{"title":"Undervaluation versus unaffordability as negotiation tactics: Evidence from a field experiment","authors":"Haimanti Bhattacharya, Subhasish Dugar","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102609","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102609","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We use a field experiment to evaluate the impacts of two price negotiation tactics on buyers’ bargaining payoffs in a marketplace where face-to-face haggling determines price and sellers often cheat on the weight. We implement three scripted interventions, all involving undercover buyers requesting a non-specific price discount. In one of the non-baseline interventions, buyers undervalue the product, while in the other, buyers reveal their inability to pay the quoted price, both at the discount-request phase. The data from a within-seller design show that compared to devaluing the opponent’s product, mentioning one’s lack of affordability leads to a higher rate of bargaining success and a higher mean price discount, culminating in a higher buyer payoff net of the monetary value of cheating. We also find that merely asking for a discount without furnishing a reason, as in our baseline intervention, leads to better bargaining outcomes for buyers than underestimating the opponent’s product.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42860766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Predicting serial position effects and judgment errors in retrospective evaluations from memory recall","authors":"Janina A. Hoffmann , Ann-Katrin Hosch","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102622","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102622","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>When forming global impressions in retrospect, the first, the last, and the most outstanding experience often have a lasting impact on the final evaluation of an event, as most prominently captured in the peak-end rule. Such serial position effects in impression formation provide indirect evidence that individuals reconstruct their evaluations by retrieving previous experiences from memory, instead of updating their impression online. Yet, latest work sheds doubt on the ability to predict global evaluations from memory retrieval on the individual level. In three experiments, we aim to quantify how much variability in retrospective evaluations can be attributed to memory retrieval by relating serial position effects in retrospective averaging judgments to serial recall curves from memory. The experiments revealed serial position effects in memory recall and corresponding, but less consistent effects in averaging judgments, demonstrating that individuals better recalled and more heavily weighted the first and last item. For long sequences, memory recall permitted to predict individuals’ averaging error to a moderate to strong degree, even if individuals were unaware of number recall as a potential averaging strategy (Experiment 2). Yet, shorter sequences fail to evidence the same relationship, possibly because individuals attempt to apply more optimal averaging strategies (Experiment 3). We discuss retrieval patterns as markers for distinct evaluation strategies.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49249046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Streakiness is not a theory: On “momentums” (hot hands) and their underlying mechanisms","authors":"Elia Morgulev","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102627","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102627","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The term momentum (or hot hand) is widely used by researchers from various disciplines when addressing streakiness. Indeed, stock prices, presidential approval ratings, students’ grades, and basketball games outcomes might all exhibit some degree of serial correlation. Over time, serial correlation assessment has evolved into a thriving research field, and it might have become a rather technical and specific matter if not for the concept of momentum that provides this “conquest for streakiness” with some theoretical underpinning and a general appeal. In this paper, we distinguish between within-contest, across-contest, and other types of serial dependencies. We also elaborate on the psychophysiological mechanisms underlying the within-contest success breeds success effect. We then bridge between literature on goal setting, high performance cycle, and momentum, as a means for addressing across-contest dependency in performance. Finally, we emphasize that the underlying mechanisms of the within-contest and across-contest success breeds success effect cannot readily explain serial correlation in other spheres. We therefore encourage researchers to go beyond simply labeling their researched phenomenon as momentum (or hot hand), instead developing more specific models and descriptions of the underlying mechanisms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48838019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The timing of communication and retaliation in bargaining: An experimental study","authors":"Andrzej Baranski , Nicholas Haas","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102621","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102621","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We conduct an experiment to investigate how the timing of communication affects bargaining outcomes and dynamics in a majoritarian, sequential bargaining game. Our data show that allowing for free-form written communication at the proposal-making stage leads to higher proposer power and minimum winning coalitions compared to when communication is possible at the voting stage only. Absent communication, outcomes fall in between both communication timings. Voting patterns reveal that the timing of communication affects how subjects evaluate proposals, as they are more likely to vote in favor under proposal-stage communication than under voting-stage communication all else equal. In general, communication affects bargaining dynamics in that voters retaliate more strongly against failed proposers, compared to the no communication baseline. We provide a detailed description of communication content, the medium utilized to communicate, and how the volume and timing of messages affects outcomes. Our results underscore the importance of an in-depth analysis of processes and dynamics to understand bargaining behavior, because even when communication may lead to outcomes that resemble equilibrium, the strategies employed by subjects need not.