{"title":"News-Driven Household Macroeconomic Expectations: Regional vs. National Telecast Information","authors":"JUSTINE GUILLOCHON","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13246","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13246","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using variations in the human-annotated topic content of national and regional telecasts, I explore the link between aggregated daily news and household unemployment, inflation, and economic situation expectations in France. Beyond the information included in national statistics, household expectations embody news information on topics related to the state of the economy, such as deficit, living cost, and economic crisis. Inflation expectations additionally incorporate news on taxes, energy, and especially oil. Distinguishing regional from national television broadcasts reveals that household expectations incorporate both regional and national news, with news on local labor market conditions having a prominent role.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 6","pages":"1759-1789"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148860077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Macro-Economic Effects of a European Deposit (Re-)Insurance Scheme","authors":"MARIUS CLEMENS, STEFAN GEBAUER, TOBIAS KÖNIG","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13232","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent proposals for a European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) favor a reinsurance framework. In this paper, we use a regime-switching open-economy DSGE model with bank defaults to assess the relative efficiency of such a scheme. We find that reinsurance by EDIS is more effective in stabilizing real activity, credit, and welfare than a national fiscal backstop. We demonstrate that risk-weighted contributions to EDIS are welfare-beneficial for depositors and discuss trade-offs policymakers face during the implementation of EDIS. We also find that macroprudential regulation and EDIS can complement each other and that EDIS can prevent bank runs under certain conditions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 6","pages":"1791-1838"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148860078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Model of Post-2008 Monetary Policy","authors":"BEHZAD DIBA, OLIVIER LOISEL","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13276","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13276","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We introduce banks and bank reserves into the basic New Keynesian model and allow the central bank to set both the interest rate on reserves (IOR rate) and the nominal stock of reserves. Our model can account, in qualitative terms, for three key features of U.S. inflation during the recent zero-lower-bound (ZLB) episodes: no significant deflation, little inflation volatility, and no significant inflation following quantitative-easing policies. Crucial to this result is our assumption that demand for bank reserves got close to satiation, but did not reach full satiation. We introduce liquid government bonds into the model to reconcile our nonsatiation assumption with the fact that Treasury-bill rates were often below the IOR rate during the ZLB episodes. Looking ahead, we explore the implications of our model for the normalization of monetary policy and its operational framework (floor system).</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 6","pages":"1577-1605"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148860136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Monetary and Macroprudential Policies under Dollar-Denominated Foreign Debt","authors":"HIDEHIKO MATSUMOTO","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13263","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies monetary and macroprudential policies in a small open economy that borrows from abroad in foreign currency. The model features a novel mechanism in which exchange rate depreciation triggered by a borrowing constraint is amplified through balance of payments adjustments, increasing the real burden of foreign debt and causing crises. This mechanism induces overborrowing in normal times and excessive imports during crises. While contractionary monetary policy during crises mitigates depreciation, anticipation of such interventions exacerbates overborrowing <i>ex ante</i>. The optimal policy combines <i>ex ante</i> macroprudential taxes to correct overborrowing and <i>ex post</i> contractionary monetary policy to mitigate depreciation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 6","pages":"1693-1728"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jmcb.13263","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148860179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Optimal Notional Defined Contributions","authors":"CARLOS E. DA COSTA, MARCELO R. SANTOS","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13234","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Notional Defined Contributions (NDC) systems mimic the incentive structure of fully funded social security while preserving the pay-as-you-go nature of most current systems. We study size-preserving social reforms that replace the current U.S. system with NDCs characterized by alternative contribution rules and deficit/GDP ratios. If one retains the current mandatory age-independent contribution rules, we find a change to an NDC to <i>reduce</i> welfare: the sacrifices in distributive and insurance properties are not compensated by the efficiency gains. NDCs are, however, flexible enough to allow for alternative contribution rules that increase welfare while preserving actuarial fairness. Contributions ought to be age-dependent and concentrated later in a worker's career. The incentive structure induces an increase in capital accumulation that results, through general equilibrium effects, in welfare gains larger for low-productivity workers, despite the increase in income inequality as captured by the Gini coefficient.