ANUAR BECHARA, ALEJANDRO BERNALES, CARLOS CAÑÓN, NICOLÁS GARRIDO
{"title":"Aggregate Risk and Lending Decisions in the Interbank Market","authors":"ANUAR BECHARA, ALEJANDRO BERNALES, CARLOS CAÑÓN, NICOLÁS GARRIDO","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13153","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a novel measure of the market‐wide rik of the interbank market: the total (across all banks) uncollateralized/collateralized lending volume ratio: . This measure is based on the intuition that lender banks should use less (more) uncollateralized (collateralized) lending when aggregate risk increases, after controlling for banks’ features and market conditions that might affect (e.g., banks’ credit risk, cross‐border inflows, supply–demand heterogeneity, and funding costs, among others). This is because collateralized loans are safer than uncollateralized ones after an interbank market‐wide collapse. Actually, we show that modifies the <jats:italic>future</jats:italic> lending decisions and net lending holdings of <jats:italic>individual</jats:italic> banks.","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13153","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We introduce a novel measure of the market‐wide rik of the interbank market: the total (across all banks) uncollateralized/collateralized lending volume ratio: . This measure is based on the intuition that lender banks should use less (more) uncollateralized (collateralized) lending when aggregate risk increases, after controlling for banks’ features and market conditions that might affect (e.g., banks’ credit risk, cross‐border inflows, supply–demand heterogeneity, and funding costs, among others). This is because collateralized loans are safer than uncollateralized ones after an interbank market‐wide collapse. Actually, we show that modifies the future lending decisions and net lending holdings of individual banks.