Andreas G B Ziegler, Giorgia Romagnoli, Theo Offerman
{"title":"Morals in Multi-Unit Markets","authors":"Andreas G B Ziegler, Giorgia Romagnoli, Theo Offerman","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvae001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae001","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how the erosion of morals, norms, and norm compliance in markets depends on the market power of individual traders. Previously studied markets allow traders to exchange at most one unit and provide market power to individual traders by de-activating two forces: (i) the replacement logic, whereby immoral trading is justified by the belief that others would trade otherwise; (ii) market selection, by which the least moral trader determines aggregate quantities. In an experiment, we compare single-unit to (more common) multi-unit markets, which may activate these forces. Multi-unit markets, in contrast to single-unit markets, lead to a complete erosion of morals. This is associated primarily with a deterioration in norm compliance: the observed level of immoral trade is in contrast with the prevailing social norm. The replacement logic is the main mechanism driving this finding.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"167 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139463419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Paolo Acciari, Facundo Alvaredo, Salvatore Morelli
{"title":"The concentration of personal wealth in Italy 1995–2016","authors":"Paolo Acciari, Facundo Alvaredo, Salvatore Morelli","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvae002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae002","url":null,"abstract":"We estimate the distribution of wealth in Italy between 1995 and 2016 using a novel source of inheritance tax files, combined with surveys and national accounts. We find that the level of wealth concentration is in line with other European countries; however, its time trend appears more in line with the US, showing a significant increase over the period studied. The country exhibits one of the greatest declines in the wealth share of the bottom 50%. The paper also shows that age plays a marginal role in explaining wealth concentration. Changes in savings, instead, are the predominant force behind the increase in wealth inequality, even at the top. Equity prices also account for a large share of wealth growth above the 99th percentile, whereas changes in house prices play only a minor role. Finally, we document the growing concentration of life-time wealth transfers, and their increasingly favorable tax treatment.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139463421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Debt crises, fast and slow","authors":"Giancarlo Corsetti, Fred Seunghyun Maeng","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad076","url":null,"abstract":"We build a dynamic model where the economy is vulnerable to belief-driven slow-moving debt crises at intermediate debt levels, and rollover crises at both low and high debt levels. Vis-à-vis the threat of slow-moving crises, countercyclical deficits generally welfare-dominate debt reduction policies. In a recession, optimizing governments only deleverage if debt is close to the threshold below which belief-driven slow-moving crises can no longer occur. The welfare benefits from deleveraging instead dominate if governments are concerned with losing market access even at low debt levels. Long bond maturities may fully eliminate belief-driven rollover crises but not slow-moving ones.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139061812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alberto Alesina, Davide Furceri, Jonathan D Ostry, Chris Papageorgiou, Dennis O Quinn
{"title":"Structural Reforms and Elections: Evidence from a World-Wide New Dataset","authors":"Alberto Alesina, Davide Furceri, Jonathan D Ostry, Chris Papageorgiou, Dennis O Quinn","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad075","url":null,"abstract":"We present two newdatabases we have constructed to explore the electoral consequences of structural economic policy reforms. One database measures reforms in domestic finance, external finance, trade, product, and labor markets covering 90 advanced and developing economies from 1973 to 2014. The other chronicles the timing and results of national elections. We find that liberalizing reforms are associated with economic benefits that accrue only gradually over time. Because of this delay, liberalizing reforms are costly to democratic incumbents when they are implemented close to elections. Electoral outcomes also depend on the state of the economy: reforms are penalized during contractions but are often rewarded in expansions.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139052192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Co-location, good, bad or both: How do new entries of discount variety stores affect local grocery businesses?","authors":"Charlotte B Evensen, Frode Steen, Simen A Ulsaker","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad074","url":null,"abstract":"We analyse 69 entries and relocations by the largest Norwegian discount variety chain Europris during the period 2016 to 2019, and measure how its location choices affect local grocery stores’ performance. We use detailed data from a major Norwegian grocery chain, which enables us to combine local grocery stores’ sales and traffic with travelling distance to new or relocated Europris stores, and a two-way fixed effects strategy. Our findings suggest that entries and relocations have significant effects and that the sign of the effect depends on the distance between the stores, creating a non-linear relationship between the effect of entry and the distance between the stores. Sufficiently close entries and relocations increase local demand since more customers are attracted to the market, but, as the distance increases, the competitive effect of a new discount variety store dominates, and local grocery store sales and traffic are reduced. As we move further away, the entry effect is gradually reduced to zero.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"83 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138682238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Demetrio Guzzardi, Elisa Palagi, Andrea Roventini, Alessandro Santoro
