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Bank Supervision and Organizational Capital: The Case of Minority Lending 银行监管与组织资本：少数族裔贷款案例
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-03-05 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12529
BYEONGCHAN AN, ROBERT BUSHMAN, ANYA KLEYMENOVA, RIMMY E. TOMY
{"title":"Bank Supervision and Organizational Capital: The Case of Minority Lending","authors":"BYEONGCHAN AN,&nbsp;ROBERT BUSHMAN,&nbsp;ANYA KLEYMENOVA,&nbsp;RIMMY E. TOMY","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12529","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12529","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We investigate whether improvements in banks' organizational capital and control systems facilitate increased loan origination to minority borrowers. We focus on bank supervisors' enforcement decisions and orders (EDOs) against banks and hypothesize that EDO-imposed improvements in loan policies, internal governance, and employee training mitigate deficiencies in credit assessments and lending decisions that previously disadvantaged minority borrowers. We find that mortgage origination to minority borrowers increases following the resolution of EDOs, and more so for banks with stricter supervisors or more severe EDOs. Using a semisupervised machine learning method to analyze the text of EDOs, we find that such increases are higher for EDOs specifying revisions of loan policies, implementation of formal internal governance procedures, or more employee training. Overall, we find that EDO-driven improvements in organizational capital generate unintended, positive social externalities that enhance access to credit for minority borrowers.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"505-549"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140053635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Does Management Voluntary Disclosure Behavior Influence Auditors’ Judgments? 管理层的自愿披露行为如何影响审计师的判断？
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-03-05 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12531
SEAN M. HILLISON, KAMBER D. VITTORI
{"title":"How Does Management Voluntary Disclosure Behavior Influence Auditors’ Judgments?","authors":"SEAN M. HILLISON,&nbsp;KAMBER D. VITTORI","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12531","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12531","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Forward-looking information, often used by auditors to evaluate complex estimates and form conclusions about going-concern audit report modifications, is commonly disclosed voluntarily by U.S. public companies. We experimentally examine how this disclosure behavior affects auditors’ skepticism toward such information. Prior research has shown that investors and analysts frequently interpret voluntarily disclosed forward-looking information as credible. We demonstrate that auditors, in contrast, exhibit greater skepticism toward forecasted information that has been voluntarily disclosed (vs. mandatorily disclosed or held privately) because of their reduced trust in management, even when the forecasts align with prior year trends (vs. being more optimistic). Our results suggest that a manager's decision to disclose, rather than the disclosure content itself, leads to increased auditor skepticism. Our findings have implications not only for audit outcomes, but also for manager disclosure behavior, as increased auditor scrutiny could discourage future voluntary disclosure.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"675-699"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140048043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Real Effects of Supply Chain Transparency Regulation: Evidence from Section 1502 of the Dodd–Frank Act 供应链透明度监管的实际效果：多德-弗兰克法案》第 1502 条的证据
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-02-29 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12530
BOK BAIK, OMRI EVEN-TOV, RUSSELL HAN, DAVID PARK
{"title":"The Real Effects of Supply Chain Transparency Regulation: Evidence from Section 1502 of the Dodd–Frank Act","authors":"BOK BAIK,&nbsp;OMRI EVEN-TOV,&nbsp;RUSSELL HAN,&nbsp;DAVID PARK","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12530","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12530","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Section 1502 of the Dodd–Frank Act requires SEC-registered issuers to conduct supply chain due diligence and submit conflict minerals disclosures (CMDs) that indicate whether their products contain tantalum, tin, tungsten, or gold (3TG) sourced from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or its neighboring countries (“covered countries”). Consistent with the reputational cost hypothesis, we find that heightened public attention to CMDs increases responsible sourcing. After Section 1502 takes effect, we find higher demand for 3TG products processed in certified smelters, decreased conflicts in covered countries’ mining regions relative to other regions, and reduced sensitivity of conflict risk to conflict minerals’ price spikes. Finally, we find that conflicts decrease in Eastern DRC territories with prevalent 3T (tantalum, tin, and tungsten) mines but increase in territories with prevalent gold mines. Overall, our findings highlight the real effects of enhanced supply chain transparency regulation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"551-587"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12530","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140015600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Wrong Kind of Transparency? Mutual Funds’ Higher Reporting Frequency, Window Dressing, and Performance 错误的透明度？共同基金较高的报告频率、"橱窗效应 "和业绩表现
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-02-20 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12527
XIANGANG XIN, P. ERIC YEUNG, ZILONG ZHANG
{"title":"Wrong Kind of Transparency? Mutual Funds’ Higher Reporting Frequency, Window Dressing, and Performance","authors":"XIANGANG XIN,&nbsp;P. ERIC YEUNG,&nbsp;ZILONG ZHANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12527","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12527","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines whether mandatory increase in reporting frequency exacerbates agency problems. Utilizing the setting of the 2004 SEC mandate on increased reporting frequency of mutual fund holdings, we show that increased reporting frequency elevates window dressing (buying winners or selling losers shortly before the end of the reporting period). This effect is driven by low-skill fund managers’ incentives to generate mixed signals. Funds managed by low-skill managers experience lower returns, more outflows, and a higher collapse rate when their window dressing is elevated after the 2004 rule change. These results suggest that, although higher reporting frequency on agents’ actions can exacerbate signal manipulations, the related manipulation costs improve sorting among agents in the longer term.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"737-781"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139928797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Economics of Information Search and Financial Misreporting 信息搜索经济学与财务误报
