MATTHIAS BREUER, EVA LABRO, HARESH SAPRA, ANASTASIA A. ZAKOLYUKINA
{"title":"Bridging Theory and Empirical Research in Accounting","authors":"MATTHIAS BREUER, EVA LABRO, HARESH SAPRA, ANASTASIA A. ZAKOLYUKINA","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12545","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12545","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Formal theory and empirical research are complementary in building and advancing the body of knowledge in accounting in order to understand real-world phenomena. We offer thoughts on opportunities for empiricists and theorists to collaborate, build on each other's work, and iterate over models and data to make progress. For empiricists, we see room for more descriptive work, more experimental work on testing formal theories, and more work on quantifying theoretical parameters. For theorists, we see room for theories explicitly tied to descriptive evidence, new theories on individuals' decision making in a data-rich world, theories focused on accounting institutions and measurement issues, and richer theories for guiding empirical work and providing practical insights. We also encourage explicitly combining formal theory and empirical models by having both in one paper and by structural estimation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"1121-1139"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12545","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140651877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ANDREW C. BAKER, DAVID F. LARCKER, CHARLES G. McCLURE, DURGESH SARAPH, EDWARD M. WATTS
{"title":"Diversity Washing","authors":"ANDREW C. BAKER, DAVID F. LARCKER, CHARLES G. McCLURE, DURGESH SARAPH, EDWARD M. WATTS","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12542","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12542","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We provide large-sample evidence on whether U.S. publicly traded corporations use voluntary disclosures about their commitments to employee diversity opportunistically. We document significant discrepancies between companies' external stances on diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) and their hiring practices. Firms that discuss DEI excessively relative to their actual employee gender and racial diversity (“diversity washers”) obtain superior scores from environmental, social, and governance (ESG) rating organizations and attract more investment from institutional investors with an ESG focus. These outcomes occur even though diversity-washing firms are more likely to incur discrimination violations and have negative human-capital-related news events. Our study provides evidence consistent with growing allegations of misleading statements from firms about their DEI initiatives and highlights the potential consequences of selective ESG disclosures.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 5","pages":"1661-1709"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12542","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140651820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Innovation and Financial Disclosure","authors":"HUI CHEN, PIERRE JINGHONG LIANG, EVGENY PETROV","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12546","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12546","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine how financial disclosure policy affects a firm manager's strategy to innovate within a two-period bandit problem featuring two production methods: an old method with a known probability of success, and a new method with an unknown probability. Exploring the new method in the first period provides the manager with decision-useful information for the second period, thus creating a real option that is unavailable under exploiting the old known production method. Voluntary disclosure of the firm's financial performance provides the manager with another option to potentially conceal initial failure from the market. The interaction of these two options determines the manager's incentive to explore. In equilibrium, a myopic manager who cares about the interim market price may over- or under-explore compared to the optimal exploration strategy that maximizes firm value. Our analysis shows that firms operating in an environment with voluntary disclosure early in the trial stage and mandated requirement later are most motivated to explore, while firms subject to early mandated disclosure and late voluntary disclosure are least likely to do so. We also provide empirical predictions about the link between the disclosure environment and the intensity and efficiency of corporate innovation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"935-979"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12546","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140643127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of Information Frictions Within Regulators: Evidence from Workplace Safety Violations","authors":"ANEESH RAGHUNANDAN, THOMAS G. RUCHTI","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12541","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12541","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is decentralized, wherein field offices coordinated at the state level undertake inspections. We study whether this structure can lead to interstate frictions in sharing information and how this impacts firms’ compliance with workplace safety laws. We find that firms caught violating in one state subsequently violate less in that state but violate more in other states. Despite this pattern, and in keeping with information frictions, violations in one state do not trigger proactive OSHA inspections in other states. Moreover, firms face lower monetary penalties when subsequent violations occur across state lines, likely due to the lack of documentation necessary to assess severe penalties. Finally, firms are more likely to shift violating behavior into states with greater information frictions. Our findings suggest that internal information within regulators impacts the likelihood and location of corporate misconduct.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"1067-1120"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12541","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140333748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Algorithmic Trading and Forward-Looking MD&A Disclosures","authors":"WAYNE B. THOMAS, YIDING WANG, LING ZHANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12540","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12540","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines how algorithmic trading (AT) affects forward-looking disclosures in Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) of annual reports. We predict and find evidence that AT relates negatively to modifications in year-over-year forward-looking MD&A disclosures. This evidence is consistent with AT reducing investors’ demand for fundamental information, which reduces managers’ incentives to supply costly forward-looking disclosures. Cross-sectional tests provide additional evidence that this negative relation is more pronounced for firms with larger earnings surprises and those with losses. We further validate our conclusion by demonstrating that investors’ fundamental information searches are a channel through which AT affects forward-looking disclosures. The conclusion is robust to using the SEC's Tick Size Pilot Program as an exogenous shock to AT and to using alternative disclosure measures (e.g., tone revisions and number of sentences in forward-looking MD&A disclosures). Overall, our study demonstrates that AT is a contributing factor to regulators’ concerns over the diminishing usefulness of forward-looking information in MD&A disclosures.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1533-1569"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140533249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Registered Reports","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12537","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12537","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"449-450"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12537","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140329039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12538","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12538","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"451"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12538","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140329033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12536","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"448"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12536","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140329038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MAXIMILIAN KOHLER, MATTHIAS D. MAHLENDORF, MISCHA SEITER, TIMO VOGELSANG
{"title":"Social Comparison on Multiple Tasks: Sacrificing Overall Performance for Local Excellence?","authors":"MAXIMILIAN KOHLER, MATTHIAS D. MAHLENDORF, MISCHA SEITER, TIMO VOGELSANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12535","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12535","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This field experiment investigates how different levels of aggregation in relative performance information (RPI) impact employee performance in environments with multiple tasks. We randomly assign store employees of a retail chain to three groups: RPI on overall performance (control group), RPI on separate tasks, and RPI on both overall performance and separate tasks. We do not find evidence that providing separate task RPI instead of overall RPI affects performance or effort allocation. However, providing RPI on both overall performance and separate tasks seems to reduce performance, especially in the low-return task. This suggests that detailed RPI directs employees’ attention to the smaller benefits of low-return tasks. We further find that only 30.5% of the employees accessed their performance reports, highlighting a distinction between providing RPI in the field and the laboratory. This study is based on a registered report accepted by the <i>Journal of Accounting Research</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1309-1361"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12535","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Employees Go to Court: Employee Lawsuits and Talent Acquisition in Audit Offices","authors":"JADE HUAYU CHEN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12534","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12534","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I examine whether employee-initiated lawsuits against an audit office adversely affect its ability to attract high-quality talent and deliver quality audits. I posit that employee lawsuits erode prospective employees’ perceptions of an office, diminishing their willingness to join. Using a comprehensive data set of individual auditor profiles, I find a decline in the quality of newly hired auditors following an employee lawsuit. Cross-sectionally, the adverse effect of employee lawsuits on talent acquisition is more pronounced when an office is undergoing higher growth and when a case receives greater media attention. Conversely, this adverse effect is less pronounced when an audit office is larger or offers more competitive wages within the local area. When an audit office is unable to recruit high-quality talent, its audit quality is likely to suffer. Consistent with this, I find a deterioration in audit quality provided by an office following an employee lawsuit. Overall, this study underscores the importance of human capital management and employer reputation for audit offices that operate in competitive labor markets.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1265-1307"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12534","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140209783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}