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On the EPA's Radar: The Role of Financial Reports in Environmental Regulatory Oversight 环保局的雷达上：财务报告在环境监管中的作用
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-09-03 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12572
BIN LI, ANNIKA YU WANG
{"title":"On the EPA's Radar: The Role of Financial Reports in Environmental Regulatory Oversight","authors":"BIN LI,&nbsp;ANNIKA YU WANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12572","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12572","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper investigates the role of corporate financial reports in the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulatory activities. By tracking the EPA's direct retrieval of SEC filings, we identify three key findings. First, the EPA retrieves a large volume of financial reports, especially from firms in high-pollution industries. Second, the EPA is more likely to access financial reports during enforcement investigations and significant rule proposals, but less so during compliance monitoring, with patterns varying predictably across firms. Third, the EPA's reliance on financial reports is potentially driven by its demand for information on firm liquidity, solvency, and profitability. Overall, our study highlights the usefulness of financial reports for the EPA as an environmental regulator.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 5","pages":"1849-1900"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12572","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142130640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
ESG Disclosures in the Private Equity Industry 私募股权投资行业的 ESG 披露
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-08-28 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12570
JEFFERSON ABRAHAM, MARCEL OLBERT, FLORIN VASVARI
{"title":"ESG Disclosures in the Private Equity Industry","authors":"JEFFERSON ABRAHAM,&nbsp;MARCEL OLBERT,&nbsp;FLORIN VASVARI","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12570","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12570","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper offers the first systematic evidence on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures provided by a large global sample of private equity (PE) firms. Using historical websites from 2000 to 2022, we develop and validate a novel dictionary-based measure of voluntary PE firm ESG disclosures. Descriptive statistics reveal an increasing time trend in these disclosures, with social topics becoming as important as environmental topics recently. Multivariate analyses show that the demand for ESG information from fund investors is a significant determinant of PE firms’ ESG disclosures. Leveraging data on PE firms’ portfolio companies, we document that more PE firm ESG disclosures are associated with better ESG outcomes at the portfolio company level, suggesting that voluntary ESG disclosures align with real actions for the average PE firm.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 5","pages":"1611-1660"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12570","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142100733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Effect of the Federal Judicial System on Public Enforcement: Evidence from SEC Enforcement Actions 联邦司法系统对公共执法的影响：美国证券交易委员会执法行动的证据
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12571
YANRONG JIA
{"title":"The Effect of the Federal Judicial System on Public Enforcement: Evidence from SEC Enforcement Actions","authors":"YANRONG JIA","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12571","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12571","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines whether the efficiency of federal district courts affects the likelihood of SEC enforcement. The results indicate that the SEC is less likely to initiate enforcement actions against firms in less efficient federal district courts. In addition, the study examines the implications of court efficiency for firms’ financial reporting quality (FRQ). The evidence suggests that firms residing in more efficient federal districts have higher FRQ and the effect is stronger in subsamples with weak private enforcement regimes. Additional analysis of the choice of venue suggests that the SEC's decision to file in the District Court for D.C. is not affected by local court efficiency. Collectively, this study highlights the importance of an efficient federal judicial system for public enforcement.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 1","pages":"503-541"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142045560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Where Does the Time Go? Auditors’ Commercial Effort, Professional Effort, and Audit Quality 时间都去哪儿了？审计师的商业努力、专业努力和审计质量
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-08-17 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12569
WILLIAM A. CICONTE III, JUSTIN LEIBY, MARLEEN WILLEKENS
{"title":"Where Does the Time Go? Auditors’ Commercial Effort, Professional Effort, and Audit Quality","authors":"WILLIAM A. CICONTE III,&nbsp;JUSTIN LEIBY,&nbsp;MARLEEN WILLEKENS","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12569","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12569","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Audit theory and regulation assumes that auditors’ commercial motivation threatens audit quality. In this registered report, we use data from two Big Four firms in the Netherlands and provide empirical evidence on the relation between auditors’ commercial motivation and (1) compensation, (2) total audit effort, and (3) audit quality. We proxy commercial motivation as the time that individual auditors report allocating to commercial activities. We hypothesize that auditors’ commercial effort is positively related to compensation and we find mixed support. Next, we hypothesize that auditors’ commercial effort is negatively related to the audit effort but we find no support. Turning to audit quality, we hypothesize a negative <i>direct</i> relation between auditors’ commercial effort and audit quality but we find no support. We also predict a positive <i>indirect</i> relation in which auditors’ commercial effort increases quality control reliance leading to higher audit quality. We find some support for this hypothesis but only when we use technical consultations to proxy for quality control. Auditors with greater commercial effort maintain quality because they rely more on technical consultations. In sum, our study challenges the assumption that auditors’ commercial effort threatens audit quality and questions the need for additional regulation to constrain commercial motivation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 1","pages":"255-317"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12569","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141994384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information - Request for Papers 议题信息 - 征求论文
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-18 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12566
