ Role in Material Misstatement Resolution: Survey and Interview Evidence","authors":"ELDAR MAKSYMOV,&nbsp;MARK PEECHER,&nbsp;ANDREW SUTHERLAND,&nbsp;JOSEPH WEBER","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12506","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12506","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Auditors are expected to identify and resolve material misstatements (MMs) in management's financial statements. However, beyond the audit opinion, the audit process is opaque. To address this, we independently survey 462 audit partners and interview 24 audit partners, CFOs, and audit committee members on how partners assess and address MM risk, resolve MMs, and the consequences of MMs. Partners identify MMs in approximately 9% (15%) of public (private) engagements and use qualitative factors to waive apparent MMs. Loan covenant and going-concern issues increase MM risk more than earnings benchmark issues. Partners point to a variety of both auditor and client factors as threats to audit effectiveness. Partners often rely on rapport with management and involve the national office and audit committee in resolving MMs. Partner incentives around restatements are context specific. Our results provide new insights into the auditor's role in financial reporting that are relevant to academics, practitioners, and regulators.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 1","pages":"275-333"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12506","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134997096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Does Carbon Footprint Information Affect Consumer Choice? A Field Experiment 碳足迹信息如何影响消费者的选择？现场实验
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-08-14 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12505
BIANCA BEYER, RICO CHASKEL, SIMONE EULER, JOACHIM GASSEN, ANN-KRISTIN GROßKOPF, THORSTEN SELLHORN
{"title":"How Does Carbon Footprint Information Affect Consumer Choice? A Field Experiment","authors":"BIANCA BEYER,&nbsp;RICO CHASKEL,&nbsp;SIMONE EULER,&nbsp;JOACHIM GASSEN,&nbsp;ANN-KRISTIN GROßKOPF,&nbsp;THORSTEN SELLHORN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12505","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12505","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper reports the results of a field experiment investigating how attributes of carbon footprint information affect consumer choice in a large dining facility. Our hypotheses and research methods were preregistered via the <i>Journal of Accounting Research</i>’s registration-based editorial process. Manipulating the measurement units and visualizations of carbon footprint information on food labels, we quantify effects on consumers’ food choices. Treated consumers choose less carbon-intensive dishes, reducing their food-related carbon footprint by up to 9.2%, depending on the treatment. Effects are strongest for carbon footprint information expressed in monetary units (“environmental costs”) and color-coded in the familiar traffic-light scheme. A postexperimental survey shows that these effects obtain although few respondents self-report concern for the environmental footprint of their meal choices. Our study contributes to the accounting literature by using an information-processing framework to shed light on the information usage and decision-making processes of an increasingly important user group of accounting information: consumers.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 1","pages":"101-136"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12505","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135304900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Out of Site, Out of Mind? The Role of the Government-Appointed Corporate Monitor 离开现场，离开思想？政府任命的企业监督员的作用
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-08-09 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12502
LINDSEY A. GALLO, KENDALL V. LYNCH, RIMMY E. TOMY
{"title":"Out of Site, Out of Mind? The Role of the Government-Appointed Corporate Monitor","authors":"LINDSEY A. GALLO,&nbsp;KENDALL V. LYNCH,&nbsp;RIMMY E. TOMY","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12502","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12502","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the role of a relatively new type of external firm monitor, an on-site government-appointed Corporate Monitor, and assess whether such appointments reduce firms' propensity to violate laws. Using a sample of deferred and nonprosecution agreements, we first document the determinants of Monitor appointment. We find firms that voluntarily disclose wrongdoing and have more independent directors are less likely to have Corporate Monitors, whereas those with more severe infractions, mandated board changes, and increased cooperation requirements are more likely to have Monitors. We find such appointments are associated with an 18%–25% reduction in violations while the Monitor is on site, however, the effect does not persist after the Monitorship ends. Using a semisupervised machine learning method to measure changes in firms' ethics and compliance norms, we find that the reduction in violations is associated with changes in ethics and compliance that also do not persist. Finally, we document that firms under Monitorship experience a persistent reduction in innovation, highlighting a previously unexplored cost of these interventions. Overall, our results suggest that, although Corporate Monitors on site are associated with fewer violations, firms revert to previous levels of violations following Monitors' departure.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"61 5","pages":"1633-1698"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12502","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49537474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Effect of Client Industry Agglomerations on Auditor Industry Specialization 客户行业集聚对审计行业专业化的影响
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-08-09 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12503
W. ROBERT KNECHEL, DEVIN WILLIAMS
{"title":"The Effect of Client Industry Agglomerations on Auditor Industry Specialization","authors":"W. ROBERT KNECHEL,&nbsp;DEVIN WILLIAMS","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12503","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Prior research on auditor industry specialization documents fee premiums for local audit offices that are industry specialists. This research assumes that the effects of specialization are uniform across markets. We examine industry specialization based on the economic theory of industry agglomeration (geographic areas with high industry concentration). Agglomeration economies can facilitate access to knowledge for auditors serving a specific industry in those locations. We find that industry specialists in agglomerations earn a fee premium in excess of specialists in other markets. We find that nonspecialist offices in agglomerations also earn fee premiums in that industry when compared to nonspecialists in other markets even when controlling for these groups’ absolute share of the national market. We also address whether or not this expertise can be shared among offices in an agglomeration specialist's firm. We find that audit offices that have easy connections to a within-firm office in an agglomerated market can earn a fee premium relative to more distant offices, suggesting a benefit from knowledge transfer. This fee premium accrues to offices that would not be considered a specialist using traditional market share measures in a given industry. These findings indicate that the benefit of industry specialization depends on more than local market share.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"61 5","pages":"1771-1825"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50125505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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