You don’t need an invoice, do you? An online experiment on collaborative tax evasion

Abstract

Collaborative evasion of taxes and social security fees is prevalent when two parties can coordinate to circumvent third-party reporting mechanisms. Prominent examples are household services when a household hires a service provider and no third party is involved; however, the evidence on the determinants of collaborative tax evasion is scarce. This study examines two coordination mechanisms of collaborative tax evasion: a partner’s signaled intention and information about the majority’s evasion behavior (empirical evasion expectation). We implement an interactive online tax evasion game with 560 participants from an online labor market. Our findings show that manipulating an empirical evasion expectation increases the fraction of evaded transactions by 19 percentage points. Our treatment manipulation of intention signals does not significantly affect evasion; however, when the willingness to evade is signaled first in the chat, the probability of evasion increases by 44 percentage points.