{"title":"Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12552","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12552","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"829"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12552","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140907054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
PHILIPP KRUEGER, ZACHARIAS SAUTNER, DRAGON YONGJUN TANG, RUI ZHONG
{"title":"The Effects of Mandatory ESG Disclosure Around the World","authors":"PHILIPP KRUEGER, ZACHARIAS SAUTNER, DRAGON YONGJUN TANG, RUI ZHONG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12548","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12548","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We compile a novel data set on mandatory environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure around the world to analyze the stock liquidity effects of such disclosure mandates. We document a positive effect of ESG disclosure mandates on firm-level stock liquidity. The effects are strongest if the disclosure requirements are implemented by government institutions, not on a comply-or-explain basis, and coupled with strong enforcement by informal institutions. Firms with weaker information environments benefit more from ESG disclosure mandates. Our results support the view that ESG disclosure regulation improves the information environment and has beneficial capital market effects.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 5","pages":"1795-1847"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12548","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140826397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MATTHEW J. BLOOMFIELD, MIRKO S. HEINLE, OSCAR TIMMERMANS
{"title":"Relative Performance Evaluation and Strategic Peer-Harming Disclosures","authors":"MATTHEW J. BLOOMFIELD, MIRKO S. HEINLE, OSCAR TIMMERMANS","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12543","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12543","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many firms use relative stock performance to evaluate and incentivize their CEOs. We document that such firms routinely disclose information that harms their peers' stock prices, and sometimes explicitly mention the harmed peers, by name, in these disclosures. Consistent with deliberate sabotage, peer-harming disclosures appear to be aimed at peers whose stock price depressions are most likely to benefit the disclosing firms' CEOs. The pricing effect of these disclosures does not reverse, suggesting that the disclosures contain legitimate information regarding peers' prospects. In sum, our results suggest that relative performance evaluation in CEO pay motivates CEOs to internalize the externalities of their disclosures, and strategically disclose information that harms peers' stock prices, in order to improve their firms' relative standing within their peer group.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"877-933"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12543","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140826391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Capital Market Effects of Centralizing Regulated Financial Information","authors":"GURPAL SRAN, MARCEL TUIJN, LAUREN VOLLON","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12544","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12544","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We study the capital market effects of information centralization by exploiting the staggered implementation of digital storage and access platforms for regulated financial information (Officially Appointed Mechanisms, or OAMs) in the European Union. We find that the implementation of OAMs results in significant improvements in capital market liquidity, consistent with the notion that OAMs lower investors' processing costs. The findings are more pronounced when processing costs are high to begin with, that is, when firms (1) are small and receive low business press coverage and (2) have high levels of retail ownership. We then identify a mechanism through which centralization facilitates capital market effects: information spillovers. First, we find that liquidity improvements are larger when OAMs have features that easily allow investors to search for peer firm information. Second, liquidity improvements are larger for firms with a high share of industry peers operating on the same OAM and for firms with a high share of small, low-coverage peers on that OAM. Third, around the annual report release dates of peer firms, focal-firm liquidity improves and focal-peer stock return synchronicity increases. Overall, our evidence suggests that, even in a modern information age, information centralization improves capital market liquidity and facilitates the acquisition and use of peer firm information.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1497-1532"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140820015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MATTHIAS BREUER, EVA LABRO, HARESH SAPRA, ANASTASIA A. ZAKOLYUKINA
{"title":"Bridging Theory and Empirical Research in Accounting","authors":"MATTHIAS BREUER, EVA LABRO, HARESH SAPRA, ANASTASIA A. ZAKOLYUKINA","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12545","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12545","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Formal theory and empirical research are complementary in building and advancing the body of knowledge in accounting in order to understand real-world phenomena. We offer thoughts on opportunities for empiricists and theorists to collaborate, build on each other's work, and iterate over models and data to make progress. For empiricists, we see room for more descriptive work, more experimental work on testing formal theories, and more work on quantifying theoretical parameters. For theorists, we see room for theories explicitly tied to descriptive evidence, new theories on individuals' decision making in a data-rich world, theories focused on accounting institutions and measurement issues, and richer theories for guiding empirical work and providing practical insights. We also encourage explicitly combining formal theory and empirical models by having both in one paper and by structural estimation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"1121-1139"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12545","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140651877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ANDREW C. BAKER, DAVID F. LARCKER, CHARLES G. McCLURE, DURGESH SARAPH, EDWARD M. WATTS
