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Forgive, Because You Were Forgiven 原谅，因为你被原谅了
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-05-03 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70114
Abraham Mathew
{"title":"Forgive, Because You Were Forgiven","authors":"Abraham Mathew","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70114","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophical orthodoxy has it that forgiveness is always discretionary—a gift we are free to extend to those who wrong us, but one that we are never morally required to offer. I dispute this orthodoxy, arguing that forgiveness is sometimes obligatory, even though wrongdoers can never demand or otherwise extract it from us. In particular, I argue that having accepted forgiveness in the past sometimes makes it obligatory to forgive one's future wrongdoers. The obligation to forgive because one was forgiven is grounded, not in a correlative right to forgiveness held by one's wrongdoer, but in a moral norm of consistency that applies to how we accept and extend forgiveness. The resulting account sheds new light on the nature and scope of our discretion to forgive and on the possibility of obligations to others without correlative rights.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Virtue of Living Together in a City: Civic Moderation in Plato's Republic 城市共同生活的美德：柏拉图《理想国》中的公民节制
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-05-03 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70115
Wenjin Liu
{"title":"The Virtue of Living Together in a City: Civic Moderation in Plato's Republic","authors":"Wenjin Liu","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70115","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines Plato's underexplored conception of civic moderation in the <jats:italic>Republic</jats:italic> . I argue that civic moderation is the virtue of civic unity. It centrally involves friendship among all citizens, best understood as a communion (κοινωνία) characterized by shared goods, collaboration, coordination, and the proper acknowledgment of one another's contributions to the joint enterprise of living together in a city. The resulting unity is not that of a single person, as Aristotle and later critics contend, but that of colleagues jointly engaged in a shared undertaking. Civic justice provides the conditions under which civic moderation arises and persists. Along the way, I challenge prevailing thin interpretations that reduce moderation to a shared belief about rule or to the subordination of desires or to a combination of the two, and I argue that the virtue instead comprises two robust and mutually sustaining dimensions: a cognitive network of interrelated commitments about civic life, and affective dispositions of respect, trust, and concern that correspond to those commitments. This account illuminates Plato's view of psychic unity and his reflections on inter‐polis relations.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Argumentatively Navigating Deep Disagreements 以辩论的方式处理深刻的分歧
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-05-01 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70117
Jordi Fairhurst
{"title":"Argumentatively Navigating Deep Disagreements","authors":"Jordi Fairhurst","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70117","url":null,"abstract":"When disagreements cut deep, epistemic agents face a predicament. Although disagreements have been widely hailed for their epistemic benefits, deep disagreements are often plagued with argumentative hurdles preventing the attainment of such epistemic goods. This raises an important question: What should one do when faced with a deep disagreement? This article develops a case-sensitive framework to help epistemic agents tailor their argumentative course of action to the rich complexity of deep disagreements in hopes of yielding positive epistemic outcomes.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An Account of Luck, Fortune, and Fate 关于运气、财富和命运的叙述
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-04-30 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70119
Jesse Hill
{"title":"An Account of Luck, Fortune, and Fate","authors":"Jesse Hill","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70119","url":null,"abstract":"Luck is one of our most important concepts. In this article, I first argue that extant accounts of luck are deeply flawed. I then argue for a hybrid account of luck that is based around the difference between skill‐based and non‐skill‐based events. This distinction helps us understand the relationships between luck, (mis)fortune, non‐agential chance, and fate. My account can also make sense of several difficult cases—for example, fair versus rigged lottery wins, the accidental versus non‐accidental discovery of buried treasure, luck in athletic achievement, and constitutive luck.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Grounding, Internality, and Actuality 基础、内在性和现实性
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-04-28 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70120
Chaoan He
{"title":"Grounding, Internality, and Actuality","authors":"Chaoan He","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70120","url":null,"abstract":"According to the principle of grounding Internality, if <i>X</i> fully grounds <i>Y</i>, then necessarily, if <i>X</i> and <i>Y</i> obtain, then <i>X</i> fully grounds <i>Y</i>. Though intuitively appealing and widely assumed, the principle is under attack from various concerns. The common arguments against Internality are usually accommodatable by the Completer Strategy. A more recent and improved variety of arguments, involving trumping grounding, squarely escape the Completer Strategy. We will first critically examine cases of trumping grounding and argue that they do not really give rise to serious troubles for Internality. Then, appealing to the distinction between token facts and type facts, we present a novel argument against Internality by invoking a hitherto unexplored grounding relation holding between ordinary facts like [Billy killed Suzy] and what we will call @-facts like [Billy <i>actually</i> killed Suzy]. Substantial defenses for our new case will be provided.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147755105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Softening the Border: A Capacities Approach to the Perception–Cognition Distinction 软化边界：感知-认知区分的能力方法
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-04-13 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70102
Jacob Beck, Casey O'Callaghan
{"title":"Softening the Border: A Capacities Approach to the Perception–Cognition Distinction","authors":"Jacob Beck, Casey O'Callaghan","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70102","url":null,"abstract":"Approaches to the perception–cognition distinction tend toward two extremes. Many embrace a hard border, treating perception and cognition as mutually exclusive, non‐overlapping categories. By contrast, eliminativism denies that any principled, theoretically useful distinction exists between perception and cognition. This article offers a third way, describing a principled but soft border between perception and cognition. This non‐exclusive approach differentiates perception from cognition while allowing that they overlap. Because it rests on the notion of a psychological capacity, we call it <jats:italic>the capacities approach</jats:italic> . Perception and cognition are distinct psychological faculties, each of which comprises a collection of psychological capacities. What unifies and differentiates each such collection is the distinctive way in which its capacities are exercised. Perceptual capacities are those that can be exercised in a stimulus‐dependent manner, whereas cognitive capacities are those that can be exercised in a stimulus‐independent manner. Because some capacities, including those associated with approximate number, language, and imagery, can be exercised in each such manner, some capacities belong to both perception and cognition. We argue that the capacities approach offers an illuminating taxonomy and handles both the empirical facts and the tricky cases better than its rivals.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147664012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Suárez on the Contingency of Causal Origin Suárez论因果起源的偶然性
