{"title":"Remnants of perception: Comments on Block and the function of visual working memory","authors":"Jake Quilty‐Dunn","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13131","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"89 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142869852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Susanna Schellenberg, Andrew J. P. Fink, Carl E. Schoonover, Mary A. Peterson
{"title":"Block on perceptual variation, attribution, discrimination, and adaptation","authors":"Susanna Schellenberg, Andrew J. P. Fink, Carl E. Schoonover, Mary A. Peterson","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13132","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142869846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Taking the simulation hypothesis seriously","authors":"David J. Chalmers","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13122","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"85 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142831888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Simulation scenarios and philosophy","authors":"Peter Godfrey‐Smith","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13124","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142831909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Let's hope we're not living in a simulation","authors":"Eric Schwitzgebel","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13125","url":null,"abstract":"In <jats:italic>Reality+</jats:italic>, David Chalmers suggests that it wouldn't be too bad if we lived in a computer simulation. I argue on the contrary that if we live in a simulation, we ought to attach a significant conditional credence to its being a small or brief simulation. Our existence and the existence of many of the people and things we care about would then unfortunately depend on contingencies difficult to assess and beyond our control. Furthermore, all the badness of the world would appear to reflect the gods’ intentional cruelty or callous disregard. A large, stable rock is a more dependable and less axiologically troubling fundamental ground for reality.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"67 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142841944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Illusory world skepticism","authors":"Susan Schneider","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13123","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"82 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142841945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Précis of Reality+","authors":"David J. Chalmers","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13121","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142841946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pain without inference","authors":"Laurenz Casser","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13134","url":null,"abstract":"A foundational assumption of contemporary cognitive science is that perceptual processing involves inferential transitions between representational states. However, it remains controversial whether accounts of this kind extend to modalities whose perceptual status is a matter of debate. In particular, it remains controversial whether we should attribute inferential mechanisms to the sensory processing underpinning (human) pain experiences. This paper argues that, contrary to recent proposals in the philosophy and science of pain, pain processing is not mediated by inferential transitions. To this end, I show that standard motivations for inferentialism—including appeal to underdetermination, illusion, cue combination, cognitive penetration, perceptual constancy, and invariance—do not carry over to pain. Instead, I suggest that pain's sensory processing may be better characterised as an idiosyncratic form of transduction, distinguishing it both from paradigmatic perceptual modalities and canonical transducers.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142776566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Judging for ourselves","authors":"Justin Khoo","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13133","url":null,"abstract":"Suppose I hear from a trusted friend that <jats:italic>The Shining</jats:italic> is scary. Believing them, I decide not to watch the film. Later, we're talking about the movie and I say, “<jats:italic>The Shining</jats:italic> is scary!” My assertion here is misleading and inappropriate—I misrepresent myself as having seen the film and judged whether it is scary. But why is this? In this paper, I clarify the scope of the observation, discuss existing explanations of it, and argue that they are all lacking. I argue that the observation is best explained as a particular instance of a general norm which holds that authorities should make assertions about matters in their authority only if they have judged those matters for themselves. Along the way, I offer a theory of judgment which distinguishes it from mere belief.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142753174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Against anti‐fanaticism","authors":"Christian Tarsney","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13120","url":null,"abstract":"Should you be willing to forego any sure good for a tiny probability of a vastly greater good? <jats:italic>Fanatics</jats:italic> say you should, <jats:italic>anti‐fanatics</jats:italic> say you should not. Anti‐fanaticism has great intuitive appeal. But, I argue, these intuitions are untenable, because satisfying them in their full generality is incompatible with three very plausible principles: acyclicity, a minimal dominance principle, and the principle that any outcome can be made better or worse. This argument against anti‐fanaticism can be turned into a positive argument for a weak version of fanaticism, but only from significantly more contentious premises. In combination, these facts suggest that those who find fanaticism counterintuitive should favor not anti‐fanaticism, but an intermediate position that permits agents to have incomplete preferences that are neither fanatical nor anti‐fanatical.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142670268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}