International Organization最新文献

The Role of Pan-African Ideology in Ethnic Power Sharing 泛非意识形态在种族权力分享中的作用

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2024-11-22 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818324000158

Janina Beiser-McGrath, Sam Erkiletian, Nils W. Metternich

{"title":"The Role of Pan-African Ideology in Ethnic Power Sharing","authors":"Janina Beiser-McGrath, Sam Erkiletian, Nils W. Metternich","doi":"10.1017/s0020818324000158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818324000158","url":null,"abstract":"What are the conditions under which governments form more ethnically inclusive coalitions? Previous contributions highlight strategic incentives as well as colonial and precolonial legacies as determinants of ethnically inclusive government coalitions but overlook the impact of political mobilization during the decolonization period. We argue that ideological exposure and commitment to the Pan-African anticolonial movement played a vital role in African leaders’ decisions to share power with other ethnic communities. We leverage novel data on African government leaders’ attendance at decolonization-era Pan-African conferences through a unique collection of conference delegate lists. Accounting for rival mechanisms, we find that African political elites who attended Pan-African conferences formed ethnically more inclusive government coalitions when they became government leaders. Our findings imply that the ideological influence and commitment signaled by conference attendance affected political leaders’ approach to form more inclusive governments and that ethnic coalitions have systematically unexplored legacies in the Pan-African decolonization movement.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142684532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Secret Innovation 秘密创新

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2024-11-19 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818324000250

Michael F. Joseph, Michael Poznansky

{"title":"Secret Innovation","authors":"Michael F. Joseph, Michael Poznansky","doi":"10.1017/s0020818324000250","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818324000250","url":null,"abstract":"Conventional wisdom holds that open, collaborative, and transparent organizations are innovative. But some of the most radical innovations—satellites, lithium-iodine batteries, the internet—were conceived by small, secretive teams in national security agencies. Are these organizations more innovative because of their secrecy, or in spite of it? We study a principal–agent model of public-sector innovation. We give research teams a secret option and a public option during the initial testing and prototyping phase. Secrecy helps advance high-risk, high-reward projects through the early phase via a cost-passing mechanism. In open institutions, managers will not approve pilot research into high-risk, high-reward ideas for fear of political costs. Researchers exploit secrecy to conduct pilot research at a higher personal cost to generate evidence that their project is viable and win their manager's approval. Contrary to standard principal–agent findings, we show that researchers may exploit secrecy even if their preferences are perfectly aligned with their manager's, and that managers do not monitor researchers even if monitoring is costless and perfect. We illustrate our theory with two cases from the early Cold War: the CIA's attempt to master mind control (MKULTRA) and the origins of the reconnaissance satellite (CORONA). We contribute to the political application of principal–agent theory and studies of national security innovation, emerging technologies, democratic oversight, the Sino–American technology debate, and great power competition.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142670708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Elections, War, and Gender: Self-Selection and the Pursuit of Victory 选举、战争与性别：自我选择与追求胜利

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2024-11-19 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818324000249

Stephen Chaudoin, Sarah Hummel, Yon Soo Park

引用次数: 0

The Effect of Education on Support for International Trade: Evidence from Compulsory-Education Reforms 教育对支持国际贸易的影响：义务教育改革的证据

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2024-11-18 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818324000262

Omer Solodoch

引用次数: 0

Race, Representation, and the Legitimacy of International Organizations 种族、代表性和国际组织的合法性

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2024-11-14 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818324000225

David A. Steinberg, Daniel McDowell

引用次数: 0

Denying the Obvious: Why Do Nominally Covert Actions Avoid Escalation? 否认显而易见：为什么名义上的隐蔽行动会避免升级？

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2024-11-13 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818324000183

Chase Bloch, Roseanne W. McManus

引用次数: 0

Peace Versus Profit: Rebel Fragmentation and Conflict Resurgence in Colombia 和平与利益：哥伦比亚叛军分裂与冲突再起

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2024-11-13 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818324000213

Frank Wyer

{"title":"Peace Versus Profit: Rebel Fragmentation and Conflict Resurgence in Colombia","authors":"Frank Wyer","doi":"10.1017/s0020818324000213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818324000213","url":null,"abstract":"Why do rebel splinter groups emerge during peace processes, and who chooses to defect? Since Colombia's landmark peace agreement with the FARC in 2016, roughly half of the territory once controlled by the group has seen a resurgence of rebel activity by FARC splinter groups. I argue that the FARC's return to arms is a case of “middle-out fragmentation,” whereby opportunities for profit induce mid- or low-ranking rebel commanders to establish splinter groups. In Colombia, I argue that profits from the cocaine trade incentivized local-level FARC officers to defect from the peace agreement and allowed them to rapidly mobilize viable splinter groups. I offer several lines of evidence for this argument. I first construct a chronology of splinter group formation, which demonstrates that mid- and low-level commanders, rather than high-level commanders, were the key drivers of fragmentation. Second, I show that splinter groups emerged in areas where opportunities for profit were greatest. Among areas previously controlled by the FARC, those with coca cultivation prior to the peace agreement were up to thirty-seven percentage points more likely to see splinter groups emerge by 2020 than areas without significant production. Using soil and weather conditions to instrument for coca cultivation produces similar results. Further, I use a novel measure of how critical each municipality is to drug trafficking to show that areas that are theoretically most important for drug trafficking are also more likely to see FARC resurgence. I also address competing explanations related to state capacity, terrain, and popular support for the rebels. These findings highlight an important challenge to peacebuilding: satisfying the political demands of rebel leadership is a necessary but insufficient component of peace agreements in cases where opportunities for profit motivate fragmentation from the middle out.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"158 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142601946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Laws of War and Public Support for Foreign Combatants 战争法与公众对外国战斗人员的支持

