{"title":"Biological Individuality and Fallacies of Composition","authors":"Alexander Geddes","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70100","url":null,"abstract":"Within the philosophy of biology, there is widespread acceptance of pluralism about biological individuality, according to which there are (at least) two theoretically important but distinct properties with a claim to the label “biological individuality”: <i>evolutionary individuality</i> and <i>physiological individuality</i>. Many who accept this also commit themselves—sometimes explicitly, often implicitly—to the further, surprising claim that the evolutionary individual and the physiological individual corresponding to a seemingly singular multicellular organism, such as a human being, are in fact distinct. I raise some problems for this distinctness claim before developing a way of holding onto pluralism while rejecting this supposed consequence of it. I do so by uncovering some natural but hidden assumptions concerning the connections between certain evolutionarily significant properties of multicellular organisms and certain properties of their parts—assumptions that, once made explicit, can be seen to amount to fallacies of composition. I show that, by rejecting these assumptions, philosophers of biology can hold on to the appealing idea that familiar multicellular organisms are at once both evolutionary and physiological individuals.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147447413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Shared Life","authors":"James Laing","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70106","url":null,"abstract":"We are social animals that seek to live a life that is, in some sense, shared with others. But what exactly do we want in wanting to live a shared life? First, I seek to show that this question is not as straightforward as it might initially appear. Second, I present an answer to this question, which makes reference to the thought that we have a need for an irreducibly relational form of emotional experience, which I call “interpersonal connection.” Third, and finally, I draw upon this answer to identify the harm implicated in the experience of loneliness.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147447414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are Rights Self-Other Symmetric?","authors":"Collis Tahzib","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70104","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, there have been several defenses of self-other symmetry. On this view, we have the same rights against ourselves as we have against others. In this paper, I challenge this view by arguing that even if some rights (such as rights against <i>serious</i> harm) are symmetric, rights against <i>minor</i> harm are not plausibly symmetric. To this end, I present four pairs of cases involving accidental, negligent, drunken and intrinsically non-consentable minor harm in which self-other symmetry's implications are highly counterintuitive. Next I provide theoretical support for these intuitions by explaining how denying them threatens to eradicate the category of prudence. I then consider and reject two responses available to defenders of self-other symmetry: namely, that rights are self-other symmetric in content but not stringency, and that self-other symmetry's intuitive and theoretical costs are outweighed by the benefits of simplicity and parsimony. I conclude by proposing two novel and weakened self-other symmetry theses that are immune to the foregoing counterexamples and are worthy of further investigation.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147351211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Contextual Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism","authors":"Mikayla Kelley","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70098","url":null,"abstract":"A central motivation for Probabilism—the principle of rationality that requires one to have credences that satisfy the axioms of probability—is the accuracy dominance argument: one should not have accuracy dominated credences, and one avoids accuracy dominance just in case one satisfies Probabilism. Until recently, the accuracy dominance argument for Probabilism has been restricted to finite credal states. One reason for this is that there are several impossibility results that apply when defining the accuracy of infinite credal states. In this paper, I offer a fully general accuracy dominance argument for Probabilism that allows for the possibility that not all sets of credences can be measured for accuracy. The normative core of the argument is the principle that one should not have credences that are accuracy dominated in some “scorable” epistemic context by alternative credences that do not have this defect. Beyond this novel rationality principle, the argument contributes two important theoretical tools to accuracy-first epistemology: the idea of an epistemic context being scorable and a general contextualizing strategy for extending the arguments of accuracy-first epistemology to the infinite setting.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"98 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147319524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Doomsday or Multiverse Bias","authors":"Yoaav Isaacs","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70103","url":null,"abstract":"Bayesian epistemology faces serious challenges when dealing with self-locating evidence. This paper argues that, given two modest assumptions about how confirmation should work (Patterning and Live Centers), Bayesianism faces an unavoidable dilemma. We must either accept an implausible form of reasoning where our mere existence provides evidence that the future is short (Doomsday), or accept an equally implausible form where our existence favors hypotheses positing vastly more observers (Multiverse Bias). Since the underlying assumptions are hard to deny, and both horns of the dilemma are deeply unpalatable, this result reveals a major problem for Bayesian epistemology.