{"title":"Regression Discontinuity Designs","authors":"M. D. Cattaneo, J. Escanciano","doi":"10.1146/annurev-economics-051520-021409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051520-021409","url":null,"abstract":"The regression discontinuity (RD) design is one of the most widely used nonexperimental methods for causal inference and program evaluation. Over the last two decades, statistical and econometric methods for RD analysis have expanded and matured, and there is now a large number of methodological results for RD identification, estimation, inference, and validation. We offer a curated review of this methodological literature organized around the two most popular frameworks for the analysis and interpretation of RD designs: the continuity framework and the local randomization framework. For each framework, we discuss three main topics: ( a) designs and parameters, focusing on different types of RD settings and treatment effects of interest; ( b) estimation and inference, presenting the most popular methods based on local polynomial regression and methods for the analysis of experiments, as well as refinements, extensions, and alternatives; and ( c) validation and falsification, summarizing an array of mostly empirical approaches to support the validity of RD designs in practice.","PeriodicalId":47891,"journal":{"name":"Annual Review of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42903292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The International Aspects of Macroprudential Policy","authors":"Kristin J. Forbes","doi":"10.1146/annurev-economics-081020-051248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-081020-051248","url":null,"abstract":"Countries are making more active use of macroprudential tools than in the past with the goal of improving the resilience of their broader financial systems. A growing body of evidence suggests that these tools can accomplish specific domestic goals and should reduce a country's vulnerability to many domestic and international shocks. The evidence also suggests, however, that these policies are not an elixir. They will not insulate economies from volatility, and they generate leakages to the nonbank financial system and spillovers through international borrowing, lending, and other cross-border exposures. Some of these unintended consequences can mitigate the effectiveness of macroprudential policies and generate new vulnerabilities and risks. The COVID-19 crisis provides a lens to evaluate the effectiveness of current macroprudential regulations during a period of extreme market volatility and economic stress. The experience to date suggests that macroprudential tools provide some benefits and should remain a focus of macroeconomic policy, but with realistic expectations about what they can accomplish.","PeriodicalId":47891,"journal":{"name":"Annual Review of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138515129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Macroeconomics of Financial Speculation","authors":"Alp Simsek","doi":"10.1146/annurev-economics-092120-050543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-092120-050543","url":null,"abstract":"I review the literature on financial speculation driven by belief disagreements from a macroeconomics perspective. To highlight unifying themes, I develop a stylized macroeconomic model that embeds several mechanisms. With short-selling constraints, speculation can generate overvaluation and speculative bubbles. Leverage can substantially inflate speculative bubbles, and leverage limits depend on perceived downside risks. Shifts in beliefs about downside tail scenarios can explain the emergence and the collapse of leveraged speculative bubbles. Speculative bubbles are related to rational bubbles, but they match better the empirical evidence on the predictability of asset returns. Even without short-selling constraints, speculation induces procyclical asset valuation. When speculation affects the price of aggregate assets, it also influences macroeconomic outcomes such as aggregate consumption, investment, and output. Speculation in the boom years reduces asset prices, aggregate demand, and output in the subsequent recession. Macroprudential policies that restrict speculation in the boom can improve macroeconomic stability and social welfare.","PeriodicalId":47891,"journal":{"name":"Annual Review of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138515141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Uncertainty Spillovers for Markets and Policy","authors":"Lars Peter Hansen","doi":"10.1146/annurev-economics-082020-054645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-082020-054645","url":null,"abstract":"We live in a world filled with uncertainty. In this essay, I show that featuring this phenomenon more in economic analyses adds to our understanding of how financial markets work and how best to design prudent economic policy. This essay explores methods that allow for a broader conceptualization of uncertainty than is typical in economic investigations. These methods draw on insights from decision theory to engage in uncertainty quantification and sensitivity analysis. Uncertainty quantification in economics differs from uncertainty quantification in most sciences because there is uncertainty from the perspective both of an external observer and of people and enterprises within the model. I illustrate these methods in two example economies in which the understanding of long-term growth is limited. One example looks at uncertainty ramifications for fluctuations in financial markets, and the other considers the prudent design of policy when the quantitative magnitude of climate change and its impact on economic opportunities are unknown.","PeriodicalId":47891,"journal":{"name":"Annual Review of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138519865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Systemic Risk in Financial Networks: A Survey","authors":"Matthew O. Jackson,Agathe Pernoud","doi":"10.1146/annurev-economics-083120-111540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-083120-111540","url":null,"abstract":"We provide an overview of the relationship between financial networks and systemic risk. We present a taxonomy of different types of systemic risk, differentiating between direct externalities between financial organizations (e.g., defaults, correlated portfolios, fire sales), and perceptions and feedback effects (e.g., bank runs, credit freezes). We also discuss optimal regulation and bailouts, measurements of systemic risk and financial centrality, choices by banks regarding