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How Seriously Should We Take AI Welfare? Constraints From the Epistemology of Consciousness 我们应该多重视人工智能福利？意识认识论的约束
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-07-14 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70148
Preston Lennon
{"title":"How Seriously Should We Take AI Welfare? Constraints From the Epistemology of Consciousness","authors":"Preston Lennon","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70148","url":null,"abstract":"Some philosophers argue that near‐term artificial intelligence (AI) systems might soon be welfare subjects. We should take AI welfare seriously, they urge, because AI systems might soon have properties indicated by our best scientific theories of consciousness, and consciousness suffices for welfare subjectivity. I argue that this view faces constraints from the epistemology of consciousness. Specifically, I argue that there is an enormous gap in justification between our first‐personal beliefs of consciousness in ourselves and our third‐personal, theoretical belief of what consciousness is according to contemporary consciousness science. The science of consciousness is so in its infancy that it is doubtful that the set of theories currently on offer is exhaustive. In contrast, beliefs about the fact that we are conscious are, famously, among the most epistemically secure we can have. Our taking AI welfare seriously, in terms of action or policy, will be constrained by these considerations from the epistemology of consciousness.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148475961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dilemmas, Teleology, and Incomparable Value 困境、目的论和无可比拟的价值
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-07-14 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70134
Aaron Thieme
{"title":"Dilemmas, Teleology, and Incomparable Value","authors":"Aaron Thieme","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70134","url":null,"abstract":"Sometimes, it may seem that an agent faces an obligation dilemma—a situation in which they cannot fulfill their obligations no matter what they do. However, there are at least three problems for any theory that embraces obligation dilemmas. The logical problem arises from a conflict between obligation dilemmas and venerable principles of deontic logic. The teleological problem arises from a conflict between obligation dilemmas and the compelling thought that an agent is obligated to do what would be best. And the practical problem arises from a conflict between believing that one faces an obligation dilemma and making a coherent choice. In this essay, I argue that these problems can be solved.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148475866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Consciousness Multiplied 意识增加
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-07-14 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70146
James H. McIntyre
{"title":"Consciousness Multiplied","authors":"James H. McIntyre","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70146","url":null,"abstract":"It is generally assumed that an ordinary human brain is associated with a single mind. Indeed, this assumption is so deeply rooted that it is rarely articulated explicitly, let alone questioned. However, as philosophers of mind have increasingly noticed, it turns out to rest on alarmingly shaky ground. In this article, I argue for the <jats:italic>multiplicity hypothesis</jats:italic> : under normal conditions, a single human brain is home to not just one, but <jats:italic>numerous</jats:italic> conscious minds at once, each as vivid and real as our own. Specifically, this argument holds that many of a human brain's proper parts themselves fulfill the neural correlates of consciousness. Although this conclusion is deeply counterintuitive, it follows from principles that any scientifically minded person, who thinks there is an intimate tie between human consciousness and neural activity, has good reasons to accept. I consider several objections, but the case for multiplicity proves resilient.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"75 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148499211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do We Need a Metaphysics of Gender? 我们需要性别形而上学吗？
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-07-13 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70147
James Murphy
{"title":"Do We Need a Metaphysics of Gender?","authors":"James Murphy","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70147","url":null,"abstract":"Metaphysicians of gender are united by the assumption that, to explain gendered phenomena like gender‐based oppression, we must provide an account of what gender is, metaphysically. I argue that we should reject this assumption. I construct an account of linguistic practice involving gender terms that makes no metaphysical claims about what gender is. My linguistic account, I show, explains all of the phenomena that metaphysicians of gender seek to explain. The explanatory power of my linguistic account reveals that debates over the metaphysics of gender are explanatorily fruitless. If our goal is to explain gendered phenomena like gender‐based oppression, we do not need a metaphysics of gender.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"372 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148429220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Seeing Colors Without Seeing Light 看不见光却能看到颜色
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-07-09 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70145
Vivian Mizrahi
{"title":"Seeing Colors Without Seeing Light","authors":"Vivian Mizrahi","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70145","url":null,"abstract":"This article defends a provocative claim: Light itself is not seen. Proposed by Aristotle, Alhazen, and recently Hilbert and Kalderon, this view regards light as the medium of sight rather than its object. Unlike reflectance physicalism or color relationalism, this medium theory maintains that colors are entirely independent of light, which merely provides conditions for their visibility. I argue that light's invisibility offers a novel solution to problems raised by color constancy. The traditional approach, originating with Helmholtz, explains constancy through “discounting the illuminant”—the visual system estimates illumination and compensates for it to recover objects’ “true” colors. But if light is colorless and invisible, it cannot contain the variable chromatic component that supposedly explains color variations and, thus, cannot be discounted as contemporary models suppose. Drawing on Husserl's perspectivist framework, I propose that chromatic variations under different illuminations are perspectival presentations of a single color property, analogous to how spatial variations present aspects of shape. We perceive stable colors not by discounting a chromatic component attributed to light, but by grasping variations as perspectives on the same objective color. I contrast this approach with color relationalism, reflectance physicalism, and enactivism, showing how it avoids difficulties they face while better capturing chromatic experience.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148408904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fission, Fusion, and Survival Through Parts 裂变，融合，通过零件生存
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-07-08 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70136
Harry R. Lloyd
