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Journal of Money Credit and Banking最新文献

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Financial Stability with Fire Sale Externalities 具有贱卖外部性的金融稳定
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Money Credit and Banking Pub Date : 2026-07-28 Epub Date: 2025-09-16 DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.13271
RYUICHIRO IZUMI, YANG LI
{"title":"Financial Stability with Fire Sale Externalities","authors":"RYUICHIRO IZUMI,&nbsp;YANG LI","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13271","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Do policies mitigating fire sale externalities improve financial stability? We study this question in a model of financial intermediation where banks are subject to self-fulfilling bank runs and may sell long-term assets subject to cash-in-the-market pricing. Without regulations, banks hold more long-term assets than socially optimal, causing inefficiently large fire sales in crises. Policymakers may regulate to mitigate this externality, but lack commitment. The optimal policy depends on how regulation affects the probability of self-fulfilling runs, and we offer a robust control theory of this relationship. Ignoring this effect could inadvertently increase fragility and lower welfare. Internalizing it robustly increases welfare.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 5","pages":"1525-1548"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Nonmonetary News in Fed Announcements: Evidence from the Corporate Bond Market 美联储公告中的非货币新闻：来自公司债券市场的证据
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Money Credit and Banking Pub Date : 2026-07-28 Epub Date: 2025-06-24 DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.13253
MICHAEL SMOLYANSKY, GUSTAVO SUAREZ
{"title":"Nonmonetary News in Fed Announcements: Evidence from the Corporate Bond Market","authors":"MICHAEL SMOLYANSKY,&nbsp;GUSTAVO SUAREZ","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13253","url":null,"abstract":"<p>When the Federal Reserve tightens monetary policy, do the prices of riskier assets fall relative to safer assets? Or, do investors interpret policy tightening as a signal that economic fundamentals are stronger than they previously believed, thus leading riskier assets to outperform? We present evidence that the latter of these two forces empirically dominates within the U.S. corporate bond market. Following an unanticipated monetary policy tightening, riskier corporate bonds outperform safer corporate bonds, demonstrating the importance of an informational, or nonmonetary, component within monetary policy announcements.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 5","pages":"1359-1383"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fiscal Distress and Banking Performance: The Role of Macroprudential Regulation 财政困境与银行绩效：宏观审慎监管的作用
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Money Credit and Banking Pub Date : 2026-07-28 Epub Date: 2025-06-25 DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.13247
HIONA BALFOUSSIA, HARRIS DELLAS, DIMITRIS PAPAGEORGIOU
{"title":"Fiscal Distress and Banking Performance: The Role of Macroprudential Regulation","authors":"HIONA BALFOUSSIA,&nbsp;HARRIS DELLAS,&nbsp;DIMITRIS PAPAGEORGIOU","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13247","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Fiscal fragility undermines a government's ability to honor its bank deposit insurance pledge and induces a positive correlation between sovereign default risk and financial (bank) default risk. We show that this positive relation is reversed if bank capital requirements in fiscally weak countries are allowed to adjust optimally. The resulting higher requirements buttress the banking system and support higher output and welfare relative to the case where macroprudential policy does not vary with the degree of fiscal stress. Fiscal tenuousness also exacerbates the effects of other risk shocks. Nonetheless, the economy's response can be mitigated if macroprudential policy is adjusted optimally.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 5","pages":"1549-1569"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Monetary and Macroprudential Policy and Welfare in an Estimated Four-Agent New Keynesian Model 一个估计的四代理新凯恩斯模型中的货币和宏观审慎政策与福利
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Money Credit and Banking Pub Date : 2026-07-28 Epub Date: 2023-08-21 DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.13095
GEORGE J. BRATSIOTIS, KASUN D. PATHIRAGE
{"title":"Monetary and Macroprudential Policy and Welfare in an Estimated Four-Agent New Keynesian Model","authors":"GEORGE J. BRATSIOTIS,&nbsp;KASUN D. PATHIRAGE","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13095","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jmcb.13095","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the <i>social</i> and <i>agent-specific</i> welfare effects of monetary and macroprudential policy in a four-agent estimated macro-economic model comprising “<i>banked simple households</i>,” “<i>underbanked simple households</i>,” “<i>firm owners</i>,” and “<i>bank owners</i>.” Optimal capital requirement and loan loss provisions ratios improve all agent-specific and social welfare, but imply smaller gains for <i>simple households</i> and <i>firm owners</i> that rely on credit. Countercyclical capital buffers support <i>firm owners</i> and <i>bank owners</i> with smaller gains for the two simple households, while countercyclical loan loss provisions improve social welfare only for specific shocks. Coordination between monetary and macroprudential policies yields higher social welfare than no coordination.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 5","pages":"1411-1452"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jmcb.13095","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135820547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Market Regulation, Cycles, and Growth Dynamics in a Monetary Union 货币联盟中的市场监管、周期和增长动力
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Money Credit and Banking Pub Date : 2026-07-28 Epub Date: 2024-09-09 DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.13212
MIRKO ABBRITTI, SEBASTIAN WEBER
{"title":"Market Regulation, Cycles, and Growth Dynamics in a Monetary Union","authors":"MIRKO ABBRITTI,&nbsp;SEBASTIAN WEBER","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13212","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jmcb.13212","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We build a two-country currency union dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with endogenous growth to assess the role of product market regulation (PMR) and labor market regulation (LMR) for growth and the adjustment to shocks. We show that with endogenous growth, there is no reason to expect real income convergence. Large shocks can lead to permanent changes of output and real exchange rates. Differences are exacerbated by different PMR and LMR. Less regulated economies have higher trend growth and recover faster from negative shocks. Results are consistent with higher inflation, lower employment, and disappointing total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates experienced in more regulated euro area members.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 5","pages":"1453-1493"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142207892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Liquidity Crises and the Market-Maker of Last Resort 流动性危机与最后做市商
