Journal of Accounting Research最新文献_第6页

Redaction as Cross-Regulatory Disclosure Avoidance 作为跨监管披露规避的修订

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-01-09 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12596

IOANNIS V. FLOROS, SHANE A. JOHNSON, WANJIA ZHAO

{"title":"Redaction as Cross-Regulatory Disclosure Avoidance","authors":"IOANNIS V. FLOROS, SHANE A. JOHNSON, WANJIA ZHAO","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12596","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12596","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We introduce the idea of cross-regulatory disclosure avoidance, whereby firms attempt to counteract expansions of disclosure under one regulation through actions that reduce disclosure under a different one. We study whether firms redact information from material contracts when they face new rules to disclose segment information. Using SFAS No. 131 as a plausibly exogenous shock to segment disclosure, we find that firms increasing the number of reported segments after the rule change exhibit a greater increase in redaction than firms maintaining the same number of segments. Consistent with proprietary cost motives, the increases are concentrated among firms with greater divergence in profitability across segments, higher abnormal segment profitability, and more negative abnormal stock returns in response to the finalization of the rule. Also, treated firms that redact after the rule change have abnormally profitable segments that they previously did not disclose. Firms that observables predict would increase redaction but did not experience declines in sales growth and profit margin. We find no evidence that agency cost motives drive the increases in redaction or, more generally, nondisclosure of segment performance before SFAS No. 131.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 2","pages":"807-855"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142940278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Silent Suffering: Using Machine Learning to Measure CEO Depression 无声的痛苦：用机器学习来衡量CEO的抑郁

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-01-08 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12590

SUNG-YUAN (MARK) CHENG, NARGESS M. GOLSHAN

引用次数: 0

Short Squeezes After Short-Selling Attacks 卖空攻击后的空头挤压

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-01-06 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12595

LORIEN STICE-LAWRENCE, YU TING FORESTER WONG, WUYANG ZHAO

引用次数: 0

The Effect of U.S. Country-by-Country Reporting on U.S. Multinationals’ Tax-Motivated Income Shifting and Real Activities 美国国别报告对美国跨国公司税收激励收入转移和实际活动的影响

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-01-06 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12594

MICHELLE L. NESSA, ANH V. PERSSON, JANE Z. SONG, ERIN M. TOWERY, MARY E. VERNON

{"title":"The Effect of U.S. Country-by-Country Reporting on U.S. Multinationals’ Tax-Motivated Income Shifting and Real Activities","authors":"MICHELLE L. NESSA, ANH V. PERSSON, JANE Z. SONG, ERIN M. TOWERY, MARY E. VERNON","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12594","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12594","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development introduced country-by-country reporting (CbCR) for multinational enterprises (MNEs) to help tax authorities combat tax-motivated income shifting. This study uses confidential U.S. tax administrative data from 2011 to 2018 to examine the effect of U.S. CbCR adoption on the tax-motivated income shifting and real activities of U.S. MNEs. We first document that while U.S. CbCR provides the Internal Revenue Service with incremental information about the location of U.S. MNEs’ global activities relative to existing U.S. tax return disclosures, substantial overlap exists between U.S. CbCR and existing disclosures. In contrast with prior CbCR studies in cross-country settings, we fail to find evidence of a change in U.S. MNEs’ tax-motivated income shifting or a reallocation of real activities based on tax incentives in response to U.S. CbCR using multiple empirical approaches. Overall, our study leverages U.S. tax administrative data to provide insights into the impact of the CbCR initiative on U.S. MNEs.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 2","pages":"951-988"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142935104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

What Happens to Partners Who Issue Adverse Internal Control Opinions? 发表不利内部控制意见的合伙人怎么办？

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-01-06 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12597