their portfolios and partnerships, and the changing nature of financial networks.","PeriodicalId":47891,"journal":{"name":"Annual Review of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138519866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Political Economy of Deep Integration","authors":"Giovanni Maggi,Ralph Ossa","doi":"10.1146/annurev-economics-121020-032425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-121020-032425","url":null,"abstract":"Modern trade agreements no longer emphasize basic trade liberalization but instead focus on international policy coordination in a much broader sense. In this review we introduce the emerging literature on the political economy of such deep integration agreements. We organize our discussion around three main points. First, the political conflict surrounding trade agreements is moving beyond the classic antagonism of exporter interests who gain from trade and import-competing interests who lose from trade. Second, there is a more intense popular backlash against deep integration agreements than there was against shallow integration agreements. Finally, the welfare economics of trade agreements has become more complex, in the sense that the goal of achieving freer trade is no longer sufficient as a guide to evaluating the efficiency of international agreements.","PeriodicalId":47891,"journal":{"name":"Annual Review of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138519868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?","authors":"Alessandra Casella,Antonin Macé","doi":"10.1146/annurev-economics-081720-114422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-081720-114422","url":null,"abstract":"Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, acquiring others’ votes when preferences are strong in exchange for giving votes away when preferences are weak. But is vote trading welfare improving or welfare decreasing? For a practice long believed to be central to collective decisions, the lack of a clear answer is surprising. We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling, the exchange of votes for votes. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions—that is, allowing one to trade votes with oneself only. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions.","PeriodicalId":47891,"journal":{"name":"Annual Review of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138515135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde,Pablo A. Guerrón-Quintana
{"title":"Estimating DSGE Models: Recent Advances and Future Challenges","authors":"Jesús Fernández-Villaverde,Pablo A. Guerrón-Quintana","doi":"10.1146/annurev-economics-081020-044812","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-081020-044812","url":null,"abstract":"We review the current state of the estimation of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. After introducing a general framework for dealing with DSGE models, the state-space representation, we discuss how to evaluate moments or the likelihood function implied by such a structure. We discuss, in varying degrees of detail, recent advances in the field, such as the tempered particle filter, approximated Bayesian computation, Hamiltonian Monte Carlo, variational inference, and machine learning. These methods show much promise but have not been fully explored by the DSGE community yet. We conclude by outlining three future challenges for this line of research.","PeriodicalId":47891,"journal":{"name":"Annual Review of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138519892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Helicopter Tour of Some Underlying Issues in Empirical Industrial Organization","authors":"Ariel Pakes","doi":"10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-023513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-023513","url":null,"abstract":"This review considers conceptual issues underlying empirical work on markets. It is divided in three parts. The first part reviews the analysis of demand and equilibrium in retail markets and then considers recent advances in the analysis of markets that require different assumptions: markets where adverse selection and moral hazard may be important, vertical markets with bargaining, and markets wherein a centralized allocation mechanism replaces prices. The second part considers the analysis of cost and production. It reviews the simultaneity and selection issues in production function estimation and then considers the distinction between revenue- and quantity-generating functions and its implications for the analysis of markups, as well as the empirical analysis of fixed costs and its implications for the analysis of product repositioning. The review concludes by considering issues that arise due to the complexity of the empirical analysis of market dynamics and appropriate ways of dealing with them.","PeriodicalId":47891,"journal":{"name":"Annual Review of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138515131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Choice in Insurance Markets: A Pigouvian Approach to Social Insurance Design","authors":"Nathaniel Hendren,Camille Landais,Johannes Spinnewijn","doi":"10.1146/annurev-economics-090820-111716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-090820-111716","url":null,"abstract":"Should choice be offered in social insurance programs? This review presents a conceptual framework that identifies the key forces determining the social value of offering choice. We show that the value of offering choice is higher the larger the variation in individual valuations for extra insurance is, but it gets reduced by both selection on risk and selection on moral hazard. Besides adverse selection, the implementation of choice-based policies is further challenged by the presence of choice frictions or the obligation to offer basic uncompensated care. All these inefficiencies can be seen as externalities that do not rationalize the absence of providing choice per se but point to the need for regulatory policies and suggest the potential value of corrective pricing à la Pigou. Applying this framework to the existing evidence on these forces in the context of unemployment insurance, we find that offering insurance choice can be valuable even in the presence of significant adverse selection. We conclude by showing how this framework can constitute a fruitful guide for further empirical research in different insurance domains.","PeriodicalId":47891,"journal":{"name":"Annual Review of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138519875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}