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 6","pages":"1839-1869"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148859938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bank Opacity and Safe Asset Moneyness","authors":"SANG RAE KIM","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13243","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A bank is more effective as a supplier of money-like safe assets when (i) its return on equity (ROE) is relatively lower and (ii) it is relatively more opaque about its balance sheet. A model is presented to support this, emphasizing that safe asset investors focus on the left tail of the collateral value distribution. Empirical tests on dealer banks and money market mutual funds' (MMFs') funding relationships confirm that higher ROE leads to MMF withdrawal due to lower moneyness of safe assets. Bank opacity mitigates the strength of this relationship, making it optimal for the banking system to maintain a certain level of opacity.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 6","pages":"1651-1691"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jmcb.13243","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148859961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Costs of Adjustment, Portfolio Separation, and the Dynamic Behavior of Bank Loans and Deposits – Revised","authors":"Michael Sigmund, Johannes Wächtler","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13245","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We revise the solutions of the dynamic optimization model of Elyasiani, Kopecky, and Van Hoose (1995), and show that the optimal policy function for the case of adjustment costs and no portfolio separation is a vector autoregressive model of order 1, and not of order 2. In addition, the empirical approach of Elyasiani, Kopecky, and Van Hoose (1995) is incorrect. The optimal policy functions for the no portfolio separation case have to be estimated with a panel vector autoregression model and not with a simultaneous equation approach. We also describe how the portfolio separation hypothesis can be tested empirically based on the correct policy functions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 6","pages":"1887-1890"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148859984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Central Bank Independence at Low Interest Rates","authors":"BENJAMÍN GARCÍA, ARSENIOS SKAPERDAS","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13222","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We create a new measure of the political pressure faced by the Federal Reserve based on the analysis of transcripts of the Chairs' testimonies to Congress. We find that the use of nontraditional policies at low interest rates led to increased political criticism and that criticism predicts legislative actions that threaten central bank independence. We develop a model where the probability of the monetary authority's future loss of independence is increasing in the use of nontraditional instruments, leading to attenuated monetary responses and higher inflation volatility. This attenuation can be mitigated under an institutional framework with clearly defined targets where the central bank is evaluated by how efficiently it achieves its goals.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 6","pages":"1871-1886"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148860142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Loan Evergreening through Banks' Lenses: Evidence from Credit Product-Level Dataa","authors":"CECILIA DASSATTI, RODRIGO LLUBERAS, FRANCESC RODRIGUEZ-TOUS","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13275","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the different rationales behind zombie lending. Exploiting granular data of different corporate loan types, we identify loan evergreening as instances where firms receive interest-only loans to repay existing amortizing loans. Avoidance of losses that erode bank capital is an important reason for zombie lending to multiple-bank firms, but not to single-bank firms. When banks provide loan evergreening to single-bank firms, these firms are less likely to receive credit and additional loan evergreening by the bank in the future, more likely to default, and to start new lending relationships afterward; this is consistent with banks providing loan evergreening to allow less creditworthy borrowers to obtain additional financing elsewhere and reduce their own exposure. Finally, zombie lending to multiple-bank firms leads to credit displacement, but zombie lending to single-bank firms does not.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 6","pages":"1607-1650"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148860169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Monetary Policy When Preferences Are Quasi-Hyperbolic","authors":"RICHARD DENNIS, OLEG KIRSANOV","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13250","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13250","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study discretionary monetary policy in an economy where economic agents have quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We demonstrate that a benevolent central bank is able to keep inflation under control for a wide range of discount factors. If the central bank, however, does not adopt the household's time preferences and tries to discourage early consumption and delayed saving, then a marginal increase in steady-state output is achieved at the cost of a much higher average inflation rate. We show that the present bias produced when households have quasi-hyperbolic discounting causes asset returns to rise substantially; in general equilibrium, the magnitude of hyperbolic discounting found in experimental studies would lead to enormous and wildly counterfactual levels for asset returns. We contrast our results with those obtained when policy is conducted according to a Taylor-type rule and to those obtained when households and the central bank discount geometrically.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 6","pages":"1729-1757"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jmcb.13250","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148860140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}