Journal of Economic Psychology最新文献

{"title":"Gender effects for loss aversion: A reconsideration","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102760","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102760","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Gender differences in decision making is a topic that has attracted much attention in the literature and the debate seems to be inconclusive. In a recent study, Bouchouicha et al. (2019) using data from an incentivised experiment with almost 3000 students and 30 different countries, estimate gender effects assuming four commonly employed definitions of loss aversion. Despite the fact that their analysis is based on the same data and the same functional forms and econometric setup, their results are inconclusive regarding the existence and the direction of gender effects for loss aversion. In this study, we investigate two extensions of their work in an effort to shed some light on the potential reasons behind this contradictory result. In particular, we explore whether: (1) a more flexible estimation method that allows for individual heterogeneity and generates more robust estimates in the presence of noise and; (2) a different utility function, can generate more robust inference regarding gender effects. We show that while a more flexible Hierarchical Bayesian estimation method is not sufficient to explain the contradictory results, an alternative utility function detects a uniform gender effect, with women being always more loss-averse, regardless the adopted definition of loss aversion.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487024000680/pdfft?md5=fd5a2de938af4c5e8817103addb677ca&pid=1-s2.0-S0167487024000680-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142149990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A meta analysis of lost-letter field experiments","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102759","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102759","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The lost-letter technique (<span><span>Milgram et al., 1965</span></span>) has been used for almost 60 years to measure social attitudes and helping behavior in psychological, sociological, and economic research. We provide a meta-analysis of lost-letter experiments to summarize the evidence. We analyze 78 studies with an overall sample size of 53,504 letters from 18 countries on five continents. We find an average return rate of 50 percent across all countries. Our meta-analysis shows that the return rate is lower for political or deviant issues. Stamped letters are also more likely to be returned, but letters with money are not more likely to be returned. A high socio-economic environment increases the chances of the return. We conclude that in line with the lost-letter paradigm, the technique allows capturing citizens’ attitudes toward the issue communicated. However, citizens do not act selflessly but react differently depending on the type of incentives.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487024000679/pdfft?md5=51a919574f01610dd690d22bf74abad3&pid=1-s2.0-S0167487024000679-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142121851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Gender identity, salience of information, and tacit coordination: Gender differences in response to strategic uncertainty","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102761","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102761","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We use a lab experiment to explore whether gender composition and gender identity salience influence team coordination. Identity in the experiment is induced using gender-specific and neutral avatars. In contrast with many previous studies, we do not find the presence of in-group favoritism, irrespective of whether gender identity or random avatars define the group. In addition, behavior remains unchanged when the gender of the counterpart is revealed. However, females are found to cooperate significantly more when gender information is disclosed, implying an elevation in the salience of gender identity induces the females to choose based on social expectations. This research adds to the discourse on gender dynamics in decision-making and suggests that gender identity plays a role in economic choices, innovating traditional views on diversity in teamwork. Our research sheds light on the intricate dynamics of gender composition in team settings, particularly under conditions of risk and uncertainty. These findings have the potential to inform both organizational practices and public policy, thereby contributing to a more equitable and efficient labor market.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142136845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Pay all subjects or pay only some? An experiment on decision-making under risk and ambiguity","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102757","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102757","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate the validity of a double random incentive system where only a subset of subjects is paid for one of their choices. By focusing on individual decision-making under risk and ambiguity, we show that using either a standard random incentive system, where all subjects are paid, or a double random system, where only 10% of subjects are paid, yields similar preference elicitation results. These findings suggest that adopting a double random incentive system could significantly reduce experimental costs and logistic efforts, thereby facilitating the exploration of individual decision-making in larger-scale and higher-stakes experiments.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487024000655/pdfft?md5=fb88002d92faeb0ca281a7f742f1e6fe&pid=1-s2.0-S0167487024000655-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142084246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Decision-makers self-servingly navigate the equality-efficiency trade-off of free partner choice in social dilemmas among unequals","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102758","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102758","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Cooperation is more likely upheld when individuals can choose their interaction partner. However, when individuals differ in their endowment or ability to cooperate, free partner choice can lead to segregation and increase inequality. To understand how decision-makers can decrease such inequality, we conducted an incentivized and preregistered experiment in which participants (<em>n</em>=500) differed in their endowment and cooperation productivity. First, we investigated how these individual differences impacted cooperation and inequality under free partner choice in a public goods game. Next, we calculated if and how decision-makers <em>should</em> restrict partner choice if their goal is to decrease inequality. Finally, we studied whether decision-makers actually <em>did</em> decrease inequality when asked to allocate endowment and productivity factors between individuals, and combine individuals into pairs of interaction partners for a two-player public goods game. Our results show that without interventions, free partner choice, indeed, leads to segregation and increases inequality. To mitigate such inequality, decision-makers <em>should</em> curb free partner choice and force individuals who were assigned different endowments and productivities to form pairs with each other. However, this comes at the cost of lower overall cooperation and earnings, showing that the restriction of partner choice results in an equality-efficiency trade-off. Participants who acted as third-parties were <em>actually</em> more likely to prioritize inequality reduction over efficiency maximization, by forcing individuals with unequal endowment and productivity levels to form pairs with each other. However, decision-makers who had a ‘stake in the game’ self-servingly navigated the equality-efficiency trade-off by preferring partner choice interventions that benefited themselves. These preferences were partly explained by norms on public good cooperation and redistribution, and participants’ social preferences. Results reveal potential conflicts on how to govern free partner choice stemming from diverging preferences ‘among unequals’.