PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH最新文献

{"title":"Replies to Alex Byrne, Mike Martin, and Nico Orlandi","authors":"Berit “Brit” Brogaard","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13050","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140331237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Précis of Seeing and Saying","authors":"Berit “Brit” Brogaard","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13049","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140331243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Episodic imagining, temporal experience, and beliefs about time","authors":"Anthony Bigg, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Shira Yechimovitz","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13054","url":null,"abstract":"We explore the role of episodic imagining in explaining why people both differentially report that it seems to them in experience as though time robustly passes, and why they differentially report that they believe that time does in fact robustly pass. We empirically investigate two hypotheses, the differential vividness hypothesis, and the mental time travel hypothesis. According to each of these, the degree to which people vividly episodically imagine past/future states of affairs influences their tendency to report that it seems to them as though time robustly passes and to judge that time does robustly pass. According to the former, a greater degree of vividness will tend to <jats:italic>increase</jats:italic> the extent to which people make such reports, while according to the latter, it will tend to <jats:italic>decrease</jats:italic> the extent to which people make such reports. We found weak evidence in favour of the former hypothesis. We reflect on the implications of this finding for theorising about such reports.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Leibniz as a virtue ethicist","authors":"Hao Dong","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13057","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I argue that Leibniz's ethics is a kind of virtue ethics where virtues of the agent are explanatorily primary. I first examine how Leibniz obtained his conception of justice as a kind of love in an early text, <jats:italic>Elements of Natural Law</jats:italic>. I show that in this text Leibniz's goal was to find a satisfactory definition of justice that could reconcile egoism with altruism, and that this was achieved through the Aristotelian virtue of friendship where friends treat each other as “other selves.” Following this decisive moment, Leibniz adopted an Aristotle‐inspired ethical framework where the virtuous agent is central for moral evaluations. I then show that, despite certain developments, Leibniz's ethics retained this essential feature throughout his career. In Leibniz's later writings, God constitutes the foundation of the moral realm, and the fundamental moral endeavor of human beings consists in the imitation of God.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The new evil demon problem at 40","authors":"Peter J. Graham","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13052","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;h2&gt;1 THE NEW EVIL DEMON PROBLEM&lt;/h2&gt;\u0000&lt;p&gt;I shall use ‘epistemic warrant’ and ‘epistemic justification’ interchangeably for a normative property that provides a good route to true belief and knowledge.1&lt;/p&gt;\u0000&lt;div&gt;Here are two facts: &lt;ul&gt;\u0000&lt;li&gt;FACT ONE: Beliefs based on taking perceptual experiences at face value are defeasibly epistemically warranted.&lt;/li&gt;\u0000&lt;li&gt;FACT TWO: Defeasibly taking perceptual experience at face value is a reliable route to true belief.&lt;/li&gt;\u0000&lt;/ul&gt;\u0000&lt;/div&gt;\u0000&lt;p&gt;Epistemologists disagree over their relationship.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000&lt;div&gt;Reliabilists believe the second helps explain the first. And by “explain” the reliabilist sets out to really, genuinely explain, to “state conditions that clarifies the underlying source of justificational status,…conditions [that are] &lt;i&gt;appropriately deep&lt;/i&gt; or &lt;i&gt;revelatory&lt;/i&gt;,” not simply conditions that state “correct” necessary and sufficient conditions (Goldman, &lt;span&gt;1979&lt;/span&gt;: 1–2, emphasis added). Reliabilists then hold that “good” psychological processes—good mind-to-mind transitions, such as forming perceptual beliefs based on perceptual experiences—are epistemically correct &lt;i&gt;because&lt;/i&gt; they are reliable routes to truth.2 Hence the motivation for &lt;i&gt;simple reliabilism&lt;/i&gt;: &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;In all possible worlds W, a belief is prima facie epistemically warranted in W if and only if (to the extent that) the psychological processes that caused or sustained the belief reliably produces true beliefs in W.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000&lt;div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;\u0000&lt;/blockquote&gt;\u0000&lt;/div&gt;\u0000&lt;p&gt;So-called “internalists” disagree. They deny that being a reliable route to truth is necessary for warrant, relying on the “New Evil Demon” scenario to make their case.3 Here's the standard version:4&lt;/p&gt;\u0000&lt;p&gt;Norma is an ordinary human adult, with normally functioning perceptual and cognitive capacities, in her normal environment. Walking around the park, she forms reliably true perceptual beliefs about her environment. Perception, in her world, is a reliable route to truth and knowledge.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000&lt;p&gt;Vicki is Norma's psychological duplicate in another possible world. From the inside, as it were, everything looks exactly to Vicki as it does to Norma. But Vicki is not walking around a park. Instead, she is floating in a vat of nutrients, where her sensory systems are hooked up to a massive super-computer. The computer deceives Vicki by inducing type identical perceptual representations to Norma's. That's why everything (in perception) looks the same to Vicki as it does to Norma, but nothing in Vicki's immediate surrounds is as it seems. Vicki, unaware of and unable to detect the deception, forms massively false perceptual beliefs. Perception, in her world, is not a reliable route to truth and knowledge.