{"title":"Just Friends? Managers’ Connections to Judges","authors":"STERLING HUANG, SUGATA ROYCHOWDHURY, EWA SLETTEN, YANPING XU","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12563","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12563","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We study the impact of social connections between judges and executives on the outcomes of Securities Class Action Litigation (SCAL). Judges who are socially connected to a firm's executives are significantly more likely to dismiss lawsuits against the firm. There is also evidence of faster resolution and lower payout amounts in connected cases. The favorable outcomes cannot be explained by the lower severity of connected cases, or by court, judge, or firm characteristics. Our results are more pronounced when executives connected to the judge are named defendants in the lawsuits, when connected cases involve less visible lawsuits or firms, and when connections between judges and executives are likely more direct. Our evidence indicates that social connections influence judge impartiality and meaningfully alter SCAL outcomes.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 1","pages":"461-502"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141608145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Decision Relevance of Loan Fair Values for Depositors","authors":"QI CHEN, RAHUL VASHISHTHA, SHUYAN WANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12564","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12564","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using a large sample of U.S. commercial banks from 1994 to 2019, we find that loan fair values are highly relevant for depositor decision making. A one-standard-deviation decrease in loan fair value performance is associated with more than 10% lower uninsured deposit flows than the sample average. Information in fair values about loan credit quality is quite limited and cannot account for the bulk of the relevance. Instead, consistent with models of bank fragility, the relevance seems to stem more from information on the decline in loan liquidation values, triggering panic-based withdrawals motivated by (self-fulfilling) expectations of withdrawals by other depositors. The findings inform the cost-benefit tradeoff of reporting loan fair values.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 1","pages":"207-254"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141597249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Show Your Hand: The Impacts of Fair Pricing Requirements in Procurement Contracting","authors":"BRAD NATHAN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12561","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12561","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies how a federal procurement regulation, known as the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA), affects the competitiveness and execution of government contracts. TINA stipulates how contracting officials (COs) can ensure reasonable prices. Following TINA, for contracts above a certain size threshold, COs can no longer rely solely on their own judgment that a price is reasonable. Instead, they must either require suppliers to provide accounting data supporting their proposed prices or expect multiple bids. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that above-threshold contracts experience greater competition (i.e., more bids), improved performance (i.e., less frequent renegotiations and cost overruns), and reduced use of the harder-to-monitor cost-plus pricing, compared to below-threshold contracts. These findings suggest that TINA's requirements enhance competition and oversight for above-threshold contracts.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1405-1448"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12561","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141496071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
RICHARD FRANKEL, BRIGHT GERSHION GODIGBE, MARYJANE RABIER
{"title":"Information Spillovers at Earnings Announcements","authors":"RICHARD FRANKEL, BRIGHT GERSHION GODIGBE, MARYJANE RABIER","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12562","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Research documents price co-movements, or “spillovers,” between focal firms and their peers at focal firms’ earnings announcements. We find that both signed and absolute co-movements between focal- and peer-firm returns are significantly lower at earnings-announcement dates compared to other dates. Analytically, we demonstrate that co-movements do not necessarily indicate common information; instead, co-movements measure the relative proportion of focal firm-specific information to common information in focal-firm earnings announcements. We study three settings where information transfers might be higher: when focal firms report significant earnings surprises, are industry leaders, or share correlated earnings patterns with peer firms. We continue to find lower return correlations during focal-firm earnings announcements. We conduct two alternative tests but fail to find evidence that common information released during focal-firm earnings announcements is significantly greater than on other days. These results raise doubt about the extent of the information externality attributable to financial-report releases.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 1","pages":"319-362"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143119421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"News Bias in Financial Journalists’ Social Networks","authors":"GUOSONG XU","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12560","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12560","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Connected financial journalists—those with working relationships, common school ties, or social media connections to company management—introduce a marked media slant into their news coverage. Using a comprehensive set of newspaper articles covering mergers and acquisition (M&A) transactions from 1997 to 2016, I find that connected journalists use significantly fewer negative words in their coverage of connected acquirers. These journalists are also more likely to quote connected executives and include less accurate language in their reporting. Moreover, they tend to portray other firms in the same network in a less negative light. Journalists’ favoritism bias has implications for both capital market outcomes and their careers. I find that acquirers whose M&As are covered by connected journalists receive significantly higher stock returns on the news article publication date. However, these acquirers’ stock prices reverse in the long term, suggesting market overreaction to news covered by connected journalists. Around M&A transactions, connected articles are correlated with increased bid competition and deal premiums. In terms of future career development, connected journalists are more likely to leave journalism and join their associated industries in the long run. Taken together, the evidence suggests that financial journalists’ personal networks promote news bias that potentially hinders the efficient dissemination of information.