农业信贷计划的分散定向：私人中介与政治中介

IF 3.9 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Journal of the European Economic Association Pub Date : 2024-03-07 DOI:10.1093/jeea/jvae018

Pushkar Maitra, Sandip Mitra, Dilip Mookherjee, Sujata Visaria

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们在印度进行了一项实地实验，比较了将小农小额信贷客户的选择权委托给当地中介机构的两种方式：私人贸易商（TRAIL）和地方政府指定人员（GRAIL）。在这两种计划中，被选中的受益人接受和偿还贷款的可能性相同，借贷和农业产出的增长情况相似。然而，只有 TRAIL 计划的农场利润增加，单位生产成本显著下降。虽然有一些证据表明，TRAIL 计划在能力和土地持有方面具有更优越的选择性，但其结果主要是由于 TRAIL 计划受惠农户的单位生产成本比 GRAIL 计划受惠农户类似能力或土地持有的单位生产成本的降低幅度更大。我们建立并检验了一个模型，在该模型中，TRAIL 代理人作为农业供应链中的中间人，能够并促使他们为接受治疗的农民提供商业建议，从而帮助他们降低单位成本。

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Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries

We conduct a field experiment in India comparing two ways of delegating selection of microcredit clients among smallholder farmers to local intermediaries: a private trader (TRAIL), versus a local-government appointee (GRAIL). Selected beneficiaries in both schemes were equally likely to take up and repay loans, and experienced similar increases in borrowing and farm output. However farm profits increased and unit costs of production decreased significantly only in TRAIL. While there is some evidence of superior selection by ability and landholding in TRAIL, the results are mainly driven by greater reduction of unit production costs for TRAIL treated farmers than GRAIL treated farmers of similar ability or landholding. We develop and test a model where the TRAIL agents’ role as middlemen in the agricultural supply chain enabled and motivated them to offer treated farmers business advice, which helped them lower unit costs.

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来源期刊

Journal of the European Economic Association ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

7.80

自引率

2.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： Journal of the European Economic Association replaces the European Economic Review as the official journal of the association. JEEA publishes articles of the highest scientific quality and is an outlet for theoretical and empirical work with global relevance. The journal is committed to promoting the ambitions of the EEA: the development and application of economics as a science, as well as the communication and exchange between teachers, researchers and students in economics.