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-02-14 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12528
JUNG MIN KIM
{"title":"Economics of Information Search and Financial Misreporting","authors":"JUNG MIN KIM","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12528","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12528","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I examine how investors’ search for different types of information affects managers’ reporting decisions. I distinguish investors’ search for information about firm fundamentals (“fundamental search”) from their search for information about managers’ incentives (“incentive search”). Based on a parsimonious model of misreporting, I predict that fundamental search reduces the earnings response coefficient, which reduces managers’ benefits from misreporting, resulting in less misreporting. In contrast, incentive search increases the earnings response coefficient, which increases the benefits from misreporting, resulting in more misreporting. I test these predictions using an empirical technique that classifies EDGAR downloads as fundamental search or incentive search. Consistent with my theoretical predictions, I find that fundamental (incentive) search is negatively (positively) related to the earnings response coefficients and intentional restatements. I confirm my findings in two distinct empirical settings where the costs of information search exogenously changed: the adoption of XBRL and the electronic filing mandate of Form 4s. Collectively, the results show that investors’ information demand can shape managers’ reporting decisions, and its effects can vary depending on the type of information investors search for.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"1007-1065"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12528","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139745206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Payment Practices Transparency and Customer-Supplier Dynamics 付款方式透明化与客户-供应商动态关系
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-02-07 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12521
JODY GREWAL, ADITYA MOHAN, GERARDO PÉREZ-CAVAZOS
{"title":"Payment Practices Transparency and Customer-Supplier Dynamics","authors":"JODY GREWAL,&nbsp;ADITYA MOHAN,&nbsp;GERARDO PÉREZ-CAVAZOS","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12521","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12521","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We exploit\u0000the introduction of the Payment Practices Disclosure Regulation in the United Kingdom (UK) to examine the effects of mandating disclosure of customer-supplier payment practices. We find that nondisclosing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) experience a reduction in their accounts receivable by 8.3%, consistent with an acceleration of their trade credit collections. Further, SMEs exhibit fewer financial constraints after the regulation. We survey managers from large firms and SMEs to understand the underlying mechanisms. The required disclosures raise large firms’ reputational concerns and shift the bargaining power between large firms and SMEs. Additionally, the new disclosures compel executives at large firms to scrutinize their own firms’ payment practices, leading to increased accountability and a stronger focus on timely payment among senior managers.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"635-674"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139750405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Earnings News and Over-the-Counter Markets 盈利新闻和场外交易市场
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-02-07 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12522
STEFAN J. HUBER, CHONGHO KIM, EDWARD M. WATTS
{"title":"Earnings News and Over-the-Counter Markets","authors":"STEFAN J. HUBER,&nbsp;CHONGHO KIM,&nbsp;EDWARD M. WATTS","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12522","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12522","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We document significant increases in bond market liquidity around earnings announcements. These increases are attributed to decreased search and bargaining costs, which arise from the over-the-counter (OTC) nature of bond markets and outweigh increases in information asymmetry during these periods. Our evidence traces reductions in search and bargaining costs to two sources around earnings announcements: (1) improved access to dealers and (2) increased participation from institutional investors, who can more easily transact with multiple dealers. Overall, our findings highlight a novel channel through which firm-specific information affects asset prices.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 2","pages":"701-735"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139904296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information - Request for Registered Reports 发行信息 - 申请注册报告
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-02-02 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12525
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Registered Reports","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12525","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 1","pages":"3-4"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12525","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139676581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information - Request for Papers 议题信息 - 征求论文
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-02-02 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12524
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12524","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 1","pages":"2"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12524","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139676580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for 发行信息--长期征集有关《世界文化多样性宣言》的提案
IF 4.4 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-02-02 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12526
{"title":"Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12526","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12526","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 1","pages":"5"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12526","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139676687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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