Personality and Social Psychology Review最新文献

{"title":"A Theoretical Framework for Studying the Phenomenon of Gaslighting.","authors":"Willis Klein, Suzanne Wood, Jennifer A Bartz","doi":"10.1177/10888683251342291","DOIUrl":"10.1177/10888683251342291","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Gaslighting is a form of psychological manipulation that, over time, causes a victim to doubt their sense of reality, often leading to a loss of agency and emotional and mental instability. Currently, mechanistic explanations for gaslighting are rooted in unfalsifiable psychodynamic theory. We propose a theoretical framework that draws upon prediction error minimization, symbolic interactionism, attachment theory, self-verification theory, and shared reality theory to illustrate the cognitive mechanisms that allow gaslighting to occur. We hypothesize that gaslighting depends on normative social-cognitive mechanisms operating in atypical social situations. Our model assumes that (close) relationships fulfill important epistemic needs-close others shape and verify our self-views and our experience of the world. This privileged position of close others is what gives gaslighters the epistemic leverage required for gaslighting to be effective. We then apply our theoretical framework to the cycle of gaslighting and conclude by distinguishing gaslighting from other related phenomena.Public AbstractGaslighting is a type of emotional abuse where someone manipulates another person into doubting their own sense of reality. Psychology lacks clear scientific explanations for how this abuse makes people feel like they're losing touch with what's real. In this report, we look at research from brain science and social psychology to explain what might be going on inside the minds of people who experience gaslighting. Our explanation focuses on how people learn from their experiences, and we also include ideas about how relationships and social situations can shape behavior. The goal is to offer a scientific explanation of gaslighting.</p>","PeriodicalId":48386,"journal":{"name":"Personality and Social Psychology Review","volume":" ","pages":"195-215"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2026-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC13018256/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144209949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Continuity and Change: The Next Chapter at PSPR.","authors":"Eranda Jayawickreme, Franki Y H Kung, Ligia Carolina Oliveira-Silva, Sarah C E Stanton, Valerie Jones Taylor, Nic M Weststrate","doi":"10.1177/10888683261417476","DOIUrl":"10.1177/10888683261417476","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48386,"journal":{"name":"Personality and Social Psychology Review","volume":" ","pages":"121-123"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2026-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146150947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Speaking the Public's Love Language: How Engaging with Lay Theories Can Build a Rigorous and Resonant Science of Relationships.","authors":"Emily A Impett","doi":"10.1177/10888683261441653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10888683261441653","url":null,"abstract":"Academic AbstractPopular lay theories shape how millions of people understand and communicate about romantic relationships, yet they are rarely examined scientifically. Rather than dismissing these frameworks as misconceptions, this review argues that engaging with lay theories can advance a science of relationships that is both empirically rigorous and publicly resonant. Using the love languages as a case study, this review introduces a bidirectional framework in which lay theories inform scientific inquiry and scientific insights are translated back to the public. Engaging with lay theories can refine theory, clarify core relational processes, and reveal contextual and cultural blind spots in lay theories. In turn, examining why lay theories resonate highlights unmet public needs, opportunities for improved scientific communication, and implications for clinical practice, relationship education, and public policy. The result is a science of relationships that is rigorous and resonant with the lived experiences of those it aims to serve.Public AbstractPopular ideas about relationships-such as the love languages-shape how millions of people understand love, communicate needs, and decide whether their romantic relationships are working. Yet these ideas are rarely examined by scientists, even though they influence real-life relationship decisions. This article argues that popular relationship theories should not simply be dismissed as wrong, but carefully studied as windows into what people need, value, and struggle with in their relationships. Using the love languages as an example, this review shows how engaging with popular ideas can help scientists improve theories of love, communicate research more clearly, and design guidance that better fits people's lives and relationships. This review also highlights potential risks of oversimplified frameworks, especially when they ignore cultural context. By building a science of relationships that is both rigorous and relatable, researchers can offer guidance that is more inclusive, useful, and responsive to the public.","PeriodicalId":48386,"journal":{"name":"Personality and Social Psychology Review","volume":"4 1","pages":"10888683261441653"},"PeriodicalIF":10.8,"publicationDate":"2026-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147739143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Masculinity Threat in Heterosexual Men: A Comprehensive Meta-Analysis of Experimental Research with Recommendations for Future Theory Building and Research Practice","authors":"Lea