{"title":"The Argument From Revelation and the Metaphysics of Properties","authors":"Donnchadh O'Conaill","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70084","url":null,"abstract":"Arguments from revelation against physicalism appeal to the special knowledge of phenomenal properties which one can have on the basis of having experiences. In a nutshell, the idea is that by having experiences one can come to know the nature or essence of certain phenomenal properties and thereby learn that they are not physical. This argument is intuitively appealing, but a proper defense of it against physicalist objections requires exploring the metaphysics of properties in more detail. I shall focus on one physicalist response, Dual Carving, which rests on the idea that there can be distinct concepts each of which reveals the essence of a property. I shall appeal to the essential connection between properties and similarities in specific respects, and to the difference between phenomenal and non‐phenomenal similarities, to undermine this response to arguments from revelation.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145836003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Practical Necessity of the Categories","authors":"Anil Gomes, Andrew Stephenson","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70080","url":null,"abstract":"Kant tells us that we cannot know whether all finite rational beings must share the same forms of sensibility. Can we know whether all finite rational beings must share the same forms of understanding? Recent discussion of this issue has focused on whether Kant thinks this can be decided from the theoretical point of view. But sometimes when knowledge gives out, we must have faith. Our concern in this essay is whether Kant thinks we can settle the question on distinctively practical grounds. We set out and evaluate an argument which would show that we have practical grounds to accept that all finite rational beings must share our forms of understanding. We consider ways in which this argument might be resisted and investigate the implications of the argument for the possibility of deciding the question on theoretical grounds. The connections Kant draws between morality, freedom, and causation show that any account of the kind of knowledge he thinks we can have of the forms of understanding of other finite rational beings must be part of a more general story about Kant's account of the nature and limits of our knowledge of the moral law.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"126 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145836004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Welfare, Connection, and Recognition","authors":"Eden Lin","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70082","url":null,"abstract":"Many philosophers hold that some social condition, such as friendship or reciprocal love, is among the basic goods that contribute to our well‐being. In this paper, I make two contributions to the debate about social basic goods. First, I give a new and better argument for the existence of such a good: that this is part of what best explains why good lives spent in the real world are better, for the people living them, than phenomenologically indistinguishable lives spent inside experience machines. Second, I argue that at least one very minimal and widely instantiated social condition—one much weaker than reciprocal love, friendship, or even the relation that holds between strangers when they enjoy one another's company—is a basic good. I discuss the relative merits of a few promising candidates for these social conditions. One is connection, the condition that obtains whenever two beings are conscious of each other. Another is recognition, the condition that a being is in whenever another being is veridically conscious of it as a conscious being.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145752968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Consequentialism Without Contradiction","authors":"Steph Ingram","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70081","url":null,"abstract":"Consequentialism, in its standard form, violates “ought” implies “can.” This is unacceptable; we must find a new formulation of the theory. I argue against contextualizing “oughts” as a means of solving this problem before discussing a more promising solution, maximalism. I argue that maximalism, while attractive, gives an unsatisfactory picture of what obligations are and why we have them. I defend holism, an alternative that upholds both Ought‐Implies‐Can and the nature of obligation. Lastly, I discuss how this relates to the actualism/possibilism debate, and how the debate can move forward.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145730891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to Think About Tacit (or Implicit) Beliefs","authors":"Andrew Moon","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70083","url":null,"abstract":"This paper defends a novel theory of tacit belief (sometimes called “implicit belief”). After providing some background and taxonomy, I argue that dispositionalist theories of belief fail to provide a good account of tacit beliefs; this failure gives us a reason to reject those dispositionalist theories. I then construct and defend my theory of tacit belief. Very generally, S tacitly believes p if and only if S is disposed to judge that p on the basis (in the right sort of way) of S's explicit beliefs. Specifying what “the right sort of way” of basing is will be the interesting and crucial part of my theory. I then show how my theory handles various cases and respond to objections.