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44245214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sex hormones and choice under risk","authors":"Burkhard C. Schipper","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2023.102607","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the correlation of choice under risk in Holt–Laury lotteries for gains and losses with gender, the use of hormonal contraceptives, menstrual cycle information, salivary testosterone, estradiol, progesterone, and cortisol as well as the digit ratio (2D:4D; length of the index finger to the ring finger of the right hand) in more than 200 subjects (45% females). In males, salivary testosterone is negatively correlated with risk aversion for gains only. In females, salivary cortisol is positively correlated with risk aversion for gains only. No other significant correlations between risk preferences and salivary hormones are observed. No significant correlations between risk preferences and the menstrual cycle are observed in naturally cycling females. No significant correlations between risk preferences and the digit ratio are observed in either gender and/or race.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49899252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"No mood effects in the field: The case of car inspections","authors":"Margaret Samahita , Håkan J. Holm","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102612","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102612","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study mood effect in the field to measure its economic impact and address shortcomings in the existing literature, which typically uses one single mood proxy and ignores selection effects. Using over 50 million car inspections in Sweden and England and multiple mood proxies, we study whether car inspectors are more lenient on good mood days and if car owners self-select into those days. We find evidence of a “Friday effect” in England and a small selection bias, but no support for consistent mood effect. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the expectations of rational actors who may exploit mood effect and the need to study mood in the field using different settings and multiple proxies to avoid hasty conclusions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49414392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Effectiveness of random payment in Experiments: A meta-Analysis of dictator games","authors":"Hamza Umer","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102608","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102608","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Monetary incentives remain an integral component of economics experiments. However, the experimental economics literature is inconclusive when it comes to the effectiveness of random payment mechanisms, specifically in non-strategic individual decision experiments. To contribute to the literature on incentives in experiments, this study performed a <em>meta</em>-analysis of 94 dictator game studies and examined the effect of two frequently used random payment mechanisms on behavior. The mechanisms analyzed were the random problem selection procedure (RPSP) and between-subject random incentivized system (BRIS). The <em>meta</em>-analysis showed that RPSP and BRIS did not significantly alter behavior when compared to a single incentivized decision and incentivizing all subjects, respectively. The results support the effectiveness of RPSP and BRIS in nonstrategic individual decision experiments.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44828690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Take-it-or-leave-it offers in negotiations: Behavioral types and endogenous deadlines","authors":"Selçuk Özyurt","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2022.102588","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2022.102588","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies a reputational bargaining model, and investigates the effects of “<em>exit threat</em>” on negotiators’ equilibrium behaviors. Although it is a purely cheap talk message, exit threat is effective and has two main effects: (1) it renders the final outcome efficient and unique, and (2) shifts the bargaining power towards the negotiator who can make this threat. Setting a deadline for negotiations pressures the opponent and incentivizes her to compromise. However, a deadline that is too early makes the opponent less willing to compromise. Thus, effective deadline is uniquely determined. Last minute agreements occur with a positive probability if negotiators cannot reach an immediate agreement. Frequency of agreement has peaks at the beginning and at the end of negotiations (deadline effect), and is flat otherwise.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48560855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“One Bite at the apple”: Legislative bargaining without replacement","authors":"Duk Gyoo Kim","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2022.102589","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2022.102589","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>To better understand the motivations behind the multilateral bargaining behaviors observed in the laboratory, I consider a modified many-player divide-the-dollar game in which players cannot propose again if they were randomly selected in one of the previous rounds but failed to provide an accepted proposal. This finite-horizon bargaining model without replacement captures the legislative process in which each legislator has only one opportunity to propose while the order of proposers is unknown. The unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium has several features that allow the transparent interpretation of experimental data. I find that proposers do not fully extract their rent, but the concern about inequity aversion is not a driving factor even in a myopic sense. Out-of-equilibrium observations suggest that retaliation and the fear thereof may be driving factors.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43721738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}