L. Lorenz, Lorena Hüther, Melanie C. Steffens, Claudia Niedlich, Helena Wesnitzer, Sven Kachel","doi":"10.1177/10888683261433109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10888683261433109","url":null,"abstract":"Threatening a man’s masculinity may lead to severe negative consequences at individual (e.g., anxiety) and societal levels (e.g., discrimination). Existing research is extensive and requires synthesis. In a comprehensive, systematic literature search, we identified and categorized peer-reviewed studies experimentally manipulating masculinity threat (MT) according to triggers, internalized responses, compensatory reactions, and moderators. We meta-analyzed studies with obtainable effect sizes ( <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\"> N <jats:sub>k</jats:sub> </jats:italic> = 442, <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">N</jats:italic> <jats:sub>participants</jats:sub> = 19,448 predominantly heterosexual, mainly Western men) using three-level random effects models. The mean MT effect was small to medium, <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">d</jats:italic> = .45, 95% CI [.38, .51]. Self-induced prototypicality threat triggers (men concluding they do not meet masculine ideals) showed the greatest impact. Negative emotions and reduced self-perceived masculinity emerged as the strongest responses. Effects weakened after initial responding, suggesting successful compensation reduces the need for further efforts. Drawing on available evidence, we separate empirically supported MT components from open questions, offering a foundation for theory and research. Public Abstract Men are often expected to demonstrate masculinity. Questioning their masculinity can lead to masculinity threat. These threats can have negative consequences for the men themselves (e.g., emotional pain) and society (e.g., discrimination of gay men, women). To better understand when and how such threats and the following consequences occur, we conducted a meta-analysis on 123 studies involving 19,448 men. On average, studies showed that masculinity threats indeed influenced men’s feelings, thoughts, and behaviors. Men were most threatened when they themselves concluded they did not conform to masculine ideals. Negative emotions (e.g., fear) and reduced feelings of masculinity emerged as the strongest consequences. Interestingly, when men initially showed masculine behaviors to reduce the threat, such as risk-taking, they were less likely to feel the need to prove their masculinity again later. We present a visual summary showing which aspects of masculinity threat are supported by evidence and which questions remain open.","PeriodicalId":48386,"journal":{"name":"Personality and Social Psychology Review","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.8,"publicationDate":"2026-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147641455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Intelligent Systems, Vulnerable Minds: A Framework for Radicalization to Violence in the Age of AI.","authors":"Jonas R Kunst,Milan Obaidi,Anton Gollwitzer,Petter B Brandtzæg,Yannic Hinrichs,Neha Saini,Daniel T Schroeder","doi":"10.1177/10888683261430089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10888683261430089","url":null,"abstract":"Academic AbstractAdvances in AI require a revision of the psychological and socio-technical dynamics by which individuals are radicalized to embrace violent extremism. This review synthesizes process models of radicalization with research on social and personality risk factors, AI, and psychological mechanisms to propose a four-stage framework mapping the AI architecture of radicalization: (1) Exposure, where recommender systems and virality features create initial attraction to extreme content; (2) Reinforcement, where filter bubbles and group recommendations leverage biases to strengthen extremist beliefs and create echo chambers; (3) Group Integration, where ideologically homogenous clusters, AI bot swarms and companions foster group belonging and readiness for action; cumulatively resulting in (4) Violent Extremist Action. We examine how established social, cognitive, personality, and contextual vulnerability factors heighten psychological risk in the AI-driven radicalization process, as well as the emerging role of generative AI. We conclude by outlining a stage-based framework for governance and future research.Public AbstractAI-driven algorithms designed to maximize engagement on social media, compounded by generative AI, can unintentionally set the stage for radicalization. It begins with Exposure, where algorithms push users toward extreme content because it captures attention. Next, during Reinforcement, algorithms feed users personalized content while AI swarms can create a synthetic consensus that reinforces emerging biases, normalizes extremity, and insulates users from alternative views. Third, during Group Integration, individuals are absorbed into extremist networks, reinforced by human peers, AI companions, and bot swarms that validate radical beliefs and deepen identity ties. By exploiting psychological needs for belonging and certainty, this stage becomes particularly pernicious, potentially opening the door for violence. We propose policy measures that can reduce radicalization at each stage.","PeriodicalId":48386,"journal":{"name":"Personality and Social Psychology Review","volume":"19 1","pages":"10888683261430089"},"PeriodicalIF":10.