{"title":"Which Thoughts Require Sensory Capacities?","authors":"Pär Sundström","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70158","url":null,"abstract":"Is it possible that something—say, an alien, an angel, or an artificial system—thinks without having or ever having had any sensory capacity? If so, what could such a thing think? An extreme nativist view on this issue is that it's possible to think every thought—alternatively, every thinkable thought—without having or having had any sensory capacity. An extreme empiricist view is that no thought is thinkable unless one has or has had some sensory capacity. In between the extremes lies a range of intermediate views. This article argues for the conditional claim that, if some thought is thinkable without having or having had any sensory capacity, then a very large range of thoughts is thinkable in this circumstance. Thus, the truth lies either at the empiricist extreme or at or near the nativist extreme.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148915409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Two Moralities of Recognition","authors":"Barry Maguire, Oded Na'aman","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70160","url":null,"abstract":"A morality of recognition maintains that moral norms have their authority in virtue of the ways in which those norms enact an ideal moral relationship. T. M. Scanlon argues that this approach can yield an account of the distinctive force of morality and an attractive account of moral motivation. We find this approach to theorizing about morals extremely promising. However, we argue that Scanlon's own account of it—recognition as justifiability, conceptualized as adherence to principles no one could reasonably reject—cannot deliver what he claims for it. Such justifiability is compatible with indifference to actual people, cannot explain what it is to wrong someone, and cannot accommodate the specific reasons that recognizing another person requires. Developing Scanlon's own analogy between morality and friendship, we argue that mutual recognition instead consists in living in caring solidarity with others as human. This more positive alternative retains the advantages of a morality of recognition while avoiding these concerns with justifiability. We close by addressing three outstanding questions, concerning moral responsibilities toward strangers, the boundaries of moral community, and the relationship between these two moralities of recognition.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148877281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Requests Create Reasons","authors":"Milan Mossé","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70149","url":null,"abstract":"By issuing requests of one another, we wield what is, on reflection, a remarkable power: to create reasons at will. But how can requesters give us reasons to do what they want, even when they stand in no relation of authority over us? And what would be lost if we saw requests as communicating the existence of pre‐existing reasons, rather than creating new ones? I propose that a request creates a reason when and because treating such requests as reasons would help the addressee to comply better with their duties. I show that this view explains how requests create reasons, why requesting is valuable, and how the reasons created by requests depend on antecedent considerations. I argue, further, that this view clarifies the discretionary nature of the reasons created by requests, gives a unified account of how requests create reasons among intimates and strangers, and reveals important forms of unfairness that result from requests.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148809903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Algorithmic AI Consciousness","authors":"Samuel Kimpton‐Nye","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70155","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I argue that the thoroughly algorithmic nature of current AI systems (such as LLMs) is no obstacle to their being conscious, despite strong apparent reasons to the contrary. To this end, I present a picture on which algorithmic AI systems comprise dispositional properties that realize categorical phenomenal properties where the latter, in turn, provide the identity conditions for their dispositional realizers. This mutual ontological dependence at the heart of the proposal yields a novel picture of (AI) consciousness that avoids epiphenomenalism, has “physicalist” credentials, and may vindicate taking behaviors of current AI systems as evidence of consciousness.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148767436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Simone De Beauvoir on Justification and Oppression","authors":"Michelle Kosch","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70151","url":null,"abstract":"This paper offers an interpretation of Simone de Beauvoir's ethical theory as presented in the works of 1944–47, and applies core concepts drawn from it to the interpretation of <jats:italic>The Second Sex</jats:italic> .","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"73 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148767438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Games Without Rules","authors":"Alexandre Declos, Olivier Massin","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70154","url":null,"abstract":"It is widely assumed that all games essentially have rules. This paper challenges this apparent truism. We argue that rules are merely one means for generating obstacles: features that make success more difficult. We propose that obstacles, not rules, are essential to games. This shift comes with several theoretical benefits. It accommodates games that lack explicit prescriptions or proscriptions, such as mazes or certain videogames; it avoids stretching the notion of “rule” to include physical laws, affordances, or program limitations; it better captures the phenomenology of game‐playing; and it clarifies how obstacles shape game identity and the boundaries between games and toys. The upshot is that obstacles provide a better foundation for understanding what games are.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148754387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Problem of Psychonomic Harmony","authors":"Joseph C. Schmid","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70153","url":null,"abstract":"The problem of nomological harmony is the problem of explaining why the laws of nature match or apply to the states of the universe in a way that results in temporal evolution. The problem of psychophysical harmony is the problem of explaining why phenomenal states are paired with physical states and other phenomenal states in surprisingly fortunate ways. Combining elements of both problems, I develop the problem of psychonomic harmony: Why do the psychophysical principles or laws match the states of the universe in a way that results in conscious experiences? Candidate solutions co‐opt the solutions to the problems of nomological and psychophysical harmony, but new and interesting challenges face several of those solutions.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148728003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Attunement and Reason","authors":"Wayne Wu","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70152","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, I present a theory of attunement, the agent's readiness to attend to a target. I focus on attunement to reasons for action, and in particular, on sensitivity to moral reasons. After noting that many claims regarding moral perception are better construed as claims regarding moral attention, I separate perceptual from attentional sensitivity. The latter includes rational attunement to reason. Drawing on Davidson's argument for the causal theory of action, I establish a causal structure that establishes the necessity of attention to reasons if we are to act on them. Attunement is found within this structure as a biased psychological state. This is then used to explain John McDowell's discussion of silencing and the contrast between virtuous, continent, and incontinent agents. After providing an empirical ground for attunement where knowledge of structure provides a critical bias that sets the agent's readiness to attend, I use the case of skill in medicine where doctors are attuned to the gist of health and disease to account for virtue where practically wise agents are attuned to moral gist. Knowledge of relevant structure, say medical or ethical structure, establishes a distinctive sensitivity to reasons for action.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148727908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Udayana on Learning Through Memory","authors":"Nilanjan Das","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70130","url":null,"abstract":"In premodern South Asia, philosophers often claimed that memory is not a method of knowledge‐acquisition. But some, especially Jaina epistemologists, dissented from this standard view. They argued that occurrent memories can help us learn novel truths about past objects and experiences. In doing so, these thinkers embraced the possibility that we can acquire <jats:italic>self‐locating knowledge</jats:italic> , that is, knowledge about ourselves or our temporal location, by means of memory. In this paper, I will focus on a Nyāya philosopher, Udayana (ca. 10th–11th centuries CE), who defended the standard view against this objection. I will reconstruct Udayana's account of memory, and explain how he tries to rule out the possibility of gaining purely self‐locating knowledge by means of memory alone. I will then argue that Udayana's response to the Jaina objection is unsuccessful, and in fact reveals a deeper tension within the Nyāya account of memory.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148589058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Attention and Evidence","authors":"David Thorstad","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70150","url":null,"abstract":"In traditional models, agents have ample reason to gather cost‐free evidence. Rational agents expect evidence gathering to weakly improve the quality of their decisions and the accuracy of their credences. These results are linked to more general principles of reflection and the value of knowledge taken to characterize genuine learning experiences. For attentionally limited agents, I show that matters are more complex. Rational attentionally limited agents still cannot expect to make worse decisions or hold less accurate credences as a result of gathering some rather than no evidence. But they can expect to make worse decisions and hold less accurate credences as a result of gathering more rather than less evidence about the world. This result highlights a neglected distinction between two versions of the requirement to gather cost‐free evidence and a gap between evidence gathering and learning experiences.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"179 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148587178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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