{"title":"Creativity as a higher agency","authors":"Kenneth Walden","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70003","url":null,"abstract":"Can human agency produce things that are genuinely creative and original? Some philosophers are skeptical. Here I argue that the case of creative activity should lead us to reexamine and ultimately expand our conception of agency. When we do this, we see that rather than being incompatible with agency, creativity offers an especially robust form of agency: a form in which agents are responsible not just for token events but for the general patterns that characterize those events as forms of human activity.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"117 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143608032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A modal theory of justification","authors":"Jaakko Hirvelä","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13143","url":null,"abstract":"This article develops a modal theory of justification, according to which a belief is justified if it is more possible that it amounts to knowledge than that it does not. The core of the theory is neutral between internalism and externalism and it solves two problems that extant modal accounts of justification suffer from. In developing the theory, an account of comparative possibility is provided to yield degrees of justification.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"2015 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143417173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Whose public reason? Which reasonableness?","authors":"Collis Tahzib","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70000","url":null,"abstract":"Rawlsian public reason liberalism holds that laws must be justified in terms of reasons that all reasonable citizens can accept. But who counts as a “reasonable” citizen? Rawlsians typically answer that reasonableness is conditional on acceptance of liberal values. But they do not typically defend this answer by explaining why the Rawlsian definition is superior to alternative possible definitions of reasonableness—for instance, libertarian reasonableness, perfectionist reasonableness, communitarian reasonableness, and so on. Once this full range of possibilities is set out in plain view, it creates a novel challenge which I call the which‐reasonableness challenge. This is the challenge of showing that the Rawlsian definition of reasonableness is superior to all the alternatives. In this paper, I set out this challenge (Section 1) and consider potential ways to overcome it: namely, by arguing that the Rawlsian definition of reasonableness is superior to the alternatives on grounds of its free‐standingness and stability (Section 2), its implicitness in the public political culture (Section 3), its anti‐sectarianism (Section 4), its fidelity to the underlying motivations of the public reason project (Section 5), and its avoidance of triviality, ad‐hocness, shoehorning and related perils (Section 6). I argue that while these considerations narrow the range of possible definitions of reasonableness, they do not do so by enough to uniquely pick out the Rawlsian definition. Rawlsian public reason liberals thus face a pressing challenge stemming from the simple question: Whose public reason? Which reasonableness?","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"78 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143393054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From singular to plural. . . and beyond?","authors":"Jonathan D. Payton","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13136","url":null,"abstract":"A growing number of philosophers and logicians advocate for plural languages in which we can refer to and quantify over pluralities of individuals. Some go further, advocating for higher‐level languages in which we can refer to and quantify over, not just pluralities of individuals, but pluralities of pluralities, pluralities of pluralities of pluralities, and so on. These languages suggest a metaphysical picture on which even a small pool of individuals gives rise to a potentially infinite hierarchy of distinct pluralities. Most higher‐levellists would be loathe to take that picture seriously, but avoiding it turns out to be more difficult than it appears. Fortunately, we can develop a ‘one‐level’ plural language which has all the benefits of higher‐level ones but which avoids any commitment to the hierarchy.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143192291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An interpersonal form of faith","authors":"Yuan Tian","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13141","url":null,"abstract":"An athlete has faith in her unathletic partner to run a marathon, a teacher has faith in her currently poor‐performing students to improve in the future, and your friend has faith in you to succeed in the difficult project that you have been pursuing, even, and especially, when your chance of failing is non‐trivial. This paper develops and defends a relational view of interpersonal faith by considering four interesting phenomena: first, in virtue of placing faith in someone, we stand in solidarity with that person; second, interpersonal faith is called for during moments of difficulty, but it can seem inappropriate during moments of ease; third, one's faith in others can feel unwelcomed, and can be rejected; and fourth, when interpersonal faith is frustrated, disappointment, rather than resentment, is warranted. I propose that when the faithor (e.g., your friend) places faith in the faithee (e.g., you) to φ, the faithor does something close to inviting the faithee to (re)commit to φ‐ing. This invitation‐like move, once properly taken up by the faithee, puts both sides of the faith in a new kind of normative relationship that is in the same broad family as a promissory relationship, albeit with a different normative profile.