International Organization最新文献_第5页

Earmarked Funding and the Control–Performance Trade-Off in International Development Organizations 国际发展组织的专项资金和控制-绩效权衡

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-05-04 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818323000085

Mirko Heinzel, Ben Cormier, B. Reinsberg

{"title":"Earmarked Funding and the Control–Performance Trade-Off in International Development Organizations","authors":"Mirko Heinzel, Ben Cormier, B. Reinsberg","doi":"10.1017/S0020818323000085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818323000085","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Since the 1990s, the funding of multilateral development assistance has rapidly transformed. Donors increasingly constrain the discretion of international development organizations (IDOs) through earmarked funding, which limits the purposes for which a donor's funds can be used. The consequences of this development for IDOs’ operational performance are insufficiently understood. We hypothesize that increases in administrative burdens due to earmarked funding reduce the performance of IDO projects. The additional reporting required of IDOs by earmarked funds, while designed to enhance accountability, ultimately increases IDOs’ supervision costs and weakens their performance. We first test these hypotheses with data on project costs and performance of World Bank projects using both ordinary-least-squares and instrumental-variable analyses. We then probe the generalizability of those findings to other organizations by extending our analysis to four other IDOs: the African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Using data on the performance of 7,571 projects approved between 1990 and 2020, we find that earmarked funding undermines both cost-effectiveness and project performance across IDOs. Donors seeking value for money may consider allocating more money to core funds rather than to earmarked funds.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"77 1","pages":"475 - 495"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46878022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Wisdom Is Welcome Wherever It Comes From: War, Diffusion, and State Formation in Scandinavia 智慧来自哪里都受欢迎：斯堪的纳维亚半岛的战争、扩散和国家形成

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-04-21 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818323000061

Eric Grynaviski, Sverrir Steinsson

引用次数: 0

Something New out of Africa: States Made Slaves, Slaves Made States 非洲的新事物：国家造就奴隶，奴隶造就国家

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-04-18 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818323000073

J. Sharman

{"title":"Something New out of Africa: States Made Slaves, Slaves Made States","authors":"J. Sharman","doi":"10.1017/S0020818323000073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818323000073","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article I explain a nexus between slavery and state formation in Africa, proceeding from initial demographic and institutional conditions to an external demand shift, individual state responses, and their collective systemic consequences. Historically, African rulers faced distinctive challenges: low population density prioritized control of people more than territory, and internal disintegration was often a greater threat than external conquest. A massive expansion in the demand for slaves offered African rulers increased opportunities to use external resources for “outside-in” state building. Many did so by creating highly militarized predatory slaving states. The collective consequence was heightened systemic insecurity. Variation in the timing of these developments reflected regional and historical variation in the expansion of the demand for slaves. Slaving states appeared first in West Africa, reflecting the late-seventeenth-century expansion of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, before spreading to East Africa a century later, following the parallel later increase in the Indian Ocean slave trade. This “outside-in” path to state formation both parallels and contrasts with contemporary postcolonial state formation.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"77 1","pages":"497 - 526"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43268220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Disorganized Political Violence: A Demonstration Case of Temperature and Insurgency 无组织的政治暴力:温度和叛乱的示范案例

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-04-17 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818323000024

Andrew Shaver, Alexander K. Bollfrass

{"title":"Disorganized Political Violence: A Demonstration Case of Temperature and Insurgency","authors":"Andrew Shaver, Alexander K. Bollfrass","doi":"10.1017/S0020818323000024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818323000024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Any act of battlefield violence results from a combination of organizational strategy and a combatant's personal motives. To measure the relative contribution of each, our research design leverages the predictable effect of ambient temperature on human aggression. Using fine-grained data collected by US forces during the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts, we test whether temperature and violence are linked for attacks that can be initiated by individual combatants, but not for those requiring organizational coordination. To distinguish alternative explanations involving temperature effects on target movements, we examine situations where targets are stationary. We find that when individual combatants have discretion over the initiation of violence, ambient temperature does shape battlefield outcomes. There is no such effect when organizational coordination is necessary. We also find that ambient temperature affects combat-age males’ endorsement of insurgent violence in a survey taken during the conflict in Iraq. Our findings caution against attributing strategic causes to violence and encourage research into how strategic and individual-level motivations interact in conflict.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"77 1","pages":"440 - 474"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42999909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

One for All? State Violence and Insurgent Cohesion 人人平等?国家暴力和叛乱凝聚力

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-02-14 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818323000012

