Journal of Accounting Research最新文献_第6页

Innovation and Financial Disclosure 创新与财务披露

IF 4.4 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-04-25 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12546

HUI CHEN, PIERRE JINGHONG LIANG, EVGENY PETROV

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引用次数: 0

The Impact of Information Frictions Within Regulators: Evidence from Workplace Safety Violations 监管机构内部信息摩擦的影响：工作场所安全违规行为的证据

IF 4.4 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12541

ANEESH RAGHUNANDAN, THOMAS G. RUCHTI

引用次数: 0

Algorithmic Trading and Forward-Looking MD&A Disclosures 算法交易和前瞻性 MD&A 披露

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12540

WAYNE B. THOMAS, YIDING WANG, LING ZHANG

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引用次数: 0

Issue Information - Request for Registered Reports 发行信息 - 申请注册报告

IF 4.4 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-03-29 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12537

引用次数: 0

Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for 发行信息--长期征集有关《世界文化多样性宣言》的提案

IF 4.4 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-03-29 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12538

引用次数: 0

Issue Information - Request for Papers 议题信息 - 征求论文

IF 4.4 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-03-29 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12536

引用次数: 0

Social Comparison on Multiple Tasks: Sacrificing Overall Performance for Local Excellence? 多重任务的社会比较：为局部卓越而牺牲整体表现？

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-03-26 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12535

MAXIMILIAN KOHLER, MATTHIAS D. MAHLENDORF, MISCHA SEITER, TIMO VOGELSANG

引用次数: 0

When Employees Go to Court: Employee Lawsuits and Talent Acquisition in Audit Offices 当员工诉诸法庭时：审计事务所的员工诉讼与人才招聘

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-03-24 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12534

JADE HUAYU CHEN

{"title":"When Employees Go to Court: Employee Lawsuits and Talent Acquisition in Audit Offices","authors":"JADE HUAYU CHEN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12534","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12534","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I examine whether employee-initiated lawsuits against an audit office adversely affect its ability to attract high-quality talent and deliver quality audits. I posit that employee lawsuits erode prospective employees’ perceptions of an office, diminishing their willingness to join. Using a comprehensive data set of individual auditor profiles, I find a decline in the quality of newly hired auditors following an employee lawsuit. Cross-sectionally, the adverse effect of employee lawsuits on talent acquisition is more pronounced when an office is undergoing higher growth and when a case receives greater media attention. Conversely, this adverse effect is less pronounced when an audit office is larger or offers more competitive wages within the local area. When an audit office is unable to recruit high-quality talent, its audit quality is likely to suffer. Consistent with this, I find a deterioration in audit quality provided by an office following an employee lawsuit. Overall, this study underscores the importance of human capital management and employer reputation for audit offices that operate in competitive labor markets.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1265-1307"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12534","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140209783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Home Sweet Home: CEOs Acquiring Firms in Their Birth Countries 甜蜜的家乡首席执行官收购其出生国的公司

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-03-19 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12533

ANTONIO MARRA, ANGELA PETTINICCHIO, RON SHALEV

引用次数: 0

Equity Incentive Plans and Board of Director Discretion over Equity Grants 股权激励计划和董事会对股权授予的自由裁量权

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-03-12 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12532

BRIAN CADMAN, RICHARD CARRIZOSA

引用次数: 0