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147495044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Socially Minded Intelligence: How Individuals, Groups, and Artificial Intelligence Can Make Each Other Smarter (or Not).","authors":"William John Bingley,S Alexander Haslam,Janet Wiles","doi":"10.1177/10888683261421666","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10888683261421666","url":null,"abstract":"Academic AbstractA core part of human intelligence is the ability to work flexibly with others to achieve goals. The incorporation of artificial agents into human spaces is making increasing demands on artificial intelligence (AI) to demonstrate and facilitate this ability. However, this kind of flexibility is not well understood because existing approaches to intelligence typically construe this either as an individual-difference trait or as a property of groups. We argue that by focusing either on individual or collective intelligence without considering their dynamic interaction, existing conceptualizations of intelligence limit the potential of people and AI systems. To address this impasse, we propose a new kind of intelligence-socially minded intelligence-that can be applied to both individuals and collectives. We outline how socially minded intelligence might be measured and cultivated within people, how it might be modelled in AI agents, and how it might be applied to other intelligent systems.Public AbstractIn psychology, \"intelligence\" is generally understood to be something that either individuals or groups have. However, the extent to which people can make each other more intelligent by working collectively-and the extent to which groups are smarter for having individuals who can think for themselves-is underexplored. Artificial intelligence (AI) research has a similar problem, meaning that artificial agents lack the ability to engage in this kind of intelligence, both with each other and with people. To address this gap in the literature, we outline a new kind of intelligence for psychology and AI-socially minded intelligence-which can be applied to individuals, groups, and artificial agents. We discuss how socially minded intelligence might be measured, improved, modeled in AI agents, and applied to other intelligent systems such as teams consisting of people and AI agents.","PeriodicalId":48386,"journal":{"name":"Personality and Social Psychology Review","volume":"17 1","pages":"10888683261421666"},"PeriodicalIF":10.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147502196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Valence Asymmetry in Cognition—A Formal Account","authors":"Nele Freyer, Christian Unkelbach, Anne Wiedenroth, Hans Alves, Paula Knischewski, Daniel Leising","doi":"10.1177/10888683251407820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10888683251407820","url":null,"abstract":"Academic Abstract <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">Valence asymmetries</jats:italic> —the tendency for bad stimuli to elicit more processing effort than good ones—have been widely observed but remain theoretically contested. To advance this debate, we present a formalized account integrating two major explanatory perspectives: the <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">intrapsychic</jats:italic> (or <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">phylogenetic</jats:italic> ) approach, which locates the effect in internal evaluative mechanisms, and the <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">ecological</jats:italic> (or <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">ontogenetic</jats:italic> ) approach, which attributes it primarily to environmental factors. We introduce a concise set of parameters to specify key concepts and analyze the argumentative structure of each perspective. This yields three major insights: (a) the traditional labels for these approaches are misleading, and we suggest using <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">valence-driven</jats:italic> and <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">distinctiveness-driven</jats:italic> instead, (b) theories must specify how exactly <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">good</jats:italic> and <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">bad</jats:italic> stimuli are defined, and (c) some explanations rely on implicit yet critical assumptions, such as the probability of having contact with stimuli. Clarifying these foundations provides a framework for informative empirical tests in future research. Public Abstract Why do people pay more attention to bad things than to good ones? Psychologists call this pattern a <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">valence asymmetry</jats:italic> . Although the effect is well established, its causes are still debated. To advance this debate, we translate two leading ideas about this bias into a precise mathematical model. This allows us to see how the explanations differ, what each predicts, and where they overlap. This analysis reveals three important insights: First, some widely used terms are misleading, and we suggest using clearer alternatives like <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">valence-driven</jats:italic> and <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">distinctiveness-driven</jats:italic> instead. Second, researchers need to define more carefully what actually counts as <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">good</jats:italic> or <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">bad</jats:italic> . Third, many theories rely on hidden assumptions—such as how often people encounter certain kinds of stimuli. Making those assumptions explicit should help future studies test competing explanations more directly.","PeriodicalId":48386,"journal":{"name":"Personality and Social Psychology Review","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147478209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Game of Self: Identity and Experience as Active Inference.","authors":"Jacob