International Organization最新文献_第7页

The Fiscal State in Africa: Evidence from a Century of Growth 非洲的财政状况：来自一个世纪增长的证据

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2022-12-14 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818322000285

Thilo N. H. Albers, Morten Jerven, Marvin Suesse

引用次数: 12

Do Politically Irrelevant Events Cause Conflict? The Cross-continental Effects of European Professional Football on Protests in Africa 与政治无关的事件会引发冲突吗？欧洲职业足球对非洲抗议活动的跨大陆影响

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2022-10-25 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818322000261

Kyosuke Kikuta, Mamoru Uesugi

{"title":"Do Politically Irrelevant Events Cause Conflict? The Cross-continental Effects of European Professional Football on Protests in Africa","authors":"Kyosuke Kikuta, Mamoru Uesugi","doi":"10.1017/S0020818322000261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818322000261","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We examine whether politically irrelevant events can cause conflicts, by analyzing the effects of professional football games in Europe on protests in Africa—an unintended spillover across the continents. By expanding psychological theories, we argue that the outcomes of the football games in Europe can affect African people's subjective evaluation of domestic politicians, which in turn can trigger protests. By exploiting as-if random variation in the results of 15,102 close football games conditional on betting odds, we find that compared to draw games, close losses of African players’ teams increase peaceful protests in their original countries while not changing the likelihood of riots or armed conflicts. The effect is particularly large for non-ethnic protests targeted at a central government. Close losses also temporarily decrease people's trust in their country's leader. By contrast, close victories do not have equivalent or compensating effects on protests or public opinion. These results suggest asymmetric misattribution: people in Africa unreasonably blame domestic politicians for bad luck in European football games, prompting protests; but they do not credit politicians with football victories.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"77 1","pages":"179 - 216"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45292479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

How International Organizations Change National Media Coverage of Human Rights 国际组织如何改变国家媒体对人权的报道

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2022-10-25 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818322000273

Stephen Chaudoin

引用次数: 1

Costly Concealment: Secret Foreign Policymaking, Transparency, and Credible Reassurance 代价高昂的隐瞒：秘密的外交政策制定、透明度和可信的保证

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2022-10-12 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818322000248

Brandon K. Yoder, William Spaniel

{"title":"Costly Concealment: Secret Foreign Policymaking, Transparency, and Credible Reassurance","authors":"Brandon K. Yoder, William Spaniel","doi":"10.1017/S0020818322000248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818322000248","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article presents a formal model that shows how states can credibly reassure each other simply by maintaining a cooperative outward narrative. The reassurance literature to date has focused largely on costly signaling, whereby benign states must distinguish themselves by taking specific actions that hostile types would not. The mere lack of overtly expressed hostility without costly signals has been considered “cheap talk,” on the assumption that this behavior is costless for hostile states and thus uninformative. In contrast, this paper argues that maintaining a cooperative façade while secretly formulating and executing exploitative policies carries inherent trade-offs, and thus constitutes a credible reassurance signal. Foreign policy planning and implementation requires communication among various individuals, groups, and organizations, which has some probability of being observed and punished by outside actors. Yet efforts to conceal the policymaking process and reduce this probability are costly—they require investments in internal monitoring and restrictions on internal communication that can substantially degrade policy outcomes. Thus, to the extent that a state's foreign policymaking process is transparent—that is, that concealing internal communications is difficult—the absence of positive signals of hostility is a credible signal of its benign intentions. The argument is illustrated with a case study of German reassurance signals during the July Crisis preceding World War I.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"76 1","pages":"868 - 900"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45468698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Index 指数

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2022-10-11 DOI: 10.1017/s0020818300012819

L. Knauer, Susan W. Blank, Jessie R. Janjigian

引用次数: 0

Compensatory Layering and the Birth of the Multipurpose Multilateral IGO in the Americas 补偿分层与美洲多用途多边政府间组织的诞生

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2022-10-10 DOI: 10.1017/S002081832200025X

Tom Long, C. Schulz

{"title":"Compensatory Layering and the Birth of the Multipurpose Multilateral IGO in the Americas","authors":"Tom Long, C. Schulz","doi":"10.1017/S002081832200025X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081832200025X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract International organizations come in many shapes and sizes. Within this institutional gamut, the multipurpose multilateral intergovernmental organization (MMIGO) plays a central role. This institutional form is often traced to the creation of the League of Nations, but in fact the first MMIGO emerged in the Western Hemisphere at the close of the nineteenth century. Originally modeled on a single-issue European public international union, the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics evolved into the multipurpose, multilateral Pan American Union (PAU). Contrary to prominent explanations of institutional genesis, the PAU's design did not result from functional needs nor from the blueprints of a hegemonic power. Advancing a recent synthesis between historical and rational institutionalism, we argue that the first MMIGO arose through a process of compensatory layering: a mechanism whereby a sequence of bargains over control and scope leads to gradual but transformative institutional change. We expect compensatory layering to occur when an organization is focal, power asymmetries among members of that organization are large, and preferences over institutional design diverge. Our empirical and theoretical contributions demonstrate the value a more global international relations (IR) perspective can bring to the study of institutional design. international relations (IR) scholars have long noted that international organizations provide smaller states with voice opportunities; our account suggests those spaces may be of smaller states’ own making.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"77 1","pages":"1 - 32"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48880036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Dark Matter of World Politics: System Trust, Summits, and State Personhood 世界政治的暗物质:体系信任、峰会和国家人格

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2022-08-22 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818322000169

Minseon Ku, Jennifer Mitzen

引用次数: 3

Memory, Institutions, and the Domestic Politics of South Korean–Japanese Relations 记忆、制度与韩日关系的国内政治

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2022-08-17 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818322000194

Eun A Jo

引用次数: 6

The Great Revenue Divergence 收入大分化

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818322000200

Alexander Lee, Jack Paine

引用次数: 5

Reacting to the Olive Branch: Hawks, Doves, and Public Support for Cooperation 对橄榄枝的反应:鹰派、鸽派和公众对合作的支持

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2022-07-26 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818322000170

Michaela Mattes, Jessica L. P. Weeks

{"title":"Reacting to the Olive Branch: Hawks, Doves, and Public Support for Cooperation","authors":"Michaela Mattes, Jessica L. P. Weeks","doi":"10.1017/S0020818322000170","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818322000170","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A popular view holds that foreign policy hawks have an advantage at bringing about rapprochement with international adversaries. This idea is rooted in domestic politics: voters respond more favorably to efforts at reconciliation when their own leader has a hawkish rather than a dovish reputation. Yet, domestic reactions are only part of the equation—to succeed, rapprochement must also evoke a favorable response by the adversary. In this research note, we argue that hawks who make conciliatory gestures may face international liabilities that could offset their domestic advantages. Foreign audiences should view doves who make overtures as more sincere and should therefore be more willing to support cooperation with foreign doves than with foreign hawks. We field a pair of survey experiments to examine whether Americans respond differently when foreign hawks versus foreign doves deliver the olive branch. We find that foreign doves fare better at eliciting cooperation because they are deemed more sincere, though the prospect of military vulnerability limits how willing Americans are to respond positively even to a dove who makes a gesture. Thus, while past research has shown that hawks are better positioned domestically to initiate rapprochement, our findings suggest that they have a harder time eliciting a favorable response from the adversary.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"76 1","pages":"957 - 976"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47442263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3