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1145-1182"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12560","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141425203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Using and Interpreting Fixed Effects Models","authors":"MATTHIAS BREUER, ED DEHAAN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12559","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12559","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Fixed effects (FE) have emerged as a ubiquitous and powerful tool for eliminating unwanted variation in observational accounting studies. Unwanted variation is plentiful in accounting research because we often use rich data to test precise hypotheses derived from abstract theories. By eliminating unwanted variation, FE reduce concerns that omitted variables bias our estimates or weaken test power. FE are not costless, though, so their use should be carefully justified by theoretical and institutional considerations. FE also transform samples and variables in ways that are not immediately apparent, and in doing so affect how we should interpret regression results. This primer explains the mechanics of FE and provides practical guidance for the informed use, transparent reporting, and careful interpretation of FE models.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1183-1226"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141329596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Government Subsidies and Corporate Misconduct","authors":"ANEESH RAGHUNANDAN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12553","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12553","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I study whether firms that receive targeted U.S. state-level subsidies are more likely to subsequently engage in corporate misconduct. I find that firms are more likely to engage in misconduct in subsidizing states, but not in other states that they operate in, after receiving state subsidies. Using data on both federal and state enforcement actions, and exploiting the legal principle of dual sovereignty for identification, I show that this finding reflects an increase in the underlying rate of misconduct and that this increase is attributable to lenient state-level misconduct enforcement. Collectively, my findings present evidence of an important consequence of targeted firm-specific subsidies: nonfinancial misconduct that potentially could impact the very stakeholders subsidies are ostensibly intended to benefit.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1449-1496"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12553","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140961571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Registered Reports","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12551","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12551","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"827-828"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12551","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140907053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12550","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"826"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12550","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140907117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"2023 Excellence in Refereeing","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12547","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The <i>Journal of Accounting Research</i> is proud to recognize our top referees of the previous calendar year. The senior editors selected those named below for their “2023 Excellence in Refereeing” based on the quality and the number of reviews they had performed for the journal during the years 2022 and 2023. We thank the referees for their invaluable services to the journal.</p><p>Darren Bernard, <i>University of Washington</i></p><p>Anne Beyer, <i>Stanford University</i></p><p>Jannis Bischof, <i>University of Mannheim</i></p><p>Elizabeth Blankespoor, <i>University of Washington</i></p><p>Matthew Bloomfield, <i>University of Pennsylvania</i></p><p>Khrystyna Bochkay, <i>University of Miami</i></p><p>Mark Bradshaw, <i>Boston College</i></p><p>Matthias Breuer, <i>Columbia University</i></p><p>Ulf Brüggemann, <i>Humboldt University Berlin</i></p><p>Jung Ho Choi, <i>Stanford University</i></p><p>Lisa De Simone, <i>University of Texas, Austin</i></p><p>Yiwei Dou, <i>New York University</i></p><p>Raphael Duguay, <i>Yale University</i></p><p>Atif Ellahie, <i>University of Utah</i></p><p>Henry Eyring, <i>Duke University</i></p><p>Vivian Fang, <i>Indiana University</i></p><p>Elia Ferracuti, <i>Duke University</i></p><p>Fabrizio Ferri, <i>University of Miami</i></p><p>Henry Friedman, <i>University of California, Los Angeles</i></p><p>John Gallemore, <i>University of North Carolina</i></p><p>João Granja, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Nicholas Guest, <i>Cornell University</i></p><p>Allen Huang, <i>Hong Kong University of Science & Technology</i></p><p>Xu Jiang, <i>Duke University</i></p><p>Zachary Kaplan, <i>Washington University, St. Louis</i> Sehwa Kim, <i>Columbia University</i></p><p>Rebecca Lester, <i>Stanford University</i></p><p>Miao Liu, <i>Boston College</i></p><p>Yao Lu, <i>Cornell University</i></p><p>William Mayew, <i>Duke University</i></p><p>Charles McClure, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Maximilian Muhn, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Anya Nakhmurina, <i>Yale University</i></p><p>Allison Nicoletti, <i>University of Pennsylvania</i></p><p>Gaizka Ormazabal, <i>IESE Business School</i></p><p>Thomas Rauter, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Delphine Samuels, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Timothy Shields, <i>Chapman University</i></p><p>Nemit Shroff, <i>MIT</i></p><p>Gurpal Sran, <i>New York University</i></p><p>Christopher Stewart, <i>University of Chicago</i></p><p>Lorien Stice-Lawrence, <i>University of Southern California</i></p><p>Andrew Sutherland, <i>MIT</i></p><p>Sorabh Tomar, <i>Southern Methodist University</i></p><p>Rahul Vashishtha, <i>Duke University</i></p><p>David Veenman, <i>University of Amsterdam</i></p><p>Braden Williams, University of Texas, Austin</p><p>Gwen Yu, <i>University of Michigan</i></p><p>Frank Zhou, <i>University of Pennsylvania</i></p><p>Christina Zhu, <i>University of Pennsylvania</i></p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 3","pages":"831-832"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12547","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140907118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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