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12566","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1142"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12566","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141730014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for 发行信息--长期征集有关《世界文化多样性宣言》的提案
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-18 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12567
{"title":"Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12567","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1143"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12567","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141730015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Just Friends? Managers’ Connections to Judges 只是朋友？管理人员与法官的关系
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-13 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12563
STERLING HUANG, SUGATA ROYCHOWDHURY, EWA SLETTEN, YANPING XU
{"title":"Just Friends? Managers’ Connections to Judges","authors":"STERLING HUANG,&nbsp;SUGATA ROYCHOWDHURY,&nbsp;EWA SLETTEN,&nbsp;YANPING XU","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12563","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12563","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We study the impact of social connections between judges and executives on the outcomes of Securities Class Action Litigation (SCAL). Judges who are socially connected to a firm's executives are significantly more likely to dismiss lawsuits against the firm. There is also evidence of faster resolution and lower payout amounts in connected cases. The favorable outcomes cannot be explained by the lower severity of connected cases, or by court, judge, or firm characteristics. Our results are more pronounced when executives connected to the judge are named defendants in the lawsuits, when connected cases involve less visible lawsuits or firms, and when connections between judges and executives are likely more direct. Our evidence indicates that social connections influence judge impartiality and meaningfully alter SCAL outcomes.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 1","pages":"461-502"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141608145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Decision Relevance of Loan Fair Values for Depositors 贷款公允价值与存款人决策的相关性
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-11 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12564
QI CHEN, RAHUL VASHISHTHA, SHUYAN WANG
{"title":"The Decision Relevance of Loan Fair Values for Depositors","authors":"QI CHEN,&nbsp;RAHUL VASHISHTHA,&nbsp;SHUYAN WANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12564","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12564","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using a large sample of U.S. commercial banks from 1994 to 2019, we find that loan fair values are highly relevant for depositor decision making. A one-standard-deviation decrease in loan fair value performance is associated with more than 10% lower uninsured deposit flows than the sample average. Information in fair values about loan credit quality is quite limited and cannot account for the bulk of the relevance. Instead, consistent with models of bank fragility, the relevance seems to stem more from information on the decline in loan liquidation values, triggering panic-based withdrawals motivated by (self-fulfilling) expectations of withdrawals by other depositors. The findings inform the cost-benefit tradeoff of reporting loan fair values.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 1","pages":"207-254"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141597249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Show Your Hand: The Impacts of Fair Pricing Requirements in Procurement Contracting 伸出你的手采购合同中公平定价要求的影响
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-03 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12561
BRAD NATHAN
{"title":"Show Your Hand: The Impacts of Fair Pricing Requirements in Procurement Contracting","authors":"BRAD NATHAN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12561","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12561","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies how a federal procurement regulation, known as the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA), affects the competitiveness and execution of government contracts. TINA stipulates how contracting officials (COs) can ensure reasonable prices. Following TINA, for contracts above a certain size threshold, COs can no longer rely solely on their own judgment that a price is reasonable. Instead, they must either require suppliers to provide accounting data supporting their proposed prices or expect multiple bids. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that above-threshold contracts experience greater competition (i.e., more bids), improved performance (i.e., less frequent renegotiations and cost overruns), and reduced use of the harder-to-monitor cost-plus pricing, compared to below-threshold contracts. These findings suggest that TINA's requirements enhance competition and oversight for above-threshold contracts.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1405-1448"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12561","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141496071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information Spillovers at Earnings Announcements 收益公告的信息溢出
IF 4.9 2区 管理学
Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-06-25 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12562
RICHARD FRANKEL, BRIGHT GERSHION GODIGBE, MARYJANE RABIER
{"title":"Information Spillovers at Earnings Announcements","authors":"RICHARD FRANKEL,&nbsp;BRIGHT GERSHION GODIGBE,&nbsp;MARYJANE RABIER","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12562","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Research documents price co-movements, or “spillovers,” between focal firms and their peers at focal firms’ earnings announcements. We find that both signed and absolute co-movements between focal- and peer-firm returns are significantly lower at earnings-announcement dates compared to other dates. Analytically, we demonstrate that co-movements do not necessarily indicate common information; instead, co-movements measure the relative proportion of focal firm-specific information to common information in focal-firm earnings announcements. We study three settings where information transfers might be higher: when focal firms report significant earnings surprises, are industry leaders, or share correlated earnings patterns with peer firms. We continue to find lower return correlations during focal-firm earnings announcements. We conduct two alternative tests but fail to find evidence that common information released during focal-firm earnings announcements is significantly greater than on other days. These results raise doubt about the extent of the information externality attributable to financial-report releases.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 1","pages":"319-362"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143119421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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