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2024-10-28 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818324000274

Yonatan Lupu, Geoffrey P.R. Wallace

{"title":"The Laws of War and Public Support for Foreign Combatants","authors":"Yonatan Lupu, Geoffrey P.R. Wallace","doi":"10.1017/s0020818324000274","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818324000274","url":null,"abstract":"Are publics in great power democracies more likely to approve of foreign armed combatants that comply with international humanitarian law (IHL)? There is a wealth of evidence that armed combatants with an incentive to seek the support of outside compliance constituencies are more likely to adhere to IHL. Yet a key mechanism underlying these claims—that people in great power democracies are more likely to support armed combatants that comply with IHL—has not been directly tested. We address this question using a series of experiments embedded in nationally representative surveys conducted in three democracies that have frequently been involved in foreign interventions: France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We find that belligerents—both governments and rebels—that comply with the laws of war are significantly more likely to garner support from publics in likely intervening countries compared to those who do not comply. In all three countries, compliance with international law caused greater approval of armed combatants as well as greater support for economic or military intervention (although support for military intervention remained relatively low in the treatment groups). This lends support to arguments that, to the extent combatants seek support from outside audiences, this can serve as a mechanism by which international law constrains armed combat.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"102 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142519915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Foreign Policy Appointments 外交政策任命

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2024-08-30 DOI: 10.1017/s002081832400016x

Matt Malis

{"title":"Foreign Policy Appointments","authors":"Matt Malis","doi":"10.1017/s002081832400016x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s002081832400016x","url":null,"abstract":"How do leaders select their top-level foreign policy appointees? Through a formal model of the domestic and intragovernmental politics surrounding an international crisis, I investigate the trade-offs shaping leaders’ appointment strategies. In the model, a leader selects a foreign policy appointee, anticipating how the appointment will affect the advice he receives in the crisis, the electorate's evaluation of his performance, and ultimately the policies that he and his foreign counterparts pursue as a consequence. The analysis uncovers a fundamental tension in the leader's ability to use appointments to advance his core political and policy objectives of deterring foreign aggression, obtaining accurate advice, and maximizing domestic approval: any appointment that advances one of these objectives invariably comes at the cost of another, and the leader's appointment strategy must balance across these trade-offs. Analyzing cross-national appointment patterns to the offices of ministers of defense and foreign affairs, I find descriptive evidence consistent with the model's predictions: leaders from dovish parties are more than twice as likely as leaders from hawkish parties to select cross-partisan and politically independent appointees, and such appointments are less likely for leaders of either party as they approach re-election.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142100655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Violent Competition and Terrorist Restraint 暴力竞争与恐怖主义克制

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2024-08-29 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818324000110

Sara M.T. Polo, Blair Welsh

{"title":"Violent Competition and Terrorist Restraint","authors":"Sara M.T. Polo, Blair Welsh","doi":"10.1017/s0020818324000110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818324000110","url":null,"abstract":"A large literature has argued that domestic competition increases a militant organization's use and severity of terrorism to differentiate their “brand” and “outbid” other organizations. However, most empirical analyses infer such competition from the quantity of groups present in a geographic area. This approach neglects specific group relationships, such as cooperation, rhetorical or violent rivalry, or peaceful coexistence. We introduce a behavioral measure of group competition and argue that variation in the quality, rather than the quantity, of competition affects the violence profile of militant groups in unexpected ways. Violent competition, where militants attack one another, imposes significant constraints on group resources and increases groups’ dependence on civilian support, which exacerbates the costs of a popular backlash against brutality. Moreover, violent competition effectively substitutes for crowding out rivals via outbidding. As competition becomes extreme, we posit that groups increasingly opt for a strategy of terrorist restraint and reduce the share of high-profile attacks on soft civilian targets. We test this argument at the macro and micro levels with cross-national data on 290 organizations in civil war (1970–2018) and granular data on the subnational targeting strategy of the Islamic State in Syria (2013–2018). Both analyses provide robust support for our argument. The findings shed light on the strategic limitations of outbidding and provide important insights for research and policy.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142089964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0