{"title":"Consciousness Doesn't Do That","authors":"Matthias Michel","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70090","url":null,"abstract":"The question of which mental functions require consciousness has recently come to the forefront because of its relevance for investigating animal consciousness. Finding out that an animal can perform a function associated with consciousness would count as evidence that it has conscious states. I argue that most of the empirical research interpreted as showing that some functions are associated with consciousness fails to show this. Instead, it merely shows that the relevant functions falter when based on degraded sensory signals—which is unsurprising. This issue hinders empirical research on the functions associated with consciousness. I explain how consciousness research can do better when investigating the functions that require consciousness. Until the relevant research is properly carried out, the presence of functions supposedly associated with consciousness in nonhuman animals should not convince the skeptics one bit.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146070174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Illusion of Permissive Balancing","authors":"Jordan Scott","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70089","url":null,"abstract":"The standard view among philosophers of normativity is that practical reasons balance <i>permissively</i> (i.e., when reasons are tied between incompatible actions, either action is rational), while epistemic reasons balance <i>prohibitively</i> (i.e., when reasons are tied between incompatible doxastic attitudes, neither attitude may be rationally formed). Those who disagree, typically epistemic permissivists, think that epistemic reasons behave like reasons for action and that all reasons exhibit permissive balancing. One thing widely agreed on is that a third possibility, that all reasons exhibit prohibitive balancing, is off the table. This paper aims to get that option back on the table. I defend the view that all reasons balance prohibitively, and the apparent permissive balancing of practical reasons is an illusion. What we take to be cases of choosing on the basis of tied practical reasons, actually involve finding extra, tie-breaking, reasons.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"263 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146005860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Distinctness of Objects Near and Far","authors":"Erica Shumener","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70086","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers working on the metaphysics of persistence typically do not extend their views to the distinctness of objects at a single time. I argue that we can provide criteria to distinguish objects across time if and only if we can provide criteria to distinguish objects at a time. Furthermore, I endorse a stronger claim. If either diachronic or synchronic distinctness facts have an analysis, then they have a common analysis. In other words, we should analyze diachronic and synchronic distinctness facts in the same way.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146005863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Zermelian Extensibility","authors":"Andrew Bacon","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70088","url":null,"abstract":"According to an influential idea in the philosophy of set theory, certain mathematical concepts, such as the notion of a well-order and set, are indefinitely extensible. Following Parsons (1983), this has often been cashed out in modal terms. This paper explores instead an extensional articulation of the idea, formulated in higher-order logic, that straightforwardly formalizes some remarks of Zermelo. The resulting picture is incompatible with the idea that the entire universe can be well-ordered, but entirely consistent with the idea that the sets of any set-theoretic universe can be.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"87 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146000837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Gradability of ‘Conscious’","authors":"Andrew Y. Lee, Poppy Mankowitz","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70074","url":null,"abstract":"Are some creatures “more conscious” than others? A number of consciousness researchers have aimed to answer this question. Yet some have claimed that this question does not even make sense. They claim that “conscious” (in the phenomenal sense) never occurs as a <jats:italic>gradable adjective</jats:italic> , meaning an adjective that permits degree expressions (“more <jats:sc>f</jats:sc> than,” “slightly <jats:sc>f</jats:sc> ,” etc.) and that is associated with a degreed property. Both sides face an explanatory burden: they must explain why some competent speakers seem confused about the meaning of “conscious.” We argue that the question does make sense: “conscious” sometimes functions as a minimal‐standard gradable adjective. But we will also explain why some theorists have been skeptical about gradable uses of “conscious.” Along the way, we address the objection that many gradable constructions involving “what it's like” expressions are infelicitous, distinguish two interpretations of “phenomenal consciousness,” and discuss how our semantic arguments bear on the metaphysical question of whether consciousness comes in degrees.