认识到无限：充分的知识和误差边际原则

IF 1.3 1区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2025-03-19 DOI:10.1111/phpr.70001

Yonathan Fiat

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引用次数: 0

摘要

假设我完全知道如果我知道这个，我知道我知道这个，我知道我知道我知道我知道这个，等等。假设我部分知道，如果我知道但我不完全知道。如果有的话，我完全知道什么？如果有的话，我只知道一部分吗？文献中的一个回应是，我完全知道我所知道的一切；片面的知识是不可能的。这种反应与知识上似是而非的误差范围原则相矛盾。文献中的另一种反应是，我什么都不完全知道；我所知道的一切，我只知道一部分。最近，戈德斯坦（即将出版，2024年）为第三种观点辩护，根据这种观点，我完全知道一些事情，我部分知道其他事情。虽然这似乎是合理的，但戈尔茨坦的解释是基于否认误差幅度原则的。在本文中，我证明了完全知识和部分知识的可能性都符合误差边际原则。我还认为，由此产生的知识图景是有良好动机的。

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Knowing to infinity: Full knowledge and the margin‐for‐error principle

Let's say that I fully know that if I know that , I know that I know that , I know that I know that I know that , and so on. Let's say that I partially know that if I know that but I don't fully know that . What, if anything, do I fully know? What, if anything, do I partially know? One response in the literature is that I fully know everything that I know; partial knowledge is impossible. This response is in tension with a plausible margin‐for‐error principle on knowledge. A different response in the literature is that I don't fully know anything; everything that I know, I partially know. Recently, Goldstein (forthcoming, 2024) defended a third view, according to which I fully know some things and I partially know other things. While this seems plausible, Goldstein's account is based on denying the margin‐for‐error principle. In this paper, I show that the possibility of both full knowledge and partial knowledge is consistent with the margin‐for‐error principle. I also argue that the resulting picture of knowledge is well‐motivated.

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来源期刊

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

3.50

自引率

6.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： Philosophy and Phenomenological Research publishes articles in a wide range of areas including philosophy of mind, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, and philosophical history of philosophy. No specific methodology or philosophical orientation is required for submissions.