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PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH最新文献

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Vigilance 警惕
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-06-08 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70127
Santiago Amaya, Samuel F. Murray
{"title":"Vigilance","authors":"Santiago Amaya, Samuel F. Murray","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70127","url":null,"abstract":"Although intentions guide actions over time, they also create coordination problems. In this paper, we explain the source of these problems, and we describe how human agents go about solving them. In short, intentions raise coordination problems because our agency is typically scattered in time. These problems are solved because we can exercise vigilance, a capacity to keep track of our plans and manage attention and memory accordingly. In discussing these claims, we criticize a standard model of intention implementation and provide a sketch of a more suitable way for thinking about intending in the context of simultaneous goal‐pursuit. In the end, we also draw some some practical consequences for the rationality of intending and planning.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pain Intensities 疼痛强度
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-06-03 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70126
Kim Soland
{"title":"Pain Intensities","authors":"Kim Soland","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70126","url":null,"abstract":"Recent philosophical work on pain distinguishes a variety of pain qualities and the mechanisms that give rise to them, but pain intensity remains a monolithic notion difficult to account for in reductive terms. The reason for this difficulty is that pain intensity is not a unitary phenomenal magnitude; pain is a complex experience featuring distinct intensive dimensions. The sensory intensity of a pain may be accounted for in terms of its salience, understood as the amount of currency it commands in a subject's attentional economy. I demonstrate how this account may be extended to extant representationalist accounts of pain, resulting in a view that is both reductively satisfying and resilient against common foils.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148289642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Finding the Right Answer: Choice Points for an Account of Success in Inquiry 寻找正确答案：探究成功的选择点
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-05-27 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70124
Tez Clark
{"title":"Finding the Right Answer: Choice Points for an Account of Success in Inquiry","authors":"Tez Clark","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70124","url":null,"abstract":"This paper concerns <jats:italic>zetetic success</jats:italic> , or success in inquiry. Recent work in epistemology largely assumes that zetetic success is a matter of learning the “complete answer” to one's question. Unfortunately, a natural way of understanding this claim renders it false. This paper instead starts with the suggestion that zetetic success is a matter of learning the <jats:italic>right</jats:italic> answer to one's question, where this claim may be understood as context‐sensitive in ways that parallel the (apparent) context‐sensitivity of knowledge. The paper then develops three possible views: Zetetic Invariantism, Zetetic Contextualism, and Zetetic Interest‐Relative Invariantism (IRI), and tentatively comes down in favor of Zetetic IRI.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Deflating and Debunking: A Case for Hard‐Line Structuralism 紧缩与揭穿：强硬派结构主义的案例
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-05-26 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70123
Chris Cho
{"title":"Deflating and Debunking: A Case for Hard‐Line Structuralism","authors":"Chris Cho","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70123","url":null,"abstract":"Can manipulated agents be morally responsible for what they do? According to hard‐line structuralism, yes. On this view, manipulated agents are responsible in virtue of satisfying the relevant structural conditions taken to be sufficient for responsibility. Historicists disagree, claiming that responsibility also has a historical dimension. Here, I offer a two‐step defense of hard‐line structuralism. The first is deflationary: I argue that the kind of manipulation that best serves the historicists entails certain structural properties that already meet the normative demands historicists invoke to justify historical conditions. The second is debunking: I argue that our reluctance to attribute responsibility to manipulated agents stems from an anchoring bias toward their pre‐manipulation psychology, a bias that lacks normative justification.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Verbal Metadisputes 口头Metadisputes
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-05-25 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70121
Alexander W. Kocurek
{"title":"Verbal Metadisputes","authors":"Alexander W. Kocurek","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70121","url":null,"abstract":"Many philosophical disputes have become so intractable that philosophers question whether there is a fact of the matter as to which side is right or whether these disputes are entirely verbal. Yet these “metadisputes” have also become intractable. This raises the question: Could they, too, be verbal? What would that even mean? Using tools from modal semantics, I develop a formal framework to help clarify and address these questions. I argue there are no universal diagnostic tests for assessing whether a dispute is verbal and that there may not even be a fact of the matter. I explore how and why that might be the case and what the consequences are for philosophical methodology.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"135 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Deterministic Theories 确定的理论
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-05-23 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70122
Hans Halvorson, J. B. Manchak, James Owen Weatherall