{"title":"Fission, Fusion, and Survival Through Parts","authors":"Harry R. Lloyd","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70136","url":null,"abstract":"Suppose that Alan is about to undergo “fission.” Each hemisphere of Alan's brain will be transplanted into the empty skull of one of his identical twin brothers. Call the individuals who will wake up after the operation Lefty and Righty. Will Alan survive the operation? Is Alan the same person as Lefty or Righty? In this paper, I argue that Alan survives fission, but not as a person. After fission, Alan will instead be a scattered object, which has as its discontiguous parts the two separate persons Lefty and Righty. (I'll say something similar about “fusion” cases as well.) Call this view <jats:italic>Survival Through Parts</jats:italic> , or “STP” for short. STP has a lot of advantages: It allows us to preserve the commonsense view that identity is necessary for what matters in survival; it is highly consonant with folk intuitions about identity in fission and fusion cases; and it affords us an attractive response to some particularly intractable fission puzzles discovered by Jacob Ross. I conclude that STP has been unjustly neglected by philosophers of personal identity.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148401559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Romantic Domination 浪漫的统治
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-07-07 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70144
Lucy McDonald
{"title":"Romantic Domination","authors":"Lucy McDonald","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70144","url":null,"abstract":"Romantic relationships between professors and students, between employers and employees, and between other partners at different points on an institutional hierarchy are widely regarded as morally troubling. Popular explanations as to why have appealed variously to violations of institutional duties, to the impossibility of sexual consent within such relationships, and to the vices of the more powerful partner. I advance an alternative explanation. Romantic relationships, I argue, are already hazardous in their own right. We are distinctively <jats:italic>exposed to</jats:italic> and <jats:italic>dependent on</jats:italic> our partners, which gives them the ability to interfere with us in significant ways. This makes romantic relationships ripe for what republicans call “domination”—a situation in which one person is vulnerable to the arbitrary interference of another. Romantic partners can avoid this objectionable condition by achieving a rough equality of power, which will prevent either partner from interfering with impunity. However, significant asymmetries of institutional power make this balancing act harder to achieve and, therefore, make domination harder to avoid. Extending the theory of freedom as non‐domination in this way, therefore, not only helps solve a tricky ethical puzzle but also demonstrates the surprising capacity of republican theory to illuminate personal relationships.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148393953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dreams and Paintings: Descartes, Dream Skepticism, and the Constitution of Mental States 《梦与画：笛卡儿、梦的怀疑论与精神状态的构成》
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-07-03 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70143
Mario Schärli
{"title":"Dreams and Paintings: Descartes, Dream Skepticism, and the Constitution of Mental States","authors":"Mario Schärli","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70143","url":null,"abstract":"Contemporary epistemologists typically read Descartes’ dream argument as an argument for external world skepticism. This paper argues that Descartes’ own development of the issues suggests otherwise and enquires into the reasons for this divergence. The Cartesian meditator, it will be shown, resists external world skepticism by substantiating that the objects of dreams depend on the existence of a spatiotemporal world. Based on this reconstruction, it is suggested that the Cartesian development of skepticism embodies a non‐standard conception of epistemology, termed the primacy of the constitutive, according to which epistemic facts and principles are grounded in the constitution of mental states. It is conjectured that this difference explains the divergent conclusions the Cartesian meditator and contemporary epistemologists draw from the dream argument. These results further our understanding of external world skepticism and raise the bar for the dream skeptic.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148371920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Imposing Mind Onto World 将心灵强加于世
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-07-03 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70142
Christopher Frugé
{"title":"Imposing Mind Onto World","authors":"Christopher Frugé","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70142","url":null,"abstract":"We impose our minds onto the world. We create artifacts that reflect our intentions to make them. We make social constructions that mirror our collective agreements. We impress value by our valuing. Discomfort with this power to mold the world in our image has led many to reject such mirroring of mind by world, but this would do away with much of the human realm. Therefore, I offer a realist account of imposition by way of enfolding it within a more general account of how intentional states can produce new intentionally dependent phenomena. Truth arises only due to beliefs determining that certain facts make them true. Desires forge satisfaction by determining that certain occurrences satisfy them. Impositions of mind are made in the same basic way. They are produced due to imposing attitudes determining how they are produced. We should be no more skeptical of imposition than of truth and satisfaction.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148371916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Comparativism About Instrumental Value 关于工具价值的比较主义
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2026-07-03 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70139
J. Dmitri Gallow
{"title":"Comparativism About Instrumental Value","authors":"J. Dmitri Gallow","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70139","url":null,"abstract":"Causal and evidential decision theory each give us a relationship between instrumental rationality and final value. It is less clear what relationship they posit between instrumental rationality and <jats:italic>instrumental</jats:italic> value. Some have argued that evidential decision theory implies a form of nihilism about instrumental value. This form of nihilism says that there's no fact‐of‐the‐matter about what a choice did to help you achieve your ends. In contrast, it has been suggested that causal decision theory supports a form of absolutism about instrumental value. Absolutism says that each choice has some absolute amount of instrumental value. Here, I argue against both nihilism and absolutism and explore a third option, which I call “comparativism.” According to the comparativist, there is a fact about how much more or less helpful your choice was than some alternative choice would have been. But there is no such thing as the amount of helpfulness which your choice has. So there's no absolute quantity of instrumental value. I show that comparativism affords us novel theories of instrumental rationality which avoid problems faced by causal decision theory.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"80 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148371917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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