价格平价下的平台收费监管

IF 3.9 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Renato Gomes, Andrea Mantovani
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引用次数: 0

摘要

网络中介极大地扩展了消费者信息,但也通过收取高额佣金提高了卖家的边际成本。为了防止脱媒,一些平台采用了价格平价和反转向条款,限制卖家使用其他销售渠道的能力。是坚持、改革还是禁止这些条款一直是政策争论的焦点,但迄今为止尚未达成共识。作为一种替代方案,本文研究了如何设定平台佣金的上限。功利性上限反映了 Pigouvian 戒律,即平台收取的净费用不应高于其对其他市场参与者产生的信息外部性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Regulating Platform Fees Under Price Parity
Online intermediaries greatly expand consumer information, but also raise sellers’ marginal costs by charging high commissions. To prevent disintermediation, some platforms adopted price parity and anti-steering provisions, which restrict sellers’ ability to use alternative sales channels. Whether to uphold, reform, or ban these provisions has been at the center of the policy debate, but, so far, little consensus has emerged. As an alternative, this paper studies how to cap platforms’ commissions. The utilitarian cap reflects the Pigouvian precept according to which the platform should charge net fees no greater than the informational externality it exerts on other market participants.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
2.80%
发文量
63
期刊介绍: Journal of the European Economic Association replaces the European Economic Review as the official journal of the association. JEEA publishes articles of the highest scientific quality and is an outlet for theoretical and empirical work with global relevance. The journal is committed to promoting the ambitions of the EEA: the development and application of economics as a science, as well as the communication and exchange between teachers, researchers and students in economics.
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