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Shaping future generosity: The role of injunctive social norms in intertemporal pro-social giving 塑造未来的慷慨：强制性社会规范在跨时空亲社会捐赠中的作用
IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2024-02-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102717
Teng Lu, Dapeng Liang, Mei Hong
{"title":"Shaping future generosity: The role of injunctive social norms in intertemporal pro-social giving","authors":"Teng Lu,&nbsp;Dapeng Liang,&nbsp;Mei Hong","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2024.102717","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Social norms are a key driving force in supporting pro-social behavior. However, existing studies focusing on the effects of norms often neglect the time signature of pro-social decisions, limiting its scope of explanation. The current study investigated the impact of injunctive norms (e.g., “This is the most socially normative donation”) on intertemporal pro-social giving across two experiments. Experiment 1 indicated that independent of social norms, generosity in economic sharing behavior decreased hyperbolically as time delay increased. Interestingly, the No norm group exhibited a steeper discounting function (i.e., less generous) than the High norm group. Experiment 2 extended these results and confirmed the mediating role of time perception. Overall, this research demonstrates that injunctive norms can influence individual intertemporal pro-social preferences and offers practical implications for increasing intertemporal pro-social giving using injunctive norms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"102 ","pages":"Article 102717"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139999791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Eliciting dishonesty in online experiments: The observed vs. mind cheating game 在在线实验中诱发不诚实行为：观察与心理作弊游戏
IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2024-02-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102715
Daniel Parra
{"title":"Eliciting dishonesty in online experiments: The observed vs. mind cheating game","authors":"Daniel Parra","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102715","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2024.102715","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, I compare two ways of eliciting cheating behavior in online experiments. I present data from two online experiments, one in which participants’ random drawing took place directly on their screens (Observed-Cheating Game) and another in which participants chose a color in their minds and then randomly drew a color from ten boxes with question marks presented on their screens (Mind-Cheating Game). The paper shows that observed online games are more likely to have non-significant treatment differences because the effect of observability is particularly strong. I show that using mind games to generate random draws in online settings solves the most prominent problems for eliciting lying by making the lies unidentifiable at the individual level. The <span>Mind-Cheating Game</span> used in the experiment is inspired by previous mind games and is specifically adapted to be easily implemented in online or field experiments.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"102 ","pages":"Article 102715"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487024000230/pdfft?md5=703db9f9c6cf662b8c24221616458793&pid=1-s2.0-S0167487024000230-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139999849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do you have a choice?: Implications for belief updating and the disposition effect 你有选择吗：信念更新和处置效应的含义
IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2024-02-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102718
Kremena Bachmann
{"title":"Do you have a choice?: Implications for belief updating and the disposition effect","authors":"Kremena Bachmann","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102718","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102718","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The present paper evaluates the importance of belief updating for the prevalence of the disposition effect – the reluctance to sell assets at losses as compared to gains. In particular, the present paper studies whether restricting choices in investment risk taking decisions motivates different learning from the decision outcomes and whether such differences in learning cause differences in the emergence of the disposition effect. The results show that investors learn from negative outcomes more like Bayesians if their risk-taking decisions are restricted. Causal mediation analysis reveals that such differences in learning increases the probability to sell after losses, which improves the overall investment performance. Compared to gains, the differences in learning after losses explain also why investors making active risk-taking choices are less likely to sell after losses as compared to gains, while the effect is reversed when choices are restricted. These findings suggest that restricting the discretion in decisions influences the way investors learn from decision outcomes and these differences in learning can explain puzzling differences in the risk-taking behavior of individual investors.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"102 ","pages":"Article 102718"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487024000266/pdfft?md5=f0c9d73fb118664234a17df2e3b678d7&pid=1-s2.0-S0167487024000266-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140008272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sharing losses in dictator and ultimatum games: A meta-analysis 独裁者和最后通牒博弈中的损失分担：元分析✩
IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2024-02-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102713
François Cochard , Alexandre Flage
{"title":"Sharing losses in dictator and ultimatum games: A meta-analysis","authors":"François Cochard ,&nbsp;Alexandre Flage","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102713","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102713","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Are people less pro-social when sharing losses instead of gains? This paper reports the findings of a meta-analysis of 33 studies with 114 estimates from ultimatum and dictator games in which participants share losses (of money, time, or even physical well-being) instead of gains. We provide evidence that dictators leave significantly more to receivers when sharing losses. Proposers are also fairer when sharing losses, but the result is only significant when protocol biases are controlled for. Receivers, on the other hand, demand significantly more in the loss-sharing ultimatum game than in the gain-sharing game. They also demand significantly more when the strategy method is employed. Moreover, we found that non-students are more generous and fairer when sharing losses than students. Finally, we found that, whether sharing a loss of time, a loss of money, or physical pain, players’ behaviors do not differ in terms of the percentage of loss shared or demanded.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"102 ","pages":"Article 102713"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139949122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Delayed risk in individual and social decisions 个人和社会决策中的延迟风险
IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2024-02-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102710
Asri Özgümüs , Holger A. Rau , Stefan T. Trautmann
{"title":"Delayed risk in individual and social decisions","authors":"Asri Özgümüs ,&nbsp;Holger A. Rau ,&nbsp;Stefan T. Trautmann","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102710","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102710","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies temporal-distance effects on individual and social risks, testing Construal Level Theory. We elicit WTPs for risky and ambiguous lotteries and vary the timing (immediately vs. in two weeks) when the uncertainty is resolved. Subjects have lower WTPs for longshots than for safer lotteries. Under ambiguity, this gap decreases with temporal distance. Subjects are ambiguity averse, which becomes less pronounced when low-probability lotteries are processed in the future. In a trust game, we study temporal-distance effects on social risks. Time distance lowers trust as trustors correctly anticipate that reciprocity is lower when trustees decide in the future.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"102 ","pages":"Article 102710"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139949134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Smartphone use decreases trustworthiness of strangers 使用智能手机会降低陌生人的可信度
IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2024-02-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102714
Sandy Campbell , Uri Gneezy
{"title":"Smartphone use decreases trustworthiness of strangers","authors":"Sandy Campbell ,&nbsp;Uri Gneezy","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102714","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102714","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Trust is crucial for social, economic, and political relationships. Evidence shows the importance of trust in distinct areas, from the day-to-day forming of personal relations to the stability of democracies. In this paper, we ask how new technologies that compete for our attention affect the formation of trust between strangers. To that end, we study how smartphone use affects interactions with, and subsequent trust in, strangers. In our experiment, we had participants wait in groups of six for approximately 20 minutes, allowing them to interact as they wished. In one treatment, participants could use their smartphones during the wait time, while in the other they did not have access to their phones. We then randomly paired participants within each group to play a trust game and answer a brief survey. As predicted, we find that limiting phone access resulted in higher levels of trustworthiness.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"102 ","pages":"Article 102714"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487024000229/pdfft?md5=e2c7b87e5b98f539c2ac4173d6db0418&pid=1-s2.0-S0167487024000229-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139949124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Impatience and crime. Evidence from the NLSY97 不耐烦与犯罪。来自 NLSY97 的证据
IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2024-02-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102711
Stefania Basiglio , Alessandra Foresta , Gilberto Turati
{"title":"Impatience and crime. Evidence from the NLSY97","authors":"Stefania Basiglio ,&nbsp;Alessandra Foresta ,&nbsp;Gilberto Turati","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102711","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102711","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We empirically test the relationship between crime and impatience at the individual level, exploiting data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). Besides providing information on violent, property, and drug crimes, NLSY97 allows us to observe different behaviors, sharing impatience as a common latent factor. We use factor analysis to extract this common factor as a measure of impatience. Estimates from a Logit model suggest a positive association between impatience and crime. This relationship differs across violent, property, and drug crimes, but we do not find significant heterogeneities when comparing individuals according to gender, parental education, and ethnic groups. The main result is robust to different factor analysis specifications and controls for risk preferences. Our findings support policies aimed at influencing individual time preferences as an indirect way to combat crime.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"101 ","pages":"Article 102711"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139926707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Effects of a fearful emotional state on financial decisions in the presence of prior outcome information 在有先验结果信息的情况下，恐惧情绪对财务决策的影响
IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2024-02-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102706
Silvia López-Guzmán , Santiago I. Sautua
{"title":"Effects of a fearful emotional state on financial decisions in the presence of prior outcome information","authors":"Silvia López-Guzmán ,&nbsp;Santiago I. Sautua","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102706","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102706","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Negative emotions have been shown to influence financial risk-taking. However, how receiving salient information about prior outcomes interacts with a decision-maker’s emotional state is not well known. In a laboratory experiment, we induced a fearful emotional state to investigate its effects on financial investment when outcome probabilities are unknown but decision-makers observe prior outcomes. The effects of fear on investment depended on whether the sequence of previous outcomes was favorable or unfavorable and contained weak or strong information. Our findings suggest that fear affected investment, at least in part, through changes in expectations of success.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"101 ","pages":"Article 102706"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139919265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What makes cooperation precarious? 是什么让合作岌岌可危？
IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2024-02-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102712
Christoph Engel , Bettina Rockenbach
{"title":"What makes cooperation precarious?","authors":"Christoph Engel ,&nbsp;Bettina Rockenbach","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102712","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102712","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Although most people are not outright selfish, cooperation frequently fails. Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) explain the well-established decline of contributions in repeated public good games with a genuine imperfection in conditional cooperation. Reanalyzing their data, we offer a more nuanced explanation. Conditional cooperators are nearly perfect, when others cooperate as well. Yet conditional cooperators strongly react to negative experiences, chiefly caused by selfish individuals. These bad experiences are the main driver for the imperfection in conditional cooperation and thus of the downward trend in contributions in repeated public good games.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"101 ","pages":"Article 102712"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139919160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
You don’t need an invoice, do you? An online experiment on collaborative tax evasion 你不需要发票，对吗？协同逃税在线实验
IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2024-02-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102708
Lilith Burgstaller , Katharina Pfeil
{"title":"You don’t need an invoice, do you? An online experiment on collaborative tax evasion","authors":"Lilith Burgstaller ,&nbsp;Katharina Pfeil","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102708","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2024.102708","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Collaborative evasion of taxes and social security fees is prevalent when two parties can coordinate to circumvent third-party reporting mechanisms. Prominent examples are household services when a household hires a service provider and no third party is involved; however, the evidence on the determinants of collaborative tax evasion is scarce. This study examines two coordination mechanisms of collaborative tax evasion: a partner’s signaled intention and information about the majority’s evasion behavior (empirical evasion expectation). We implement an interactive online tax evasion game with 560 participants from an online labor market. Our findings show that manipulating an empirical evasion expectation increases the fraction of evaded transactions by 19 percentage points. Our treatment manipulation of intention signals does not significantly affect evasion; however, when the willingness to evade is signaled first in the chat, the probability of evasion increases by 44 percentage points.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"101 ","pages":"Article 102708"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139915085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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