{"title":"Words, Articulations, and Utterance Plans","authors":"Luca Gasparri","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70096","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70096","url":null,"abstract":"Under what conditions does an externale (a sequence of speech sounds, a mark of ink) qualify as an articulation of a word? Standard approaches to the issue appeal to intentions and to the satisfaction of performance standards, but these treatments are challenged by the intuitive admissibility of unintentional and anomalous tokens. Recently, alternatives appealing to the role of lexical access in word production have been considered, but these, I argue, are threatened by counterexamples of their own. In this paper, I leverage formal and empirical insights into the architecture of utterance production to present a new hypothesis. The main idea is this: for an externale produced by a speaker to qualify as a token of a word, it must originate from the execution of an utterance score that incorporates the local standards over the word's form. I explain how this approach threads the needle between some key desiderata and can accommodate the case studies that challenge its competitors.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146169480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Justifying Futile Climate Resistance","authors":"Ten-Herng Lai, Edmund Tweedy Flanigan","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70092","url":null,"abstract":"Many have attempted to justify certain acts of disruptive climate activism by appealing to, at least in part, their effectiveness. Accordingly, they help raise awareness, assure others that many will participate in the collective action, pressure politicians, call for change in governmental policies, and/or directly frustrate environmentally damaging industries. But what if the climate disaster is inevitable? What if climate protests and resistance are futile? Should this be the case, we cannot appeal to the instrumental value realized to justify the costs (or even harm) imposed by activists, as those would be gratuitous costs (or harm). Nevertheless, we believe that futile climate activism can be justified as fitting protest, that is, as a form of fitting expression against serious disregard for the lives of others. Violent climate resistance can satisfy the conditions of correct directedness, type appropriateness, proportionality, and adequacy, and is thus called for in situations of futility. The conditions of fitting protest may have further implications for protests that aim to bring about political or social change.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146169479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Valuings as Sentiments","authors":"Mauro Rossi, Christine Tappolet","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70093","url":null,"abstract":"We are valuing beings, beings who possess the capacity to value things. But what is it “to value” something? The most common accounts in the literature hold that to value an item is either to have a first‐order or a second‐order desire toward it; or to believe that item to be valuable; or to care about that item; or to have a combination of all these mental states. In our paper, we raise some objections against all these accounts and defend a new affective account of valuings. Unlike standard affective accounts, according to which the term “valuing” refers to a single type of affective state, such as care, we hold that “valuing” refers to the members of a class of affective states, namely, the class of sentiments. On our view, to value something is to have a particular sentiment toward it. Since sentiments can be of different types, our account implies that there are as many ways of valuing things as there are types of sentiments.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146129363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epistemic Cans","authors":"Timothy Kearl, Christopher Willard-Kyle","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70091","url":null,"abstract":"We argue that S is in a position to know that p iff S can know that p. Thus, what makes position-to-know-ascriptions true is just a special case of what makes ability-ascriptions true: compossibility. The novelty of our compossibility theory of epistemic modality lies in its subsuming epistemic modality under agentive modality, the modality characterizing what agents can do.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146072127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Consciousness Doesn't Do That","authors":"Matthias Michel","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70090","url":null,"abstract":"The question of which mental functions require consciousness has recently come to the forefront because of its relevance for investigating animal consciousness. Finding out that an animal can perform a function associated with consciousness would count as evidence that it has conscious states. I argue that most of the empirical research interpreted as showing that some functions are associated with consciousness fails to show this. Instead, it merely shows that the relevant functions falter when based on degraded sensory signals—which is unsurprising. This issue hinders empirical research on the functions associated with consciousness. I explain how consciousness research can do better when investigating the functions that require consciousness. Until the relevant research is properly carried out, the presence of functions supposedly associated with consciousness in nonhuman animals should not convince the skeptics one bit.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146070174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Illusion of Permissive Balancing","authors":"Jordan Scott","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70089","url":null,"abstract":"The standard view among philosophers of normativity is that practical reasons balance <i>permissively</i> (i.e., when reasons are tied between incompatible actions, either action is rational), while epistemic reasons balance <i>prohibitively</i> (i.e., when reasons are tied between incompatible doxastic attitudes, neither attitude may be rationally formed). Those who disagree, typically epistemic permissivists, think that epistemic reasons behave like reasons for action and that all reasons exhibit permissive balancing. One thing widely agreed on is that a third possibility, that all reasons exhibit prohibitive balancing, is off the table. This paper aims to get that option back on the table. I defend the view that all reasons balance prohibitively, and the apparent permissive balancing of practical reasons is an illusion. What we take to be cases of choosing on the basis of tied practical reasons, actually involve finding extra, tie-breaking, reasons.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"263 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146005860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Distinctness of Objects Near and Far","authors":"Erica Shumener","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70086","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers working on the metaphysics of persistence typically do not extend their views to the distinctness of objects at a single time. I argue that we can provide criteria to distinguish objects across time if and only if we can provide criteria to distinguish objects at a time. Furthermore, I endorse a stronger claim. If either diachronic or synchronic distinctness facts have an analysis, then they have a common analysis. In other words, we should analyze diachronic and synchronic distinctness facts in the same way.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146005863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Zermelian Extensibility","authors":"Andrew Bacon","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70088","url":null,"abstract":"According to an influential idea in the philosophy of set theory, certain mathematical concepts, such as the notion of a well-order and set, are indefinitely extensible. Following Parsons (1983), this has often been cashed out in modal terms. This paper explores instead an extensional articulation of the idea, formulated in higher-order logic, that straightforwardly formalizes some remarks of Zermelo. The resulting picture is incompatible with the idea that the entire universe can be well-ordered, but entirely consistent with the idea that the sets of any set-theoretic universe can be.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"87 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146000837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Gradability of ‘Conscious’","authors":"Andrew Y. Lee, Poppy Mankowitz","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70074","url":null,"abstract":"Are some creatures “more conscious” than others? A number of consciousness researchers have aimed to answer this question. Yet some have claimed that this question does not even make sense. They claim that “conscious” (in the phenomenal sense) never occurs as a <jats:italic>gradable adjective</jats:italic> , meaning an adjective that permits degree expressions (“more <jats:sc>f</jats:sc> than,” “slightly <jats:sc>f</jats:sc> ,” etc.) and that is associated with a degreed property. Both sides face an explanatory burden: they must explain why some competent speakers seem confused about the meaning of “conscious.” We argue that the question does make sense: “conscious” sometimes functions as a minimal‐standard gradable adjective. But we will also explain why some theorists have been skeptical about gradable uses of “conscious.” Along the way, we address the objection that many gradable constructions involving “what it's like” expressions are infelicitous, distinguish two interpretations of “phenomenal consciousness,” and discuss how our semantic arguments bear on the metaphysical question of whether consciousness comes in degrees.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145968448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Beyond Normativity","authors":"Lewis Williams","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70085","url":null,"abstract":"Recent years have seen a growing number of philosophers come to defend normative nihilism. Even if their arguments do not induce in many a belief in normative nihilism, there may be grounds on which to be less than certain about the falsity of normative nihilism. How, then, can we accommodate the possibility of normative nihilism when deliberating about what to do? In this article, I defend two theses. First, I distinguish between normative questions and deliberative questions and argue that the question “what am I to do under uncertainty about the truth of normative nihilism?” is best understood as an example of the latter. Second, I propose a novel framework for deliberation under uncertainty about the truth of normative nihilism: maximize expected decision‐relevance. A striking upshot of this article is that there is an important sense in which we need make no mistake by flouting normative considerations under uncertainty about the truth of normative nihilism.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145897322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：