PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH最新文献

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Vague Mereology and Borderline Connections 模糊流变学与边缘性联系
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-09-28 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70159
A. J. Cotnoir, Giulia Schirripa
{"title":"Vague Mereology and Borderline Connections","authors":"A. J. Cotnoir, Giulia Schirripa","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70159","url":null,"abstract":"The summit of Mt Everest is determinately part of it; parts of the Khumbu Glacier are determinately not. In between are a range of candidate parts whose mereological status with respect to Mt Everest is unsettled. Among the various accounts of vagueness, supervaluationism has received a great deal of attention. But very little attention has been paid to supervaluational theories of mereological relations themselves, and formal mereologies set within supervaluational logics are largely unexplored. In this paper, we provide two formal semantics for a vague mereology. We start with a simple supervaluational system using overlap as a primitive under a global consequence relation, but argue that it is unsatisfactory. We then develop a richer framework based on the idea of borderline connections, and expand it to a modal semantics of precisifications with a determinacy operator under a local consequence relation. We then prove a range of results, including the equivalence between borderline connection and indeterminate overlap, the vagueness of minimal and maximal fusions, and the distinction between mereological and compositional vagueness. The framework is intended to be compatible with a range of philosophical interpretations, including epistemic, semantic, and ontic views of vagueness.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149123164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Teleological Inference 目的论的推理
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-09-28 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70165
Benjamin Claessens
{"title":"Teleological Inference","authors":"Benjamin Claessens","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70165","url":null,"abstract":"How do we acquire teleological beliefs? A teleological belief is a belief that some event or process occurs for the sake of a purpose. Such beliefs include beliefs about actions, natural functions, and the meaning of life. This article will advance a theory of teleological inference. I will argue (1) that we acquire teleological beliefs by statistical inference, (2) that we conceive of a purpose as a type of difference‐maker, and (3) that we infer purposive relations as apparent difference‐making relations. The proposed theory claims empirical, phenomenological, and theoretical support. Empirically, it best explains the teleological bias: the universal human disposition to endorse teleological explanations of phenomena. It also explains a range of observed interactions between causal, normative, and purposive judgment. The theory suggests that mental state attributions play no essential role in teleological inference and explains the phenomenal character of agentive experience.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149123205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
There Are No Abilities to Succeed 没有成功的能力
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-09-23 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70164
David Heering
{"title":"There Are No Abilities to Succeed","authors":"David Heering","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70164","url":null,"abstract":"There is an essential connection between the concept of an ability and various forms of practical and cognitive success. In particular, it is in virtue of exercising their abilities that agents’ general practical and cognitive endeavors, their doings and believings, become achievements—intentional actions or instances of knowledge. Abilities enable success. In this paper, I challenge the ubiquitous idea that when agents succeed, they are exercising the ability <jats:italic>to succeed</jats:italic> , that is, that abilities enable success as abilities to succeed. My argument is that while achievements are highly specific, the content of what an ability is an ability to do (its prejacent) is always general. Hence, the relevant achievements never appear in the prejacents of abilities exercised in achievement; there are no abilities to succeed. I draw out some general lessons for the philosophy of abilities.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149124459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Question of Referentiality 参照性问题
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-09-22 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70162
Eliot Michaelson
{"title":"The Question of Referentiality","authors":"Eliot Michaelson","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70162","url":null,"abstract":"Most theorists have offered different accounts of reference fixing for names, demonstratives, and indexicals. Indeed, this variety can seem an inevitable response to a certain class of hard cases. Here, I will offer a unified account of reference fixing equally capable of handling these cases. Then, I will show how to extend the account to help Predicativists about names and Quantificationalists about demonstratives accommodate these cases as well. One interesting upshot of this strategy is that it offers a way of explaining what makes a term referential that doesn't appeal to logical form.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149124475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Therapeutic Insight and Aspect Perception 治疗洞察力和方面感知
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-09-19 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70163
Adrian Kind, William Child
{"title":"Therapeutic Insight and Aspect Perception","authors":"Adrian Kind, William Child","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70163","url":null,"abstract":"In psychotherapy patients gain new insights into their mental life. Although philosophers have used examples from psychotherapy to make points in debates on self‐knowledge, there has been little serious effort to understand the nature and epistemology of therapeutic insight events. The paper fills that gap. It is argued that an understanding of such insights can be achieved by considering them through the lens of Wittgenstein's discussion of aspect perception. It is claimed that therapeutic insight can be understood in analogy to aspect perception, and that the interpersonal process leading to insight is in its central features analogous to the interpersonal occurrence of aspect perception.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148993694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Epistemology and Semantics of Ignorance 无知的认识论和语义学
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-09-10 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70156
Mona Simion, Christoph Kelp, Lilith Mace
{"title":"The Epistemology and Semantics of Ignorance","authors":"Mona Simion, Christoph Kelp, Lilith Mace","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70156","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is concerned with ignorance. It develops a novel, full account of the nature and epistemic normativity of objectual and factual ignorance, degrees of ignorance, comparative ignorance, and the semantics of permissible outright attributions of ignorance of facts and phenomena. On this account, objectual ignorance of a phenomenon P is inversely proportional to fully comprehensive and maximally well‐connected knowledge of P: The closer an agent A approximates fully comprehensive and maximally well‐connected knowledge of P, the lower the degree of ignorance of A with regard to P. In turn, “A is ignorant with regard to a phenomenon P” is true in a context c just in case A approximates fully comprehensive and well‐connected knowledge of P distantly enough to surpass a threshold on degrees of objectual ignorance determined by <jats:italic>c</jats:italic> . Factual ignorance wh‐ of a fact F is directly proportional to the number of possible answers to the embedded wh‐ question that one must properly eliminate in order to have a complete answer to the embedded wh‐ question: The closer an agent A approximates a full answer to the embedded wh‐ question, the lower the degree of ignorance of A with regard to F. In turn, “A is ignorant wh‐ of a fact F” is true in context c if and only if A approximates a full answer to the embedded wh‐ question distantly enough to surpass a threshold of degrees of factual ignorance determined by c.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148915407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Which Thoughts Require Sensory Capacities? 哪些想法需要感官能力?
