{"title":"Financial Transparency of Private Firms: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment","authors":"JOACHIM GASSEN, MAXIMILIAN MUHN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12568","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12568","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines why private firms choose to be financially transparent or opaque by conducting a field experiment with more than 25,000 firms in Germany. We inform a randomly chosen set of firms about a disclosure option that allows eligible firms to restrict access to their otherwise publicly available financial statements. We also vary the messaging in subtle ways to induce experimental variation in the probability that firms take transacting (capital providers or customers and suppliers) versus non-transacting stakeholders (competitors or general interest parties) into consideration when making their filing decision. Based on each firm's actual filing decision, we find that treated firms are 15% more likely to restrict access to their financial statements. This intention-to-treat effect is persistent and concentrated among firms that should derive lower net benefits from disclosure (smaller, more mature firms in less capital-intensive industries). These findings indicate that informational constraints affect firms’ disclosure practice. Additionally, we show that the treatment effect is almost 40% larger for firms that have a higher, exogenously induced, probability of considering non-transacting stakeholders when making their disclosure decision. By analyzing subsequent firm activity and complementary survey evidence, we also provide suggestive evidence that disclosure requirements put an undue burden on very small private firms.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 1","pages":"413-460"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12568","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142124061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the EPA's Radar: The Role of Financial Reports in Environmental Regulatory Oversight","authors":"BIN LI, ANNIKA YU WANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12572","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12572","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper investigates the role of corporate financial reports in the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulatory activities. By tracking the EPA's direct retrieval of SEC filings, we identify three key findings. First, the EPA retrieves a large volume of financial reports, especially from firms in high-pollution industries. Second, the EPA is more likely to access financial reports during enforcement investigations and significant rule proposals, but less so during compliance monitoring, with patterns varying predictably across firms. Third, the EPA's reliance on financial reports is potentially driven by its demand for information on firm liquidity, solvency, and profitability. Overall, our study highlights the usefulness of financial reports for the EPA as an environmental regulator.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 5","pages":"1849-1900"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12572","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142130640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"ESG Disclosures in the Private Equity Industry","authors":"JEFFERSON ABRAHAM, MARCEL OLBERT, FLORIN VASVARI","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12570","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12570","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper offers the first systematic evidence on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures provided by a large global sample of private equity (PE) firms. Using historical websites from 2000 to 2022, we develop and validate a novel dictionary-based measure of voluntary PE firm ESG disclosures. Descriptive statistics reveal an increasing time trend in these disclosures, with social topics becoming as important as environmental topics recently. Multivariate analyses show that the demand for ESG information from fund investors is a significant determinant of PE firms’ ESG disclosures. Leveraging data on PE firms’ portfolio companies, we document that more PE firm ESG disclosures are associated with better ESG outcomes at the portfolio company level, suggesting that voluntary ESG disclosures align with real actions for the average PE firm.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 5","pages":"1611-1660"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12570","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142100733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Effect of the Federal Judicial System on Public Enforcement: Evidence from SEC Enforcement Actions","authors":"YANRONG JIA","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12571","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12571","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines whether the efficiency of federal district courts affects the likelihood of SEC enforcement. The results indicate that the SEC is less likely to initiate enforcement actions against firms in less efficient federal district courts. In addition, the study examines the implications of court efficiency for firms’ financial reporting quality (FRQ). The evidence suggests that firms residing in more efficient federal districts have higher FRQ and the effect is stronger in subsamples with weak private enforcement regimes. Additional analysis of the choice of venue suggests that the SEC's decision to file in the District Court for D.C. is not affected by local court efficiency. Collectively, this study highlights the importance of an efficient federal judicial system for public enforcement.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 1","pages":"503-541"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142045560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
WILLIAM A. CICONTE III, JUSTIN LEIBY, MARLEEN WILLEKENS