ASHLEIGH L. BAKKE, ELIZABETH N. COWLE, STEPHEN P. ROWE, MICHAEL S. WILKINS

{"title":"What Happens to Partners Who Issue Adverse Internal Control Opinions?","authors":"ASHLEIGH L. BAKKE, ELIZABETH N. COWLE, STEPHEN P. ROWE, MICHAEL S. WILKINS","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12597","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12597","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We investigate how audit firms balance the tension between professional responsibility and client service by examining changes in partner assignments following adverse internal control opinions (ICOs). We find that partners are significantly more likely to be reassigned when they issued an adverse ICO to any of their clients in the previous year. Further, partners issuing adverse ICOs experience unfavorable changes in their client portfolios in the form of lower fees and less prestigious assignments. We find that consequences are more negative when adverse ICOs are issued to clients that are more important to the local office and that there are no consequences when partners issue continuing adverse opinions to clients they have “inherited” from an original adverse ICO partner. We also find that the consequences are stronger for partners of non-Big 4 audit firms that are likely to be more sensitive to client service considerations. The negative portfolio effects we observe persist for at least three years, and our findings are robust to restrictions involving mandatory partner rotation and adverse ICOs that lead to client loss. Overall, our results are consistent with adverse ICO partners experiencing negative consequences as audit firms respond to client service incentives in the area of internal controls over financial reporting.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 2","pages":"649-688"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142935095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Context-Based Interpretation of Financial Information 基于上下文的财务信息解释

IF 4.4 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-12-18 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12593

ALEX G. KIM, VALERI V. NIKOLAEV

引用次数: 0

Does Access to Patent Information Help Technological Acquisitions? Evidence from Patent Library Openings 专利信息的获取是否有助于技术收购？来自专利图书馆开放的证据

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-12-13 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12592

CONNIE X. MAO, YUERU QIN, XUAN TIAN, CHI ZHANG

引用次数: 0

Tax Subsidy Disclosure and Local Economic Effects 税收补贴披露与地方经济效应

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-12-11 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12591

LISA DE SIMONE, REBECCA LESTER, ANEESH RAGHUNANDAN

{"title":"Tax Subsidy Disclosure and Local Economic Effects","authors":"LISA DE SIMONE, REBECCA LESTER, ANEESH RAGHUNANDAN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12591","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12591","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We examine if the effectiveness of business tax subsidies varies based on state disclosure laws. The prior accounting literature on government disclosure documents substantial variation in the quality of such disclosures, raising questions about their effectiveness for monitoring. State and local business subsidies for investment and employment have tripled in size over the past 30 years, but transparency problems inhibit clear assessments of whether subsidies achieve their intended outcomes. We examine both internal disclosure laws, which mandate subsidy reporting by the granting state agency to other state oversight agencies, and external disclosure laws, which mandate reporting to the public. We find positive effects of subsidies on local employment when subsidies are subject to internal disclosure laws; by implementing such regimes, governments could forego 1.2–1.7 subsequent subsidies per county, saving $419.0–$593.5 million in aggregate. In contrast, we observe little effect of external disclosure, which we show is due to governments either substituting to other types of incentives or posting stale information that impedes public monitoring. We contribute to the government disclosure literature by demonstrating the real employment effects of internal government disclosures, and we provide policy-relevant evidence about the conditions under which external disclosure regimes facilitate public monitoring.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 2","pages":"547-598"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142804668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Spillover Effects of the SEC's Regulatory Oversight on Private Debt Contracting: Evidence from Cross-listed Foreign Firms 美国证券交易委员会的监管对私人债务契约的溢出效应：来自交叉上市外国公司的证据

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-11-11 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12585

Mahfuz Chy, Inder K. Khurana, Hoyoun Kyung

{"title":"Spillover Effects of the SEC's Regulatory Oversight on Private Debt Contracting: Evidence from Cross-listed Foreign Firms","authors":"Mahfuz Chy, Inder K. Khurana, Hoyoun Kyung","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12585","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12585","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We examine the effect of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) regulatory oversight on private debt contracting outcomes, using the signing of the multilateral memorandum of understanding (MMoU) as a natural experiment. The MMoU enables the SEC to take stricter punitive actions against wealth expropriation by cross-listed firms’ insiders and enforce better compliance with applicable rules and regulations. We find that enhanced SEC oversight in the post-MMoU regime lowers loan spreads by 36 basis points, thus saving an average cross-listed firm approximately $9 million in direct loan costs over the life of a bank loan. Cross-sectional analyses show that the effect is more pronounced for borrowers from countries with weaker institutions, borrowers with greater accounting discretion, and for loans arranged by top lenders or loans not secured by collateral. Conversely, the effect is less pronounced for borrowers who use IFRS or when the SEC faces greater budgetary constraints. Enhanced SEC oversight also leads to an increase in loan maturity and a decrease in financial covenants. Our evidence suggests that while the SEC's primary mandate is to protect public equity and bond investors, its supervision yields substantial borrowing cost savings and more lenient nonprice loan terms in the private debt markets as well.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 2","pages":"769-806"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142601958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Issue Information - Request for Papers 议题信息 - 征求论文

IF 4.9 2区管理学

Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-11-06 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12587

引用次数: 0