International Organization最新文献

How Migrating Overseas Shapes Political Preferences: Evidence from a Field Experiment 海外移民如何影响政治偏好：来自实地实验的证据

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2025-10-16 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818325100842

Nikhar Gaikwad, Kolby Hanson, Aliz Tóth

引用次数: 0

Elite–Public Gaps on Nuclear Weapons: The Roles of Salience and Knowledge 精英与公众在核武器问题上的差距：突出和知识的作用

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2025-09-15 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818325100799

David C. Logan

{"title":"Elite–Public Gaps on Nuclear Weapons: The Roles of Salience and Knowledge","authors":"David C. Logan","doi":"10.1017/s0020818325100799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818325100799","url":null,"abstract":"<p>An explosion of survey experimental research shows that public support for nuclear use is alarmingly high and malleable. Thus, nuclear nonuse may depend on elite restraint. Can elites be counted on to resist nuclear use? How do national security elites think about nuclear weapons, and what does this imply for potential nuclear use and our understanding of public–elite gaps in political behavior? Drawing on the literature on public opinion formation, I argue that two features of public attitudes toward nuclear weapons help explain elite–public gaps on nuclear weapons: low salience and low knowledge. I then test this explanation using parallel preregistered survey experiments assessing support for nuclear use across three samples: the US public before the Ukraine conflict; the US public after the Ukraine conflict began; and a highly elite sample of US military officers and strategists, also after the Ukraine conflict began. While the US public is willing to support nuclear use, US national security elites are significantly more reluctant. Among the public, respondents for whom nuclear weapons are a high-knowledge or high-salience issue behave more like elites: they are less likely to support nuclear use. The findings have important implications for survey experimental research, scholarship on nuclear weapons, public opinion formation, and elite–public gaps in political behavior.</p>","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"89 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2025-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145059333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

From Cocaine to Avocados: Criminal Market Expansion and Violence 从可卡因到鳄梨：犯罪市场扩张和暴力

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2025-09-09 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818325100763

Chelsea Estancona, Lucía Tiscornia

引用次数: 0

International State Building and Civilian Preferences: Experimental Evidence from Liberia 国际国家建设与平民偏好：来自利比里亚的实验证据

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2025-09-05 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818325100829

Cameron Mailhot, Sabrina Karim

{"title":"International State Building and Civilian Preferences: Experimental Evidence from Liberia","authors":"Cameron Mailhot, Sabrina Karim","doi":"10.1017/s0020818325100829","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818325100829","url":null,"abstract":"<p>While often described as a unified process imposed by external actors on weak, conflict-ridden countries, international state building increasingly comprises a variety of actors involved in different ways in (re)building a diverse set of institutions. Civilian preferences are often excluded from this fragmented environment. We identify and explicate three dimensions along which postconflict state building meaningfully varies: the actor involved, the type of institution targeted, and the form of involvement. We then examine how variation along each dimension impacts civilians’ state-building preferences with two rounds of original survey experiments fielded in Liberia. We find that Liberians largely prefer state-building processes overseen by a subset of international actors; that they prefer state building focused on security-oriented institutions over non-security-oriented institutions; and that different forms of involvement in the process meaningfully influence their preferences. We also find that these preferences depend on civilians’ characteristics. Ultimately, we provide an initial, conceptual mapping of the diversified landscape of international state building, as well as an empirical “unpacking” of the conditions that may shape civilians’ preferences toward the process.</p>","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2025-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144995214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Trade and Exchange Rate Competition in East Asia 东亚地区的贸易和汇率竞争

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2025-08-19 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818325100751

Mark S. Manger, Nicola Nones

{"title":"Trade and Exchange Rate Competition in East Asia","authors":"Mark S. Manger, Nicola Nones","doi":"10.1017/s0020818325100751","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818325100751","url":null,"abstract":"Exchange rate manipulation—the active devaluation of a currency through intervention in the foreign exchange market—is a frequent trigger of international disputes. Yet it is not an obvious policy choice: as a blunt tool to boost export competitiveness, it is disliked by citizens and importers because of the loss of purchasing power it entails, and because it benefits those with investment abroad at the expense of those with savings at home. It is thus notable that a group of East Asian countries, from Japan and Korea to Thailand, undertake frequent and often large interventions to devalue their currencies. What explains their policy choice? We provide evidence that exchange rate depreciations are undertaken at the behest of export industries. Because lobbying activities in East Asian countries are not directly observable, we focus on Japan and Korea and construct a proxy measure of lobbying by exporters, drawing on news reports. We use machine learning to scale daily reports of industry demands in the two leading financial newspapers, the Japanese Nihon Keizai Shimbun and, in a robustness check, the Korean Hankyung, over twenty-five years. We find evidence that mounting public pressure by organized economic interest groups precedes intervention and induces currency depreciation.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"17 1","pages":"1-21"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144898812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Supplying Influence: Domestic Production Networks in Trade Politics 供给影响：贸易政治中的国内生产网络

