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Dialetheism and the countermodel problem 辩证法与反模型问题
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2024-10-28 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13130
Andreas Fjellstad, Ben Martin
{"title":"Dialetheism and the countermodel problem","authors":"Andreas Fjellstad, Ben Martin","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13130","url":null,"abstract":"According to some dialetheists, we ought to reject the distinction between object and meta‐languages. Given that dialetheists advocate truth‐value gluts within their object‐language, whether in order to solve the liar paradox or for some other reason, this rejection of the object‐/meta‐language distinction comes with the commitment to use a glutty metatheory. While it has been pointed out that a glutty metatheory brings with it <jats:italic>expressive</jats:italic> deficiencies, we highlight here another complication arising from the use of a glutty metatheory, this time <jats:italic>evidential</jats:italic> in nature. According to this <jats:italic>countermodel problem</jats:italic>, while the thoroughgoing dialetheist who embraces a glutty metatheory can justify their <jats:italic>acceptance</jats:italic> of a rule of inference's <jats:italic>invalidity</jats:italic> using countermodels, to justify their renunciation of an unwanted rule they actually require the means to warrant their <jats:italic>rejection</jats:italic> of the rule's <jats:italic>validity</jats:italic>—which cannot be supplied by countermodels based on a standard dialetheic semantics. We end by sketching out a possible solution for the thoroughgoing dialetheist using a bilaterialist semantics.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142519436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The duty to listen 倾听的责任
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2024-10-25 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13119
Hrishikesh Joshi, Robin McKenna
{"title":"The duty to listen","authors":"Hrishikesh Joshi, Robin McKenna","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13119","url":null,"abstract":"In philosophical work on the ethics of conversational exchange, much has been written regarding the speaker side—i.e., on the rights and duties we have as speakers. This paper explores the relatively neglected topic of the duties pertaining to the listeners’ side of the exchange. Following W.K. Clifford, we argue that it's fruitful to think of our epistemic resources as <jats:italic>common property</jats:italic>. Furthermore, listeners have a key role in maintaining and improving these resources, perhaps a more important role than speakers. We develop this idea by drawing from Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber's “interactionist” picture of reason, which suggests that reasoning is essentially dialogical and relies on the epistemic vigilance of listeners. The paper defends an imperfect, <jats:italic>prima facie</jats:italic> duty to listen, one that is sufficiently strong to place substantial demands on individuals, but not so overly demanding as to be implausible.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142490823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Better guesses 更好的猜测
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2024-10-22 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13118
Niels Linnemann, Feraz Azhar
{"title":"Better guesses","authors":"Niels Linnemann, Feraz Azhar","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13118","url":null,"abstract":"It has recently become popular to analyze scenarios in which we <jats:italic>guess</jats:italic>, in terms of a trade‐off between the accuracy of our guess (namely, its credence) and its specificity (namely, how many answers it rules out). Dorst and Mandelkern describe an account of guessing, based on epistemic utility theory (EUT), in which permissible guesses vary depending on how one weighs accuracy against specificity. We provide a minimal formal account of guessing that: (i) does not employ EUT, but rests on how such trade‐offs are treated in the sciences; (ii) is relatively parsimonious; and (iii) is consistent with a variety of more specific models that describe what an agent is doing when they (rationally) guess. Our account also recovers patterns of guessing and predictions about typical outcomes of guessing, as identified by Dorst and Mandelkern. Furthermore, we focus on how permissible guesses can be improved upon, via changes in an agent's credence distribution. Such <jats:italic>better permissible guesses</jats:italic> can be generated in solving <jats:italic>Fermi problems</jats:italic>—guessing problems of a type that has received almost no attention in the philosophical literature—which we also analyze. Our account strengthens the case for understanding guessing (now, very broadly considered) in terms of accuracy‐specificity trade‐offs.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142486707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bilateralism, coherence, and incoherence 双边主义、一致性和不一致性
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2024-10-16 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13115
Rea Golan
{"title":"Bilateralism, coherence, and incoherence","authors":"Rea Golan","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13115","url":null,"abstract":"Bilateralism is the view that the speech act of denial is as primitive as that of assertion. Bilateralism has proved helpful in providing an intuitive interpretation of formalisms that, <jats:italic>prima facie</jats:italic>, look counterintuitive, namely, multiple‐conclusion sequent calculi. Under this interpretation, a sequent of the form is regarded as the statement that it is incoherent, according to our conversational norms, to occupy the position of asserting all the sentences in and denying all the sentences in . Some have argued, based on this interpretation, that the notion of invalidity is as conceptually primitive and important as the notion of validity: whereas the latter is couched in terms of what positions are incoherent and hence untenable, the former is couched in terms of what positions are coherent and hence tenable. My ultimate goal in this paper is to contest this view. Based on a novel technical account of the two notions—one that I find more accurate than the existing accounts in the literature—I shall argue that the notion of incoherence takes conceptual priority over the notion of coherence.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142444491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Heidegger's argument for fascism 海德格尔对法西斯主义的论证
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2024-10-16 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13116
Neil Sinhababu
{"title":"Heidegger's argument for fascism","authors":"Neil Sinhababu","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13116","url":null,"abstract":"Heidegger's ontological theories, his observations about liberalism and fascism, and his evaluation of Being are three premises of an argument for fascism. The ontological premise is that integrated wholes and instruments or objects of will are ontologically superior, as <jats:italic>Being and Time</jats:italic> suggests in discussing Being‐a‐whole and using tools. The social premise is that fascist societies are wholes integrated by dictatorial will, while liberal societies are looser aggregates of free individuals, as Heidegger describes in his 1930s seminars. The evaluative premise, shared with the medieval tradition and expressed in his notebook remarks about war, is that ontological superiority makes things better. The conclusion that fascism is better than liberalism should be rejected along with the evaluative premise.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142444492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intellectual humility without limits: Magnanimous humility, disagreement and the epistemology of resistance 知识分子的谦逊无极限：宽宏大量的谦逊、分歧和抵抗的认识论