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487024000667/pdfft?md5=b1f4318f356010a7e0ab4b58b680cca2&pid=1-s2.0-S0167487024000667-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142241040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The usage of apologies and group cooperation","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102755","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102755","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Using a repeated public goods game, we experimentally examine how apologies support mutual cooperation in groups. In two treatments where participants can send either <em>public</em> or <em>private</em> apologies, contributions increase by 0.43 and 0.87 standard deviations respectively, compared to a control treatment. Examining the mechanisms, we find much consistency in the usage of apologies: participants apologise when contributing less than others and subsequently make amends by raising contributions. Recipients of apologies also believe that apologisers are more caring and will contribute more. While there are only minimal differences in the effects of sending and receiving <em>individual</em> apologies across the private and public treatments, we find that sincere apology usage by <em>groups</em> is strongly associated with higher group cooperation, especially in the public treatment.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142021252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Replication: The money illusion effect in a Brazilian sample and meta-analyses","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102744","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102744","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky (1997, Money illusion, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 341–374) described the phenomenon of money illusion as the inclination to consider money without adequately taking into account the inflation factor, emphasizing nominal values rather than real ones. This study aims to replicate the four conditions outlined in the original research by Shafir and colleagues, adapted to the Brazilian context: problems that include different financial decision-making situations (regarding earnings, transactions, contracts) that might be affected by money illusion. This cross-sectional and pre-registered study evaluated the money illusion in a sample of 372 Brazilian participants and was conducted via mobile phone/computer. The results found were very similar to the original findings: depending on the terms used (real, nominal, or neutral framing), participants showed varying inclinations towards opting for economically advantageous opportunities. Based on these findings, it is plausible that the money illusion effect may exhibit cultural independence. This assertion is substantiated by the replication of the effect within a distinct cultural context from the original study. To reinforce the empirical basis of this assertion, future investigations should analyze these findings across diverse cultural settings.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141979415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Choose for others as you would choose for yourself? A layered analysis of probabilistic preferential choice across social distances","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102754","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102754","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The present study examines the effect of social distance on choice behavior through the lens of a probabilistic modeling framework. In an experiment, participants made incentive-compatible choices between lotteries in three different social distance conditions: self, friend, and stranger. We conduct a layered, within-subjects analysis that considers four properties of preferential choice. These properties vary in their granularity. At the coarsest level, we test whether choices are consistent with transitive underlying preferences. At a finer level of granularity, we evaluate whether each participant is best described as having fixed preferences with random errors or probabilistic preferences with error-free choices. In the latter case, we further distinguish three different bounds on response error rates. At the finest level, we identify the specific transitive preference ranking of the choice options that best describes a person’s choices. At each level of the analysis, we find that the stability between the self and friend conditions exceeds that between the self and stranger conditions. Stability increases with the coarseness of the analysis: Nearly all people are consistent with transitive preferences regardless of the social distance condition, but only for very few do we infer the same preference ranking in every social distance condition. Overall, while it matters whether one makes a choice on behalf of a friend versus for a stranger, the differences are most apparent when analyzing the data at a detailed level of granularity.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016748702400062X/pdfft?md5=706b4a7b4f243a4c13f3494c9c557ee9&pid=1-s2.0-S016748702400062X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142021253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The leadership fallacy: How misattribution of leadership leads to a blaming game","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102753","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102753","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Assigning responsibility for a project’s success or failure is key to organizational performance, yet attribution fallacies often interfere. Our experimental study (<em>N</em>=339) shows team members mistakenly attribute too much influence to their leaders on task outcomes. Despite task outcomes being randomly determined by easy or hard difficulty rather than leadership, leaders received undue credit or blame. Leaders assessed their teams more negatively in difficult tasks, except for female leaders, who were more lenient in assessing both conditions than men. Leaders' self-assessments did not differ between experimental conditions, confirming their self-motivated evaluation; moreover completing an easy task boosted their confidence for harder challenges. Our study shows that attributional errors manifest differently in the evaluation of leaders and followers and demonstrates that success in simpler tasks can increase leaders' confidence, potentially leading to riskier behaviors.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141992981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Institutional quarantine and dishonest behavior","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102756","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102756","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Quarantine has been implemented worldwide to mitigate the spread of infectious diseases such as COVID-19. Although recent literature has outlined the mental and psychological costs of quarantine, its ethical costs are not fully understood. In two online experiments conducted during an institutional quarantine event (481 participants), we find that institutional quarantine leads to more dishonest behavior, including lying about the outcome of a random-draw task and overreporting one’s performance in a real-effort task to gain financial benefits. By directly manipulating individuals’ perceived psychological ownership, we provide suggestive evidence that psychological ownership may be one mechanism underlying the relationship between institutional quarantine and dishonest behavior. A complementary experiment (226 participants) suggests that anxiety and frustration may also serve as explanatory factors for this effect. We then discuss the implications of our findings, which may inspire approaches to mitigate the negative effects of institutional quarantine on honesty.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141946552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}