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IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2022.102586
Jeremy Clark
{"title":"","authors":"Jeremy Clark","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2022.102586","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2022.102586","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41476744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Take-it-or-leave-it offers in negotiations: Behavioral types and endogenous deadlines 谈判中要么接受，要么放弃：行为类型和内源性截止日期
IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2022.102588
Selçuk Özyurt
{"title":"Take-it-or-leave-it offers in negotiations: Behavioral types and endogenous deadlines","authors":"Selçuk Özyurt","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2022.102588","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2022.102588","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies a reputational bargaining model, and investigates the effects of “<em>exit threat</em>” on negotiators’ equilibrium behaviors. Although it is a purely cheap talk message, exit threat is effective and has two main effects: (1) it renders the final outcome efficient and unique, and (2) shifts the bargaining power towards the negotiator who can make this threat. Setting a deadline for negotiations pressures the opponent and incentivizes her to compromise. However, a deadline that is too early makes the opponent less willing to compromise. Thus, effective deadline is uniquely determined. Last minute agreements occur with a positive probability if negotiators cannot reach an immediate agreement. Frequency of agreement has peaks at the beginning and at the end of negotiations (deadline effect), and is flat otherwise.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48560855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
“One Bite at the apple”: Legislative bargaining without replacement “咬一口苹果”:没有替代的立法谈判
IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2022.102589
Duk Gyoo Kim
{"title":"“One Bite at the apple”: Legislative bargaining without replacement","authors":"Duk Gyoo Kim","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2022.102589","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2022.102589","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>To better understand the motivations behind the multilateral bargaining behaviors observed in the laboratory, I consider a modified many-player divide-the-dollar game in which players cannot propose again if they were randomly selected in one of the previous rounds but failed to provide an accepted proposal. This finite-horizon bargaining model without replacement captures the legislative process in which each legislator has only one opportunity to propose while the order of proposers is unknown. The unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium has several features that allow the transparent interpretation of experimental data. I find that proposers do not fully extract their rent, but the concern about inequity aversion is not a driving factor even in a myopic sense. Out-of-equilibrium observations suggest that retaliation and the fear thereof may be driving factors.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43721738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The unintended consequences of confinement: Evidence from the rural area in Guatemala 监禁的意外后果:来自危地马拉农村地区的证据
IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2022.102587
Jose Gabriel Castillo , Manuel A. Hernandez
{"title":"The unintended consequences of confinement: Evidence from the rural area in Guatemala","authors":"Jose Gabriel Castillo ,&nbsp;Manuel A. Hernandez","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2022.102587","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2022.102587","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Individual and social preferences have shown to be important factors in individual decision making and general economic performance. Yet, they are usually assumed as given and stable, underestimating their impact in the rhythm of economic recovery after a natural disaster or pandemic. This paper examines the effects of COVID-19 initial confinement on households’ individual and social preferences across small communities in the rural area of Guatemala. We use a comprehensive panel household survey of agricultural smallholders collected during two survey rounds in 2019, prior to the pandemic, and 2020 and find that preferences generally shifted following the onset of the pandemic. We observe a significant increase in risk tolerance, deteriorated perceptions towards trust and generosity, and a higher frequency of emotional issues, while intra-household relationships remain stable. We find that experiencing a household adverse situation, a higher degree of exposure to the virus, and more stringent local confinement measures shaped several of the variations in preferences. The focus of the study on a region with high poverty and malnutrition rates offers important insights of the consequences of confinement on perceptions and attitudes in complex and vulnerable rural contexts during the wake of a public health emergency.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49873231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic uncertainty aversion in bargaining — Experimental evidence 讨价还价中的策略不确定性厌恶——实验证据
IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2023.102604
Ben Greiner
{"title":"Strategic uncertainty aversion in bargaining — Experimental evidence","authors":"Ben Greiner","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102604","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102604","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In a series of four experiments I demonstrate the existence of significant aversion to basically non-existent strategic uncertainty in very simple bargaining games. This aversion goes far beyond ordinary risk or ambiguity aversion. Specifically, although almost nobody expects or chooses the rejection of an offered equal split in a bargaining game, participants behave as if there would be a considerably large rejection rate for equal splits. This behavior is robust across experimental designs and subject pools, can lead to inefficiencies in markets, and is incompatible with consistency of strategies and rational beliefs.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42672879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Experimental analysis of impatience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations 双边和多边谈判不耐烦的实验分析
IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2023.102606
Nathaniel A. Burns , Cary A. Deck , Charles J. Thomas
