Journal of Accounting Research最新文献

{"title":"News Bias in Financial Journalists’ Social Networks","authors":"GUOSONG XU","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12560","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12560","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Connected financial journalists—those with working relationships, common school ties, or social media connections to company management—introduce a marked media slant into their news coverage. Using a comprehensive set of newspaper articles covering mergers and acquisition (M&amp;A) transactions from 1997 to 2016, I find that connected journalists use significantly fewer negative words in their coverage of connected acquirers. These journalists are also more likely to quote connected executives and include less accurate language in their reporting. Moreover, they tend to portray other firms in the same network in a less negative light. Journalists’ favoritism bias has implications for both capital market outcomes and their careers. I find that acquirers whose M&amp;As are covered by connected journalists receive significantly higher stock returns on the news article publication date. However, these acquirers’ stock prices reverse in the long term, suggesting market overreaction to news covered by connected journalists. Around M&amp;A transactions, connected articles are correlated with increased bid competition and deal premiums. In terms of future career development, connected journalists are more likely to leave journalism and join their associated industries in the long run. Taken together, the evidence suggests that financial journalists’ personal networks promote news bias that potentially hinders the efficient dissemination of information.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1145-1182"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12560","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141425203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Using and Interpreting Fixed Effects Models","authors":"MATTHIAS BREUER,&nbsp;ED DEHAAN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12559","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12559","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Fixed effects (FE) have emerged as a ubiquitous and powerful tool for eliminating unwanted variation in observational accounting studies. Unwanted variation is plentiful in accounting research because we often use rich data to test precise hypotheses derived from abstract theories. By eliminating unwanted variation, FE reduce concerns that omitted variables bias our estimates or weaken test power. FE are not costless, though, so their use should be carefully justified by theoretical and institutional considerations. FE also transform samples and variables in ways that are not immediately apparent, and in doing so affect how we should interpret regression results. This primer explains the mechanics of FE and provides practical guidance for the informed use, transparent reporting, and careful interpretation of FE models.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1183-1226"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141329596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Government Subsidies and Corporate Misconduct","authors":"ANEESH RAGHUNANDAN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12553","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12553","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I study whether firms that receive targeted U.S. state-level subsidies are more likely to subsequently engage in corporate misconduct. I find that firms are more likely to engage in misconduct in subsidizing states, but not in other states that they operate in, after receiving state subsidies. Using data on both federal and state enforcement actions, and exploiting the legal principle of dual sovereignty for identification, I show that this finding reflects an increase in the underlying rate of misconduct and that this increase is attributable to lenient state-level misconduct enforcement. Collectively, my findings present evidence of an important consequence of targeted firm-specific subsidies: nonfinancial misconduct that potentially could impact the very stakeholders subsidies are ostensibly intended to benefit.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1449-1496"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12553","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140961571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Registered Reports","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12551","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12551","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"827-828"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12551","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140907053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12550","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"826"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12550","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140907117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"2023 Excellence in Refereeing","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12547","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The <i>Journal of Accounting Research</i> is proud to recognize our top referees of the previous calendar year. The senior editors selected those named below for their “2023 Excellence in Refereeing” based on the quality and the number of reviews they had performed for the journal during the years 2022 and 2023. We thank the referees for their invaluable services to the journal.</p><p>Darren Bernard, <i>University of Washington</i></p><p>Anne Beyer, <i>Stanford University</i></p><p>Jannis Bischof, <i>University of Mannheim</i></p><p>Elizabeth Blankespoor, <i>University of Washington</i></p><p>Matthew Bloomfield, <i>University of Pennsylvania</i></p><p>Khrystyna Bochkay, <i>University of Miami</i></p><p>Mark Bradshaw, <i>Boston College</i></p><p>Matthias Breuer, <i>Columbia University</i></p><p>Ulf Brüggemann, <i>Humboldt University Berlin</i></p><p>Jung Ho Choi, <i>Stanford University</i></p><p>Lisa De Simone, <i>University of Texas, Austin</i></p><p>Yiwei Dou, <i>New York University</i></p><p>Raphael Duguay, <i>Yale University</i></p><p>Atif Ellahie, <i>University of Utah</i></p><p>Henry Eyring, <i>Duke University</i></p><p>Vivian Fang, <i>Indiana University</i></p><p>Elia Ferracuti, <i>Duke University</i></p><p>Fabrizio Ferri, <i>University of Miami</i></p><p>Henry Friedman, <i>University of California, Los Angeles</i></p><p>John Gallemore, <i>University of North