Declan Devlin, Korbinian Moeller, Iro Xenidou-Dervou, Bert Reynvoet, Francesco Sella
{"title":"Familiar Sequences Are Processed Faster Than Unfamiliar Sequences, Even When They Do Not Match the Count-List","authors":"Declan Devlin, Korbinian Moeller, Iro Xenidou-Dervou, Bert Reynvoet, Francesco Sella","doi":"10.1111/cogs.13481","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cogs.13481","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In order processing, consecutive sequences (e.g., 1-2-3) are generally processed faster than nonconsecutive sequences (e.g., 1-3-5) (also referred to as the reverse distance effect). A common explanation for this effect is that order processing operates via a memory-based associative mechanism whereby consecutive sequences are processed faster because they are more familiar and thus more easily retrieved from memory. Conflicting with this proposal, however, is the finding that this effect is often absent. A possible explanation for these absences is that familiarity may vary both within and across sequence types; therefore, not all consecutive sequences are necessarily more familiar than all nonconsecutive sequences. Accordingly, under this familiarity perspective, familiar sequences should always be processed faster than unfamiliar sequences, but consecutive sequences may not always be processed faster than nonconsecutive sequences. To test this hypothesis in an adult population, we used a comparative judgment approach to measure familiarity at the individual sequence level. Using this measure, we found that although not all participants showed a reverse distance effect, all participants displayed a familiarity effect. Notably, this familiarity effect appeared stronger than the reverse distance effect at both the group and individual level; thus, suggesting the reverse distance effect may be better conceptualized as a specific instance of a more general familiarity effect.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/cogs.13481","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141564841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Realistic About Reference Production: Testing the Effects of Domain Size and Saturation","authors":"Ruud Koolen, Emiel Krahmer","doi":"10.1111/cogs.13473","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cogs.13473","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Experiments on visually grounded, definite reference production often manipulate simple visual scenes in the form of grids filled with objects, for example, to test how speakers are affected by the number of objects that are visible. Regarding the latter, it was found that speech onset times increase along with domain size, at least when speakers refer to nonsalient target objects that do not pop out of the visual domain. This finding suggests that even in the case of many distractors, speakers perform object-by-object scans of the visual scene. The current study investigates whether this systematic processing strategy can be explained by the simplified nature of the scenes that were used, and if different strategies can be identified for photo-realistic visual scenes. In doing so, we conducted a preregistered experiment that manipulated domain size and saturation; replicated the measures of speech onset times; and recorded eye movements to measure speakers’ viewing strategies more directly. Using controlled photo-realistic scenes, we find (1) that speech onset times increase linearly as more distractors are present; (2) that larger domains elicit relatively fewer fixation switches back and forth between the target and its distractors, mainly before speech onset; and (3) that speakers fixate the target relatively less often in larger domains, mainly after speech onset. We conclude that careful object-by-object scans remain the dominant strategy in our photo-realistic scenes, to a limited extent combined with low-level saliency mechanisms. A relevant direction for future research would be to employ less controlled photo-realistic stimuli that do allow for interpretation based on context.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/cogs.13473","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141459937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Erratum for “Chunking Versus Transitional Probabilities: Differentiating Between Theories of Statistical Learning”","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/cogs.13472","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cogs.13472","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Emerson, S. N. & Conway, C. M. (2023). Chunking versus transitional probabilities: Differentiating between theories of statistical learning. <i>Cognitive Science</i>, <i>47</i>(5), e13284. https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13284</p><p>Pre-Registration section lists an incorrect website for the project data. Data for the study can be found at https://osf.io/tnzky or through the full project page at https://osf.io/dr4ec.</p><p>We apologize for the oversight.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/cogs.13472","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141459935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Vision Verbs Emerge First in English Acquisition but Touch, not Audition, Follows Second","authors":"Lila San Roque, Elisabeth Norcliffe, Asifa Majid","doi":"10.1111/cogs.13469","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cogs.13469","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Words that describe sensory perception give insight into how language mediates human experience, and the acquisition of these words is one way to examine how we learn to categorize and communicate sensation. We examine the differential predictions of the typological prevalence hypothesis and embodiment hypothesis regarding the acquisition of perception verbs. Studies 1 and 2 examine the acquisition trajectories of perception verbs across 12 languages using parent questionnaire responses, while Study 3 