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000&lt;p&gt;Internalists conclude that Vicki's perceptual beliefs, though massively in error, are nonetheless just as justified— “equally justified”—as Norma's. Taking perceptual experience at face value, given no reason to suppose it is not a good guide to truth in the circumst","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140097116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Knowledge‐by‐Acquaintance First","authors":"Uriah Kriegel","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13051","url":null,"abstract":"Bertrand Russell's epistemology had the interesting structural feature that it made propositional knowledge (“S knows that <jats:italic>p</jats:italic>”) asymmetrically dependent upon what Russell called <jats:italic>knowledge by acquaintance</jats:italic>. On this view, a subject lacking any knowledge by acquaintance would be unable to know that <jats:italic>p</jats:italic> for <jats:italic>any p</jats:italic>. This is something that virtually nobody has defended since Russell, and in this paper I initiate a sympathetic reconsideration.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139988583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Causal modeling in multilevel settings: A new proposal","authors":"Thomas Blanchard, Andreas Hüttemann","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13043","url":null,"abstract":"An important question for the causal modeling approach is how to integrate non-causal dependence relations such as asymmetric supervenience into the approach. The most prominent proposal to that effect (due to Gebharter) is to treat those dependence relationships as formally analogous to causal relationships. We argue that this proposal neglects some crucial differences between causal and non-causal dependencies, and that in the context of causal modeling non-causal dependence relationships should be represented as <i>mutual</i> dependence relationships. We develop a new kind of model – “hybrid models” - based on this suggestion, and formulate a set of axioms for those models. Our formalism has important implications for Kim's exclusion problem: whereas Gebharter's framework vindicates Kim's causal exclusion objection against nonreductive physicalism, our framework has no such implication, and can help non-reductive physicalists vindicate the efficacy of high-level properties. A further benefit of our formalism is that it yields a natural and plausible way of thinking about interventions in multi-level contexts.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139750382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Commonsense morality and contact with value","authors":"Adam Lovett, Stefan Riedener","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13044","url":null,"abstract":"There seem to be many kinds of moral duties. We should keep our promises; we should pay our debts of gratitude; we should compensate those we've wronged; we should avoid doing or intending harm; we should help those in need. These constitute, some worry, an unconnected heap of duties: the realm of commonsense morality is a disorganized mess. In this paper, we outline a strategy for unifying commonsense moral duties. We argue that they can be understood in terms of contact with value. You are in contact with a value when you are manifest in it or when it is manifest in you. You have reason to get in contact with the good and avoid contact with evil. And when you're in contact with a value, the weight of the reasons it grounds are amplified for you. These ideas, we argue, can bring order to the chaos of commonsense morality.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139750379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Autonomy and aesthetic valuing","authors":"Nick Riggle","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13045","url":null,"abstract":"Accounts of aesthetic valuing emphasize two constraints on the formation of aesthetic belief. We must form our own aesthetic beliefs by engaging with aesthetic value first-hand (the acquaintance principle) and by using our own capacities (the autonomy principle). But why? C. Thi Nguyen's proposal is that aesthetic valuing has an inverted structure. We often care about inquiry and engagement for the sake of having true beliefs, but in aesthetic engagement this is flipped: we care about arriving at good aesthetic beliefs for the sake of the values that arise in the process of doing so. The engagement is the point, so we must use our own capacities in first-hand encounters. Here I challenge Nguyen's account. I argue that it misconstrues the value of aesthetic belief; it conflicts with restrictions on aesthetic testimony; and it has trouble harnessing engagement-value for a theory of aesthetic value. A better approach emphasizes the social character of aesthetic valuing. On this view, aesthetic valuing is a social practice structured around the collaborative exercise and improvement of certain special capacities. The autonomy and acquaintance principles tell us to engage these capacities in forming our aesthetic beliefs. Understood aright, and contrary to consensus, these rules are identical.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139522857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Abstraction and grounding","authors":"Louis deRosset, Øystein Linnebo","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13036","url":null,"abstract":"The idea that some objects are metaphysically “cheap” has wide appeal. An influential version of the idea builds on abstractionist views in the philosophy of mathematics, on which numbers and other mathematical objects are abstracted from other phenomena. For example, Hume's Principle states that two collections have the same number just in case they are equinumerous, in the sense that they can be correlated one-to-one:","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139076827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}