{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Registered Reports","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12537","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12537","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"449-450"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12537","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140329039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12538","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12538","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"451"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12538","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140329033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12536","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"448"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12536","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140329038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MAXIMILIAN KOHLER, MATTHIAS D. MAHLENDORF, MISCHA SEITER, TIMO VOGELSANG
{"title":"Social Comparison on Multiple Tasks: Sacrificing Overall Performance for Local Excellence?","authors":"MAXIMILIAN KOHLER, MATTHIAS D. MAHLENDORF, MISCHA SEITER, TIMO VOGELSANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12535","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12535","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This field experiment investigates how different levels of aggregation in relative performance information (RPI) impact employee performance in environments with multiple tasks. We randomly assign store employees of a retail chain to three groups: RPI on overall performance (control group), RPI on separate tasks, and RPI on both overall performance and separate tasks. We do not find evidence that providing separate task RPI instead of overall RPI affects performance or effort allocation. However, providing RPI on both overall performance and separate tasks seems to reduce performance, especially in the low-return task. This suggests that detailed RPI directs employees’ attention to the smaller benefits of low-return tasks. We further find that only 30.5% of the employees accessed their performance reports, highlighting a distinction between providing RPI in the field and the laboratory. This study is based on a registered report accepted by the <i>Journal of Accounting Research</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1309-1361"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12535","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Employees Go to Court: Employee Lawsuits and Talent Acquisition in Audit Offices","authors":"JADE HUAYU CHEN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12534","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12534","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I examine whether employee-initiated lawsuits against an audit office adversely affect its ability to attract high-quality talent and deliver quality audits. I posit that employee lawsuits erode prospective employees’ perceptions of an office, diminishing their willingness to join. Using a comprehensive data set of individual auditor profiles, I find a decline in the quality of newly hired auditors following an employee lawsuit. Cross-sectionally, the adverse effect of employee lawsuits on talent acquisition is more pronounced when an office is undergoing higher growth and when a case receives greater media attention. Conversely, this adverse effect is less pronounced when an audit office is larger or offers more competitive wages within the local area. When an audit office is unable to recruit high-quality talent, its audit quality is likely to suffer. Consistent with this, I find a deterioration in audit quality provided by an office following an employee lawsuit. Overall, this study underscores the importance of human capital management and employer reputation for audit offices that operate in competitive labor markets.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1265-1307"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12534","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140209783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Home Sweet Home: CEOs Acquiring Firms in Their Birth Countries","authors":"ANTONIO MARRA, ANGELA PETTINICCHIO, RON SHALEV","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12533","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12533","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We find that foreign-born CEOs are more inclined than domestic-born ones to acquire across borders, and that this inclination is explained by their preference for targets in their birth country. This preference is motivated by foreign-born CEOs’ information advantage in their birth country and by these CEOs’ desire to give back to the birth country. CEOs’ desire to help their birth country also influences target location, increasing the likelihood of a target in countries that colonized the CEO birth country. The motives that drive acquisitions in acquirer CEOs’ birth countries measurably affect the returns of acquirers’ shareholders, target premium, and acquisition synergy. Both acquirers’ returns and synergy but not target premium are abnormally positive when the motive for an acquisition is a CEO's information advantage in the birth country. Targets premiums but not acquirers’ returns and synergy are abnormally positive when the motive for an acquisition is the desire to give back to the CEO's birth country.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1363-1404"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140162155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Equity Incentive Plans and Board of Director Discretion over Equity Grants","authors":"BRIAN CADMAN, RICHARD CARRIZOSA","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12532","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12532","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Equity compensation is granted out of an equity incentive plan that must be approved by shareholders and cedes discretion over equity grants to boards of directors. We predict and find that equity plan proposals give boards more discretion over grants when the firm faces greater labor market forces and more volatile stock returns. When examining votes, we find that shareholders are less likely to support plans with abnormal discretion. We also find that boards with more discretion grant more equity in response to stock price declines. Lastly, we find that boards request additional shares when their ability to grant equity is more constrained by a smaller pool of available shares, and when they plan to increase equity grants. Overall our findings illuminate how firms balance needs to respond to labor market pressure and volatile operating environments against shareholder governance and oversight of equity compensation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1227-1264"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12532","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140118011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BYEONGCHAN AN, ROBERT BUSHMAN, ANYA KLEYMENOVA, RIMMY E. TOMY
{"title":"Bank Supervision and Organizational Capital: The Case of Minority Lending","authors":"BYEONGCHAN AN, ROBERT BUSHMAN, ANYA KLEYMENOVA, RIMMY E. TOMY","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12529","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12529","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We investigate whether improvements in banks' organizational capital and control systems facilitate increased loan origination to minority borrowers. We focus on bank supervisors' enforcement decisions and orders (EDOs) against banks and hypothesize that EDO-imposed improvements in loan policies, internal governance, and employee training mitigate deficiencies in credit assessments and lending decisions that previously disadvantaged minority borrowers. We find that mortgage origination to minority borrowers increases following the resolution of EDOs, and more so for banks with stricter supervisors or more severe EDOs. Using a semisupervised machine learning method to analyze the text of EDOs, we find that such increases are higher for EDOs specifying revisions of loan policies, implementation of formal internal governance procedures, or more employee training. Overall, we find that EDO-driven improvements in organizational capital generate unintended, positive social externalities that enhance access to credit for minority borrowers.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"505-549"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140053635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Does Management Voluntary Disclosure Behavior Influence Auditors’ Judgments?","authors":"SEAN M. HILLISON, KAMBER D. VITTORI","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12531","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12531","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Forward-looking information, often used by auditors to evaluate complex estimates and form conclusions about going-concern audit report modifications, is commonly disclosed voluntarily by U.S. public companies. We experimentally examine how this disclosure behavior affects auditors’ skepticism toward such information. Prior research has shown that investors and analysts frequently interpret voluntarily disclosed forward-looking information as credible. We demonstrate that auditors, in contrast, exhibit greater skepticism toward forecasted information that has been voluntarily disclosed (vs. mandatorily disclosed or held privately) because of their reduced trust in management, even when the forecasts align with prior year trends (vs. being more optimistic). Our results suggest that a manager's decision to disclose, rather than the disclosure content itself, leads to increased auditor skepticism. Our findings have implications not only for audit outcomes, but also for manager disclosure behavior, as increased auditor scrutiny could discourage future voluntary disclosure.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"675-699"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140048043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Real Effects of Supply Chain Transparency Regulation: Evidence from Section 1502 of the Dodd–Frank Act","authors":"BOK BAIK, OMRI EVEN-TOV, RUSSELL HAN, DAVID PARK","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12530","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12530","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Section 1502 of the Dodd–Frank Act requires SEC-registered issuers to conduct supply chain due diligence and submit conflict minerals disclosures (CMDs) that indicate whether their products contain tantalum, tin, tungsten, or gold (3TG) sourced from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or its neighboring countries (“covered countries”). Consistent with the reputational cost hypothesis, we find that heightened public attention to CMDs increases responsible sourcing. After Section 1502 takes effect, we find higher demand for 3TG products processed in certified smelters, decreased conflicts in covered countries’ mining regions relative to other regions, and reduced sensitivity of conflict risk to conflict minerals’ price spikes. Finally, we find that conflicts decrease in Eastern DRC territories with prevalent 3T (tantalum, tin, and tungsten) mines but increase in territories with prevalent gold mines. Overall, our findings highlight the real effects of enhanced supply chain transparency regulation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"551-587"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12530","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140015600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}