{"title":"Where Does the Time Go? Auditors’ Commercial Effort, Professional Effort, and Audit Quality","authors":"WILLIAM A. CICONTE III, JUSTIN LEIBY, MARLEEN WILLEKENS","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12569","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12569","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Audit theory and regulation assumes that auditors’ commercial motivation threatens audit quality. In this registered report, we use data from two Big Four firms in the Netherlands and provide empirical evidence on the relation between auditors’ commercial motivation and (1) compensation, (2) total audit effort, and (3) audit quality. We proxy commercial motivation as the time that individual auditors report allocating to commercial activities. We hypothesize that auditors’ commercial effort is positively related to compensation and we find mixed support. Next, we hypothesize that auditors’ commercial effort is negatively related to the audit effort but we find no support. Turning to audit quality, we hypothesize a negative <i>direct</i> relation between auditors’ commercial effort and audit quality but we find no support. We also predict a positive <i>indirect</i> relation in which auditors’ commercial effort increases quality control reliance leading to higher audit quality. We find some support for this hypothesis but only when we use technical consultations to proxy for quality control. Auditors with greater commercial effort maintain quality because they rely more on technical consultations. In sum, our study challenges the assumption that auditors’ commercial effort threatens audit quality and questions the need for additional regulation to constrain commercial motivation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 1","pages":"255-317"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12569","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141994384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12566","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1142"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12566","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141730014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12567","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1143"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12567","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141730015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Just Friends? Managers’ Connections to Judges","authors":"STERLING HUANG, SUGATA ROYCHOWDHURY, EWA SLETTEN, YANPING XU","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12563","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12563","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We study the impact of social connections between judges and executives on the outcomes of Securities Class Action Litigation (SCAL). Judges who are socially connected to a firm's executives are significantly more likely to dismiss lawsuits against the firm. There is also evidence of faster resolution and lower payout amounts in connected cases. The favorable outcomes cannot be explained by the lower severity of connected cases, or by court, judge, or firm characteristics. Our results are more pronounced when executives connected to the judge are named defendants in the lawsuits, when connected cases involve less visible lawsuits or firms, and when connections between judges and executives are likely more direct. Our evidence indicates that social connections influence judge impartiality and meaningfully alter SCAL outcomes.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 1","pages":"461-502"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141608145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Decision Relevance of Loan Fair Values for Depositors","authors":"QI CHEN, RAHUL VASHISHTHA, SHUYAN WANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12564","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12564","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using a large sample of U.S. commercial banks from 1994 to 2019, we find that loan fair values are highly relevant for depositor decision making. A one-standard-deviation decrease in loan fair value performance is associated with more than 10% lower uninsured deposit flows than the sample average. Information in fair values about loan credit quality is quite limited and cannot account for the bulk of the relevance. Instead, consistent with models of bank fragility, the relevance seems to stem more from information on the decline in loan liquidation values, triggering panic-based withdrawals motivated by (self-fulfilling) expectations of withdrawals by other depositors. The findings inform the cost-benefit tradeoff of reporting loan fair values.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 1","pages":"207-254"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141597249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Show Your Hand: The Impacts of Fair Pricing Requirements in Procurement Contracting","authors":"BRAD NATHAN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12561","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12561","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies how a federal procurement regulation, known as the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA), affects the competitiveness and execution of government contracts. TINA stipulates how contracting officials (COs) can ensure reasonable prices. Following TINA, for contracts above a certain size threshold, COs can no longer rely solely on their own judgment that a price is reasonable. Instead, they must either require suppliers to provide accounting data supporting their proposed prices or expect multiple bids. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that above-threshold contracts experience greater competition (i.e., more bids), improved performance (i.e., less frequent renegotiations and cost overruns), and reduced use of the harder-to-monitor cost-plus pricing, compared to below-threshold contracts. These findings suggest that TINA's requirements enhance competition and oversight for above-threshold contracts.</p>","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"62 4","pages":"1405-1448"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12561","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141496071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}