{"title":"Deterministic Theories","authors":"Hans Halvorson, J. B. Manchak, James Owen Weatherall","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70122","url":null,"abstract":"Determinism is (roughly) the thesis that the past determines the future. But efforts to define it precisely have exposed deep methodological disagreements. Standard possible‐worlds formulations of determinism presuppose an “agreement” relation between worlds, but this relation can be understood in multiple ways, none of which is particularly clear. We critically examine the proliferation of definitions of determinism in the recent literature, arguing that these definitions fail to deliver clear verdicts about actual scientific theories. We advocate a return to a formal approach, in the logical tradition of Carnap, that treats determinism as a property of scientific theories, rather than an elusive metaphysical doctrine. We highlight two key distinctions: (1) the difference between qualitative and “full” determinism, as emphasized in recent discussions of physics and metaphysics, and (2) the distinction between weak and strong formal conditions on the uniqueness of world extensions. We argue that defining determinism in terms of metaphysical notions such as haecceities is unhelpful, whereas rigorous formal criteria such as Belot's D1 and D3 offer a tractable and scientifically relevant account. By clarifying what it means for a theory to be deterministic, we set the stage for a fruitful interaction between physics and metaphysics.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Beyond Substitution—An Antipositionalist's Guide to Subtraction— 超越替代——一个反位置主义者的减法指南
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-05-09 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70113
Jon Erling Litland
{"title":"Beyond Substitution—An Antipositionalist's Guide to Subtraction—","authors":"Jon Erling Litland","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70113","url":null,"abstract":"Existing accounts of relations do not properly account for variably polyadic relations: they fail to capture the relationship between completions of the same relation by different numbers of relata. This paper develops a fully general account of such relations by adding an operation of <jats:italic>subtraction</jats:italic> to the antipositionalist theory of relations pioneered by Fine in “Neutral Relations”. Along the way we rebut a common argument against antipositionalism; defend some strong principles about the behavior of <jats:italic>occurrences</jats:italic> of objects; and speculatively propose some principles about the structure of variably polyadic relations.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Touching Through: The Puzzle of Mediated Contact 触碰：媒介接触的谜题
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-05-08 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70111
William Hornett, Robert Morgan
{"title":"Touching Through: The Puzzle of Mediated Contact","authors":"William Hornett, Robert Morgan","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70111","url":null,"abstract":"It is natural to think that one person touches another when their bodies make direct contact. However, much interpersonal touch is not like this. We often touch people <jats:italic>through</jats:italic> things like their clothing. But this raises a puzzle: How can you touch someone without <jats:italic>directly</jats:italic> touching the surface of their body? Moreover, where particular moral violations and crimes essentially involve touch, an account of when one person mediately touches another is required to determine when the relevant wrong or crime has occurred. We introduce and articulate this novel puzzle before rejecting five plausible solutions. We then develop and defend our own account, on which one person touches another through some medium when the medium acts as a certain kind of person boundary determined by social norms concerning intimacy.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"70 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Supervenience and Boolean Reduction 直觉与布尔约简
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-05-07 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70118
Brian Epstein, David Ishii Smyth
{"title":"Supervenience and Boolean Reduction","authors":"Brian Epstein, David Ishii Smyth","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70118","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we develop a novel framework for analyzing and comparing different varieties of supervenience. We introduce a new two‐dimensional family of metaphysical determination relations, which we call “Boolean reducibility relations,” and show that many varieties of supervenience—including strong and weak individual supervenience, strong and weak modal operator supervenience, and strong global supervenience—are mathematically equivalent to specific Boolean reducibility relations. With this framework, we can clarify and generalize the concept of supervenience. Furthermore, we use it to show that many widely accepted claims in the literature involve superfluous assumptions and can be strengthened, while others are erroneous and need to be corrected. These include claims by Kim, McLaughlin and Bennett, Stalnaker, Bacon, Shagrir, and others.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"70 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148289650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Metaethics and the Functions of Moral Language 元伦理学与道德语言的功能
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-05-04 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70116
Amie L. Thomasson
{"title":"Metaethics and the Functions of Moral Language","authors":"Amie L. Thomasson","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70116","url":null,"abstract":"Metaethics has long included debates about the function of moral discourse. Some have argued that moral statements express our attitudes, others that they serve as prescriptions for how to act, still others that they describe moral facts or properties. This article argues that we can best address these questions about function by attending to work in empirical linguistics. Tracing the development of moral language through different grammatical forms, and noting the additional functions added at each stage of development, enables us to give a more empirically grounded and fine‐grained answer to questions about the functions of moral discourse. This analysis shows how multiple functions come to be layered up through different grammatical forms. Interestingly, it also preserves the different grains of truth picked up on by historically “rival” views—including prescriptivist, expressivist, and even descriptivist views. In so doing, it helps develop a comprehensive neo‐pragmatist approach to understanding moral discourse.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"70 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148289645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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