International Organization最新文献

Contestation of International Organizations: Patterns, Drivers, and Responses 国际组织之争：模式、驱动因素与回应

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2026-10-02 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818326101477

Jonas Tallberg, Stefanie Walter, Michael Zürn

{"title":"Contestation of International Organizations: Patterns, Drivers, and Responses","authors":"Jonas Tallberg, Stefanie Walter, Michael Zürn","doi":"10.1017/s0020818326101477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818326101477","url":null,"abstract":"The contestation of international organizations (IOs) over past decades has inspired a rich research program. This essay takes stock of progress by reviewing key findings in existing scholarship and identifying critical areas for future study. We propose a typology that distinguishes between internal contestation, which criticizes the institutions or policies of an IO with the aim of reform, and external contestation, which challenges an IO’s foundational principles and very existence. Building on this conceptual distinction, we review the most important findings of existing research on three key themes: patterns of contestation, drivers of contestation, and responses to contestation. We also argue that this conceptualization helps us better understand the changing nature of contestation: while criticism of how IOs function has long been a staple of world politics, it recently appears to have shifted toward a deeper form involving more fundamental questioning of IOs themselves. We conclude by highlighting the need for dynamic theories and improved measurements to explain when and how IO contestation shifts from internal criticism to external rejection, and by outlining a forward-looking research agenda on organizational robustness, hegemonic contestation, and the relationship between IO contestation and the broader contestation of global governance.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"198 1","pages":"1-34"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2026-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149123153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Unrest, Shifting Power, and Death-Watch War 动荡，转移力量，死亡守卫之战

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2026-10-02 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818326101490

Jesse C. Johnson, Scott Wolford

{"title":"Unrest, Shifting Power, and Death-Watch War","authors":"Jesse C. Johnson, Scott Wolford","doi":"10.1017/s0020818326101490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818326101490","url":null,"abstract":"Domestic unrest often creates problems of both shifting power and shifting preferences. We analyze a model in which a foreign state considers a “death-watch” attack against a domestic state temporarily weakened by unrest in which (1) two polarized factions compete for the power to set policy in the future and (2) the foreign state’s favored faction may support an invasion. Military success allows the foreign state to seize policy control, but defeat may hasten the rise of its disfavored faction when the favored faction links the outcomes of the two conflicts by bandwagoning with the attacker. In equilibrium, decisions to attack and bandwagon depend on the interaction of shifting power and shifting preferences. We show first that temporary weakness causes war, but only when the favored faction is unlikely to survive unrest. Second, increasing factional polarization can encourage or discourage foreign attack and local bandwagoning, conditional on how domestic preferences are shifting. Third, extensions show that (1) death-watch attacks are possible at any distribution of power; (2) the threat of attack may not be sufficient to deter domestic unrest; and (3) attack may be profitable even when alternative options of aiding a favored faction are available. We also use the model to explain why similar episodes of unrest in Ukraine prompted Russian invasion in 2014 but not 2004.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"50 1","pages":"1-36"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2026-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149123404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Foreign Aid and the Performance of Bureaucrats 对外援助与官僚绩效

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2026-09-21 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818326101489

Maria Nagawa

引用次数: 0

“To Hell or to Connacht”: Expropriation, Inequality, and Local Legacies of Settler Colonialism “去地狱还是去康纳特”：移民殖民主义的征用、不平等和地方遗产

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2026-09-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818326101465

Jeremy Bowles, Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, Michael Olson

引用次数: 0

Revolutionizing Time, Reforging Social Orders: State-Building Success and the Enforcement of Symbolic Programs in Revolutionary France 变革时间，重塑社会秩序：法国大革命时期国家建设的成功与象征性计划的实施

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2026-08-05 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818326101453

Megan A. Stewart

{"title":"Revolutionizing Time, Reforging Social Orders: State-Building Success and the Enforcement of Symbolic Programs in Revolutionary France","authors":"Megan A. Stewart","doi":"10.1017/s0020818326101453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818326101453","url":null,"abstract":"How do state builders reshape society? While existing work shows they often rely on violence, education, elite co-optation, and institution building, this article underscores the importance of symbolic programs. When intensely enforced, symbolic programs reshape social orders by forging new social bonds and socializing individuals into state builders’ governing principles. I test this argument using subnational variation in the enforcement of the French Republican calendar—a symbolic program that politicized time, labor, and rest, rightfully regulated by the state, rather than sacred duties governed by the Catholic Church—and its association with labor conflicts. In departments where the calendar was more strongly enforced, it fostered political understandings of labor and rest, reduced coordination costs, and increased mobilization potential. Using original data and a difference-in-differences design, I find that more intense enforcement of the calendar is associated with a higher likelihood of labor conflict onset, demonstrating the long-term social effects of symbolic state-building programs.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"23 1","pages":"457-496"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2026-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148698818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Protecting at Home or Providing Abroad: Refugee Policy in Civil Conflicts 国内保护或国外提供：国内冲突中的难民政策

