International Organization最新文献_第6页

Free Riding, Network Effects, and Burden Sharing in Defense Cooperation Networks 防务合作网络中的搭便车、网络效应与责任分担

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-01-11 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818322000315

Brandon J. Kinne, Stephanie N. Kang

{"title":"Free Riding, Network Effects, and Burden Sharing in Defense Cooperation Networks","authors":"Brandon J. Kinne, Stephanie N. Kang","doi":"10.1017/S0020818322000315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818322000315","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How do states distribute the burdens of collective defense? This paper develops a network theory of burden sharing. We focus on bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCAs), which promote cooperation in a variety of defense, military, and security issue areas. Using a computational model, we show that DCA partners’ defense spending depends on the network structure of their agreements. In bilateral terms, DCAs increase defense spending by committing states to defense activities and allowing partners to reciprocally punish free riding. However, as a state's local network of defense partnerships grows more densely connected, with many transitive “friend of a friend” relations, DCAs have the countervailing effect of reducing defense spending. The more deeply integrated states are in bilateral defense networks, the less they spend on defense. We distinguish two potential mechanisms behind this effect—one based on efficiency improvements, the other on free riding. An empirical analysis using multilevel inferential network models points more to efficiency than to free riding. Defense networks reduce defense spending, and they do so by allowing countries to produce security more efficiently.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"77 1","pages":"405 - 439"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49568751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

A Theory of External Wars and European Parliaments 外部战争理论与欧洲议会

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-01-10 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818322000303

Brenton Kenkel, Jack Paine

{"title":"A Theory of External Wars and European Parliaments","authors":"Brenton Kenkel, Jack Paine","doi":"10.1017/S0020818322000303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818322000303","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The development of parliamentary constraints on the executive was critical in Western European political history. Previous scholarship identifies external wars as a key factor, but with varying effects. Sometimes, willing monarchs granted parliamentary rights in return for revenues to fight wars. Yet at other times, war threats empowered rulers over other elites or caused states to fragment. We analyze a formal model to understand how external wars can either stimulate or undermine prospects for a contractual relationship between a ruler and elite actors. We recover the standard intuition that war threats make the ruler more willing to grant parliamentary rights in return for revenue. Our key insight is that war threats also affect the bargaining position of elites. A previously unrecognized tension yields our new findings: stronger outsider threats increase pressure either on elites to fund the ruler or on the ruler to accept constraints—but not both simultaneously. Elites with immobile wealth depend on the ruler for security. War threats undercut their credibility to refuse funding for an unconstrained ruler. By contrast, war threats make elites with mobile wealth and a viable exit option unwilling to fund a hopeless war effort. Only under circumscribed conditions do war threats align three conditions needed for parliament to arise in equilibrium: ruler willingness, elite credibility, and elite willingness. We apply our theory to posit strategic foundations for waves and reversals of historical European parliaments.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"77 1","pages":"102 - 143"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43401446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Deflective Cooperation: Social Pressure and Forum Management in Cold War Conventional Arms Control 偏转合作:冷战常规军备控制中的社会压力与论坛管理

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-01-10 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818322000364

Giovanni Mantilla

{"title":"Deflective Cooperation: Social Pressure and Forum Management in Cold War Conventional Arms Control","authors":"Giovanni Mantilla","doi":"10.1017/S0020818322000364","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818322000364","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Why do states create weak international institutions? Frustrated with proliferating but disappointing international environmental institutions, scholars increasingly bemoan agreements which, rather than solving problems, appear to exist “for show.” This article offers an explanation of this phenomenon. I theorize a dynamic of deflective cooperation to explain the creation of compromise face-saving institutions. I argue that when international social pressure to create an institution clashes with enduring disagreements among states about the merits of creating it, states may adopt cooperative arrangements that are ill-designed to produce their purported practical effects. Rather than negotiation failures or empty gestures, I contend that face-saving institutions represent interstate efforts to manage intractable disagreement through suboptimal institutionalized cooperation. I formulate this argument inductively through a new multi-archival study of conventional weapons regulation during the Cold War, which resulted in the oft-maligned 1980 UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. A careful reconsideration of the negotiation process extends and nuances existing IR theorizing and retrieves its historical significance as a critical juncture and complex product of contesting diplomatic practices.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"77 1","pages":"564 - 598"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45020522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

INO volume 77 issue 1 Cover and Back matter INO第77卷第1期封面和封底

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818323000048

引用次数: 0

International Organization: Theories and Institutions 国际组织:理论与制度

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-22559-8

J. Barkin

引用次数: 34

INO volume 77 issue 1 Cover and Front matter 国际出版组织第77卷第1期封面和封面问题

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818323000036

引用次数: 0

Segregated Economies in an Integrated World: The Gendered Consequences of Exchange Rate Movements in Low- and Middle-Income Countries 一体化世界中的隔离经济:中低收入国家汇率变动的性别后果

1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818323000139

Joel W. Simmons

引用次数: 0

INO volume 77 issue 3 Cover and Back matter INO第77卷第3期封面和封底

1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818323000176

引用次数: 0

Dual Use Deception: How Technology Shapes Cooperation in International Relations 双重用途欺骗:技术如何影响国际关系中的合作

1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818323000140

Jane Vaynman, Tristan A. Volpe

{"title":"Dual Use Deception: How Technology Shapes Cooperation in International Relations","authors":"Jane Vaynman, Tristan A. Volpe","doi":"10.1017/s0020818323000140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818323000140","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Almost all technology is dual use to some degree: it has both civilian and military applications. This feature creates a dilemma for cooperation. States can design arms control institutions to curtail costly competition over some military technology. But they also do not want to limit valuable civilian uses. How does the dual use nature of technology shape the prospects for cooperation? We argue that the duality of technology presents a challenge not by its very existence but rather through the ways it alters information constraints on the design of arms control institutions. We characterize variation in technology along two dual use dimensions: (1) the ease of distinguishing military from civilian uses; and (2) the degree of integration within military enterprises and the civilian economy. Distinguishability drives the level of monitoring needed to detect violations. When a weapon is indistinguishable from its civilian counterpart, states must improve detection though intelligence collection or intrusive inspections. Integration sharpens the costs of disclosing information to another state. For highly integrated technology, demonstrating compliance could expose information about other capabilities, increasing the security risks from espionage. Together, these dimensions generate expectations about the specific information problems states face as they try to devise agreements over various technologies. We introduce a new qualitative data set to assess both variables and their impact on cooperation across all modern armament technologies. The findings lend strong support for the theory. Efforts to control emerging technologies should consider how variation in the dual use attributes shapes this tension between detection and disclosure.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135784066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

INO volume 77 issue 3 Cover and Front matter 国际出版组织第77卷第3期封面和封面问题

1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818323000164

引用次数: 0