PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH最新文献

{"title":"Parity and Pareto","authors":"Brian Hedden","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13056","url":null,"abstract":"Pareto principles are at the core of ethics and decision theory. The Strong Pareto principle says that if one thing is better than another for someone and at least as good for everyone else, then the one is overall better than the other. But a host of famous figures express it differently, with ‘not worse’ in place of ‘at least as good.’ In the presence of parity (or incommensurability), this results in a strictly stronger Pareto principle, which I call Super‐Strong Pareto. Super‐Strong Pareto, however, yields cyclic betterness and is therefore false. I point out a number of influential arguments—concerning population ethics, collective action problems, and decision‐making in the face of parity and uncertainty—that crucially rely on Super‐Strong Pareto and are therefore unsound. I then turn to the most influential argument against the possibility of parity—Broome's collapsing argument—and argue that it likewise relies on Super‐Strong Pareto reasoning and is therefore question‐begging. Finally, I turn to the much‐neglected question of how to justify Strong Pareto. The answer I arrive at, which emphasizes tie‐breaking, yields a striking insight, namely that Super‐Strong Pareto amounts to the denial of insensitivity to mild sweetening. That is what makes it problematic in the presence of parity.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140533234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Resolving to believe: Kierkegaard's direct doxastic voluntarism","authors":"Z Quanbeck","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13055","url":null,"abstract":"According to a traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard, he endorses a strong form of direct doxastic voluntarism on which we can, by brute force of will, make a “leap of faith” to believe propositions that we ourselves take to be improbable and absurd. Yet most leading Kierkegaard scholars now wholly reject this reading, instead interpreting Kierkegaard as holding that the will can affect what we believe only indirectly. This paper argues that Kierkegaard does in fact endorse a restricted, sophisticated, and plausible version of direct doxastic voluntarism. On Kierkegaard's view, when we take ourselves to be in an epistemically permissive situation, we have the ability to form outright beliefs (but not credences) at will in virtue of our ability to voluntarily 1) open or close inquiry and 2) determine our attitude towards epistemic risk.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140340819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Language and representationalism1","authors":"Nico Orlandi","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13047","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"84 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140331214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Seeing or Saying?","authors":"Alex Byrne","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13048","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140331264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Of seeming disagreement","authors":"M. G. F. Martin","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13046","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140331242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Replies to Alex Byrne, Mike Martin, and Nico Orlandi","authors":"Berit “Brit” Brogaard","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13050","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140331237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Précis of Seeing and Saying","authors":"Berit “Brit” Brogaard","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13049","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140331243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Episodic imagining, temporal experience, and beliefs about time","authors":"Anthony Bigg, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Shira Yechimovitz","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13054","url":null,"abstract":"We explore the role of episodic imagining in explaining why people both differentially report that it seems to them in experience as though time robustly passes, and why they differentially report that they believe that time does in fact robustly pass. We empirically investigate two hypotheses, the differential vividness hypothesis, and the mental time travel hypothesis. According to each of these, the degree to which people vividly episodically imagine past/future states of affairs influences their tendency to report that it seems to them as though time robustly passes and to judge that time does robustly pass. According to the former, a greater degree of vividness will tend to <jats:italic>increase</jats:italic> the extent to which people make such reports, while according to the latter, it will tend to <jats:italic>decrease</jats:italic> the extent to which people make such reports. We found weak evidence in favour of the former hypothesis. We reflect on the implications of this finding for theorising about such reports.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Leibniz as a virtue ethicist","authors":"Hao Dong","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13057","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I argue that Leibniz's ethics is a kind of virtue ethics where virtues of the agent are explanatorily primary. I first examine how Leibniz obtained his conception of justice as a kind of love in an early text, <jats:italic>Elements of Natural Law</jats:italic>. I show that in this text Leibniz's goal was to find a satisfactory definition of justice that could reconcile egoism with altruism, and that this was achieved through the Aristotelian virtue of friendship where friends treat each other as “other selves.” Following this decisive moment, Leibniz adopted an Aristotle‐inspired ethical framework where the virtuous agent is central for moral evaluations. I then show that, despite certain developments, Leibniz's ethics retained this essential feature throughout his career. In Leibniz's later writings, God constitutes the foundation of the moral realm, and the fundamental moral endeavor of human beings consists in the imitation of God.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The new evil demon problem at 40","authors":"Peter J. Graham","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13052","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;h2&gt;1 THE NEW EVIL DEMON PROBLEM&lt;/h2&gt;\u0000&lt;p&gt;I shall use ‘epistemic warrant’ and ‘epistemic justification’ interchangeably for a normative property that provides a good route to true belief and knowledge.1&lt;/p&gt;\u0000&lt;div&gt;Here are two facts: &lt;ul&gt;\u0000&lt;li&gt;FACT ONE: Beliefs based on taking perceptual experiences at face value are defeasibly epistemically warranted.&lt;/li&gt;\u0000&lt;li&gt;FACT TWO: Defeasibly taking perceptual experience at face value is a reliable route to true belief.&lt;/li&gt;\u0000&lt;/ul&gt;\u0000&lt;/div&gt;\u0000&lt;p&gt;Epistemologists disagree over their relationship.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000&lt;div&gt;Reliabilists believe the second helps explain the first. And by “explain” the reliabilist sets out to really, genuinely explain, to “state conditions that clarifies the underlying source of justificational status,…conditions [that are] &lt;i&gt;appropriately deep&lt;/i&gt; or &lt;i&gt;revelatory&lt;/i&gt;,” not simply conditions that state “correct” necessary and sufficient conditions (Goldman, &lt;span&gt;1979&lt;/span&gt;: 1–2, emphasis added). Reliabilists then hold that “good” psychological processes—good mind-to-mind transitions, such as forming perceptual beliefs based on perceptual experiences—are epistemically correct &lt;i&gt;because&lt;/i&gt; they are reliable routes to truth.2 Hence the motivation for &lt;i&gt;simple reliabilism&lt;/i&gt;: &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;In all possible worlds W, a belief is prima facie epistemically warranted in W if and only if (to the extent that) the psychological processes that caused or sustained the belief reliably produces true beliefs in W.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000&lt;div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;\u0000&lt;/blockquote&gt;\u0000&lt;/div&gt;\u0000&lt;p&gt;So-called “internalists” disagree. They deny that being a reliable route to truth is necessary for warrant, relying on the “New Evil Demon” scenario to make their case.3 Here's the standard version:4&lt;/p&gt;\u0000&lt;p&gt;Norma is an ordinary human adult, with normally functioning perceptual and cognitive capacities, in her normal environment. Walking around the park, she forms reliably true perceptual beliefs about her environment. Perception, in her world, is a reliable route to truth and knowledge.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000&lt;p&gt;Vicki is Norma's psychological duplicate in another possible world. From the inside, as it were, everything looks exactly to Vicki as it does to Norma. But Vicki is not walking around a park. Instead, she is floating in a vat of nutrients, where her sensory systems are hooked up to a massive super-computer. The computer deceives Vicki by inducing type identical perceptual representations to Norma's. That's why everything (in perception) looks the same to Vicki as it does to Norma, but nothing in Vicki's immediate surrounds is as it seems. Vicki, unaware of and unable to detect the deception, forms massively false perceptual beliefs. Perception, in her world, is not a reliable route to truth and knowledge.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000&lt;p&gt;Internalists conclude that Vicki's perceptual beliefs, though massively in error, are nonetheless just as justified— “equally justified”—as Norma's. Taking perceptual experience at face value, given no reason to suppose it is not a good guide to truth in the circumst","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140097116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}