PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH最新文献

Grounding, Internality, and Actuality 基础、内在性和现实性

IF 1.5 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-04-28 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70120

Chaoan He

引用次数: 0

Softening the Border: A Capacities Approach to the Perception–Cognition Distinction 软化边界：感知-认知区分的能力方法

IF 1.5 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-04-13 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70102

Jacob Beck, Casey O'Callaghan

{"title":"Softening the Border: A Capacities Approach to the Perception–Cognition Distinction","authors":"Jacob Beck, Casey O'Callaghan","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70102","url":null,"abstract":"Approaches to the perception–cognition distinction tend toward two extremes. Many embrace a hard border, treating perception and cognition as mutually exclusive, non‐overlapping categories. By contrast, eliminativism denies that any principled, theoretically useful distinction exists between perception and cognition. This article offers a third way, describing a principled but soft border between perception and cognition. This non‐exclusive approach differentiates perception from cognition while allowing that they overlap. Because it rests on the notion of a psychological capacity, we call it the capacities approach . Perception and cognition are distinct psychological faculties, each of which comprises a collection of psychological capacities. What unifies and differentiates each such collection is the distinctive way in which its capacities are exercised. Perceptual capacities are those that can be exercised in a stimulus‐dependent manner, whereas cognitive capacities are those that can be exercised in a stimulus‐independent manner. Because some capacities, including those associated with approximate number, language, and imagery, can be exercised in each such manner, some capacities belong to both perception and cognition. We argue that the capacities approach offers an illuminating taxonomy and handles both the empirical facts and the tricky cases better than its rivals.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147664012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Suárez on the Contingency of Causal Origin Suárez论因果起源的偶然性

IF 1.5 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-04-07 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70110

Han Thomas Adriaenssen

引用次数: 0

On the Ontology of Composites in Abhidharma Buddhism 论阿毗达摩佛教的复合本体

IF 1.5 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-04-06 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70109

Monima Chadha, Shaun Nichols

引用次数: 0

The Normative Profile of Knowledge by Acquaintance 熟人知识的规范概况

IF 1.5 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-03-31 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70108

Emad H. Atiq

{"title":"The Normative Profile of Knowledge by Acquaintance","authors":"Emad H. Atiq","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70108","url":null,"abstract":"Many philosophers have found it plausible that sense experience affords a species of nonpropositional awareness and knowledge, what Russell termed “knowledge by acquaintance.” At the same time, a prominent strand in epistemology maintains that knowledge has a distinctive normative profile: it is embedded in justificatory relations, serves as a standard of success for underlying attitudes, grounds regulative norms, and qualifies as a cognitive achievement. Yet it remains unclear how a nonpropositional state of acquaintance, formed without evidential basis and beyond rational control, could fit within this normative structure. I trace the connections between different formulations of what I call “the normativity objection” to Russell's view and offer a unified response. The objection, I argue, rests on an overly passive conception of acquaintance. Once acquaintance is seen as partly constituted by attention—a subject-level, reasons-responsive activity—it can satisfy knowledge's normative role by serving as the success condition of a norm-governed performance. This not only strengthens the Russellian program but also reveals a striking convergence between the structure of consciousness and the structure of epistemic normativity.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147586307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

From Computational Indeterminacy to the Causal Relevance of Mental Content 从计算不确定性到心理内容的因果关联

IF 1.5 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-03-23 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70105

Jens Harbecke, Oron Shagrir

{"title":"From Computational Indeterminacy to the Causal Relevance of Mental Content","authors":"Jens Harbecke, Oron Shagrir","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70105","url":null,"abstract":"A central claim in contemporary cognitive science is that the neural mechanisms that bring about cognitive capacities and behavior are computations. It is also widely assumed that computations are not sensitive to the content, or the semantic properties of representations. From this insensitivity premise, some infer that mental content is causally irrelevant—a position we term the sensitivity argument against the causal relevance of content. This conclusion, however, sits uneasily with everyday situations in which the contents of our representations appear indispensable to our actions. In this paper, we reject the view that such experiences are illusory and instead identify a flaw in the inference from insensitivity to content to its causal irrelevance. Drawing on the phenomenon of computational indeterminacy —the fact that a single physical state can realize multiple formalisms—we argue that content can be causally relevant even when computation itself is content‐insensitive. While remaining neutral on the precise link between higher level and physical causation, we show that computational indeterminacy offers a principled route to restoring the causal relevance of mental content.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"207 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147495352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Biological Individuality and Fallacies of Composition 生物个性与写作谬误

IF 1.5 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-03-14 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70100

Alexander Geddes

{"title":"Biological Individuality and Fallacies of Composition","authors":"Alexander Geddes","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70100","url":null,"abstract":"Within the philosophy of biology, there is widespread acceptance of pluralism about biological individuality, according to which there are (at least) two theoretically important but distinct properties with a claim to the label “biological individuality”: <i>evolutionary individuality</i> and <i>physiological individuality</i>. Many who accept this also commit themselves—sometimes explicitly, often implicitly—to the further, surprising claim that the evolutionary individual and the physiological individual corresponding to a seemingly singular multicellular organism, such as a human being, are in fact distinct. I raise some problems for this distinctness claim before developing a way of holding onto pluralism while rejecting this supposed consequence of it. I do so by uncovering some natural but hidden assumptions concerning the connections between certain evolutionarily significant properties of multicellular organisms and certain properties of their parts—assumptions that, once made explicit, can be seen to amount to fallacies of composition. I show that, by rejecting these assumptions, philosophers of biology can hold on to the appealing idea that familiar multicellular organisms are at once both evolutionary and physiological individuals.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147447413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Shared Life 共享的生活

IF 1.5 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-03-13 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70106

James Laing

引用次数: 0

Are Rights Self-Other Symmetric? 权利自我与他人对称吗？

IF 1.5 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-03-01 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70104

Collis Tahzib

引用次数: 0

A Contextual Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism 关于概率的上下文准确性优势论证

IF 1.5 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-02-26 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70098

Mikayla Kelley

{"title":"A Contextual Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism","authors":"Mikayla Kelley","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70098","url":null,"abstract":"A central motivation for Probabilism—the principle of rationality that requires one to have credences that satisfy the axioms of probability—is the accuracy dominance argument: one should not have accuracy dominated credences, and one avoids accuracy dominance just in case one satisfies Probabilism. Until recently, the accuracy dominance argument for Probabilism has been restricted to finite credal states. One reason for this is that there are several impossibility results that apply when defining the accuracy of infinite credal states. In this paper, I offer a fully general accuracy dominance argument for Probabilism that allows for the possibility that not all sets of credences can be measured for accuracy. The normative core of the argument is the principle that one should not have credences that are accuracy dominated in some “scorable” epistemic context by alternative credences that do not have this defect. Beyond this novel rationality principle, the argument contributes two important theoretical tools to accuracy-first epistemology: the idea of an epistemic context being scorable and a general contextualizing strategy for extending the arguments of accuracy-first epistemology to the infinite setting.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"98 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147319524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0