examines their relative frequencies in English corpus data. We find the vision verbs <i>see</i> and <i>look</i> are acquired first, consistent with the typological prevalence hypothesis. However, for children at 12–23 months, touch—not audition—verbs take precedence in terms of their age of acquisition, frequency in child-produced speech, and frequency in child-directed speech, consistent with the embodiment hypothesis. Later at 24–35 months old, frequency rates are observably different and audition begins to align with what has previously been reported in adult English data. It seems the initial orientation to verbalizing touch over audition in child–caregiver interaction is especially related to the control of physically and socially appropriate behaviors. Taken together, the results indicate children's acquisition of perception verbs arises from the complex interplay of embodiment, language-specific input, and child-directed socialization routines.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/cogs.13469","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141459939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Aspectual Processing Shifts Visual Event Apprehension","authors":"Uğurcan Vurgun, Yue Ji, Anna Papafragou","doi":"10.1111/cogs.13476","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cogs.13476","url":null,"abstract":"<p>What is the relationship between language and event cognition? Past work has suggested that linguistic/aspectual distinctions encoding the internal temporal profile of events map onto nonlinguistic event representations. Here, we use a novel visual detection task to directly test the hypothesis that processing telic versus atelic sentences (e.g., “Ebony folded a napkin in 10 seconds” vs. “Ebony did some folding for 10 seconds”) can influence whether the very same visual event is processed as containing distinct temporal stages including a well-defined endpoint or lacking such structure, respectively. In two experiments, we show that processing (a)telicity in language shifts how people later construe the temporal structure of identical visual stimuli. We conclude that event construals are malleable representations that can align with the linguistic framing of events.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/cogs.13476","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141459934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Flexible Conceptual Representations","authors":"Alyssa Truman, Marta Kutas","doi":"10.1111/cogs.13475","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cogs.13475","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A view that has been gaining prevalence over the past decade is that the human conceptual system is malleable, dynamic, context-dependent, and task-dependent, that is, flexible. Within the flexible conceptual representation framework, conceptual representations are constructed ad hoc, forming a different, idiosyncratic instantiation upon each occurrence. In this review, we scrutinize the neurocognitive literature to better understand the nature of this flexibility. First, we identify some key characteristics of these representations. Next, we consider how these flexible representations are constructed by addressing some of the open questions in this framework: We review the age-old question of how to reconcile flexibility with the apparent need for shareable stable definitions to anchor meaning and come to mutual understanding, as well as some newer questions we find critical, namely, the nature of relations among flexible representations, the role of feature saliency in activation, and the viability of all-or-none feature activations. We suggest replacing the debate about the existence of a definitional stable core that is obligatorily activated with a question of the <i>degree</i> and <i>probability</i> of activation of the information constituting a conceptual representation. We rely on published works to suggest that (1) prior featural salience matters, (2) feature activation may be graded, and (3) Bayesian updating of prior information according to current demands offers a viable account of how flexible representations are constructed. This proposal provides a theoretical mechanism for incorporating a changing momentary context into a constructed representation, while still preserving some of the concept's constituent meaning.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/cogs.13475","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141459936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michiko Sakaki, Alexandr Ten, Hannah Stone, Kou Murayama
{"title":"Role of Metacognitive Confidence Judgments in Curiosity: Different Effects of Confidence on Curiosity Across Epistemic and Perceptual Domains","authors":"Michiko Sakaki, Alexandr Ten, Hannah Stone, Kou Murayama","doi":"10.1111/cogs.13474","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cogs.13474","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Previous research suggests that curiosity is sometimes induced by novel information one has no relevant knowledge about, but it is sometimes induced by new information about something that one is familiar with and has prior knowledge about. However, the conditions under which novelty or familiarity triggers curiosity remain unclear. Using metacognitive confidence judgments as a proxy to quantify the amount of knowledge, this study evaluates the relationship between the amount of relevant knowledge and curiosity. We reviewed previous studies on the relationship between subjective curiosity and confidence and reanalyzed existing large-sample data. The findings indicate that the relationship between curiosity and confidence differs depending on the nature of the stimuli: epistemic versus perceptual. Regarding perceptual stimuli, curiosity is stronger when individuals have lower confidence levels. By contrast, for epistemic stimuli, curiosity is stronger when individuals have higher confidence levels. These results suggest that curiosity triggered by perceptual stimuli is based on perceived novelty, whereas that triggered by epistemic stimuli is based on familiarity with prior knowledge.