{"title":"Rent Sharing within Firms","authors":"David D. Cho, A. Krueger","doi":"10.1086/718713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/718713","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the extent to which economic rents are shared among different types of workers within firms. We utilize administrative payroll records in order to estimate the elasticity of employee compensation with respect to the price of crude oil at petroleum extraction companies. We find that the elasticity of rent sharing is heterogeneous within firms and significantly higher for workers at the top of the earnings distribution. These results can be rationalized by a bargaining model in which insiders within a firm possess greater power to negotiate over wages.","PeriodicalId":48308,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Labor Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46697638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to a Special Issue in Honor of Alan B. Krueger","authors":"David Card, Alexandre Mas","doi":"10.1086/718434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/718434","url":null,"abstract":"Alan Krueger was one of the most prolific and influential economists of his generation. While his research extended into many different areas, including environmental economics,macroeconomics, and behavioral economics, he identifiedfirst and foremost as a “labor economist.”Hewas a labor economist par excellence, always pushing the field in a new (or long overlooked) direction while maintaining the highest standards for the quality and credibility of his empirical findings. The papers in this issue, written by his students and colleagues in labor economics, pay tribute to some of his major contributions to our field. Virtually every paper builds on one or more of Alan’s ideas. Alan earned his bachelor’s degree in industrial and labor relations from Cornell in 1983. His early education included classes in labor economics and statistics that informed his work throughout his career, including a deep appreciation of the value of original data. Thiswas reflected in the surveys at the heart of many of his best-known papers—including his studies of minimum wages (Katz and Krueger 1992; Card and Krueger 1994), twins (Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994), well-being (Kahneman et al. 2004), and wage posting (Hall and Krueger 2012)—and by his founding of the Survey Research Center at Princeton in 1993. Alan’s 1987 dissertation at Harvard focused on wage determination—a topic he returned to often. The first chapter, which was his job market paper and was later published in theQuarterly Journal of Economics (Krueger 1991), is remarkable for the bold simplicity of its design. Alan proposed to","PeriodicalId":48308,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Labor Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41641446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Consequences of Letter Grades for Labor Market Outcomes and Student Behavior","authors":"B. Tan","doi":"10.1086/719994","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/719994","url":null,"abstract":"I study the consequences of letter grades serving as coarse measures of academic achievement using university administrative data that record both the letter grade and the precise mark (0–100) received for each course that a given student takes. I exploit a regression discontinuity design with marks as the running variable. I find that receiving a better grade in a single class results in USD 32 greater monthly earnings after graduation, a 1.4% increase. I also find that marginal students who receive a worse grade take significantly easier courses and earn lower grades in future semesters.","PeriodicalId":48308,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Labor Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49457074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Network Connections and Board Seats: Are Female Networks Less Valuable?","authors":"Emma von Essen, N. Smith","doi":"10.1086/719965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/719965","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate how sizes of professional networks affect the probability of appointment to a supervisory board and whether the effect is gendered. Using an employer-employee data set of the Danish labor market, 1995–2011, we find larger networks to associate with a higher probability of becoming a first-time director. The effect is larger for men. One explanation is that men, compared with women, have more connections to larger and listed firms and to other males—attributes that increase the appointment probability. Women who have connections to incumbent directors before being appointed director have more labor market experience than other directors.","PeriodicalId":48308,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Labor Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49173547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Optimal Allocation of Seats in the Presence of Peer Effects: Evidence from a Job Training Program","authors":"M. Baird, J. Engberg, Isaac M Opper","doi":"10.1086/719968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/719968","url":null,"abstract":"We model optimal treatment assignment in programs with a limited number of seats and study how the presence of peer effects impacts the optimal allocation rule. We then use data from a randomized control trial to show evidence that there are large peer effects in the context of job training for disadvantaged adults in the United States. Finally, we combine the model and the empirics to show that the program would have had a much greater impact if the assignment choices had accounted for the peer