{"title":"理由的模态理论","authors":"Jaakko Hirvelä","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13143","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article develops a modal theory of justification, according to which a belief is justified if it is more possible that it amounts to knowledge than that it does not. The core of the theory is neutral between internalism and externalism and it solves two problems that extant modal accounts of justification suffer from. In developing the theory, an account of comparative possibility is provided to yield degrees of justification.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"2015 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2025-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A modal theory of justification\",\"authors\":\"Jaakko Hirvelä\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/phpr.13143\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This article develops a modal theory of justification, according to which a belief is justified if it is more possible that it amounts to knowledge than that it does not. The core of the theory is neutral between internalism and externalism and it solves two problems that extant modal accounts of justification suffer from. In developing the theory, an account of comparative possibility is provided to yield degrees of justification.\",\"PeriodicalId\":48136,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH\",\"volume\":\"2015 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-02-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13143\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13143","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
This article develops a modal theory of justification, according to which a belief is justified if it is more possible that it amounts to knowledge than that it does not. The core of the theory is neutral between internalism and externalism and it solves two problems that extant modal accounts of justification suffer from. In developing the theory, an account of comparative possibility is provided to yield degrees of justification.
期刊介绍:
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research publishes articles in a wide range of areas including philosophy of mind, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, and philosophical history of philosophy. No specific methodology or philosophical orientation is required for submissions.