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145732850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What do Easy Inferences get us?","authors":"Amie L. Thomasson","doi":"10.1111/phpr.12777","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12777","url":null,"abstract":"In <i>Ontology Made Easy</i> (2015), I defend the idea that there are “easy” inferences that begin from uncontroversial premises and end with answers to disputed ontological questions. But what do easy inferences really get us? Bueno and Cumpa (this journal, 2020) argue that easy inferences don’t tell us about the <i>natures of properties</i>—they don’t tell us what properties <i>are</i>. Moreover, they argue, by accepting an ontologically neutral quantifier we can also resist the conclusion that properties or numbers <i>exist</i>. Here I address these two issues in turn—in ways that help clarify both the scope and results of easy ontology. First, it is important to see that easy inferences were <i>never intended</i> to address modal questions. Modal questions are addressed by a different part of the total deflationary view—modal normativism. So understood, metaphysical modal questions nonetheless <i>do not</i> provide a remaining area for serious metaphysical inquiry. Second, I argue that we have reason to resist adopting an ontologically neutral quantifier, if we aim to answer ontological questions (without begging the question). Addressing these issues helps to clarify both what does (and does not) follow from easy inferences, and how they form part of a larger deflationary metametaphysical view.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"78 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145718484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Simon M. Huttegger, Sean Walsh, Francesca Zaffora Blando
{"title":"Bayesian Convergence for Computably Bounded Agents","authors":"Simon M. Huttegger, Sean Walsh, Francesca Zaffora Blando","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70079","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we pursue two goals. First, we argue that computable probability theory offers a fitting framework for modeling the credences of computably bounded—and, thus, more realistic—Bayesian reasoners. Second, we develop a Bayesian perspective on algorithmic randomness: a branch of computability theory that provides a formal account of what it takes for a sequence of observations (a data stream) to be probabilistically typical in an algorithmically specifiable way. In particular, we argue that adopting such a perspective leads to novel insights for one of the pillars of Bayesian epistemology: Bayesian convergence to the truth. In a companion article, we showed that, for Bayesian agents whose credences are given by computable probability measures, the data streams that guarantee convergence to the truth coincide with the algorithmically random ones. Here, we put these results to use to counter various skeptical arguments which target the philosophical significance of Bayesian convergence-to-the-truth theorems.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145689040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Necessary Uniformity of Physical Probability","authors":"Ezra Rubenstein","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70077","url":null,"abstract":"According to contemporary consensus, physical probabilities may be “non‐uniform”: they need not correspond to a uniform measure over the space of physically possible worlds. Against consensus, I argue that only uniform probabilities connect robustly to long‐run frequencies. Suppose, for example, that a uniform measure assigns a probability of x to a coin landing Heads on any given toss (independently of the outcomes on other tosses). Then, in almost all physically possible worlds containing many tosses, the frequency of Heads outcomes approximates x. Thus, if the physical probability of Heads is not x, the frequency deviates from this probability in almost all physically possible worlds. But this would undermine the robust connection between long‐run frequencies and physical probabilities. Conclusion: the uniform measure assigns the correct physical probability to Heads outcomes! This paper makes the argument rigorous and general, and evaluates its significance.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145680246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Empirical Stalemate: Why Science Fails to Settle a Central Philosophical Debate About Perception","authors":"Peter Fisher Epstein, Umrao Sethi","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70078","url":null,"abstract":"Empirical arguments in the philosophy of perception have become increasingly influential. In this paper, we evaluate the prospects for one such argument—the <jats:italic>Argument from Structure</jats:italic> —in light of the a priori constraint that we must give a unified account of visual experience. We argue that, correctly understood, the kinds of empirical findings marshalled in support of an internalist conclusion about color experience (or secondary quality experience more broadly) provide similar support for an <jats:italic>externalist</jats:italic> conclusion about shape experience (or primary quality experience more broadly). When coupled with the a priori requirement that we give a uniform metaphysical account of the two kinds of experience, we find ourselves with two arguments, equal in force, for opposing internalist and externalist conclusions about visual experience as a whole. Such empirical arguments, then, rather than taking us beyond the limitations of armchair theorizing, effectively leave us with a dialectical stalemate.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145575697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Imaging and the diachronic Dutch Book","authors":"Melissa Fusco","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70065","url":null,"abstract":"Causal decision theorists update by conditionalization on their own acts, just like evidential decision theorists and rational pure observers do. But should they? Imaging, due to Lewis and Gärdenfors, can be treated as a counterfactual‐inspired recipe for belief revision. In a decision‐theoretic context, a longstanding, though not popular, gloss on imaging involves norms of update: conditioning is the <jats:italic>correct</jats:italic> response to <jats:italic>learning</jats:italic> that is the case, while imaging is the <jats:italic>correct</jats:italic> response to <jats:italic>making</jats:italic> the case. Here, I aim to counter a major obstacle to the viability of the claim that it can be rational to update by imaging: the diachronic Dutch Book.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"167 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145545415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