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143083249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hinge trust*","authors":"Annalisa Coliva","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13142","url":null,"abstract":"Trust is central to epistemology, particularly in accounts of testimony, where it describes the relationship between a hearer and a speaker (or trustor and trustee), enabling the acquisition of information. The speaker's trustworthiness—marked by sincerity and knowledge—is essential for testimony to transmit knowledge or justified belief. However, trust's nature and role remain conceptually elusive, as the current debate highlights. This paper addresses the foundational question of what trust entails, rather than the conditions under which one is trustworthy. Specifically, we examine Wittgenstein's <jats:italic>On Certainty</jats:italic> to propose a characterization of trust in its most fundamental form, termed “hinge trust.” Hinge trust is a stance preceding the ability to form justified beliefs, directed not only at people but also at perceptual faculties, objects, and the environment. It underpins our epistemic practices, particularly in acquiring epistemic hinges essential for reasoning and inquiry.Building on this, we advocate a “trust‐first” framework, analogous to the “knowledge‐first” approach in epistemology. Trust is conceptualized as a primitive stance, distinct from “reliance +” a reactive attitude, or goodwill or commitment. These elements, while significant, are not constitutive of trust. Additionally, we explore the interplay between trust and distrust, arguing that trust is both conceptually and axiologically prior to distrust. Finally, we address the role of trust in testimony and hinge epistemology, demonstrating its foundational significance.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143071456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Love first","authors":"P. Quinn White","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13135","url":null,"abstract":"How should we respond to the humanity of others? Should we care for others' well‐being? Respect them as autonomous agents? Largely neglected is an answer we can find in the religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Buddhism: we should love all. This paper argues that an ideal of love for all can be understood apart from its more typical religious contexts and moreover provides a unified and illuminating account of the the nature and grounds of morality. I defend a novel account of love for all that avoids serious worries about the incoherence or impossibility of loving everyone. Doing so requires countenancing a neglected form of love. Love admits as its object not just individual entities like people and groups; we can also bear a love for the Fs in general—for all the Joneses, all the philosophers, or even all the human beings. I go on to argue that while it is possible for ordinary agents like us to love all, we shouldn't. Instead, we should approximate love for all. The minimal approximation of love for all is, surprisingly, respect; I derive the basic, structural features of deontological ethics (including anti‐paternalism and anti‐aggregation) from the ideal of loving all.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142991136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Similarity accounts of counterfactuals: A reality check1","authors":"Alan Hájek","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13138","url":null,"abstract":"To an unusual extent, philosophers agree that counterfactuals have truth conditions involving the most similar possible worlds where their antecedents are true, in the style of the celebrated and path‐breaking Stalnaker/Lewis accounts. Roughly, these accounts say that the counterfactual <jats:italic>if A were the case, C would be the case</jats:italic> is true if and only if <jats:italic>at the most similar A‐worlds, C is true</jats:italic>. I will argue that there are general structural problems with the appeals to both “the most” and “similar”. I will challenge any fixation on ‘the most __ worlds’, however we fill in the blank with a non‐trivial ordering of worlds: in ignoring worlds that are later in the ordering, it adjudicates various implausibly specific counterfactuals to be true. I will then raise foundational problems for appealing to ‘similarity’—from consequents that are chancy, disjunctive antecedents, and unspecific antecedents more generally. I will also raise further problems for a number of specific proposals for understanding ‘similarity’. A recurring theme will be the tension that may arise between probability and similarity considerations. I will end by arguing for a paradigm shift, replacing ‘the most similar worlds’ approach with one based on conditional chances.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142991131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The do‐able solution to the interface problem","authors":"Yair Levy","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13139","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers and cognitive scientists increasingly recognize the need to appeal to <jats:italic>motor representations</jats:italic> over and above intentions in attempting to understand how action is planned and executed. But doing so gives rise to a puzzle, which has come to be known as “the Interface Problem”: How is it that intentions and motor representations manage to interface in producing action? The question has semed puzzling, because each state is thought to be formatted differently: Intention has propositional format, whereas the format of motor representation is motoric. My primary goal here is to defend a novel and attractive (dis)solution to the interface problem. I do so by connecting it with a rather different discussion about the format of intention, instigated by a minority of philosophers who reject the idea that intention should be construed as a propositional attitude. As I explain, the most compelling reason to accept the heterodox non‐propositional conception of intention actually holds the key also to explaining away the interface problem. In so doing, the heterodox conception itself gains further credibility.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142988714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：