{"title":"Epistemic Respect","authors":"Ripley Stroud","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70075","url":null,"abstract":"I propose that listeners have a moral duty to believe <jats:italic>anyone's</jats:italic> testimony, on pain of disrespect, unless they have independent reasons to think that the testifier is not credible. What typically entitles a person to standard‐issue respect is having the capacity for practical reasoning: practical agency and moral norm‐responsiveness. I show that the capacity for theoretical reasoning <jats:italic>also</jats:italic> involves agency and norm‐responsiveness, making it structurally isomorphic to the capacity for practical reasoning. This therefore plausibly grounds an entitlement to a specifically <jats:italic>epistemic</jats:italic> type of respect: an entitlement to be treated <jats:italic>as an epistemic agent</jats:italic> . Because we express our epistemic agency through providing testimony, and testimony generally justifies belief, treating someone as an epistemic agent requires accepting their testimony in the absence of countervailing evidence. So, because epistemic agents are morally entitled to be treated as epistemic agents, testifiers are morally entitled to have their testimony believed by default. To not treat someone in this way is to express that you take (without good reason) either their capacity for agency or norm‐responsiveness to be compromised.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"144 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145498242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hybrid Deference, Hybrid Chance","authors":"Alexander Meehan","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70071","url":null,"abstract":"If you learn about one kind of chance and nothing else, then you should defer to those chances. But what if you learn about more than one kind of chance? In such “hybrid” cases, familiar chance‐credence principles, like the Principal Principle, go silent when they should intuitively speak. This paper proposes a new principle, the Parent Principle, which speaks in these cases and also yields the right verdicts in single‐kind cases. I discuss the implications of the Parent Principle proposal for the priority of fundamental dynamical chance and the autonomy of special science chances, as well as for the view that chance can be entirely characterized by its predictive, credence‐guiding role.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"78 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145447147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Eugene M. Caruso, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Wen Yu
{"title":"Do Time‐Biases Promote or Frustrate Wellbeing?","authors":"Eugene M. Caruso, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Wen Yu","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70070","url":null,"abstract":"Evidence shows that people have multiple time‐biases. One is near‐bias, another is future‐bias, and a third is present‐bias. Philosophers have argued that, in part, the normative status of these biases depends on the extent to which they tend to promote, or frustrate, wellbeing, where “wellbeing” is taken to be of fundamental value. Since near‐bias is thought to be associated with impulsivity, lack of self‐control, and poor long‐term health and financial outcomes, it has often been supposed that it is associated with lower wellbeing and is therefore rationally impermissible. By contrast, philosophical views about the normative status of future‐bias have been mixed, with some arguing that future‐bias is impermissible because it frustrates wellbeing, and others arguing that it is at least permissible (and perhaps obligatory) because it is the product of mechanisms whose functioning can be expected to promote wellbeing. However, to date, there are no studies that <jats:italic>directly</jats:italic> probe how time‐biases correlate with wellbeing. We empirically investigate which biases promote or frustrate wellbeing. We find no evidence that near‐bias or present‐bias frustrate wellbeing, but future‐bias is associated with higher measures of wellbeing on several measures.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145424242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Nature, Structure, and Perception of Illumination","authors":"Will Davies","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70073","url":null,"abstract":"Illumination is a defining characteristic of natural environments, yet its nature and spatial structure remain poorly understood. I argue first that illumination is not simply light: it is an emergent, ecologically significant kind. Illumination has features not possessed by light, and contains self‐organizing structures that persist through the continual flow of light itself. These structures are immaterial and ephemeral, yet no less real for that. I then argue that these illumination entities are genuine objects of perception. This contrasts with the majority view, which explains illumination‐dependent variations in appearance solely by appeal to the perceived properties of material objects. The argument exploits the proposed ontology, which shows that the structure of illumination is more like that of continuous masses of fluid than of discrete solids. Illumination entities are thus individuated not by rigid boundaries, but by stable patterns of intensity and flow. I argue that this fluid‐like structure is mirrored by a distinctive type of perceptual organization, whereby scenes are parsed into zones and flows of illumination at multiple scales. This organization involves attributing spatial‐structural features that apply distinctively to illumination, which warrants treating it as an object of perception.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"118 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145404277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lady Parts and Baby Parts: What Is a Fetus?","authors":"Alexandria Boyle","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70072","url":null,"abstract":"A common‐sense view of mammalian pregnancy treats the fetus as (a) an organism and (b) co‐extensive with the approximately baby‐shaped entity developing in the uterus. In this paper, I draw on metabolic accounts of the organism to show that (a) and (b) cannot both be correct: either the fetus is not an organism, or it is considerably more extensive than we tend to think, overlapping considerably—perhaps completely—with its mother. Although other accounts of organisms may have different consequences, I argue that they are all likely to put pressure on the idea that the fetus is a roughly baby‐shaped organism. I show that this has consequences for understanding the metaphysics of birth, our nature and persistence, and the ethical dynamics of pregnancy.