{"title":"Diversity Washing","authors":"ANDREW C. BAKER, DAVID F. LARCKER, CHARLES G. McCLURE, DURGESH SARAPH, EDWARD M. WATTS","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12542","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12542","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We provide large-sample evidence on whether U.S. publicly traded corporations use voluntary disclosures about their commitments to employee diversity opportunistically. We document significant discrepancies between companies' external stances on diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) and their hiring practices. Firms that discuss DEI excessively relative to their actual employee gender and racial diversity (“diversity washers”) obtain superior scores from environmental, social, and governance (ESG) rating organizations and attract more investment from institutional investors with an ESG focus. These outcomes occur even though diversity-washing firms are more likely to incur discrimination violations and have negative human-capital-related news events. Our study provides evidence consistent with growing allegations of misleading statements from firms about their DEI initiatives and highlights the potential consequences of selective ESG disclosures.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 5","pages":"1661-1709"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12542","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140651820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Innovation and Financial Disclosure","authors":"HUI CHEN, PIERRE JINGHONG LIANG, EVGENY PETROV","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12546","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12546","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine how financial disclosure policy affects a firm manager's strategy to innovate within a two-period bandit problem featuring two production methods: an old method with a known probability of success, and a new method with an unknown probability. Exploring the new method in the first period provides the manager with decision-useful information for the second period, thus creating a real option that is unavailable under exploiting the old known production method. Voluntary disclosure of the firm's financial performance provides the manager with another option to potentially conceal initial failure from the market. The interaction of these two options determines the manager's incentive to explore. In equilibrium, a myopic manager who cares about the interim market price may over- or under-explore compared to the optimal exploration strategy that maximizes firm value. Our analysis shows that firms operating in an environment with voluntary disclosure early in the trial stage and mandated requirement later are most motivated to explore, while firms subject to early mandated disclosure and late voluntary disclosure are least likely to do so. We also provide empirical predictions about the link between the disclosure environment and the intensity and efficiency of corporate innovation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"935-979"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12546","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140643127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of Information Frictions Within Regulators: Evidence from Workplace Safety Violations","authors":"ANEESH RAGHUNANDAN, THOMAS G. RUCHTI","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12541","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12541","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is decentralized, wherein field offices coordinated at the state level undertake inspections. We study whether this structure can lead to interstate frictions in sharing information and how this impacts firms’ compliance with workplace safety laws. We find that firms caught violating in one state subsequently violate less in that state but violate more in other states. Despite this pattern, and in keeping with information frictions, violations in one state do not trigger proactive OSHA inspections in other states. Moreover, firms face lower monetary penalties when subsequent violations occur across state lines, likely due to the lack of documentation necessary to assess severe penalties. Finally, firms are more likely to shift violating behavior into states with greater information frictions. Our findings suggest that internal information within regulators impacts the likelihood and location of corporate misconduct.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"1067-1120"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12541","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140333748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Algorithmic Trading and Forward-Looking MD&A Disclosures","authors":"WAYNE B. THOMAS, YIDING WANG, LING ZHANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12540","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12540","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines how algorithmic trading (AT) affects forward-looking disclosures in Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) of annual reports. We predict and find evidence that AT relates negatively to modifications in year-over-year forward-looking MD&A disclosures. This evidence is consistent with AT reducing investors’ demand for fundamental information, which reduces managers’ incentives to supply costly forward-looking disclosures. Cross-sectional tests provide additional evidence that this negative relation is more pronounced for firms with larger earnings surprises and those with losses. We further validate our conclusion by demonstrating that investors’ fundamental information searches are a channel through which AT affects forward-looking disclosures. The conclusion is robust to using the SEC's Tick Size Pilot Program as an exogenous shock to AT and to using alternative disclosure measures (e.g., tone revisions and number of sentences in forward-looking MD&A disclosures). Overall, our study demonstrates that AT is a contributing factor to regulators’ concerns over the diminishing usefulness of forward-looking information in MD&A disclosures.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1533-1569"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140533249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Registered Reports","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12537","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12537","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"449-450"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12537","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140329039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}