{"title":"Determinism, deliberation, and responsibility","authors":"Robert Audi","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13071","url":null,"abstract":"In appraising human actions, an important consideration is whether they are free. If they are compelled, this may be excusatory; if controlled by someone other than the agent, this may mitigate; and if selfishly motivated, this may invalidate excuses. Moral appraisals of action by non‐philosophers do not normally consider whether it can be free under determinism. Metaphysical inquiry about action, by contrast, seems incomplete if it does <jats:italic>not</jats:italic> consider this. Are there two free will problems, one normative and one metaphysical? If so, they share such terms as ‘could’ and ‘could not’, and thoughtful non‐philosophers question their own normative assumptions once they understand the metaphysical problem determinism poses for the philosophy of action. This paper distinguishes metaphysical from action‐theoretic elements of the free will problem but also connects the metaphysical issues with normative questions about responsibility; it critically appraises some major metaphysical arguments concerning free action; and—to the extent possible in a single paper—it provides a positive account of free action neutral toward determinism.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141769065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Indirect evaluative voluntarism","authors":"Alex Horne","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13091","url":null,"abstract":"Is genuine self‐creation – understood as self‐directed value‐acquisition – possible? Many philosophers think not. I disagree. I explain why a recent attempt to solve the problem fails and use it to motivate an alternative proposal: indirect evaluative voluntarism. Indirect evaluative voluntarism is not only well‐suited to explaining how self‐creation is possible; it also unifies two important aspects of our doxastic lives, <jats:italic>viz</jats:italic>. responsibility for the acquisition of both evaluative and non‐evaluative beliefs.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141755150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A causal modeler's guide to double effect reasoning","authors":"Gerard J. Rothfus","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13087","url":null,"abstract":"Trolley problems and like cases are often thought to show the inadequacy of purely consequentialist moral theories. In particular, they are often taken to reveal that consequentialists unduly neglect the moral significance of the <jats:italic>causal structure</jats:italic> of decision problems. To precisify such critiques and one sort of deontological morality they motivate, I develop a formal modeling framework within which trolley problems can be represented as suitably supplemented structural causal models and various consequentialist and double effect‐inspired moral theories can be viewed as disagreeing over the inputs of a common decision rule.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141754711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inquiry for the mistaken and confused","authors":"Arianna Falbo","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13089","url":null,"abstract":"Various philosophers have recently defended norms of inquiry which forbid inquiry into questions which lack true answers. I argue that these norms are overly restrictive, and that they fail to capture an important relationship between inquiry and our position as non‐ideal epistemic agents. I defend a more flexible and forgiving norm: Epistemic Improvement. According to this norm, inquiry into a question is permissible only if it's not rational for one to be sure that by inquiring one won't <jats:italic>improve epistemically</jats:italic> upon the question. This norm illuminates the significant role that inquiry plays in our lives, given our epistemic nonideality, and it also motivates a robust understanding of the value of inquiry, as encompassing epistemic improvements which go beyond figuring out the answers to questions.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141730512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Chance, ability, and control","authors":"Matthew Mandelkern","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13080","url":null,"abstract":"This paper concerns a controversy between two compelling and popular claims in the theory of ability. One is the claim that ability requires control. The other is the claim that success entails ability, that is, that φ‐ing entails that you are able to φ. Since actually φ‐ing obviously does not entail that φ is in your control, these two claims cannot both be true. I introduce a new form of evidence to help adjudicate this controversy: judgments about the possibility and probability of ability ascriptions. I argue that these judgments provide evidence in favor of the thesis that success entails ability, and against the thesis that ability requires control. Moreover, I argue that these judgments support an analysis of ability in terms of conditionals.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141730509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Two concepts of directed obligation","authors":"Brendan de Kenessey","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13083","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that there are two importantly distinct normative relations that can be referred to using phrases like ‘X is obligated to Y,’ ‘Y has a right against X,’ or ‘X wronged Y.’ When we say that I am obligated to you not to read your diary, one thing we might mean is that I am subject to a deontological constraint against reading your diary that gives me a non‐instrumental, agent‐relative reason not to do so, and which you are typically in a unique position to waive with consent. I call this first relation <jats:italic>the constraint relation</jats:italic>. A second thing we might mean is that you are in a position to fittingly hold me personally accountable for reading your diary by demanding that I not read your diary, resenting me if I do so without excuse, and deciding whether to forgive me for this afterwards. I call this second relation <jats:italic>the accountability relation</jats:italic>. Though these two kinds of directed obligation often coincide, I argue that they are extensionally dissociable and play different normative roles. We cannot provide an adequate theory of ‘obligation <jats:italic>to</jats:italic>’ until we recognize that this phrase denotes not one relation, but two.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141448252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to make up your mind","authors":"Joost Ziff","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13079","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops an account of committed beliefs: beliefs we commit to through reflection and conscious reasoning. To help make sense of committed beliefs, I present a new view of conscious reasoning, one of putting yourself in a position to become phenomenally consciously aware of evidence. By doing this for different pieces of evidence, you begin to make your up mind, making conscious reasoning, as such, a voluntary activity with an involuntary conclusion. The paper then explains how we use conscious reasoning in reflection not just to form and change committed beliefs, but to become aware of existing ones. The paper concludes with an explanation of how the limitations of conscious reasoning require us to maintain committed beliefs in a system. It is our maintenance of this system that allows us to knit together individual episodes of conscious reasoning into one enduring performance as a committed systematic believer.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141356324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Infinite inference and mathematical conventionalism","authors":"Douglas Blue","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13084","url":null,"abstract":"We argue that (1) a purported example of an infinite inference we humans can actually perform admits a faithful, finitary description, and (2) infinite inference contravenes any view which does not grant our minds uncomputable powers. These arguments block the strategy, dating back to Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language, of using infinitary inference rules to secure the determinacy of arithmetical truth on conventionalist grounds.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141358415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why better safe than sensitive","authors":"Haicheng Zhao","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13081","url":null,"abstract":"One interesting and potentially attractive feature of the sensitivity account of knowledge is that it not only preserves knowledge of ordinary propositions, but also concedes the skeptic's intuition that we do not know skeptical hypotheses do not obtain. This paper challenges the sensitivity‐based reply to the skeptic, advocated by Robert Nozick, among others. Sensitivity generates an implausibly bizarre result that although we do not know we are not brains in vats (because a belief to this effect is insensitive), a real BIV who is in a much worse epistemic situation can sensitively believe that it is not in the good case. This result reveals a fundamental problem with the sensitivity conditional: its antecedent is not suitable for picking out possibilities that are relevant for our epistemic evaluation. I then offer a systematic explanation of why it is the safety account—the main competitor of sensitivity—that picks out a more suitable set of possibilities. A consequence of this comparison is that the safety account delivers an overall more satisfying reply to the skeptic than sensitivity does.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141381413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Naturalized knowledge‐first and the epistemology of groups","authors":"Alexander Bird","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13082","url":null,"abstract":"This paper commences by making a case for a naturalized approach to knowledge‐first epistemology. On this basis it then goes on to describe and defend a naturalized, functionalist account of group knowledge. It then contrasts this with Jennifer Lackey's (2021) account of the epistemological status of groups.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141378176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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