Petri Böckerman, Mika Kortelainen, Liisa T Laine, Mikko Nurminen, Tanja Saxell
{"title":"Information Technology, Improved Access, and Use of Prescription Drugs","authors":"Petri Böckerman, Mika Kortelainen, Liisa T Laine, Mikko Nurminen, Tanja Saxell","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvae034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae034","url":null,"abstract":"We estimate the effects of health information technology designed to improve access to medication while limiting overuse through easier prescription renewal and improved information provision. We focus on benzodiazepines, a commonly prescribed class of mental health and insomnia medications, which are highly effective but potentially addictive. We study the staggered rollout of a nationwide electronic prescribing system over four years in Finland and use population-wide, individual-level administrative data sets. We find that e-prescribing increases average benzodiazepine use due to increased prescription renewals. The increase is most pronounced for younger patients. E-prescribing can improve the health of elderly patients and may help to balance the access-overuse trade-off. Without additional monitoring for addiction in place, it may, however, also have unintended health consequences for younger patients, who are more likely to develop mental and behavioral health disorders.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140836634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation","authors":"Laurent Bouton, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Antonin Macé, Dimitrios Xefteris","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvae035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae035","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the comparative properties of voting rules based on the richness of their ballot spaces, assuming a given distribution of voting rights. We focus on how well voting rules aggregate the information dispersed among voters. We consider how different voting rules affect both voters’ decisions at the voting stage and the incentives of the agenda-setter who decides whether to put the proposal to a vote. Without agenda-setter, the voting efficiency of rules is higher when their ballot space is richer. Moreover, full-information efficiency requires full divisibility of the votes. In the presence of an agenda-setter, we uncover a novel trade-off: in some cases, rules with high voting efficiency provide worse incentives to the agenda-setter to select good proposals. This negative effect can be large enough to wash out the higher voting efficiency of even the most efficient rules.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140813030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political Power, Elite Control, and Long-Run Development: Evidence from Brazil","authors":"Claudio Ferraz, Frederico Finan, Monica Martinez-Bravo","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvae033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae033","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes how changes in the concentration of political power affect long-run development. We study Brazil’s military dictatorship whose rise to power dramatically altered the distribution of power of local political elites. We document that municipalities that were more politically concentrated prior to the dictatorship in the 1960s are relatively richer in 2000, despite being poorer initially. Our evidence suggests that this reversal of fortune was the result of the military’s policies aimed at undermining the power of traditional elites. These policies increased political competition among traditional elites, leading to better governance, more public goods, and higher income levels.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140798738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Welfare analysis of regulations on media platform advertising","authors":"Jiekai Zhang","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvae032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae032","url":null,"abstract":"This paper estimates the welfare effects of TV advertising regulation. I develop a structural model of demand and supply in which both the broadcast content and the amount of advertising are endogenously determined. My results suggest that more varied content, and, in particular, more educational content, can be offered in a laissez-faire equilibrium. Children and teenagers would watch more educational content as more of this type of programming becomes available. Total consumer welfare is higher in a laissez-faire equilibrium than that under the current advertising restrictions.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"120 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140625213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of NGO-Provided AID on Government Capacity: Evidence from Uganda","authors":"Erika Deserranno, Aisha Nansamba, Nancy Qian","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvae029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae029","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates whether NGO-provided basic healthcare crowds out or crowds in similar services provided by the government in rural Uganda. We find that NGO entry reduces the number of government workers, which leads to a reduction in government-provided health services. The results are driven by the NGO often hiring the government worker in places where skilled labor is scarce. In places where skilled labor is relatively abundant, the NGO hires a second person and complements government healthcare. Thus, the effects of NGO entry on government capacity are nuanced.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140616196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Downside and Upside Uncertainty Shocks","authors":"Mario Forni, Luca Gambetti, Luca Sala","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvae024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae024","url":null,"abstract":"An increase in uncertainty is not contractionary per se. What is contractionary is a widening of the left tail of the GDP growth forecast distribution, the downside uncertainty. On the contrary, an increase of the right tail, the upside uncertainty, is mildly expansionary. The reason why uncertainty shocks have been previously found to be contractionary is because movements in downside uncertainty dominate existing empirical measures of uncertainty. The results are obtained using a new econometric approach which combines quantile regressions and structural VARs.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140586936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Absenteeism, Productivity, and Relational Contracts Inside the Firm","authors":"Achyuta Adhvaryu, Jean-François Gauthier, Anant Nyshadham, Jorge Tamayo","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvae026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae026","url":null,"abstract":"We study relational contracts among managers using unique data that tracks transfers of workers across teams in Indian ready-made garment factories. We focus on how relational contracts help managers cope with worker absenteeism shocks, which are frequent, often large, weakly correlated across teams, and which substantially reduce team productivity. Together these facts imply gains from sharing workers. We show that managers respond to shocks by lending and borrowing workers in a manner consistent with relational contracting, but many potentially beneficial transfers are unrealized. This is because managers’ primary relationships are with a very small subset of potential partners. A borrowing event study around main trading partners’ separations from the firm reinforces the importance of relationships. We show robustness to excluding worker moves least likely to reflect relational borrowing responses to idiosyncratic absenteeism shocks. Counterfactual simulations reveal large gains to reducing costs associated with forming and maintaining additional relationships among managers.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140586974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Immigration and Business Dynamics: Evidence from U.S. Firms","authors":"Parag Mahajan","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvae022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae022","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the impact of immigration on U.S. local business dynamics using a comprehensive collection of survey and administrative data. It finds heterogeneous impacts across the employer productivity distribution that favor higher-productivity firms and lead to increases in average local earnings. Responses to immigration along the exit margin are particularly important. Immigrant inflows cull establishments from low-productivity firms while preserving establishments from high-productivity firms. Overall, reduced exit accounts for 43% of immigrant-induced job creation and 41% of immigrant-induced earnings growth. A general equilibrium model proposes a mechanism that ties immigrant workers to high-productivity employers and shows how accounting for changes to the employer productivity distribution can yield substantially larger estimates of immigrant-generated economic surplus than canonical models of labor demand.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"367 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140204174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulating Platform Fees Under Price Parity","authors":"Renato Gomes, Andrea Mantovani","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvae014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae014","url":null,"abstract":"Online intermediaries greatly expand consumer information, but also raise sellers’ marginal costs by charging high commissions. To prevent disintermediation, some platforms adopted price parity and anti-steering provisions, which restrict sellers’ ability to use alternative sales channels. Whether to uphold, reform, or ban these provisions has been at the center of the policy debate, but, so far, little consensus has emerged. As an alternative, this paper studies how to cap platforms’ commissions. The utilitarian cap reflects the Pigouvian precept according to which the platform should charge net fees no greater than the informational externality it exerts on other market participants.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"69 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140153512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Gender Gap in Earnings Losses After Job Displacement","authors":"Hannah Illing, Johannes Schmieder, Simon Trenkle","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvae019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae019","url":null,"abstract":"We compare men and women who are displaced from similar jobs by applying an event study design combined with propensity score matching and reweighting to administrative data from Germany. After a mass layoff, women’ s earnings losses are about 35% higher than men’ s, with the gap persisting five years after displacement. This is partly explained by women taking up more part-time employment, but even women’ s full-time wage losses are almost 50% higher than men’ s. Parenthood magnifies the gender gap sharply. Finally, displaced women spend less time on job search and apply for lower-paid jobs, highlighting the importance of labor supply decisions.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140153709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}