{"title":"On Permissive Consent","authors":"Alexander Dinges","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70176","url":null,"abstract":"Many impermissible actions can be made permissible by giving consent. For instance, my consent can make it permissible for you to enter my home or use my belongings. There is an ongoing debate about the nature of consent. In this article, I propose a novel account of consent that accommodates and unifies a range of otherwise recalcitrant phenomena. I suggest that to consent is simply to assert a normative proposition, roughly, the proposition that the target action is permissible. This sets my view apart from its competitors, where consent either doesn't require any communicative act or requires communicating an intention or decision, such as an intention to make something permissible.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149419165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Self‐Application and Higher‐Orderese","authors":"William Nava","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70173","url":null,"abstract":"Following Arthur Prior, some philosophers have thought that English allows predicate quantification, as exemplified by a sentence like ‘Carlos is something Diana is not‐kind’. This paper both defends this conclusion and argues that if the second‐order reading of Prior sentences is correct, English also admits of <jats:italic>self‐applicative predication</jats:italic> (SAP): cases in which a predicate applies directly to itself, not to a reified variant of itself. The presence of SAP in English is used to argue for the use of a SAP‐friendly language for the purposes of metaphysics, based largely on grounds analogous to those on which some philosophers have recently defended the use of higher‐order languages.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149360386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Valenced Experience and the Epistemology of Value","authors":"Declan Smithies","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70174","url":null,"abstract":"What is the epistemic role of valenced experience in justifying our beliefs about value? According to the perceptual model, valenced experience justifies beliefs about value in much the same way that perceptual experience justifies beliefs about color, shape, and motion. In some cases, the perceptual model generates plausible verdicts: for example, feeling aversion to the painful condition in your foot justifies believing that this painful condition is bad for you without needing any justification itself. In other cases, however, the perceptual model is implausible: feeling moral admiration towards an act of wanton cruelty cannot justify believing that the act is morally admirable, as this moral emotion is itself unjustified. There is a puzzling asymmetry here that needs to be explained. Why do some valenced feelings justify beliefs about value without needing any justification, whereas others need to be justified in the same way as our evaluative beliefs? We cannot solve this puzzle just by restricting the perceptual model, as this fails to explain why it applies in some cases but not others. Instead, I explain the puzzling asymmetry by combining an inferential model of the epistemology of value with plausible assumptions about the metaphysics of value.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149251256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is There a Real Difference Between Undercutting and Rebutting?","authors":"Dan Baras","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70170","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70170","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:italic>Defeaters</jats:italic> in epistemology are the things that make justified beliefs lose their justification. Philosophers distinguish between different kinds of defeaters, and one such distinction is commonly made between <jats:italic>rebutting</jats:italic> and <jats:italic>undercutting</jats:italic> defeaters. That this distinction is both tenable and important has been orthodoxy ever since Pollock introduced it more than half a century ago. This article challenges the orthodoxy. I argue that, taken together, Pollock's definitions and the assumptions made by subsequent literature imply one of two things: Either every defeater is both rebutting and undercutting, which means that there is no material distinction between the two, or else the distinction turns out to be arbitrary, yielding counterintuitive implications and lacking the significance attributed to it.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149241619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Gnosticism and Inexact Knowledge","authors":"Bernhard Salow","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70171","url":null,"abstract":"Gnostic consequentialism holds that a belief is rational just in case it is sufficiently likely to constitute knowledge. I show that this view makes implausible dynamic predictions when combined with the most influential models of the “inexact knowledge” we have in cases involving imprecise measurement or repeated chance processes. These models, built on the idea that such knowledge requires a margin for error, allow that one can have “improbable knowledge,” that is, that one can know something even though it is unlikely (given one's evidence, or given how one's belief was formed) that one knows it. I show that the problems can be alleviated by rejecting this idea, but that this may force us to deny that inexact knowledge requires a margin for error. I leave open how we should respond to this dilemma.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149241661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In Search of Essentially Predicative Entities","authors":"Michael Rieppel","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70169","url":null,"abstract":"According to a Fregean view recently resurgent in higher‐order metaphysics, predicates do not denote objects, construed as any kind of thing a name could denote. Many common routes to that conclusion, however, don't do much to illuminate what it is about names and predicates that should prevent them from both denoting kinds of objects. This paper critically examines arguments that promise to fill this gap and establish the negative Fregean conclusion by reflection on the nature of predication. I begin with two such arguments but conclude that, when situated in a general syntactic and semantic framework, they don't succeed. I then develop a third, more promising argument, inspired by Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning. The resulting proposal vindicates key Fregean ideas, while also departing from common views about predication in higher‐order settings. I go on to show that, despite these departures, the proposal can accommodate quantification into predicate position. Ultimately, however, the Fregean victory remains constrained, in that we have little reason to think that natural language predicates in fact function in the proposed manner.