PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH最新文献

{"title":"On behalf of the moral realist","authors":"Gideon Rosen","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13037","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The overarching thesis of Clark-Doane's gripping book (Clarke-Doane, <span>2020</span>) is that despite the many deep similarities between the views, realism about mathematics is a tenable position whereas moral realism is not. The closing chapters develop two main arguments for this thesis. The Argument from Safety (as I'll call it) wields a general epistemological principle to argue that moral realism leads to moral skepticism and is thus untenable, whereas mathematical realism has no such consequence. The New Open Question Argument (as Clarke-Doane calls it) argues in the alternative that even if we could know all the moral facts as the realist conceives them, the most important moral questions would still be open, and hence that these moral questions are not questions about the facts at all.</p>\u0000<p>In what follows I respond on behalf of the moral realist. For definiteness I focus on the sort of full-strength realism that takes moral questions to concern a domain of fact that is not only mind-independent but irreducibly normative and therefore sharply distinct from the facts with which the positive sciences are concerned (Enoch, <span>2011</span>). My moral realism endorses what Clarke-Doane calls <i>objectivity</i> — the idea that every non-vague moral claim is determinately true or false in the one true moral universe — and so rejects most forms of relativism. It also includes the antiskeptical thesis that the moral facts are often knowable, not just in principle but in ordinary ways. If Clarke-Doane's arguments make trouble anywhere, they should make trouble here. I'm going to argue that no trouble has been made.</p>","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"205 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139038773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Realism, disagreement, and explanation","authors":"Brian Leiter","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13041","url":null,"abstract":"<p><i>Morality and Mathematics</i> by Justin Clarke-Doane (<span>2020</span>; hereafter “JCD”) is a richly argued and deeply original contribution to meta-ethics. My focus will be primarily on the arguments in Chapters 2 and 3, purporting to show that moral beliefs and mathematical beliefs are actually on a par when it comes to both <i>a priori</i> and <i>a posteriori</i> justification (what I will call the “Symmetry Thesis”).1 I start by saying something briefly about JCD's understanding of “realism” in Chapter 1, since it bears on some of the arguments in the chapters that follow.2</p>","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139038794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Inquiry beyond knowledge","authors":"Bob Beddor","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13042","url":null,"abstract":"Why engage in inquiry? According to many philosophers, the goal of inquiring into some question is to come to know its answer. While this view holds considerable appeal, this paper argues that it stands in tension with another highly attractive thesis: knowledge does not require absolute certainty. Forced to choose between these two theses, I argue that we should reject the idea that inquiry aims at knowledge. I go on to develop an alternative view, according to which inquiry aims at maximizing the epistemic value of our credences. This alternative view makes room for knowledge that falls shy of certainty, and it coheres nicely with a rich body of work in epistemic decision theory. I proceed to highlight the implications of this replacement for some important topics in epistemology, including the dogmatism paradox, the nature of interrogative attitudes, and the norm of practical reasoning.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"82 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138586964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The unity of knowledge","authors":"John Hyman","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13035","url":null,"abstract":"<h2>1 INTRODUCTION</h2>\u0000<p>Intellectualists, in one sense of the term, hold that knowing how to do something (knowing how) is reducible to knowing that something is the case (knowing that), while their opponents deny this. Intellectualists therefore believe in the unity of knowledge—at least where these two forms of knowledge are concerned—whereas anti-intellectualists generally believe that there are at least two irreducibly different kinds of knowledge. But it is quite possible to deny the intellectualist claim about reduction while insisting on the unity of knowledge, either on the grounds that knowing that is reducible to knowing how or on the grounds that the unity of knowledge can be defended without relying on either kind of reduction. I shall defend a position of the latter kind, but since my argument depends on the theory that knowledge is an ability, and since knowing how is commonly regarded by anti-intellectualists as an ability, it has an affinity with the former position as well.</p>\u0000<p>I shall approach my topic by discussing an unorthodox defence of intellectualism by Natalia Waights Hickman (<span>2019</span>), unorthodox because Ryle is usually the intellectualists’ whipping-boy, but Waights Hickman's intellectualism is inspired by Ryle, especially by his claim that ‘when a person knows how to do things of a certain sort […] his performance is in some way governed by principles, rules, canons, standards or criteria.’ (<span>1946a</span>, p. 8). This may not be true without exception, but it is true in a large variety of cases, and these are the cases I shall focus on, particularly performances that are governed—or better, guided—by rules. So, like Waights Hickman, I shall argue for the unity of knowing that and knowing how, at least to the extent that knowing how is exercised in performances that are guided by rules; but unlike Waights Hickman, I shall not defend an intellectualist position. The principal claim I shall defend is that knowledge of facts and knowledge of rules are one thing and not two things, not because rules are facts—which they are not—but because knowledge in general is an ability, which we exercise when we are guided by or respond rationally to the things we know.</p>","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"48 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91398757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The relevance of salience for the epistemology of mathematics","authors":"Catarina Dutilh Novaes","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13038","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"205 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139299477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Précis of morality and mathematics","authors":"Justin Clarke‐Doane","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13039","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139293058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Replies to Rosen, Leiter, and Dutilh Novaes","authors":"Justin Clarke‐Doane","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13040","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139293999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Geach-Kaplan sentence reconsidered","authors":"Kentaro Fujimoto","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13031","url":null,"abstract":"The Geach-Kaplan sentence is alleged to be an example of a <i>non-first-orderizable</i> sentence, and the proof of the alleged non-first-orderizability is credited to David Kaplan. However, there is also a widely shared intuition that the Geach-Kaplan sentence is still first-orderizable <i>by invoking sets or other extra non-logical resources</i>. The plausibility of this intuition is particularly crucial for <i>first-orderism</i>, namely, the thesis that all our scientific discourse and reasoning can be adequately formalized by first-order logic. I first argue that the Geach-Kaplan sentence is, in fact, <i>not</i> first-orderizable even by invoking extra non-logical resources, in any sense that is acceptable for first-orderism and adequately corresponds to the sense in which the Geach-Kaplan sentence is deemed to be non-first-orderizable <i>simpliciter</i> via Kaplan's proof. To address this problem on behalf of first-orderism, I then propose an alternative conception of first-orderizability in the sense of which the Geach-Kaplan sentence and any other second-order sentences become first-orderizable by invoking extra non-logical resources; furthermore, in certain circumstances, they are first-orderizable <i>without incurring any extra ontological commitment</i>. My analysis also turns out to yield (as a biproduct) a significant enhancement of the so-called <i>paradox of plurality</i>.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"2 12","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71417652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why Mary left her room","authors":"Michaela M. McSweeney","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13034","url":null,"abstract":"I argue for an account of grasping, or understanding that, on which we grasp via a higher-order mental act of Husserlian fulfillment. Fulfillment is the act of matching up the objects of our phenomenally presentational experiences with those of our phenomenally representational thought. Grasping-by-fulfilling is importantly different from standard epistemic aims, in part because it is phenomenal rather than inferential. (I endorse Bourget's (2017) arguments to that effect.) I show that grasping-by-fulfilling cannot be a species of propositional knowledge or belief, and that it is not essentially connected to justification. I motivate a revisionary epistemology on which achieving propositional knowledge and coming to grasp are dual epistemic aims. My account makes sense of a common occurrence—that we are often unmoved to act on our beliefs until we come to phenomenally experience them in some way. It also explains puzzling features of human inquiry.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"15 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71417454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Causal decision theory, context, and determinism","authors":"Calum McNamara","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13021","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The classic formulation of causal decision theory (CDT) appeals to counterfactuals. It says that you should aim to choose an option that would have a good outcome, were you to choose it. However, this version of CDT faces trouble if the laws of nature are deterministic. After all, the standard theory of counterfactuals says that, if the laws are deterministic, then if anything—including the choice you make—were different in the present, either the laws would be violated or the distant past would be changed. And as several authors have shown, it's easy to transform this upshot of the standard theory of counterfactuals into full‐blown counterexamples to CDT. In response to these counterexamples, I argue here that the problem lies, not so much with CDT's guiding idea—that it's the expected causal consequences of your actions that matter for rational decision‐making—but with the fact that the classic formulation of CDT doesn't pay sufficient attention to the context‐sensitivity of counterfactuals. I develop a contextualist version of CDT which better accounts for this context‐sensitivity. And I show that my theory avoids the problems faced by the classic formulation of CDT in determinstic worlds.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"174 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135779697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}