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-09-07 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70158
Pär Sundström
{"title":"Which Thoughts Require Sensory Capacities?","authors":"Pär Sundström","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70158","url":null,"abstract":"Is it possible that something—say, an alien, an angel, or an artificial system—thinks without having or ever having had any sensory capacity? If so, what could such a thing think? An extreme nativist view on this issue is that it's possible to think every thought—alternatively, every thinkable thought—without having or having had any sensory capacity. An extreme empiricist view is that no thought is thinkable unless one has or has had some sensory capacity. In between the extremes lies a range of intermediate views. This article argues for the conditional claim that, if some thought is thinkable without having or having had any sensory capacity, then a very large range of thoughts is thinkable in this circumstance. Thus, the truth lies either at the empiricist extreme or at or near the nativist extreme.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148915409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Two Moralities of Recognition 承认的两种道德
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-09-03 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70160
Barry Maguire, Oded Na'aman
{"title":"Two Moralities of Recognition","authors":"Barry Maguire, Oded Na'aman","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70160","url":null,"abstract":"A morality of recognition maintains that moral norms have their authority in virtue of the ways in which those norms enact an ideal moral relationship. T. M. Scanlon argues that this approach can yield an account of the distinctive force of morality and an attractive account of moral motivation. We find this approach to theorizing about morals extremely promising. However, we argue that Scanlon's own account of it—recognition as justifiability, conceptualized as adherence to principles no one could reasonably reject—cannot deliver what he claims for it. Such justifiability is compatible with indifference to actual people, cannot explain what it is to wrong someone, and cannot accommodate the specific reasons that recognizing another person requires. Developing Scanlon's own analogy between morality and friendship, we argue that mutual recognition instead consists in living in caring solidarity with others as human. This more positive alternative retains the advantages of a morality of recognition while avoiding these concerns with justifiability. We close by addressing three outstanding questions, concerning moral responsibilities toward strangers, the boundaries of moral community, and the relationship between these two moralities of recognition.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148877281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Requests Create Reasons 请求如何创造理由
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-08-25 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70149
Milan Mossé
{"title":"How Requests Create Reasons","authors":"Milan Mossé","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70149","url":null,"abstract":"By issuing requests of one another, we wield what is, on reflection, a remarkable power: to create reasons at will. But how can requesters give us reasons to do what they want, even when they stand in no relation of authority over us? And what would be lost if we saw requests as communicating the existence of pre‐existing reasons, rather than creating new ones? I propose that a request creates a reason when and because treating such requests as reasons would help the addressee to comply better with their duties. I show that this view explains how requests create reasons, why requesting is valuable, and how the reasons created by requests depend on antecedent considerations. I argue, further, that this view clarifies the discretionary nature of the reasons created by requests, gives a unified account of how requests create reasons among intimates and strangers, and reveals important forms of unfairness that result from requests.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148809903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Algorithmic AI Consciousness 算法AI意识
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-08-20 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70155
Samuel Kimpton‐Nye
{"title":"Algorithmic AI Consciousness","authors":"Samuel Kimpton‐Nye","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70155","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I argue that the thoroughly algorithmic nature of current AI systems (such as LLMs) is no obstacle to their being conscious, despite strong apparent reasons to the contrary. To this end, I present a picture on which algorithmic AI systems comprise dispositional properties that realize categorical phenomenal properties where the latter, in turn, provide the identity conditions for their dispositional realizers. This mutual ontological dependence at the heart of the proposal yields a novel picture of (AI) consciousness that avoids epiphenomenalism, has “physicalist” credentials, and may vindicate taking behaviors of current AI systems as evidence of consciousness.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148767436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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