Self-serving bias in redistribution choices: Accounting for beliefs and norms

IF 2.5 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Dianna R. Amasino , Davide Domenico Pace , Joël van der Weele
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

We explore the psychological mechanisms underlying self-serving redistribution decisions in an experimental setting. This self-serving bias in redistribution has been attributed not only to self-interest, but also to constructs such as differing beliefs about the hard work or luck underlying inequality, differing fairness views, and differing perceptions of social norms. In this study, we directly measure each of these potential mechanisms and compare their mediating roles in the relationship between status and redistribution. In our experiment, participants complete real-effort tasks and then are randomly assigned a high or low pay rate per correct answer to exogenously induce (dis)advantaged status. Participants are then paired and those assigned the role of dictator decide how to divide their joint earnings. We find that advantaged dictators keep more for themselves than disadvantaged dictators and report different fairness views and beliefs about task performance, but not different perceptions of social norms. Further, only fairness views play a significant mediating role between status and allocation differences, suggesting this is the primary mechanism underlying self-serving differences in support for redistribution.

再分配选择中的自私偏见:信仰和规范的解释
我们在实验环境中探讨了自我服务再分配决策背后的心理机制。这种再分配中的自私自利偏见不仅归因于自身利益,还归因于对不平等背后的努力或运气的不同信念、对公平的不同看法以及对社会规范的不同看法。在本研究中,我们直接测量了这些潜在的机制,并比较了它们在地位与再分配关系中的中介作用。在我们的实验中,参与者完成真正的努力任务,然后随机分配每个正确答案的高或低报酬率,以外生诱导(不利)地位。然后,参与者被分成两组,被分配为独裁者的人决定如何分配他们的共同收入。我们发现优势独裁者比劣势独裁者为自己保留了更多的东西,并且报告了不同的关于任务绩效的公平观点和信念,但没有不同的社会规范感知。此外,只有公平观点在地位和分配差异之间发挥了显著的中介作用,这表明这是支持再分配的自私差异的主要机制。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.20
自引率
31.40%
发文量
69
审稿时长
63 days
期刊介绍: The Journal aims to present research that will improve understanding of behavioral, in particular psychological, aspects of economic phenomena and processes. The Journal seeks to be a channel for the increased interest in using behavioral science methods for the study of economic behavior, and so to contribute to better solutions of societal problems, by stimulating new approaches and new theorizing about economic affairs. Economic psychology as a discipline studies the psychological mechanisms that underlie economic behavior. It deals with preferences, judgments, choices, economic interaction, and factors influencing these, as well as the consequences of judgements and decisions for economic processes and phenomena. This includes the impact of economic institutions upon human behavior and well-being. Studies in economic psychology may relate to different levels of aggregation, from the household and the individual consumer to the macro level of whole nations. Economic behavior in connection with inflation, unemployment, taxation, economic development, as well as consumer information and economic behavior in the market place are thus among the fields of interest. The journal also encourages submissions dealing with social interaction in economic contexts, like bargaining, negotiation, or group decision-making. The Journal of Economic Psychology contains: (a) novel reports of empirical (including: experimental) research on economic behavior; (b) replications studies; (c) assessments of the state of the art in economic psychology; (d) articles providing a theoretical perspective or a frame of reference for the study of economic behavior; (e) articles explaining the implications of theoretical developments for practical applications; (f) book reviews; (g) announcements of meetings, conferences and seminars.
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