{"title":"Experimental analysis of impatience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations","authors":"Nathaniel A. Burns ,&nbsp;Cary A. Deck ,&nbsp;Charles J. Thomas","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102606","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102606","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We conduct unstructured bilateral and multilateral negotiations in a laboratory experiment, to assess whether bargainers’ impatience affects outcomes as predicted by structured models meant to represent less-structured naturally-occurring settings. For concreteness we consider a buyer who can make only one trade negotiating with one or two sellers, with impatience induced via time pressure: a bargainer receives their negotiated payoff only if agreement is reached before expiration of a randomly determined bargainer-specific time limit that is unknown to all bargainers. We find increasing the buyer’s impatience generally harms the buyer, supporting the predictions from standard bilateral models and from some multilateral models.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42620382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Impulsiveness moderates the effects of exogenous attention on the sensitivity to gains and losses in risky lotteries 冲动性调节了外生注意对风险彩票收益和损失敏感性的影响
IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2023.102600
Alejandro Hirmas, Jan B. Engelmann
{"title":"Impulsiveness moderates the effects of exogenous attention on the sensitivity to gains and losses in risky lotteries","authors":"Alejandro Hirmas,&nbsp;Jan B. Engelmann","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102600","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102600","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Does attention have a causal impact on risky decisions? We address this question in a preregistered experiment in which participants accept or reject a series of mixed gambles while exogenously varying how information can be sampled. Specifically, in each trial participants observe the outcomes of a mixed-gamble with gains and losses presented sequentially. To isolate the causal role of attention on the decision process, we manipulate for how long a specific attribute is presented before showing the next one (e.g., 600 ms/800 ms vs 400 ms). Our results partially confirm our preregistered hypotheses that longer exposure to an attribute increases its weight on the decision. While we find no effects on choice frequency, we observe specific effects on the decision weights of our Random Utility Model. Presenting losses longer (for 600 ms, but not 800 ms) than gains (400 ms) leads to increased sensitivity for losses. When gains are presented for longer (600 ms and 800 ms) than losses (400 ms), the participants show increased sensitivity to both gain and loss values in their decision. Loss aversion reflects this trend across attention treatments, but differences remain non-significant. Further exploratory analyses show that specifically participants with higher impulsiveness become more sensitive to attribute values when gains are presented for longer. Jointly, these results support the notion that attention has a causal impact on the sensitivity to specific attributes during risky choice. Moreover, our results underline the moderating role of impulsiveness on the relationship between attention and choice.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47824031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The stability of self-control in a population-representative study 一项人口代表性研究中自我控制的稳定性
IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2022.102599
Deborah A. Cobb-Clark , Nancy Kong , Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch
{"title":"The stability of self-control in a population-representative study","authors":"Deborah A. Cobb-Clark ,&nbsp;Nancy Kong ,&nbsp;Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2022.102599","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2022.102599","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate the stability of self-control at the population level. Analyzing repeated Brief Self-Control Scale scores, we demonstrate that self-control exhibits a high degree of mean-level, rank-order, and individual-level stability over the medium term. Changes in self-control are not associated with major life events, nor are they economically important. The stability of self-control is particularly striking given that our study period (2017–2020) spans the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49873233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
书评
IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2023.102603
Stavros A. Drakopoulos
{"title":"","authors":"Stavros A. Drakopoulos","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102603","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102603","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45499177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Locus of control and other-regarding behavior: Experimental evidence from a large heterogeneous sample 控制点和其他相关行为：来自大量异质样本的实验证据
IF 3.5 2区 经济学
Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2023.102605
Valeria Fanghella , Corinne Faure , Marie-Charlotte Guetlein , Joachim Schleich
{"title":"Locus of control and other-regarding behavior: Experimental evidence from a large heterogeneous sample","authors":"Valeria Fanghella ,&nbsp;Corinne Faure ,&nbsp;Marie-Charlotte Guetlein ,&nbsp;Joachim Schleich","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102605","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102605","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper investigates the relationship between locus of control and other-regarding behavior in a large and heterogeneous sample of the French population. We relate locus of control with incentivized measures of other-regarding behavior in the dictator and ultimatum games. Participants with high internal locus of control offer comparatively less in situations with passive responders (dictator game) but tend to increase their offers when their counterparts have veto power (ultimatum game). Moreover, they appear better at anticipating responders’ behavior in the ultimatum game, which leads to offers with a higher probability of acceptance and higher expected payoff. Some results for the ultimatum game, however, are sensitive to model specification and sample composition. Our findings suggest that a high internal locus of control increases individuals’ ability to adapt to strategic and non-strategic settings.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47691762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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