{"title":"Reconstructing Income Inequality in Italy: New Evidence and Tax System Implications from Distributional National Accounts","authors":"Demetrio Guzzardi, Elisa Palagi, Andrea Roventini, Alessandro Santoro","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad073","url":null,"abstract":"This work reconstructs novel series on income distribution in Italy combining survey data, tax data and National Accounts both at the national and regional levels, and it analyzes the overall progressivity of the tax system. Our new Distributional National Accounts allow to correct for remarkable misreporting of capital income in surveys, to provide more accurate estimates of consumption, and to better account for the role of informal economy. Our fresh estimates show higher income concentration at the top 1% and 0.1% with respect to previous studies in order of 1.5 percentage points. Moreover, the share of national income of the richest top 10%, top 1% and top 0.1% has been steadily increasing after the 2008 crisis. Our results shed further light on the multifaceted nature of inequality in Italy: youngest individuals, women and inhabitants of Southern regions have been increasingly exposed to growing levels of inequality. Finally, the Italian tax system is only slightly progressive up to the 95th percentile of the income distribution, and regressive for the top 5%. Moreover, it is regressive throughout the whole distribution when individuals are ranked with respect to their net wealth.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138682049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michal Bauer, Jana Cahlíková, Dagmara Celik Katreniak, Julie Chytilová, Lubomír Cingl, Tomáš Želinský
{"title":"Nastiness in Groups","authors":"Michal Bauer, Jana Cahlíková, Dagmara Celik Katreniak, Julie Chytilová, Lubomír Cingl, Tomáš Želinský","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad072","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides evidence showing that people are more prone to engage in nasty behavior, malevolently causing _nancial harm to other people at own costs, when they make decisions in a group context rather than when making choices individually on their own. We establish this behavioral regularity in a series of large-scale experiments among university students, adolescents, and nationally representative samples of adults – more than ten thousand subjects in total. We test several potential mechanisms, and the results suggest that individual nasty inclinations are systematically more likely to affect behavior when decisions are made under the “cover” of a group, i.e., in a group decision-context that creates a perception of diffused responsibility.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":" 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138492738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rationality and Zero Risk","authors":"Itzhak Gilboa, Stefania Minardi, Fan Wang","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad071","url":null,"abstract":"We adopt a definition of “rationality” as robustness to analysis: a mode of behavior is rational for a decision maker if she feels comfortable with it once it has been analyzed and explained to her. With this definition in mind, is it irrational to violate continuity axioms in one’s stated preferences? Specifically, does it make sense to avoid any positive probability of a negative outcome, not matter how small? Or, if a decision maker states such a “zero risk” policy, does she mean what she says? We propose to study this question axiomatically, asking which modes of behavior correspond to such statements. The baseline model evaluates a lottery by its expected utility and an extra additive term that measures the cost of deviating from a “zero risk” choice. A generalized version allows for multiple sets of principles, where the cost of risking a set of principles is added to the expected utility of a lottery. Stronger assumptions imply that the cost of violating a set of principles is additive in the individual costs. We develop a comparative behavioral analysis that allows to make interpersonal comparisons about the relative importance of principles.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"24 S55","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138494674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Double marginalization, market foreclosure, and vertical integration","authors":"Philippe Choné, Laurent Linnemer, Thibaud Vergé","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad070","url":null,"abstract":"Double marginalization is a robust phenomenon in procurement under asymmetric information when sophisticated contracts can be implemented. In this context, vertical integration causes merger-specific elimination of double marginalization but biases the make-or-buy decision against independent suppliers. If the buyer has full bargaining power over prices and quantities, a vertical merger benefits final consumers even when it results in the exclusion of efficient suppliers. If on the contrary the buyer’s bargaining power is reduced after she has committed to deal exclusively with a limited set of suppliers, exclusion of efficient suppliers may harm final consumers.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"24 3‐4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138494673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Risky Gravity","authors":"Luciana Juvenal, Paulo Santos Monteiro","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad060","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the canonical trade model with heterogeneous firms, love for variety and trade costs, and integrate it in the consumption CAPM model. This yields a structural gravity equation that includes an additional factor related to risk premia. Empirical evidence based on firm-level data confirms the importance of cross-sectional heterogeneity in risk and time-varying risk premia to shape bilateral trade flows. The structural gravity model augmented to account for fluctuations in risk premia offers a compelling explanation for trade collapses during abrupt economic downturns.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"24 S56","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138494672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}