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2026-07-22 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818326101416

Jessica S. Sun

引用次数: 0

Collective Deterrence 集体威慑

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2026-07-15 DOI: 10.1017/s002081832610143x

Scott Wolford, Joshua Landry, Kevin Galambos

引用次数: 0

Dirty Work and the Domestic Politics of Aid 肮脏的工作和援助的国内政治

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2026-06-25 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818326101404

Santi Foncillas, Erasmus Kersting, Christopher Kilby

引用次数: 0

Democracy, Debt, and the Bench: Political Ideology in Sovereign Immunity Cases 民主、债务和法官席：主权豁免案件中的政治意识形态

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2026-06-19 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818326101398

Monica Widmann

{"title":"Democracy, Debt, and the Bench: Political Ideology in Sovereign Immunity Cases","authors":"Monica Widmann","doi":"10.1017/s0020818326101398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818326101398","url":null,"abstract":"Following pressure from investors, Congress passed the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) to facilitate lawsuits by nonstate commercial actors against sovereign states in US courts. This legislation redefined sovereign debt as a commercial activity, seemingly favoring creditors. Yet case outcomes proved variable. While the FSIA established clear procedural guidelines, judicial discretion remained, raising questions about what factors influence outcomes. How deep is the effect of judges’ partisan leanings? To what extent does a left–right divide exist in this issue area? Although sovereign debt of other countries rarely sparks US political debate, I argue that partisan influence persists in these cases, particularly when defendants are democracies. Republican-nominated judges consistently apply the FSIA’s pro-creditor framework regardless of defendant characteristics, reflecting their party’s historical support for transnational commercial actors and contract enforcement. Democratic-nominated judges, however, exhibit conditional deference: when democracies demonstrate fiscal restraint before defaulting—signaling genuine economic distress—Democratic-nominated judges more readily defer to the sovereign defendant within the FSIA’s constraints. When democracies maintain high government consumption while defaulting, suggesting strategic choice rather than necessity, Democratic-nominated judges enforce more strictly. By contrast, both Democratic- and Republican-nominated judges converge on pro-creditor positions when adjudicating autocratic defaults because the absence of credible fiscal signals eliminates conditions for conditional deference. I test this argument with an original data set of sovereign debt litigation cases brought to the United States from 1977 to 2022.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"283 1","pages":"1-33"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2026-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Transnational Networks and Interstate Competition: How Support for Nonstate Actors Increases Conflict between States 跨国网络与州际竞争：对非国家行为体的支持如何加剧国家间的冲突

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2026-05-29 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818326101349

Brandon J Kinne, Juan F. Tellez, Anya Stewart, Iliyan Iliev, Brandon Derr, Shreya Murthy, Patrick Bernhard

{"title":"Transnational Networks and Interstate Competition: How Support for Nonstate Actors Increases Conflict between States","authors":"Brandon J Kinne, Juan F. Tellez, Anya Stewart, Iliyan Iliev, Brandon Derr, Shreya Murthy, Patrick Bernhard","doi":"10.1017/s0020818326101349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818326101349","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars and policymakers alike now view competition between states as the primary threat to international security. Yet the nontraditional threats that previously defined the global security landscape, such as terrorism and civil war, continue to flourish. Recent interstate conflicts have featured nonstate armed groups as central actors, and governments rely on these groups to extend their interests. This article examines how government support for foreign nonstate actors affects interstate competition. We conceptualize state–nonstate ties as transnational networks comprised of cooperative relationships between governments and foreign terrorist organizations, rebel groups, militias, and civilian groups. We argue that these transnational networks exacerbate interstate tensions in two ways. First, they increase a state’s capacity relative to adversaries, which emboldens the government, increases its bargaining leverage, and leads to increased aggression toward other states. Second, they increase a government’s liability for the actions of sponsored groups, which leads to unintended confrontations and retaliatory actions by affected targets. To measure interstate competition, we use high-resolution event data on verbal and material conflict between governments. We incorporate these data into network models that allow transnational ties and interstate conflict to co-evolve, such that states form ties to nonstate actors in response to interstate conflict, and those ties in turn influence conflict probability. We find that both the size and structure of governments’ respective transnational networks are associated with an increase in verbal and material conflict. Further, this association is particularly strong for states that lack conventional military strength. These findings suggest that cooperation between governments and nonstate actors is integrally connected to, and often exacerbates, interstate competition.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"247 1","pages":"281-323"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2026-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0