没有推理的痛苦

IF 1.3 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Laurenz Casser
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引用次数: 0

摘要

当代认知科学的一个基本假设是,知觉加工涉及表征状态之间的推理转换。然而,这种说法是否延伸到有争议的感知状态的模式仍然存在争议。特别是,我们是否应该将推理机制归因于支撑(人类)疼痛体验的感觉处理仍然存在争议。本文认为,与最近关于疼痛的哲学和科学建议相反,疼痛处理不是由推理转换介导的。为此,我证明了推理主义的标准动机——包括对不确定性、幻觉、线索组合、认知渗透、感知恒常性和不变性的呼吁——并不适用于疼痛。相反,我认为疼痛的感觉处理可能被更好地描述为一种特殊形式的转导,将其与范式感知模式和规范转导区分开来。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Pain without inference
A foundational assumption of contemporary cognitive science is that perceptual processing involves inferential transitions between representational states. However, it remains controversial whether accounts of this kind extend to modalities whose perceptual status is a matter of debate. In particular, it remains controversial whether we should attribute inferential mechanisms to the sensory processing underpinning (human) pain experiences. This paper argues that, contrary to recent proposals in the philosophy and science of pain, pain processing is not mediated by inferential transitions. To this end, I show that standard motivations for inferentialism—including appeal to underdetermination, illusion, cue combination, cognitive penetration, perceptual constancy, and invariance—do not carry over to pain. Instead, I suggest that pain's sensory processing may be better characterised as an idiosyncratic form of transduction, distinguishing it both from paradigmatic perceptual modalities and canonical transducers.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.50
自引率
6.70%
发文量
57
期刊介绍: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research publishes articles in a wide range of areas including philosophy of mind, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, and philosophical history of philosophy. No specific methodology or philosophical orientation is required for submissions.
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