破解核稳定性:战争模拟技术、不确定性和升级

IF 8.2 1区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Jacquelyn G. Schneider, Benjamin Schechter, Rachael Shaffer
{"title":"破解核稳定性:战争模拟技术、不确定性和升级","authors":"Jacquelyn G. Schneider, Benjamin Schechter, Rachael Shaffer","doi":"10.1017/S0020818323000115","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How do emerging technologies affect nuclear stability? In this paper, we use a quasi-experimental cyber-nuclear wargame with 580 players to explore three hypotheses about emerging technologies and nuclear stability: (1) technological uncertainty leads to preemption and escalation; (2) technological uncertainty leads to restraint; and (3) technological certainty leads to escalation through aggressive counterforce campaigns. The wargames suggest that uncertainty and fear about cyber vulnerabilities create no immediate incentives for preemptive nuclear use. The greater danger to strategic stability lies in how overconfidence in cyber exploits incentivizes more aggressive counterforce campaigns and, secondarily, how vulnerabilities encourage predelegation or automation. Both of these effects suggest worrisome relationships between cyber exploits and inadvertent nuclear use on one hand and cyber vulnerabilities and accidental nuclear use on the other hand. Together, these findings reveal the complicated relationship between pathways to escalation and strategic stability, highlighting the role that confidence and perhaps-misplaced certainty—versus uncertainty and fear—play in strategic stability.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"77 1","pages":"633 - 667"},"PeriodicalIF":8.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Hacking Nuclear Stability: Wargaming Technology, Uncertainty, and Escalation\",\"authors\":\"Jacquelyn G. Schneider, Benjamin Schechter, Rachael Shaffer\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/S0020818323000115\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract How do emerging technologies affect nuclear stability? In this paper, we use a quasi-experimental cyber-nuclear wargame with 580 players to explore three hypotheses about emerging technologies and nuclear stability: (1) technological uncertainty leads to preemption and escalation; (2) technological uncertainty leads to restraint; and (3) technological certainty leads to escalation through aggressive counterforce campaigns. The wargames suggest that uncertainty and fear about cyber vulnerabilities create no immediate incentives for preemptive nuclear use. The greater danger to strategic stability lies in how overconfidence in cyber exploits incentivizes more aggressive counterforce campaigns and, secondarily, how vulnerabilities encourage predelegation or automation. Both of these effects suggest worrisome relationships between cyber exploits and inadvertent nuclear use on one hand and cyber vulnerabilities and accidental nuclear use on the other hand. Together, these findings reveal the complicated relationship between pathways to escalation and strategic stability, highlighting the role that confidence and perhaps-misplaced certainty—versus uncertainty and fear—play in strategic stability.\",\"PeriodicalId\":48388,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Organization\",\"volume\":\"77 1\",\"pages\":\"633 - 667\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":8.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-08-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Organization\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818323000115\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Organization","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818323000115","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要新兴技术如何影响核稳定性?在本文中,我们使用一个有580名参与者的准实验性网络核战争游戏来探索关于新兴技术和核稳定性的三个假设:(1)技术的不确定性导致抢占和升级;(2) 技术的不确定性导致约束;以及(3)技术确定性通过积极的反作用力运动导致升级。战争演习表明,对网络漏洞的不确定性和恐惧不会立即刺激先发制人的核使用。战略稳定面临的更大危险在于,对网络利用的过度自信如何激励更具侵略性的反作用力运动,其次,漏洞如何鼓励预先授权或自动化。这两种影响都表明,一方面网络漏洞和无意核使用与另一方面网络脆弱性和意外核使用之间存在着令人担忧的关系。总之,这些发现揭示了升级途径与战略稳定之间的复杂关系,突显了信心和可能错位的确定性——与不确定性和恐惧——在战略稳定中发挥的作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Hacking Nuclear Stability: Wargaming Technology, Uncertainty, and Escalation
Abstract How do emerging technologies affect nuclear stability? In this paper, we use a quasi-experimental cyber-nuclear wargame with 580 players to explore three hypotheses about emerging technologies and nuclear stability: (1) technological uncertainty leads to preemption and escalation; (2) technological uncertainty leads to restraint; and (3) technological certainty leads to escalation through aggressive counterforce campaigns. The wargames suggest that uncertainty and fear about cyber vulnerabilities create no immediate incentives for preemptive nuclear use. The greater danger to strategic stability lies in how overconfidence in cyber exploits incentivizes more aggressive counterforce campaigns and, secondarily, how vulnerabilities encourage predelegation or automation. Both of these effects suggest worrisome relationships between cyber exploits and inadvertent nuclear use on one hand and cyber vulnerabilities and accidental nuclear use on the other hand. Together, these findings reveal the complicated relationship between pathways to escalation and strategic stability, highlighting the role that confidence and perhaps-misplaced certainty—versus uncertainty and fear—play in strategic stability.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
14.50
自引率
1.30%
发文量
25
期刊介绍: International Organization (IO) is a prominent peer-reviewed journal that comprehensively covers the field of international affairs. Its subject areas encompass foreign policies, international relations, political economy, security policies, environmental disputes, regional integration, alliance patterns, conflict resolution, economic development, and international capital movements. Continuously ranked among the top journals in the field, IO does not publish book reviews but instead features high-quality review essays that survey new developments, synthesize important ideas, and address key issues for future scholarship.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信