Journal of Economic Psychology最新文献

Heuristic centred-belief players

IF 2.5 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-03-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102806

Irenaeus Wolff

{"title":"Heuristic centred-belief players","authors":"Irenaeus Wolff","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2025.102806","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2025.102806","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Strategic behaviour often diverges from Nash-equilibrium, in particular in inexperienced play. Studying a class of games in which participants choose their payment and receive it as long as their opponent chooses a different amount, I show that none of the popular models of behavioural game theory predicts the predominant aggregate choice pattern consistently. And yet, noisy introspection (Goeree and Holt, 2004) readily accounts for about half of the individual observations. The reason for the apparent paradox and the mis-match of the aggregate data and the models is a disregarded behavioural type that makes up about 25% of the population. These 25% display a specific form of central-tendency bias, holding beliefs that peak in the centre of the option set and that are roughly symmetric. In addition, the players show a more heuristic process translating their belief into actions, as their choices cannot be explained readily by quantal responding. The behavioural pattern of a ‘centred belief’ in connection with boundedly-rational decision-making is present also in another prominent game from the literature on behavioural game theory, the 11–20 game. Finally, I show that classifying players as ‘heuristic centred-belief types’ by one game’s beliefs has predictive power for behaviour in the other game.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"108 ","pages":"Article 102806"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143643383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

ChatGPT and the labor market: Unraveling the effect of AI discussions on students’ earning expectations

IF 2.5 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102803

Samir Huseynov

引用次数: 0

Performance under pressure and its impact on compensation: Evidence from professional basketball

IF 2.5 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-02-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102807

Helmut M. Dietl , Steffen Q. Mueller , Marco Henriques Pereira , Markus Lang

引用次数: 0

Card or dice? An improved experimental approach to measure dishonesty

IF 2.5 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-02-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102802

Daniel Hermann , Selina Bruns , Oliver Mußhoff

{"title":"Card or dice? An improved experimental approach to measure dishonesty","authors":"Daniel Hermann , Selina Bruns , Oliver Mußhoff","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2025.102802","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2025.102802","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce a modified die-roll experiment carried out in Germany and Cambodia to measure precise dishonesty rates, while the individual lie is not observable to the experimenter. Participants draw an envelope from a box containing many envelopes. Each envelope contains a card depicting a die number, which participants view in private and then deposit into a different box filled with many envelopes. The payoff of participants depends on the reported number, thereby creating an incentive to dishonestly report numbers with higher payoffs. Although the individual lie remains hidden from the experimenter, the drawn distribution of cards by a group of participants is known. Results of the modified experiment are compared to the classical die-roll task, in which individual dishonesty is private information and the outcome distribution is assumed, based on a probability function. The comparison reveals that the modified card method shows comparable levels of lying to the classical die-roll task among students, but not among smallholders in rural Cambodia. Considering the farmers, the number of liars is lower in the card task compared to the die-roll task. Although the individual lie is not observable, we find partially different dishonesty proportions between numbers comparing the two tasks. This suggests that the observability of the drawn distribution affects the costs of lying.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"108 ","pages":"Article 102802"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143509275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

How do humans respond to large realized losses?

IF 2.5 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-02-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102805

Redzo Mujcic , Nattavudh Powdthavee

{"title":"How do humans respond to large realized losses?","authors":"Redzo Mujcic , Nattavudh Powdthavee","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2025.102805","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2025.102805","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In a controlled field setting, in which the majority of people in our sample lose more than £90,000, we examine how human beings respond to major financial losses. University ethics boards would not allow this kind of huge-loss phenomenon to be studied with normal social-science experiments. Yet the scientific and practical issues at stake are unusually important ones. In the analyzed gameshow setting, individuals are handed £100,000 in cash. They then have to make risky decisions. Facing a sequence of seven questions, individuals are required to distribute their cash endowment over a set of possible answers. Participants lose any cash placed on a wrong answer. In a sample of British participants, we find that people become increasingly more cautious as they lose more of their cash endowment. A realized prior loss of £75,000 or more increases the propensity to fully diversify by 50 percentage points compared to a prior loss of £25,000. We find a similar cautious response in a smaller sample of US participants when the stakes are raised to $1 million US dollars. Our study appears to be the first to be able to calculate systematically how human beings react to large and unrecoverable financial losses.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"107 ","pages":"Article 102805"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143444654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Do managers accept artificial intelligence? Insights into the role of business area and AI functionality

IF 2.5 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-02-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102804

Miriam Gieselmann , Daniel Erdsiek , Vincent Rost , Kai Sassenberg

{"title":"Do managers accept artificial intelligence? Insights into the role of business area and AI functionality","authors":"Miriam Gieselmann , Daniel Erdsiek , Vincent Rost , Kai Sassenberg","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2025.102804","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2025.102804","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>More and more companies use artificial intelligence (AI). Research aimed to understand acceptance from the perspective of AI users or people affected by AI decisions. However, the perspective of decision-makers in companies (i.e., managers) has not been considered. To address this gap, we investigate managers’ acceptance of AI usage in companies, focusing on two potential determinants. Across four experimental studies (<em>N</em><sub>total</sub> = 2025), we tested whether the business area (i.e., human resources vs. finances/ marketing) and AI functionality affect managers’ acceptance of AI (i.e., perceived risk of negative consequences, willingness to invest). Findings indicate that managers (a) perceive more risk of and (b) are less willing to invest in AI usage in human resources than in finances and marketing. Besides, the results suggest that acceptance declines if functionality crosses a critical boundary and AI autonomously implements decisions without prior human control. Accordingly, the current research sheds light on the AI acceptance of managers and gives insights into the role of the business area and AI functionality.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"108 ","pages":"Article 102804"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143509274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Loss aversion is not robust: A re-meta-analysis

IF 2.5 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-02-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102801

Eldad Yechiam, Dana Zeif

引用次数: 0

Identified disclosure to increase Consumers’ detection of native advertising

IF 2.5 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-02-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102800

Dalia Shilian , Eyal Pe'er

引用次数: 0

Shaping societal norms: Experimental evidence on the normative impact of free speech law

IF 2.5 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-01-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102799

Daniel L. Chen , Susan Yeh

引用次数: 0

Purely hedonic image concerns and audience size: Evidence from a charity dictator game

IF 2.5 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-01-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102798

Sem Manna , Alessandro Stringhi

引用次数: 0