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145396860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A synthesis view of counterfactuals","authors":"Sarah Moss","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70035","url":null,"abstract":"There are two prominent views of counterfactuals in the literature—variably strict conditional accounts developed by Stalnaker 1968 and D. K. Lewis 1973, and strict conditional accounts defended by von Fintel 2001, Gillies 2007, and others. Unfortunately, both views face serious challenges. This paper argues that traditional strict conditional views fail to accommodate our judgments about probabilistic variants of Heim sequences, where these judgments cannot be explained away as beliefs about counterfactual probabilities. Similar problems arise for other theories of counterfactuals, including views defended by Križ 2015, Klecha 2015, and K. Lewis 2018. After presenting challenges for traditional views, I introduce an alternative semantics and pragmatics for counterfactuals. The synthesis view that I defend incorporates a key insight of variably strict accounts—namely, that the antecedent of a counterfactual often influences what worlds are relevant to its truth conditions at a context. However, unlike variably strict accounts, my view preserves a strict conditional semantics according to which Antecedent Strengthening is valid, thereby capturing data that have motivated strict conditional theorists. By adopting the right account of the pragmatics of counterfactuals, we can endorse a strict conditional semantics and still account for a wide range of intuitive judgments, including probabilistic judgments about counterfactuals.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145382260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Scientific or naïve? Perceptions of direct and indirect realism, and why they matter","authors":"Eugen Fischer, Keith Allen, Paul E. Engelhardt","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70063","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophical debates about the nature of perception are standardly informed by an empirical assumption about folk beliefs: They assume there is such a thing as “the” common‐sense conception of vision, and that this conception is captured by Direct Realism. This naïve theory is thought to compete with scientifically informed Indirect Realism. This paper discusses how to render these claims empirically tractable and reports a scientific accuracy rating study whose findings suggest instead that both Direct Realism and Indirect Realism capture prescientific conceptions. We discuss two philosophical consequences: “Common sense” is too conflicted about vision to deserve epistemic default status in philosophical debates about perception, and the “problem of perception” needs to be reconceptualized as arising not from a challenge to our ordinary understanding of vision, but from a patent conflict within this understanding. Together, these two upshots facilitate a fresh approach to the problem which can usefully be transferred to further “aporetic” problems that arise from conflicts between beliefs to which we are pretheoretically attracted.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145289377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Purely Instrumental Agents Are Possible","authors":"Bennett Eckert‐Kuang","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70069","url":null,"abstract":"Purely instrumental agents can reason about how to realize their ends, but not about which ends to pursue. They can do one thing in order to do another but cannot choose their final ends for reasons. Some have argued that such agents are impossible, and that the success of <jats:italic>moral constitutivism</jats:italic> depends on their impossibility. Moral constitutivists hope to ground moral norms in the nature of rational agency as such. But if purely instrumental agents are possible, then rational agency is too thin to ground moral norms. I argue that purely instrumental agents are possible, but their possibility by itself does not refute moral constitutivism. Moral constitutivists might embrace a <jats:italic>pluralist</jats:italic> form of constitutivism, according to which practical norms for an agent are grounded in the nature of her kind of agency, not in the nature of rational agency as such. This pluralist variant of constitutivism, however, faces problems of its own. I leave open whether pluralism fares any better overall than extant versions of moral constitutivism.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145260737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Aristotle on the unity of general justice and virtue","authors":"Claudia Yau","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70061","url":null,"abstract":"Aristotle opens his much‐anticipated treatment of general justice with a focused discussion of whether general justice is the same as virtue. Competing answers to this question have been offered on Aristotle's behalf, and different parts of <jats:italic>EN</jats:italic> V.1–2 appear to support alternative views. This paper offers an account of the relationship between general justice and virtue—and an explanation of Aristotle's puzzling claim that justice and virtue are “the same but different in being”—by appealing to his distinction between general justice as a state (ἕξις) and general justice as an exercise (χρῆσις). General justice and virtue are the same <jats:italic>state</jats:italic>. However, justice as an exercise and virtue as an exercise stand in a part–whole relationship. This account resolves Broadie and Rowe's charge that Aristotle has no coherent conception of the relationship between <jats:italic>particular</jats:italic> justice and character virtue. It also has implications for understanding whether justice is always another's good, whether a just ruler is necessarily virtuous, and the cultivation of justice and virtue.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145255238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Generality of Normative Thought","authors":"Jeremy David Fix","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70068","url":null,"abstract":"What is it to think a generic normative thought of the form “Human beings should exercise regularly” or “Human beings must keep promises”? I argue that although such thoughts resemble, in different respects, intentions and evaluative beliefs, they are not, first and foremost, either of those types of states. They instead have a different temporal profile of a settled disposition of the will which grounds specific intentions to acts and specific evaluative beliefs when the subject is in the relevant circumstances for either. Such states provide for a distinct type of practical irrationality, which explains the resemblance to intentions. We also can form evaluative beliefs through reflection on those settled dispositions, which explains how they are the basis for types of a distinct type of evaluative belief.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"84 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145241995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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