L. Schubiger

{"title":"One for All? State Violence and Insurgent Cohesion","authors":"L. Schubiger","doi":"10.1017/S0020818323000012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818323000012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What effect does state violence have on the cohesiveness and fragmentation of insurgent organizations? This article develops a theory of how state violence against civilians affects insurgent cohesion and fragmentation in civil war. It argues that the state-led collective targeting of an armed group's alleged civilian constituency increases the probability of insurgent fragmentation, defined as the process through which insurgent organizations split into distinct entities, each with its own social composition, goals, and leadership. This effect is driven by the interaction of several mechanisms at the individual, group, and organizational levels: state-led collective targeting enlarges the supply of fresh recruits, strengthens the bonds between immediate group members (interpersonal cohesion), and disrupts intra-organizational coordination, strategic unity, and institutional arrangements that underpin the commitment of individual fighters to the organization as a whole (ideological cohesion). The implications of this argument are empirically tested in an analysis of armed groups fighting against their governments between 1946 and 2008. The results suggest that campaigns of massive state violence directed against the civilian constituency of rebel groups increase the overall risk of insurgent fragmentation, a finding that has important implications for the duration and escalation of civil wars.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"77 1","pages":"33 - 64"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45947429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

Partners with Benefits: When Multinational Corporations Succeed in Authoritarian Courts 有利益的合作伙伴：当跨国公司在权威法庭上取得成功

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-02-09 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818322000297

Frederick R. Chen, Jian Xu

{"title":"Partners with Benefits: When Multinational Corporations Succeed in Authoritarian Courts","authors":"Frederick R. Chen, Jian Xu","doi":"10.1017/S0020818322000297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818322000297","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Scholars often assume that courts in authoritarian regimes cannot credibly protect foreign investors’ interests because these institutions lack judicial independence. In this article, we construct a novel data set on multinational corporations’ litigation activities in Chinese courts from 2002 to 2017. This supports the first systematic case-level analysis of foreign firms’ lawsuit outcomes in an authoritarian judiciary. We find that foreign companies frequently engage in litigation in authoritarian courts. Moreover, we theoretically and empirically distinguish between two types of government–business ties in terms of their effectiveness in incentivizing the host state to protect foreign investors’ interests. We argue that ad hoc, personal political connections deliver only trivial lawsuit success for multinational enterprises, while formal corporate partnerships with regime insiders can lead the state to structurally internalize foreign investors’ interests. In particular, we demonstrate that joint venture partnerships with state-owned enterprises help foreign firms obtain more substantial monetary compensation than other types of multinational enterprises. By contrast, the personal political connections of foreign firms’ board members do not foster meaningful judicial favoritism. These findings are robust to tests of alternative implications, matching procedures, and subsample robustness checks. This article advances our understanding of multinational corporations’ political risk in host countries, government–business relations, and authoritarian judicial institutions.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"77 1","pages":"144 - 178"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2023-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48573153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

War and Welfare in Colonial Algeria 阿尔及利亚殖民地的战争与福利

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-02-08 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818322000376

Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, Melissa M. Lee

引用次数: 3

The Impact of China's AIIB on the World Bank 中国的亚投行对世界银行的影响

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-01-27 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818322000327

Jing Qian, J. Vreeland, Jianzhi Zhao

引用次数: 2

War Did Make States: Revisiting the Bellicist Paradigm in Early Modern Europe 战争的确造就了国家:重新审视近代早期欧洲的好战主义范式

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-01-27 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818322000352

L. Cederman, Paola Galano Toro, Luc Girardin, Guy Schvitz

引用次数: 5

Free Riding, Network Effects, and Burden Sharing in Defense Cooperation Networks 防务合作网络中的搭便车、网络效应与责任分担

IF 7.8 1区社会学

International Organization Pub Date : 2023-01-11 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818322000315

Brandon J. Kinne, Stephanie N. Kang

{"title":"Free Riding, Network Effects, and Burden Sharing in Defense Cooperation Networks","authors":"Brandon J. Kinne, Stephanie N. Kang","doi":"10.1017/S0020818322000315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818322000315","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How do states distribute the burdens of collective defense? This paper develops a network theory of burden sharing. We focus on bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCAs), which promote cooperation in a variety of defense, military, and security issue areas. Using a computational model, we show that DCA partners’ defense spending depends on the network structure of their agreements. In bilateral terms, DCAs increase defense spending by committing states to defense activities and allowing partners to reciprocally punish free riding. However, as a state's local network of defense partnerships grows more densely connected, with many transitive “friend of a friend” relations, DCAs have the countervailing effect of reducing defense spending. The more deeply integrated states are in bilateral defense networks, the less they spend on defense. We distinguish two potential mechanisms behind this effect—one based on efficiency improvements, the other on free riding. An empirical analysis using multilevel inferential network models points more to efficiency than to free riding. Defense networks reduce defense spending, and they do so by allowing countries to produce security more efficiently.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":"77 1","pages":"405 - 439"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49568751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1