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"75 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149226496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Attention and the Relevance Problem","authors":"Jelle Bruineberg","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70168","url":null,"abstract":"The relevance problem is the problem of how cognitive systems can be sensitive to what is relevant despite relevance being holistic, open‐ended, and context‐sensitive. The problem has typically been applied to higher‐order cognitive processes. In this paper, I argue that there is a hitherto unrecognized relevance problem for perceptual attention. This problem becomes apparent when considering the functions of attention: attention must not only support ongoing task performance but also remain sensitive to opportunities for task switching, latent learning, and context checking. Existing treatments of the relevance problem have largely focused on its task‐relative form: given a task, what is relevant? I argue that attention faces a more general problem that includes sensitivity to factors relevant to other interests and to cues indicating that another activity may be worth pursuing. For such features of the environment to stand out as salient, salience cannot be determined solely by bottom‐up factors and a limited set of occurrent top‐down factors, such as current goals and intentions. Rather, it must reflect the wider (if not the entire) range of an agent's latent interests in a context‐sensitive way. This motivational unencapsulation of attention poses a challenge for both contemporary accounts of attention and suggests that passive attention is much more intelligent than commonly thought.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149130287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Collective Plural Identity","authors":"Simon Thunder","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70167","url":null,"abstract":"I argue against a near‐universally accepted extensionality principle concerning the necessary and sufficient conditions for plural identity, that is, the relation of identity that holds between pluralities of things. The extensionality principle says that pluralities <jats:italic>xx</jats:italic> and <jats:italic>yy</jats:italic> are identical iff they are same‐membered (i.e., iff any <jats:italic>z</jats:italic> that is one of <jats:italic>xx</jats:italic> is also one of <jats:italic>yy</jats:italic> , and vice versa). I argue that the apparent intuitive case for this principle confuses facts about the nature of plural identity with facts about certain kinds of plural predication, and that other attempts to establish the extensionality principle fail. I then show that the lack of motivation for the extensionality principle translates to a lack of motivation for another widely accepted claim concerning the alleged modal rigidity of pluralities. What will emerge from my discussion is the plausibility of an account of what (for reasons that will become clear) I will call <jats:italic>collective</jats:italic> plural identity, according to which the relationship between pluralities and their members is not as intimate as has been supposed: Pluralities are neither individuated by the members (for there can be distinct, same‐membered pluralities) nor incapable of changing their members from world to world.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149093369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Beyond Misinformation: Social Media and the Sculpting of Epistemic Agency","authors":"Carolina Flores","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70166","url":null,"abstract":"The dominant account of social media's epistemic harms focuses on the spread of misinformation and the production of false beliefs at scale. This paper argues that the misinformation narrative, whatever its merits, has obscured a deeper and more intimate form of epistemic damage. Dominant social media platforms do not merely supply bad inputs to stable epistemic machinery. They reshape the machinery itself. I argue that social media platforms are powerful engines for sculpting epistemic agency via two mechanisms: normative learning, through which users internalize descriptive and injunctive norms about how to interact with evidence, and reinforcement learning, through which habitual patterns of epistemic response are developed. In these ways, platforms can reshape users' epistemic styles, including their testimonial policies, evidential thresholds for belief revision, and theoretical values governing how they select explanations. This should trouble us, as the constraints driving which styles are produced are systematically orthogonal to truth and ignore information about the environments agents inhabit. This discussion identifies a neglected form of epistemic hostility: not the exploitation of existing cognitive vulnerabilities to implant false beliefs, but the production of new vulnerabilities that can then be exploited. From this, more and better evidence cannot save us.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"405 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149093370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Vague Mereology and Borderline Connections","authors":"A. J. Cotnoir, Giulia Schirripa","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70159","url":null,"abstract":"The summit of Mt Everest is determinately part of it; parts of the Khumbu Glacier are determinately not. In between are a range of candidate parts whose mereological status with respect to Mt Everest is unsettled. Among the various accounts of vagueness, supervaluationism has received a great deal of attention. But very little attention has been paid to supervaluational theories of mereological relations themselves, and formal mereologies set within supervaluational logics are largely unexplored. In this paper, we provide two formal semantics for a vague mereology. We start with a simple supervaluational system using overlap as a primitive under a global consequence relation, but argue that it is unsatisfactory. We then develop a richer framework based on the idea of borderline connections, and expand it to a modal semantics of precisifications with a determinacy operator under a local consequence relation. We then prove a range of results, including the equivalence between borderline connection and indeterminate overlap, the vagueness of minimal and maximal fusions, and the distinction between mereological and compositional vagueness. The framework is intended to be compatible with a range of philosophical interpretations, including epistemic, semantic, and ontic views of vagueness.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149123164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}