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"345 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147292549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why Paternalism Is Wrong (When It Is Wrong)","authors":"Jonathan Parry","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70099","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes a novel reinterpretation of the familiar, if inchoate, thought that paternalism offends against an ideal of personal sovereignty. The central idea is that (competent) persons have a particular kind of normative power. Just as each of us has the right to control how others are permitted to use our bodies or property, we each have a structurally similar right to control how others are permitted to use our <i>good</i>. When others seek to benefit us without adequately consulting our will, they trespass into a domain that is ours to control, treating us as lacking rights that we in fact have. The paper argues that this theory of anti-paternalism is superior to existing accounts, is independently attractive, and rests on deeper foundations.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147319525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Guessing and Its Limits","authors":"Helena Fang","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70101","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:label/> Guessing is the thesis that, roughly put, you may believe something iff it is among the most probable answers to a salient question. The thesis is motivated by observed features of felicitous belief reports when agents confront a question they aren't certain how to answer. This paper raises a novel problem for the thesis, focusing on belief reports in <jats:italic>multi‐question</jats:italic> scenarios. I introduce and motivate a plausible inter‐question principle for belief, show that Guessing is incompatible with the principle, and argue that the resulting puzzle is intractable and significant—posing a unique challenge to the thesis. Moreover, the problem generalizes to formally parallel “question‐sensitive” accounts in epistemology and philosophy of language, calling for future research into their limits.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146777273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mistreating Consent","authors":"Elise Woodard","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70094","url":null,"abstract":"Consent plays an important role in our lives. Using someone's body or property without their consent is typically a serious wrong. However, there are various ways in which consensual interactions may be morally deficient. This paper articulates an underexplored way in which consent can be defective, namely by being <jats:italic>moot</jats:italic> . Moot consent occurs when others would act regardless of our consent. (Imagine Audrey consents to have sex with Brice, but if she hadn't consented, he would have had sex with her anyway.) These cases are disturbing, but it is difficult to explain why while preserving morally relevant distinctions among cases. On my view, moot consent is still valid consent, but the consent‐receiver wrongs the agent by mistreating the consent: consent fails to play a proper role in the consent‐receiver's practical deliberation and reasons for action. Cases of moot consent underscore that we care not just about the presence of consent but also about the role it plays in others' reasoning.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146205085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A New Acquaintance Theory of Introspection","authors":"Matt Duncan","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70097","url":null,"abstract":"According to the acquaintance theory of introspection, certain special features of our knowledge of our own minds are grounded in our acquaintance with—that is, direct awareness of—our minds. The acquaintance theory is ancient, but it began to take a new shape in the 20th century. It has since become one of the leading theories of introspection. But, more recently, some philosophers have started thinking differently about what knowledge by acquaintance is, what <jats:italic>constitutes</jats:italic> it. According to late‐20th‐century acquaintance theorists, it is constituted by <jats:italic>beliefs</jats:italic> based on acquaintance. However, according to more recent acquaintance theorists, acquaintance is itself a sui generis, non‐propositional form of knowledge. This development is highly relevant to the acquaintance theory of introspection, but it has yet to be shown how. In this paper, I introduce and defend a <jats:italic>new</jats:italic> acquaintance theory of introspection. I start by describing the old acquaintance theory of introspection. Then I outline some of the most prominent objections to it, as well as standard responses. Then I introduce the new acquaintance theory of introspection and show how it is an improvement over the old theory—in some ways, a vast improvement.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146198730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dispositions and Dependence","authors":"Lisa Vogt","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70095","url":null,"abstract":"According to the principle <jats:sc>No Upwards Essence</jats:sc> , there are no cases in which some essentially depends on , yet grounds . One of the most pressing objections that afflict Dispositional Essentialism (DE) is that it violates <jats:sc>No Upwards Essence</jats:sc> and is therefore untenable. In this paper, I defend DE against this objection. First, I argue that DE only violates <jats:sc>No Upwards Essence</jats:sc> in the presence of further contentious assumptions that proponents of DE are not necessarily forced to accept. And second, I argue that <jats:sc>No Upwards Essence</jats:sc> should not be adopted: The extant arguments in favor of the principle are wanting, and it is subject to counterexamples.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146198729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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