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-04-07 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70110
Han Thomas Adriaenssen
{"title":"Suárez on the Contingency of Causal Origin","authors":"Han Thomas Adriaenssen","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70110","url":null,"abstract":"Do individuals have their actual causal origins necessarily? Or could one and the same individual also have had a causal origin other than its actual one? Late medieval and early modern Aristotelians confront this question in the course of their discussions of the metaphysics of causation. In this paper, I discuss and evaluate Francisco Suárez's case for the view that causal origin is contingent, in the sense that the same individual that in fact proceeds from one cause could also have proceeded from some other cause of the same kind instead. I argue that his defense of this claim against his opponents is stronger, and philosophically more interesting, than appears at first. In particular, I argue that Suárez challenges the ontology of causal action presupposed by his opponents by invoking shared assumptions about truth and what we would now call truthmaking.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"85 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147630708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the Ontology of Composites in Abhidharma Buddhism 论阿毗达摩佛教的复合本体
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-04-06 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70109
Monima Chadha, Shaun Nichols
{"title":"On the Ontology of Composites in Abhidharma Buddhism","authors":"Monima Chadha, Shaun Nichols","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70109","url":null,"abstract":"Abhidharma Buddhism maintains that the only ultimately real ( <jats:italic>paramārtha</jats:italic> ) entities in the universe are <jats:italic>dharmas</jats:italic> , which are simples. What then is the ontological status of composites on this theory? One possibility is that Abhidharma Buddhists deny the reality of composites. We argue, however, that Abhidharma Buddhists affirm the reality of some composites, based on the causal efficacy of the composites. This depends on distinguishing between two notions of reality—ultimate reality ( <jats:italic>paramārtha</jats:italic> ) and substantial reality ( <jats:italic>dravyasat</jats:italic> ). If an entity is causally efficacious, it counts as substantially real. Abhidharma Buddhists affirm the substantial reality of material composites (like the eye); in this case, the causal powers of the composite are of the same type of the causal powers of the constituent dharmas. Abhidharma Buddhists also affirm the substantial reality of mental composites (like sensory episodes), which are composed of diverse kinds of dharmas. We argue that in the latter case Abhidharma Buddhists are committed to some form of emergentism.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"277 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147619704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Normative Profile of Knowledge by Acquaintance 熟人知识的规范概况
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-03-31 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70108
Emad H. Atiq
{"title":"The Normative Profile of Knowledge by Acquaintance","authors":"Emad H. Atiq","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70108","url":null,"abstract":"Many philosophers have found it plausible that sense experience affords a species of nonpropositional awareness and knowledge, what Russell termed “knowledge by acquaintance.” At the same time, a prominent strand in epistemology maintains that knowledge has a distinctive normative profile: it is embedded in justificatory relations, serves as a standard of success for underlying attitudes, grounds regulative norms, and qualifies as a cognitive achievement. Yet it remains unclear how a nonpropositional state of acquaintance, formed without evidential basis and beyond rational control, could fit within this normative structure. I trace the connections between different formulations of what I call “the normativity objection” to Russell's view and offer a unified response. The objection, I argue, rests on an overly passive conception of acquaintance. Once acquaintance is seen as partly constituted by attention—a subject-level, reasons-responsive activity—it can satisfy knowledge's normative role by serving as the success condition of a norm-governed performance. This not only strengthens the Russellian program but also reveals a striking convergence between the structure of consciousness and the structure of epistemic normativity.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147586307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
From Computational Indeterminacy to the Causal Relevance of Mental Content 从计算不确定性到心理内容的因果关联
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-03-23 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70105
Jens Harbecke, Oron Shagrir
{"title":"From Computational Indeterminacy to the Causal Relevance of Mental Content","authors":"Jens Harbecke, Oron Shagrir","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70105","url":null,"abstract":"A central claim in contemporary cognitive science is that the neural mechanisms that bring about cognitive capacities and behavior are computations. It is also widely assumed that computations are not sensitive to the content, or the semantic properties of representations. From this insensitivity premise, some infer that mental content is causally irrelevant—a position we term the <jats:italic>sensitivity argument</jats:italic> against the causal relevance of content. This conclusion, however, sits uneasily with everyday situations in which the contents of our representations appear indispensable to our actions. In this paper, we reject the view that such experiences are illusory and instead identify a flaw in the inference from insensitivity to content to its causal irrelevance. Drawing on the phenomenon of <jats:italic>computational indeterminacy</jats:italic> —the fact that a single physical state can realize multiple formalisms—we argue that content can be causally relevant even when computation itself is content‐insensitive. While remaining neutral on the precise link between higher level and physical causation, we show that computational indeterminacy offers a principled route to restoring the causal relevance of mental content.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"207 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147495352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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