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2025-08-19 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818325100581

Timm Betz, Leonhard Hummel

{"title":"Supplying Influence: Domestic Production Networks in Trade Politics","authors":"Timm Betz, Leonhard Hummel","doi":"10.1017/s0020818325100581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818325100581","url":null,"abstract":"Why are some firms more successful than others in obtaining privileged treatment from their government? Trade policy, as an unusually targeted tool, offers a rich context to understand such questions of special-interest politics and corporate power. Studying decisions on anti-dumping petitions in the United States, we introduce a novel source of privileged treatment. We argue that firms with more linkages throughout the domestic economy enjoy a privileged political position. Benefits to these firms extend indirectly to a wider set of constituents, which allows firms to assemble broader coalitions and to portray protectionist policy as more than purely particularistic politics. We provide evidence for this argument by developing original measures of linkages between firms, derived from over 600,000 customer–supplier relationships among industries, matching them with data on anti-dumping petitions filed by US firms, written briefs filed by members of Congress on behalf of these firms, and the geographic distribution of industries. Our account identifies a new explanation of differences in the political influence of firms, underscores the relevance of domestic production networks in politics, and offers a novel perspective on cleavages and coalitions in trade politics. Our results also suggest that the expansion of global supply chains, long considered a hallmark of political power, has weakened the clout of some of the largest firms by limiting their domestic footprint.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"70 1","pages":"1-38"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144898852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Global Politics of Scientific Consensus: Evidence from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 科学共识的全球政治：来自政府间气候变化专门委员会的证据

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2025-07-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818325000062

Zuhad Hai

{"title":"The Global Politics of Scientific Consensus: Evidence from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change","authors":"Zuhad Hai","doi":"10.1017/s0020818325000062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818325000062","url":null,"abstract":"When is science politicized in the international climate change regime? Does greater scientific certainty protect it from becoming politically contentious? I study these questions in the context of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the organization responsible for communicating the global scientific consensus on climate change. Using newly digitized data from inter-state negotiations at the IPCC, I show that states attempt to influence the IPCC’s assessment of scientific consensus in line with their bargaining positions in climate change negotiations. Estimating an ideal-point model, I find that the predominant cleavage over climate science is distributional—between new and old industrializers with broader ideological disagreements, rather than between large polluters and vulnerable countries. Next, I show that this cleavage is mediated by scientific uncertainty. Large polluters are more likely to agree with each other on interpretations of relatively uncertain science, which allows them to jointly weaken the scientific basis for strong climate agreements. Conversely, these countries are less likely to agree on relatively certain science, which heightens conflict over the distribution of the burden of mitigation. Thus greater scientific certainty may change the nature of politicization rather than reducing it.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"28 1","pages":"233-256"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144534098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Shaming Paris: A Political Economy of Climate Commitments 羞辱巴黎：气候承诺的政治经济学

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2025-07-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818325000074

Justin Melnick, Alastair Smith

引用次数: 0

Apology Diplomacy: The International Image Effects of Interstate Apologies 道歉外交：州际道歉的国际形象效应

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2025-07-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818325000086

Michaela Mattes, Jessica L.P. Weeks

{"title":"Apology Diplomacy: The International Image Effects of Interstate Apologies","authors":"Michaela Mattes, Jessica L.P. Weeks","doi":"10.1017/s0020818325000086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818325000086","url":null,"abstract":"Can states improve their international image by apologizing for past wrongs, or do apologies hurt countries’ reputations? We argue that apologizing can boost a country’s international image by providing reassurance about future behavior and conveying appropriate values. Yet apologies could also signal weakness, and their international effects could depend on reactions in the sending and receiving countries. To test these arguments, we pair large-scale US-based survey experiments involving Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with the historical case of Germany’s 1951 Holocaust apology. In our experiments, respondents learned whether a foreign state apologized for past offenses, how the target of the apology responded, whether key domestic groups in the sender opposed the apology, and whether the sender was democratic or not. We found that apologies boosted foreign favorability and willingness to cooperate, and did not indicate weakness. These effects persisted even if the target rejected the apology or the apology provoked backlash inside the sender, and did not depend on whether the sender was described as democratic. The case of Germany’s 1951 Holocaust apology corroborates these patterns. Together, our findings suggest that apologies may be a powerful tool of public diplomacy.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"36 1","pages":"306-331"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144534095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Conflicts that Leave Something to Chance 让事情顺其自然的冲突

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2025-07-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818325000025

Peter Schram

引用次数: 0