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/cogs.13474","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141459938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Numbers in Context: Cardinals, Ordinals, and Nominals in American English","authors":"Greg Woodin, Bodo Winter","doi":"10.1111/cogs.13471","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cogs.13471","url":null,"abstract":"<p>There are three main types of number used in modern, industrialized societies. Cardinals count sets (e.g., people, objects) and quantify elements of conventional scales (e.g., money, distance), ordinals index positions in ordered sequences (e.g., years, pages), and nominals serve as unique identifiers (e.g., telephone numbers, player numbers). Many studies that have cited number frequencies in support of claims about numerical cognition and mathematical cognition hinge on the assumption that most numbers analyzed are cardinal. This paper is the first to investigate the relative frequencies of different number types, presenting a corpus analysis of morphologically unmarked numbers (not, e.g., “eighth” or “21st”) in which we manually annotated 3,600 concordances in the Corpus of Contemporary American English. Overall, cardinals are dominant—both pure cardinals (sets) and measurements (scales)—except in the range 1,000–10,000, which is dominated by ordinal years, like 1996 and 2004. Ordinals occur less often overall, and nominals even less so. Only for cardinals do round numbers, associated with approximation, dominate overall and increase with magnitude. In comparison with other registers, academic writing contains a lower proportion of measurements as well as a higher proportion of ordinals and, to some extent, nominals. In writing, pure cardinals and measurements are usually represented as number words, but measurements—especially larger, unround ones—are more likely to be numerals. Ordinals and nominals are mostly represented as numerals. Altogether, this paper reveals how numbers are used in American English, establishing an initial baseline for any analyses of number frequencies and shedding new light on the cognitive and psychological study of number.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/cogs.13471","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141421469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ilona Bass, Cristian Espinoza, Elizabeth Bonawitz, Tomer D. Ullman
{"title":"Teaching Without Thinking: Negative Evaluations of Rote Pedagogy","authors":"Ilona Bass, Cristian Espinoza, Elizabeth Bonawitz, Tomer D. Ullman","doi":"10.1111/cogs.13470","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cogs.13470","url":null,"abstract":"<p>When people make decisions, they act in a way that is either automatic (“rote”), or more thoughtful (“reflective”). But do people notice when <i>others</i> are behaving in a rote way, and do they care? We examine the detection of rote behavior and its consequences in U.S. adults, focusing specifically on pedagogy and learning. We establish <i>repetitiveness</i> as a cue for rote behavior (Experiment 1), and find that rote people are seen as worse teachers (Experiment 2). We also find that the more a person's feedback seems similar across groups (indicating greater rote-ness), the more negatively their teaching is evaluated (Experiment 3). A word-embedding analysis of an open-response task shows people naturally cluster rote and reflective teachers into different semantic categories (Experiment 4). We also show that repetitiveness can be decoupled from perceptions of rote-ness given contextual explanation (Experiment 5). Finally, we establish two additional cues to rote behavior that can be tied to quality of teaching (Experiment 6). These results empirically show that people detect and care about scripted behaviors in pedagogy, and suggest an important extension to formal frameworks of social reasoning.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141307176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bridging the Chasm Between Cognitive Representations and Formal Structures of Linguistic Meanings","authors":"Prakash Mondal","doi":"10.1111/cogs.13456","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cogs.13456","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper aims to show that properties of cognitive/conceptual representations and formal-logical structures of linguistic meaning can be inter-translated, recast, transformed into one another, and so united together, even though cognitive/conceptual representations and formal-logical structures of linguistic meaning are apparently distinct in ontology and divergent in their form or character. While cognitive/conceptual representations are ultimately rooted in sensory-motor systems, formal-logical structures of linguistic meaning are abstractions detached from and independent of the actualized world. This paper sketches out the foundations of how representations of linguistic meaning in terms of cognitive/conceptual structures in Cognitive/Conceptual Semantics can be unified with those in terms of formal-logical structures in Formal Semantics. This is done by recasting cognitive/conceptual representations in terms of formal-logical structures of linguistic meaning and re-encoding formal-logical structures of linguistic meaning in terms of cognitive/conceptual representations. Then, these two types of semantic representations, thus shown representationally equivalent, will be related to a series of derivations across levels in neuronal networks and dynamics. The general discussion on unifying cognitive/conceptual representations of linguistic meaning with formal-logical structures is contextualized within the broader context of theorizing in cognitive science.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141159082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}