{"title":"On Sarah McGrath's <i>Moral Knowledge</i>","authors":"Julia Markovits","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13025","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 107, Issue 2 p. 545-552 SYMPOSIUM On Sarah McGrath's Moral Knowledge Julia Markovits, Corresponding Author Julia Markovits [email protected] Cornell University Correspondence Julia Markovits, Cornell University. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Julia Markovits, Corresponding Author Julia Markovits [email protected] Cornell University Correspondence Julia Markovits, Cornell University. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 11 October 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13025Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume107, Issue2September 2023Pages 545-552 RelatedInformation","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135688676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The sources of moral knowledge","authors":"Ralph Wedgwood","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13022","url":null,"abstract":"Does moral knowledge require a special or distinctive epistemology? Or is it enough just to develop a general account of knowledge and justified belief, which can then just be applied to our moral beliefs? Among those theorists who have searched for a special epistemology for moral beliefs, one common idea is that moral knowledge has a distinctive fundamental source. In particular, according to many of these theorists, there are certain special mental states—often labelled “moral intuitions”—that serve as the primary source of our moral knowledge. As most of its proponents accept, this view comes with some deep and difficult questions about the nature of these moral intuitions. Broadly speaking, there are two main kinds of answers to these questions that philosophers have explored. First, some philosophers have proposed that these moral intuitions are fundamentally akin to a priori intuitions, of the sort that are often supposed to be central to reasoning in mathematics.1 Secondly, some other philosophers have proposed that these moral intuitions have a deep connection of some sort with our moral emotions.2 In principle, it may be possible to reconcile these two answers, by arguing that our moral intuitions have a deep connection with our moral emotions, but that nonetheless at least some of these intuitions are in an important sense a priori—in the sense of being available in principle to all thinkers who possess the relevant concepts, regardless of the particular experiences that those thinkers have had.3 By contrast, those who hold that it is enough to apply a general account of knowledge and justified belief to the special case of moral beliefs often appeal to the idea of “reflective equilibrium.” This idea was originally proposed by John Rawls (1972: 46–53) as part of his account of the method of moral theory. Strictly speaking, for Rawls, reflective equilibrium is an ideal, which he never claimed to actually have reached; so, for Rawls, the appropriate method of moral theory is the pursuit of reflective equilibrium. For our purposes, however, the important point is that several philosophers have thought that the pursuit of reflective equilibrium is simply the appropriate method for rational intellectual inquiry in general; for this reason, these philosophers have concluded that no special or distinctive epistemology for moral beliefs is required.4 Moral knowledge can be acquired in any of the ways in which we acquire ordinary empirical knowledge, and our efforts to acquire and preserve such knowledge are subject to frustration in all of the same ways that our efforts to acquire and preserve ordinary empirical knowledge are. Any source of ordinary empirical knowledge is also a potential source of moral knowledge, and any threat to our ordinary empirical knowledge (or our ability to acquire such knowledge in the first place) is also a threat in the moral domain. This makes it sound as if she favours the “generalist” side in this debate—that i","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135688665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Where does moral knowledge come from?","authors":"Hilary Kornblith","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13024","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 107, Issue 2 p. 556-560 SYMPOSIUM Where does moral knowledge come from? Hilary Kornblith, Corresponding Author Hilary Kornblith [email protected] University of Massachusetts, Amherst Correspondence Hilary Kornblith, University of Massachusetts, Amherst Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Hilary Kornblith, Corresponding Author Hilary Kornblith [email protected] University of Massachusetts, Amherst Correspondence Hilary Kornblith, University of Massachusetts, Amherst Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 11 October 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13024Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume107, Issue2September 2023Pages 556-560 RelatedInformation","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135688313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The epistemic insignificance of phenomenal force","authors":"Lu Teng","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13020","url":null,"abstract":"Does phenomenal force, the distinctive phenomenology attributed to perceptual experience, really form an integral part of the latter? If not, what implications does it have for perceptual justification? In this paper, I first argue for a metacognitive account, according to which phenomenal force constitutes a separate, metacognitive state. This account opens up a previously unexplored path for challenging phenomenal conservatism or dogmatism, which has been a prominent theory of perceptual justification over the past two decades. Moreover, I investigate several alternative possibilities in which phenomenal force might still be deemed as significant, but ultimately demonstrate that its epistemic role remains marginal at best.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46715503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Partiality, Asymmetries, and Morality's Harmonious Propensity","authors":"Benjamin Lange, J. Brandt","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13017","url":null,"abstract":"We argue for asymmetries between positive and negative partiality. Specifically, we defend four claims: i) there are forms of negative partiality that do not have positive counterparts; ii) the directionality of personal relationships has distinct effects on positive and negative partiality; iii) the extent of the interactions within a relationship affects positive and negative partiality differently; and iv) positive and negative partiality have different scope restrictions. We argue that these asymmetries point to a more fundamental moral principle, which we call Morality's Harmonious Propensity. According to this principle, morality has a propensity toward preserving positive relationships and dissolving negative ones.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42529537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Dworkin–Williams debate: Liberty, conceptual integrity, and tragic conflict in politics","authors":"M. Queloz","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13002","url":null,"abstract":"Bernard Williams articulated his later political philosophy notably in response to Ronald Dworkin, who, striving for coherence or integrity among our political concepts, sought to immunize the concepts of liberty and equality against conflict. Williams, doubtful that we either could or should eliminate the conflict, resisted the pursuit of conceptual integrity. Here, I reconstruct this Dworkin–Williams debate with an eye to drawing out ideas of ongoing philosophical and political importance. The debate not only exemplifies Williams's political realism and its connection to his critique of the morality system. It also illustrates the virtues and hazards of contemporary efforts to ameliorate or engineer our concepts; it indicates what political philosophy might look to in appraising political concepts; it adverts to the different needs these concepts have to meet if they are to sustain a politics of pluralism, deal with polarization, and secure the consent of those who end up on the losing side of political decisions; and it presents us with two starkly contrasting conceptions of politics itself, of the place of political values within it, and of our prospects of reducing the uncomfortably conflictual character of those values through philosophy.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45164012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Two kinds of curiosity","authors":"Daniela Dover","doi":"10.1111/phpr.12976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12976","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46188447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In defense of guilt‐tripping","authors":"Rachel Achs","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42834151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Arguments philosophical and political","authors":"Anthony Simon Laden","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47683551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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