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145968448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Beyond Normativity","authors":"Lewis Williams","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70085","url":null,"abstract":"Recent years have seen a growing number of philosophers come to defend normative nihilism. Even if their arguments do not induce in many a belief in normative nihilism, there may be grounds on which to be less than certain about the falsity of normative nihilism. How, then, can we accommodate the possibility of normative nihilism when deliberating about what to do? In this article, I defend two theses. First, I distinguish between normative questions and deliberative questions and argue that the question “what am I to do under uncertainty about the truth of normative nihilism?” is best understood as an example of the latter. Second, I propose a novel framework for deliberation under uncertainty about the truth of normative nihilism: maximize expected decision‐relevance. A striking upshot of this article is that there is an important sense in which we need make no mistake by flouting normative considerations under uncertainty about the truth of normative nihilism.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145897322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Argument From Revelation and the Metaphysics of Properties","authors":"Donnchadh O'Conaill","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70084","url":null,"abstract":"Arguments from revelation against physicalism appeal to the special knowledge of phenomenal properties which one can have on the basis of having experiences. In a nutshell, the idea is that by having experiences one can come to know the nature or essence of certain phenomenal properties and thereby learn that they are not physical. This argument is intuitively appealing, but a proper defense of it against physicalist objections requires exploring the metaphysics of properties in more detail. I shall focus on one physicalist response, Dual Carving, which rests on the idea that there can be distinct concepts each of which reveals the essence of a property. I shall appeal to the essential connection between properties and similarities in specific respects, and to the difference between phenomenal and non‐phenomenal similarities, to undermine this response to arguments from revelation.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145836003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Practical Necessity of the Categories","authors":"Anil Gomes, Andrew Stephenson","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70080","url":null,"abstract":"Kant tells us that we cannot know whether all finite rational beings must share the same forms of sensibility. Can we know whether all finite rational beings must share the same forms of understanding? Recent discussion of this issue has focused on whether Kant thinks this can be decided from the theoretical point of view. But sometimes when knowledge gives out, we must have faith. Our concern in this essay is whether Kant thinks we can settle the question on distinctively practical grounds. We set out and evaluate an argument which would show that we have practical grounds to accept that all finite rational beings must share our forms of understanding. We consider ways in which this argument might be resisted and investigate the implications of the argument for the possibility of deciding the question on theoretical grounds. The connections Kant draws between morality, freedom, and causation show that any account of the kind of knowledge he thinks we can have of the forms of understanding of other finite rational beings must be part of a more general story about Kant's account of the nature and limits of our knowledge of the moral law.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"126 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145836004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Welfare, Connection, and Recognition","authors":"Eden Lin","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70082","url":null,"abstract":"Many philosophers hold that some social condition, such as friendship or reciprocal love, is among the basic goods that contribute to our well‐being. In this paper, I make two contributions to the debate about social basic goods. First, I give a new and better argument for the existence of such a good: that this is part of what best explains why good lives spent in the real world are better, for the people living them, than phenomenologically indistinguishable lives spent inside experience machines. Second, I argue that at least one very minimal and widely instantiated social condition—one much weaker than reciprocal love, friendship, or even the relation that holds between strangers when they enjoy one another's company—is a basic good. I discuss the relative merits of a few promising candidates for these social conditions. One is connection, the condition that obtains whenever two beings are conscious of each other. Another is recognition, the condition that a being is in whenever another being is veridically conscious of it as a conscious being.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145752968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Consequentialism Without Contradiction","authors":"Steph Ingram","doi":"10.1111/phpr.70081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70081","url":null,"abstract":"Consequentialism, in its standard form, violates “ought” implies “can.” This is unacceptable; we must find a new formulation of the theory. I argue against contextualizing “oughts” as a means of solving this problem before discussing a more promising solution, maximalism. I argue that maximalism, while attractive, gives an unsatisfactory picture of what obligations are and why we have them. I defend holism, an alternative that upholds both Ought‐Implies‐Can and the nature of obligation. Lastly, I discuss how this relates to the actualism/possibilism debate, and how the debate can move forward.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145730891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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