effects.","PeriodicalId":48308,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Labor Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43397340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Labor Market Discrimination against Family Responsibilities: A Correspondence Study with Policy Change in China","authors":"Haoran He, S. Li, Yuling Han","doi":"10.1086/719966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/719966","url":null,"abstract":"China shifted its controversial one-child policy (1979–2015) to a two-child policy in 2016. We take advantage of this unexpected policy change and the heterogeneities in the prechange environment to investigate labor market discrimination against expected family responsibilities. In a two-wave correspondence study before and after the policy change, we sent 8,848 fictitious resumes with ages 22–29 in response to online job advertisements. Their gender and only-child/siblinged status were systematically varied. We find that women—but not men—are subject to labor market discrimination for expected family responsibilities. This discrimination worsens with the increase in women’s reproductive age.","PeriodicalId":48308,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Labor Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42789112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Foreign Students in College and the Supply of STEM Graduates","authors":"M. Anelli, Kevin Shih, K. Williams","doi":"10.1086/719964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/719964","url":null,"abstract":"Do foreign students affect the likelihood that domestic students obtain a STEM degree and occupation? Using administrative student records from a US university, we exploit idiosyncratic variation in the share of foreign classmates in introductory math classes and find that foreign classmates displace domestic students from STEM majors and occupations. However, displaced students gravitate toward high-earning social science majors, so their expected earnings are not penalized. We explore several mechanisms. Results indicate that displacement is concentrated in classes where foreign classmates possess weak English language ability, suggesting that diminished in-class communication and social interactions might play an important role.","PeriodicalId":48308,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Labor Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41859828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When the Stadium Goes Silent: How Crowds Affect the Performance of Discriminated Groups","authors":"M. Caselli, Paolo Falco, Gianpiero Mattera","doi":"10.1086/719967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/719967","url":null,"abstract":"Using a natural experiment induced by COVID-19, we test how the sudden absence of fans at football games impacts player performance in Italy. We find that African players, who are most commonly targeted by racial harassment, play better when fans are no longer at the stadium. A similar, albeit weaker, effect is detected among black players. Using official records of racist behavior by fans, we show that performance improves the most on teams that were subject to abuse before the lockdown. Our evidence suggests that racist pressure can harm discriminated groups and lower the overall quality of the game.","PeriodicalId":48308,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Labor Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48154102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Putting the Husband Through: The Role of Credit Constraints in the Timing of Marriage and Spousal Education","authors":"Murat F. Iyigun, J. Lafortune","doi":"10.1086/719689","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/719689","url":null,"abstract":"In the United States, age at first marriage was lowest and the education gap between husbands and wives was highest during the 1950s. The conventional explanation for such a negative correlation is that early marriage leads to earlier and higher fertility, which in turn prevents women from acquiring education. Here, we propose that early marriages enabled couples to overcome credit constraints in education. A model that includes this motive and mechanism can replicate not only the marriage and education patterns observed in the middle of the century in the United States but also the overall trends over the twentieth century.","PeriodicalId":48308,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Labor Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43374210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vincent Boucher, Carlo L. Del Bello, Fabrizio Panebianco, T. Verdier, Y. Zenou
{"title":"Education Transmission and Network Formation","authors":"Vincent Boucher, Carlo L. Del Bello, Fabrizio Panebianco, T. Verdier, Y. Zenou","doi":"10.1086/718981","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/718981","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a model of intergenerational transmission of education wherein children belong to either highly educated or low-educated families. Children choose the intensity of their social activities, while parents decide how much educational effort to exert. Using Add Health data, we find that, on average, children’s homophily acts as a complement to the educational effort of highly educated parents but as a substitute for the educational effort of low-educated parents. We also find that policies that subsidize kids’ socialization efforts can backfire for low-educated students because they tend to increase their interactions with other low-educated students.","PeriodicalId":48308,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Labor Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2022-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47120065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}