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2024-10-09 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13117
Brandon Yip
{"title":"Intellectual humility without limits: Magnanimous humility, disagreement and the epistemology of resistance","authors":"Brandon Yip","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13117","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I provide a characterisation of a neglected form of humility: magnanimous humility. Unlike most contemporary analyses of humility, magnanimous humility is not about limitations but instead presupposes that one possesses some entitlement in a context. I suggest that magnanimous intellectual humility (IH) consists in a disposition to appropriately refrain from exercising one's legitimate epistemic entitlements because one is appropriately motivated to pursue some epistemic good. I then shown that Magnanimous IH has an important role to play in contexts of disagreement and oppression. It calls on knowing parties to refrain from pressing their epistemic entitlements to facilitate mutual understanding. And it is a virtue that oppressed persons have good reason to cultivate in order to develop meta‐lucidity in themselves and others.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142397919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Moral agency under oppression 压迫下的道德力量
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2024-10-08 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13105
Sukaina Hirji
{"title":"Moral agency under oppression","authors":"Sukaina Hirji","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13105","url":null,"abstract":"In Huckleberry Finn, a thirteen‐year old white boy in antebellum Missouri escapes from his abusive father and befriends a runaway slave named Jim. On a familiar reading of the novel, both Huck and Jim are, in their own ways, morally impressive, transcending the unjust circumstances in which they find themselves in to treat each other as equals. Huck saves Jim's life from two men looking for runaway slaves, and later Jim risks his chance at freedom to save Huck's friend Tom. I want to complicate the idea that Huck and Jim are morally commendable for what they do. More generally, I want to explore how oppression undermines the moral agency of the oppressed, and to some degree, the oppressor. In §1 I take a careful look at Jim's choice, arguing that his enslavement compromises his moral agency. In §2 I show how Jim's oppression also shapes the extent to which Huck can be praiseworthy for his action. In §3, I consider the consequences for thinking about the moral agency of the oppressed, and in §4 I explore the limitations of the concept of moral worth for theorizing in cases of oppression.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142384372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Save the five: Meeting Taurek's challenge 拯救五人组迎接陶瑞克的挑战
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13103
Zach Barnett
{"title":"Save the five: Meeting Taurek's challenge","authors":"Zach Barnett","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13103","url":null,"abstract":"Six people are in trouble. We can save five of them or just the sixth. What should we do? John Taurek defends a radical view: We are not required to save the greater number. Taurek has persuaded some. But even the unpersuaded agree that Taurek poses a deep and important challenge: From where does the priority of the many derive? It seems difficult, or even impossible, to convince someone who denies the importance of the numbers… to care about the numbers. That's what this paper aims to do. It will argue that the priority of the many follows, with minimal other assumptions, from something all should accept: the modest premise that if we can improve one person's chance of survival—without affecting anyone else—we should.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142384032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
I expect you to be happy, so I see you smile: A multidimensional account of emotion attribution 我期待你快乐，所以我看到你微笑：情感归因的多维解释
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2024-09-25 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13113
Leda Berio, Albert Newen
{"title":"I expect you to be happy, so I see you smile: A multidimensional account of emotion attribution","authors":"Leda Berio, Albert Newen","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13113","url":null,"abstract":"Constructivist theories of emotions and empirical studies have been increasingly stressing the role of contextual information and cultural conventions in emotion recognition. We propose a new account of emotion recognition and attribution that systematically integrates these aspects, and argue that emotion recognition is part of the general process of person impression formation. To describe the structural organization and the role of background information in emotion recognition and attribution, we introduce situation models and personal models. These models constitute the top‐level structures in a complex hierarchy of dimensions which considers different types of basic emotion cues. Thus, we propose a multidimensional account of emotion recognition which enables us to integrate the top‐down and bottom‐up processes involved: basic emotion cues in certain contexts can trigger situation models and person models, which influence emotion recognition which, in turn, reinforce or modify these models. We argue that this kind of loop deeply affects the way emotions enter our social interactions. Our account is in line with the “normative turn” of social cognition, that stresses the way social expectations actively shape the patterns we recognize, and make, in our social world.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142321468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Welfare and autonomy under risk 风险下的福利和自主
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2024-09-25 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13112
Pietro Cibinel
{"title":"Welfare and autonomy under risk","authors":"Pietro Cibinel","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13112","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the relationship between promoting people's welfare and respecting their autonomy of choice under risk. I highlight a conflict between these two aims. Given compelling assumptions, welfarists end up disregarding people's unanimous preference, even when everyone involved is entirely rational and only concerned with maximizing their own welfare. Non‐welfarist theories of social choice are then considered. They are shown to face difficulties, too: either they fail to respect the value of welfare in at least one important sense, or they end up prioritizing different people's welfare differently in non‐risky choices, on the basis of their attitudes to risk, which are intuitively irrelevant in this context.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142321467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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