Carolina</i></p><p>João Granja, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Nicholas Guest, <i>Cornell University</i></p><p>Allen Huang, <i>Hong Kong University of Science &amp; Technology</i></p><p>Xu Jiang, <i>Duke University</i></p><p>Zachary Kaplan, <i>Washington University, St. Louis</i> Sehwa Kim, <i>Columbia University</i></p><p>Rebecca Lester, <i>Stanford University</i></p><p>Miao Liu, <i>Boston College</i></p><p>Yao Lu, <i>Cornell University</i></p><p>William Mayew, <i>Duke University</i></p><p>Charles McClure, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Maximilian Muhn, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Anya Nakhmurina, <i>Yale University</i></p><p>Allison Nicoletti, <i>University of Pennsylvania</i></p><p>Gaizka Ormazabal, <i>IESE Business School</i></p><p>Thomas Rauter, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Delphine Samuels, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Timothy Shields, <i>Chapman University</i></p><p>Nemit Shroff, <i>MIT</i></p><p>Gurpal Sran, <i>New York University</i></p><p>Christopher Stewart, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Lorien Stice-Lawrence, <i>University of Southern California</i></p><p>Andrew Sutherland, <i>MIT</i></p><p>Sorabh Tomar, <i>Southern Methodist University</i></p><p>Rahul Vashishtha, <i>Duke University</i></p><p>David Veenman, <i>University of Amsterdam</i></p><p>Braden Williams, University of Texas, Austin</p><p>Gwen Yu, <i>University of Michigan</i></p><p>Frank Zhou, <i>University of Pennsylvania</i></p><p>Christina Zhu, <i>University of Pennsylvania</i></p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"831-832"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12547","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140907118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12552","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12552","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"829"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12552","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140907054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Effects of Mandatory ESG Disclosure Around the World","authors":"PHILIPP KRUEGER,&nbsp;ZACHARIAS SAUTNER,&nbsp;DRAGON YONGJUN TANG,&nbsp;RUI ZHONG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12548","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12548","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We compile a novel data set on mandatory environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure around the world to analyze the stock liquidity effects of such disclosure mandates. We document a positive effect of ESG disclosure mandates on firm-level stock liquidity. The effects are strongest if the disclosure requirements are implemented by government institutions, not on a comply-or-explain basis, and coupled with strong enforcement by informal institutions. Firms with weaker information environments benefit more from ESG disclosure mandates. Our results support the view that ESG disclosure regulation improves the information environment and has beneficial capital market effects.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 5","pages":"1795-1847"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12548","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140826397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Relative Performance Evaluation and Strategic Peer-Harming Disclosures","authors":"MATTHEW J. BLOOMFIELD,&nbsp;MIRKO S. HEINLE,&nbsp;OSCAR TIMMERMANS","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12543","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12543","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many firms use relative stock performance to evaluate and incentivize their CEOs. We document that such firms routinely disclose information that harms their peers' stock prices, and sometimes explicitly mention the harmed peers, by name, in these disclosures. Consistent with deliberate sabotage, peer-harming disclosures appear to be aimed at peers whose stock price depressions are most likely to benefit the disclosing firms' CEOs. The pricing effect of these disclosures does not reverse, suggesting that the disclosures contain legitimate information regarding peers' prospects. In sum, our results suggest that relative performance evaluation in CEO pay motivates CEOs to internalize the externalities of their disclosures, and strategically disclose information that harms peers' stock prices, in order to improve their firms' relative standing within their peer group.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"877-933"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12543","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140826391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Capital Market Effects of Centralizing Regulated Financial Information","authors":"GURPAL SRAN,&nbsp;MARCEL TUIJN,&nbsp;LAUREN VOLLON","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12544","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12544","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We study the capital market effects of information centralization by exploiting the staggered implementation of digital storage and access platforms for regulated financial information (Officially Appointed Mechanisms, or OAMs) in the European Union. We find that the implementation of OAMs results in significant improvements in capital market liquidity, consistent with the notion that OAMs lower investors' processing costs. The findings are more pronounced when processing costs are high to begin with, that is, when firms (1) are small and receive low business press coverage and (2) have high levels of retail ownership. We then identify a mechanism through which centralization facilitates capital market effects: information spillovers. First, we find that liquidity improvements are larger when OAMs have features that easily allow investors to search for peer firm information. Second, liquidity improvements are larger for firms with a high share of industry peers operating on the same OAM and for firms with a high share of small, low-coverage peers on that OAM. Third, around the annual report release dates of peer firms, focal-firm liquidity improves and focal-peer stock return synchronicity increases. Overall, our evidence suggests that, even in a modern information age, information centralization improves capital market liquidity and facilitates the acquisition and use of peer firm information.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1497-1532"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140820015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}