Journal of Economic Psychology最新文献

Temperatures and trust: Survey evidence on the role of climate in shaping trust in people and institutions 温度与信任：关于气候在塑造对人和机构的信任中的作用的调查证据

IF 2.3 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-07-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102831

Karin Hansson , Alexander Popov

引用次数: 0

Evaluation mode affects choice of healthy and unhealthy Food: The role of taste and healthiness attribute evaluability 评价模式影响健康与不健康食品的选择：口味和健康属性可评价性的作用

IF 2.5 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-07-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102832

Sadaf Mokarram-Dorri , Siegfried Dewitte

{"title":"Evaluation mode affects choice of healthy and unhealthy Food: The role of taste and healthiness attribute evaluability","authors":"Sadaf Mokarram-Dorri , Siegfried Dewitte","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2025.102832","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2025.102832","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Understanding the determinants of healthy and unhealthy food choices is paramount to improving public health. This paper zooms in on the role of evaluation mode (i.e., separate versus joint evaluation) in consumers’ food choices. A series of four studies in the paper and four studies in the <span><span>online appendix</span></span> (N = 2024) investigate the effect of evaluation mode on the choice share of healthy and unhealthy foods. In line with earlier work in various domains, the results demonstrate that joint evaluation of healthy and unhealthy food options improves consumers’ decision-making by decreasing (increasing) the choice share of unhealthy (healthy) food, compared to the separate evaluation mode. We show that this relies on the simple fact that the healthiness attribute is difficult to judge in isolation, certainly in comparison with the taste attribute. Indeed, when healthiness becomes easier to evaluate, unhealthy choices become more frequent in the joint evaluation mode as well. The studies are set up to allow us to distinguish the evaluability account from the justification and the goal-highlighting accounts. The theoretical contributions, the methodological implications for the self-control literature, and the managerial implications are discussed.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"109 ","pages":"Article 102832"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144685456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

IF 2.5 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-07-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102829

Praveen Kujal

引用次数: 0

Tax aversion as an implicit phenomenon 避税是一种隐性现象

IF 2.5 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-07-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102828

Giulia Sesini, Cinzia Castiglioni, Paola Iannello, Edoardo Lozza

{"title":"Tax aversion as an implicit phenomenon","authors":"Giulia Sesini, Cinzia Castiglioni, Paola Iannello, Edoardo Lozza","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2025.102828","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2025.102828","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The term “tax aversion” refers to a dislike of taxes which is stronger than the reaction to other types of payments. Although many scholars have found that the word “tax” elicits negative feelings, contrasting findings have been obtained when tax aversion has been measured as an explicit tendency. The present study suggests a complementary perspective on tax aversion, suggesting that tax aversion might operate as both a latent phenomenon and an explicit propensity. We propose that tax aversion may stem from an inner predisposition rather than an explicit and rational attitude. Such intuition drove the present research, aimed at measuring tax aversion at an implicit level and examining the relationship between implicit, explicit, and behavioral measures of tax aversion. Across three studies, we employed the Implicit Association Test (IAT) alongside traditional measures to explore implicit tax aversion and its behavioral implications. The novelty of this research lies in the use of the IAT to measure implicit tax aversion, examining its relationship with explicit measures, such as the TAX-I (<span><span>Kirchler & Wahl, 2010</span></span>), as well as with the behavioral outcomes of tax aversion based on the study conducted by <span><span>Sussman and Olivola (2011)</span></span>. Consistent with our hypothesis, the findings support the idea that tax aversion can operate as a latent phenomenon. Furthermore, the implicit hostility measured through the IAT appears to be linked to the behavioral outcomes of tax aversion; contrarily, no relationship was found with explicit tax-related attitudes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"109 ","pages":"Article 102828"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144654390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Economic consequences of gender differences in behavior 性别行为差异的经济后果

IF 2.5 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-05-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102818

Jaume García-Segarra , Iñigo Hernandez-Arenaz , Pedro Rey-Biel

引用次数: 0

No evidence of first-mover advantage in a large sample of penalty shootouts 在大量的点球大战样本中，没有证据表明先发优势存在

IF 2.5 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-03-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102816

David Pipke

引用次数: 0

Heuristic centred-belief players 启发式中心信念玩家

IF 2.5 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-03-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102806

Irenaeus Wolff

{"title":"Heuristic centred-belief players","authors":"Irenaeus Wolff","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2025.102806","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2025.102806","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Strategic behaviour often diverges from Nash-equilibrium, in particular in inexperienced play. Studying a class of games in which participants choose their payment and receive it as long as their opponent chooses a different amount, I show that none of the popular models of behavioural game theory predicts the predominant aggregate choice pattern consistently. And yet, noisy introspection (Goeree and Holt, 2004) readily accounts for about half of the individual observations. The reason for the apparent paradox and the mis-match of the aggregate data and the models is a disregarded behavioural type that makes up about 25% of the population. These 25% display a specific form of central-tendency bias, holding beliefs that peak in the centre of the option set and that are roughly symmetric. In addition, the players show a more heuristic process translating their belief into actions, as their choices cannot be explained readily by quantal responding. The behavioural pattern of a ‘centred belief’ in connection with boundedly-rational decision-making is present also in another prominent game from the literature on behavioural game theory, the 11–20 game. Finally, I show that classifying players as ‘heuristic centred-belief types’ by one game’s beliefs has predictive power for behaviour in the other game.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"108 ","pages":"Article 102806"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143643383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

ChatGPT and the labor market: Unraveling the effect of AI discussions on students’ earning expectations 聊天技术和劳动力市场：揭示人工智能讨论对学生收入预期的影响

IF 2.5 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102803

Samir Huseynov

引用次数: 0

Performance under pressure and its impact on compensation: Evidence from professional basketball 压力下的表现及其对薪酬的影响：来自职业篮球的证据

IF 2.5 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-02-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102807

Helmut M. Dietl , Steffen Q. Mueller , Marco Henriques Pereira , Markus Lang

引用次数: 0

Card or dice? An improved experimental approach to measure dishonesty 牌还是骰子？一种改进的测量不诚实的实验方法

IF 2.5 2区经济学

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2025-02-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102802

Daniel Hermann , Selina Bruns , Oliver Mußhoff

{"title":"Card or dice? An improved experimental approach to measure dishonesty","authors":"Daniel Hermann , Selina Bruns , Oliver Mußhoff","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2025.102802","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2025.102802","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce a modified die-roll experiment carried out in Germany and Cambodia to measure precise dishonesty rates, while the individual lie is not observable to the experimenter. Participants draw an envelope from a box containing many envelopes. Each envelope contains a card depicting a die number, which participants view in private and then deposit into a different box filled with many envelopes. The payoff of participants depends on the reported number, thereby creating an incentive to dishonestly report numbers with higher payoffs. Although the individual lie remains hidden from the experimenter, the drawn distribution of cards by a group of participants is known. Results of the modified experiment are compared to the classical die-roll task, in which individual dishonesty is private information and the outcome distribution is assumed, based on a probability function. The comparison reveals that the modified card method shows comparable levels of lying to the classical die-roll task among students, but not among smallholders in rural Cambodia. Considering the farmers, the number of liars is lower in the card task compared to the die-roll task. Although the individual lie is not observable, we find partially different dishonesty proportions between numbers comparing the two tasks. This suggests that the observability of the drawn distribution affects the costs of lying.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"108 ","pages":"Article 102802"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143509275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0