税务策略披露:洗绿指令?

IF 4.9 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
KATARZYNA BILICKA, ELISA CASI, CAROL SEREGNI, BARBARA M. B. STAGE
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了定性税务披露任务的影响,该任务旨在通过对企业施加声誉成本来提高税务透明度和合规性。我们将 2016 年英国要求大型企业披露其税收战略的改革作为外生冲击。我们发现,受影响的企业--那些必须发布税收战略报告的企业--也显著增加了其年报中的税收战略披露量,但这种披露包含了更多的模板。独立的税收战略报告所包含的叙述与年报中的叙述相似,具有粘性,其质量与性别和人权方面的披露质量相关。至于实际行为变化,我们发现在多个代用指标和公司特征中,税收筹划并没有显著的影响。虽然我们发现强制规定增加了媒体对被处理公司的关注,但我们的结果表明,在定性披露的情况下,这种强制渠道可能不起作用,因为定性披露可能很难被外部利益相关者验证。即使在我们预期声誉成本较高的公司子样本中,我们也记录了类似的反应。总之,我们的研究结果表明,强制企业进行定性税务披露可以激励企业将自己塑造成良好的税务公民,而无需改变其做法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Tax Strategy Disclosure: A Greenwashing Mandate?
We investigate the effects of a qualitative tax disclosure mandate aimed at improving tax transparency and compliance by imposing reputational costs for firms. We use, as an exogenous shock, the 2016 UK reform that required large businesses to disclose their tax strategy. We find that treated firms—those that must publish a tax strategy report—also significantly increase the volume of tax strategy disclosure in their annual reports, but this disclosure contains more boilerplate. The standalone tax strategy reports contain narratives similar to those in the annual reports, are sticky, and their quality is correlated with those of disclosures on gender and human rights. Turning to real behavioral changes, we document no significant effect on tax planning across several proxies and firm characteristics. While we find that the mandate increased media attention on treated firms, our results suggest that this enforcement channel might not work in the context of qualitative disclosure, which may be hard to verify for outside stakeholders. Even in subsamples of firms for which we would expect higher reputational costs, we document similar responses. Taken together, our findings indicate that mandating qualitative tax disclosure has incentivized firms to portray themselves as good tax citizens without changing their practices.
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来源期刊
Journal of Accounting Research
Journal of Accounting Research BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
6.80%
发文量
53
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting Research is a general-interest accounting journal. It publishes original research in all areas of accounting and related fields that utilizes tools from basic disciplines such as economics, statistics, psychology, and sociology. This research typically uses analytical, empirical archival, experimental, and field study methods and addresses economic questions, external and internal, in accounting, auditing, disclosure, financial reporting, taxation, and information as well as related fields such as corporate finance, investments, capital markets, law, contracting, and information economics.
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