B Hirsh","doi":"10.1177/10888683261422344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10888683261422344","url":null,"abstract":"Academic AbstractActive inference is an integrative theoretical framework that models the nervous system as a statistical engine for predicting and regulating sensory input. Within this framework, perception and behavior work toward the same imperative: minimizing uncertainty. The current article extends this approach to the inferences social agents make about themselves as both subjects and objects of experience. The resulting model conceptualizes \"The Game of Self\" as a continuous Bayesian updating of episodic and semantic self-representations in order to reduce self-related uncertainty. The model proposes a bidirectional predictive loop that evolves over time-semantic representations of identity guide the construction of episodic experience, while those experiences, in turn, shape semantic self-categorization. In both directions, the self-representations that emerge through active inference are those with the highest posterior probabilities given situational evidence. The article explores how episodic and semantic self-representations are continuously shaped by a dynamic and adaptive process of Bayesian inference.Public AbstractWho am I? What am I feeling? What should I do? These are fundamental questions that people ask themselves throughout their lives-and the answers can shape everything from small decisions to major life changes. But how do we come to know ourselves in the face of social and personal uncertainty? This article examines how the brain uses statistical modeling to make sense of identity and experience in an uncertain world. It introduces the concept of \"The Game of Self\"-an ongoing cycle between who we think we are and what we're experiencing. Our beliefs about who we are shape what we experience, and our experiences shape who we think we are. In each moment, our sense of self is the brain's best statistical guess about our current identity and lived experience. This framework offers new ways to think about selfhood-not as fixed, but as adaptive and responsive.","PeriodicalId":48386,"journal":{"name":"Personality and Social Psychology Review","volume":"292 1","pages":"10888683261422344"},"PeriodicalIF":10.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147350626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Four Years Into the Next Chapter at PSPR","authors":"Jonathan M. Adler, Kathleen R. Bogart, Cindy McPherson Frantz, Eranda Jayawickreme, Ligia Carolina Oliveira-Silva, Phia S. Salter, Sarah C. E. Stanton","doi":"10.1177/10888683251405630","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10888683251405630","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48386,"journal":{"name":"Personality and Social Psychology Review","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.8,"publicationDate":"2026-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146160501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Least Equal When Most Teachable: The Biodevelopmental Learning Opportunities and Outcomes Model of Gender Differences in Sexuality.","authors":"Diana E Peragine,Emily A Impett,Doug P VanderLaan","doi":"10.1177/10888683251391836","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10888683251391836","url":null,"abstract":"Academic AbstractGender differences in sexuality are often attributed to evolved biological differences organized before adolescence or experiential ones learned afterward-neglecting learning that endures because it is evolutionarily expected, and we are biologically sensitized to it. Here, we present the Biodevelopmental Learning Opportunities and Outcomes Model (BLOOM) of gender differences in sexuality, arguing women's lower interest in sex originates not from unequal capacities to want/desire it, but unequal opportunities to like/enjoy sex when biospsychosocially primed to learn from it. We synthesize evidence indicating sex is least equal in adolescence, offering the greatest costs and fewest rewards to women/girls who debut with men/boys (WDM). Concomitantly, it is most teachable in adolescence, when a window of opportunity for sexual incentive learning may open, particularly among individuals with heightened sexual plasticity/learning aptitude (i.e., women/girls). Implications for distinguishing gender differences in sexuality from experience-contingent similarities, and realizing equal sexual rights, education, and health are discussed.Public AbstractGender differences in sexual enjoyment are among the largest in psychology and have remained so over decades despite other advances in gender equality. The gender gap in sexual pleasure, for example, has gained widespread attention and is increasingly discussed as an explanation for gender differences in sexuality. Here, we spotlight the largest, but least discussed, gender gap in sexual enjoyment: the developmental gap. We review evidence that adolescence is not simply a vulnerable period for sexual health, but a window of opportunity for learning to have healthy, enjoyable, and desirable sex-and one wherein equal opportunity is lacking. We propose women get the least equitable sex during this window, when they are primed to learn from it, and this learning informs sexual interest thereafter, generating acquired differences that are often mistaken for inborn ones. We close with recommendations for ensuring equal opportunities for healthy sex and sexual health across genders.","PeriodicalId":48386,"journal":{"name":"Personality and Social Psychology Review","volume":"6 1","pages":"10888683251391836"},"PeriodicalIF":10.8,"publicationDate":"2026-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146021447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}