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Money Credit and Banking Pub Date : 2026-07-28 Epub Date: 2025-09-12 DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.13273
CHARLES M. KAHN, DAVID MARSHALL, ROBERT L. MCDONALD
{"title":"Liquidity Crises and the Market-Maker of Last Resort","authors":"CHARLES M. KAHN,&nbsp;DAVID MARSHALL,&nbsp;ROBERT L. MCDONALD","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13273","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13273","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study market illiquidity in an economy subject to nonfundamental shocks. Asset trading occurs via decentralized bargaining. The model has multiple rational expectations equilibria; we associate certain Pareto-inferior equilibria with liquidity crises. The government can improve welfare by acting as a “market-maker of last resort” (MMLR), purchasing assets at above-market prices. Several policies employed by the United States during the financial crisis are examples of MMLR. We consider “aggressive” and “conservative” MMLR policies. The aggressive policy supports the unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium. The conservative policy, which embeds a “no-bailout constraint,” only supports an inefficient equilibrium.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 5","pages":"1327-1357"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jmcb.13273","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information Transparency of Firm Financing 企业融资的信息透明度
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Money Credit and Banking Pub Date : 2026-07-28 Epub Date: 2025-06-23 DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.13259
ANTOINE L. NOËL, HONGFEI SUN
{"title":"Information Transparency of Firm Financing","authors":"ANTOINE L. NOËL,&nbsp;HONGFEI SUN","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13259","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13259","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose a theory on information transparency of optimal financial contracts. Our model nests adverse selection and agency cost. There exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium with novel features: First, three types of optimal contracts can arise endogenously, that is, equity, transparent debt, and opaque debt. The former two require firms to take on a costly verification technology while opaque debt does not. Second, the unique equilibrium is either pooling on opaque debt, or mixing with transparent and opaque financing. Third, firms with sufficiently high quality and intermediate levels of internal funds find it optimal to use a transparent contract.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 5","pages":"1299-1326"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Banks of a Feather: The Informational Advantage of Being Alike 羽毛的银行：相似的信息优势
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Money Credit and Banking Pub Date : 2026-07-28 Epub Date: 2025-07-11 DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.13252
PETER BEDNAREK, VALERIYA DINGER, ALISON SCHULTZ, NATALJA VON WESTERNHAGEN
{"title":"Banks of a Feather: The Informational Advantage of Being Alike","authors":"PETER BEDNAREK,&nbsp;VALERIYA DINGER,&nbsp;ALISON SCHULTZ,&nbsp;NATALJA VON WESTERNHAGEN","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13252","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13252","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Banks lend more to banks that are similar to them. Using data from the German credit register and proprietary supervisory data on the quality of banks' loan portfolio, we show that a similar portfolio of the lending and borrowing bank helps to overcome information asymmetries in interbank markets. While interbank lenders generally do not adjust their lending to information on the counterparty's portfolio quality, banks with an exposure to similar industries and regions strongly react to this private information. Lending between similar banks is particularly important for borrowers with opaque loan portfolios, which do not obtain credit from dissimilar peers.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 5","pages":"1257-1297"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jmcb.13252","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Monetary Policy and the Drifting Natural Rate of Interest 货币政策与浮动的自然利率
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Money Credit and Banking Pub Date : 2026-07-28 Epub Date: 2025-09-15 DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.13274
SANDRA DAUDIGNON, ORESTE TRISTANI
{"title":"Monetary Policy and the Drifting Natural Rate of Interest","authors":"SANDRA DAUDIGNON,&nbsp;ORESTE TRISTANI","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13274","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13274","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Empirical analyses find that the long-run natural rate is subject to permanent shocks. How should monetary policy react to such shocks? Because of the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates, the mere possibility of future movements toward zero of the long-run natural rate imparts a downward bias on inflation expectations. To offset this bias, a central bank optimizing under commitment should not only rely on forward guidance at the ZLB, as recommended by the existing literature, but also adopt an expansionary bias away from the ZLB.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 5","pages":"1385-1410"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Tariffs and Foreign Direct Investment in a Dynamic North–South Model 动态南北模型中的关税与外国直接投资
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Money Credit and Banking Pub Date : 2026-07-28 Epub Date: 2024-10-23 DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.13221
TATSURO IWAISAKO, HITOSHI TANAKA
{"title":"Tariffs and Foreign Direct Investment in a Dynamic North–South Model","authors":"TATSURO IWAISAKO,&nbsp;HITOSHI TANAKA","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13221","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines how import tariffs by a developed country (the North) and a developing country (the South) affect innovation and foreign direct investment (FDI) using a quality ladder model. We show that a Northern import tariff raises the relative wage of Northern labor, but impedes innovation and FDI. This may worsen Northern welfare. By contrast, a Southern import tariff raises the relative wage of Southern labor and promotes innovation and FDI. This can improve Southern welfare. These imply that the South has a stronger incentive than the North to impose an import tariff, which is consistent with actual observation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 5","pages":"1495-1524"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jmcb.13221","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148615710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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